AHC: Strong post-war Royal Navy?

[PSL]

They wouldn't and more appropriately they couldn't. This is in response to your assertion back in the thread that the RN situation is hopeless as they needed 48 (?) fighters on a single carriet to deal with the worst case scenario of 50 Tu95s which would be the entire ABMF fleet at the time.

However that website shows that the theat isn't from the entire AVMF fleet but from 4 missile divisions in 3 basing areas. While the squadrons and regiments in these 3 base areas can be moved around there are limits to this so a division is likely to only ever have 3 regiments at the expense of another division. This makes the RNs assumptions like 2 carrers as a tactical unit with 32 fighters, and 4 sea dart escorts plus the missiles on the carrers a valid assessment, and their situation nit hopeless.

Then the situation is worse than hopeless. The American exercises show the bombers getting through to the fleet and hitting up to 1/3 of the ships. CAP could only be expected to 'down' 1/3 of the attacking bombers and escorts ended up 'on their own'. If you can't intercept these bombers -then you have to contend with many more missiles ...a target that's much harder to destroy than a bomber. Worse their maybe just as many missiles launched from SSGN & missile cruisers. Combined , that could mean as many as 100 missiles launched in coordinated strike on any one battle group/convoy.

 

[Riain]

2) Role - what is the point of this?

1948 to 1956-57 to re-fight WW2. the strategy was to have a lot of escorts and light carriers for trade protection and the RN was totally reliant on mobilisation to get huge numbers of people and refit a lot of escorts.

1957 to 1966 conventional tripwire to a nuclear WW3 and fighting limited wars, mostly East of Suez. The strategy was for powerful carrier strike and amphibious forces.

1966-68 the same as above but with a reduction for the EoS role by 1975.

1968-1981 more of an effort into fighting a conventional WW3 before it goes nuclear, immediate and rapid withdrawal EoS and rundown of the carrier and amphibious force

1981-1982 as above, but with more limited focus on ASW and 'administrative' amphibious capability.

1982-1991 move back to more like the 1968-81 policy/strategy.

1) Money - can the UK afford this?

Not with the OTL Defence policy/strategy, particularly with the chopping and changing in 1966-68 and 1981-82. In addition some bad strategic decisions (in terms of long term procurement) and procurement decisions like the rebuilds of Victorious and Tiger.

For example if the strategy in the 1948-56 WW3 mobilisation period wasn't escorts and light carriers for trade protection but offensive forces like fleet carriers and amphibious force the transition into the tripwire WW3/EoS would be easier. Similarly if the Vic rebuild included new boilers in the first teardown then a 2nd WW2 carrier could have been rebuilt or Ark finished for the same money as was spent on the double Vic teardown.*

Another example is the transition from EoS to a NATO role, this was done in a particularly damaging way and a one step process could have allowed Britain to do this transition with much more capability that would be useful to NATO.


*do people know this? That the Vic was torn down to the hangar deck and rebuilt back up to the fight deck and island, then it was discovered that the boilers were screwed so it was torn down to the hangar deck again, new machinery was installed and rebuilt to the new angled deck design, which is why it took 8 years.

 

[Zen9]

Then the situation is worse than hopeless. The American exercises show the bombers getting through to the fleet and hitting up to 1/3 of the ships. CAP could only be expected to 'down' 1/3 of the attacking bombers and escorts ended up 'on their own'. If you can't intercept these bombers -then you have to contend with many more missiles ...a target that's much harder to destroy than a bomber. Worse their maybe just as many missiles launched from SSGN & missile cruisers. Combined , that could mean as many as 100 missiles launched in coordinated strike on any one battle group/convoy.

Previouslyyou have suggested that these exercises showed overwhelming of CDS and Type 984 equipped carrier. Which wasn't available until 1959 at the earliest and more plausibly after 1960.

But you then cited this happening BEFORE any such equipped carrier was available. What is your source of this claim?

 

[Zen9]

We are not speaking of wasting hundreds of millions of pounds developing ineffective AAA gun systems that barely saw any service.

And it is much better to confuse the issue of missile and gun budgets than carrier and missile budgets.

 

[Riain]

Then the situation is worse than hopeless. The American exercises show the bombers getting through to the fleet and hitting up to 1/3 of the ships. CAP could only be expected to 'down' 1/3 of the attacking bombers and escorts ended up 'on their own'. If you can't intercept these bombers -then you have to contend with many more missiles ...a target that's much harder to destroy than a bomber. Worse their maybe just as many missiles launched from SSGN & missile cruisers. Combined , that could mean as many as 100 missiles launched in coordinated strike on any one battle group/convoy.

A few things in there.

The exercises that showed that 1/3 of the bombers could get through didn't result in the USN being shut down in favour of buying a white flag. The result was to adopt new technologies, tactics and other things to mitigate against this danger.

If the Russians can fly missions with 3 missiles on their bombers their bases are within Buccaneer/A6-A7 range, so that is a way to mitigate against the 100 missile bomber attacks. Personally I doubt they'd want to launch attacks at ranges where only 1 missile can be carried, the success rates would be too low with such a weak attack. I think the 2 missile range would be the most likely form of attack: too far for the carriers to attack bases but enough missiles to get good result.

Close cooperation between bombers and SSGNs would be too difficult, but wider cooperation within say half a day is likely. The USN and RN know this, they have their own SSNs and aircraft to learn the art of the possible, and can again use technologies and tactics to mitigate against this threat.

The RN assumed that a Type 82 could deal with an attack of 5 closely spaced aircraft. Another assumption was that it would be as effective as a CAP of 8 Phantoms, I assume that means a pair of Phantoms on station 24 hours a day and any pair could take on 5 closely spaced aircraft. That means that a well placed Type 82 could take out 1/4 of an AVMF regimental attack on its own.

 

[Riain]

Previouslyyou have suggested that these exercises showed overwhelming of CDS and Type 984 equipped carrier. Which wasn't available until 1959 at the earliest and more plausibly after 1960.

But you then cited this happening BEFORE any such equipped carrier was available. What is your source of this claim?

I once read a paper ages ago, so long ago that I didn't really understand the significance, that the maths of the E1 AEW detection and the F8 time to height, speed and tail-chase attack with sidewinders paradigm meant that interceptions were unlikely.

However the range of the E2's radar range and the Phantom's time to height, speed and head-on attack with sparrows made interception likely again.

 

[Zen9]

That's likely against the post '63 anti-ship missiles displayed at Tushino.
Now they had to intercept at over 100nm. Hence TFX with Pheonix AAMs.

And that's why the RAN looked at an Essex modernised with F4.

 

[PSL]

The info comes from Friedman NETWORKCENTRIC WARFARE. This time line here is confusing. The 1970s Sea Dart and CVA-01 are not consistent with 1950s CDS & Type 984 Radar intercept technology. The statement was the new tech didn't solve the basic problem that each controller could barely handle a few targets at a time. Anything more than a dozen threats at once would overwhelm the CAP and the battle group air defence , leaving every one to fend for themselves. The Americans solved this with digital network through NTDS which increased reaction time from analogue with 1-2 targets engaged over several minutes down to 5 digital targets in 1/2 minute.

 

[Riain]

How many consoles and operators are there in a Task Force of 2 carriers and 4 or 5 Type 82 DLGs? My guess is that in those 7 ships there would be close to 40 consoles and operators. Then there's the 4 operators aloft in the 2 Gannet AWE3s.

I always thought that the bottleneck was illumination channels for the SAMs, rather than how many targets can be tracked.

 

[Zen9]

Not a bad summary of the CDS on Wiki

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comprehensive_Display_System

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

OTL

Metropolitan Vickers received its first contract for a marine gas turbine in 1943.

MGB2009 was fitted with one Metrovick G.1 Gatric, but it's unclear whether trials began in 1945 or 1947. AFAIK this was based on the Company's F.2 jet engine. According to Navypaedia she now produced 5,200 shp, but it is unclear if that is the G.1 alone or in combination with the 2 Paxman diesels.

Next were the Bold class fast attack craft, Bold Pioneer and Bold Pathfinder. According to Navypaedia, both were laid down in 1950, launched in 1951 and completed in 1953. They initially they had 2 Metrovick G.2 gas turbines and two Mercedes diesels, but the latter were replaced by a pair of Delitcs. AFAIK the G.2 was also based on the Metrovick F.2 gas turbine. According to Navypaedia the G.2 produced 4,500 shp.

Back in 1946 it appears that English Electric and Rolls Royce were both awarded contracts for marine gas turbines. The resulting EL60 and RM60 seem to have been in the 6,000 shp class.

The RM60 was fitted to the steam gunboat Grey Goose and trials seem to have taken place between 1952 and 1956. Although the trials were successful the RM60 did not become an operational engine.

Meanwhile plans to fit the EL60 to the frigate Hotham were abandoned in 1952 because of problems with the prototype ashore.

2 Brave class fast attack craft were launched in 1958 and completed in 1960. They used 3 Bristol Proteus gas turbines producing 3,500 each.

Next we have the 7 Type 81 frigates laid down 1958-60 and completed 1961-64 and the 8 County class destroyers laid down 1959-66 and completed 1962-70. Both had combined steam and gas (COSAG) machinery. The gas was provided by the G.6 gas turbine producing 7,500 shp, but it was built by AEI, not Metrovick.

The Type 14 frigate Exmouth was taken in hand for gas turbine trials in 1966. She was fitted with an Olympus rated at 15,000 shp and two Proteus engines rated at 3,500 shp each. The arrangement was called Combined Gas on Gas (COGOG) because the Olympus and Proteus engines could not be run at the same time. She rejoined the fleet in 1968.

TTL

The trials of the G.1 aboard MGB2009 and the G.2 aboard the Bold class continue as OTL.

However, Metrovick receives a contract to develop a marine version of its F.9 Sapphire engine in 1946 in place of the OTL contract awarded to Rolls Royce. Trials of the Marine Sapphire take place on Grey Goose 1952-56.

In 1946 Bristol receives contracts to develop marine versions of the Proteus and BE.10 Olympus in place of the contract awarded to English Electric.

A pair of fast attack craft fitted with three Proteus engines is ordered from Vosper at the same time as the Bold class for competitive trials. These ships are effectively the Brave class brought forward about 10 years. The two prototype Proteus boats were successful enough for 18 production boats to be built instead of the OTL Dark class, which had Deltic diesels.

HMS Hotham or another suitable ship was fitted with one Olympus and two Proteus engines. Trials began in 1953. These were effectively the Exmouth trials brought forward 15 years.

By about 1955 the results of the trials being conducted by Grey Goose and Hotham were successful enough for the Admiralty to decide to build a fast frigate with COGOG machinery. Full power was to be provided by either two Olympus or Sapphire engines up-rated to about 25,000shp. The cruising engines were to be marine versions of the Bristol Orion (first run 1956) or Rolls Royce Tyne (first run 1955).

The winners were the Bristol Olympus and RR Tyne. The research and development was paid for with the money spent on the G.6 IOTL.

A grand total of 42 Type 20 frigates were built for the Royal Navy in place of the OTL Rothesay, Tribal and Leander classes. Type 20 was effectively a gas turbine powered Leander because it carried the same armament and sensors. All other things being equal 9 would be exported (2 Chile, 3 SAN and RNZN), while the Dutch and Indians would build 6 each in their own yards. However, I'm not sure if the Australians would build 2 in place of their final pair of Type 12s.

The TTL County class would still have COSAG machinery, but the quartet of G.6 gas turbines would be replaced by a pair of Olympus engines.

Note
Some of the OTL dates may not be 100% accurate.

I think we might be able to do better than that.

I think that I have been too prudent with the Marine Sapphire. I had the Sapphire trials on Grey Goose take place at the same time as the trials of the RM60 on Grey Goose. However, the OTL RM60 was a new design, whereas the Sapphire was already under development. Therefore, I think there's a reasonable chance that it would be ready for sea trials a year or two earlier than RM60. I also think that the Bold class would have had one or two Marine Sapphires instead of the pair of G.2 gas turbines fitted IOTL.

Meanwhile a pair prototype of Marine Proteus engines had been fitted to a sister of MGB2009. Trials began in 1948 or 1949. The trials were early enough and successful enough for a class of 30 boats powered by 3 Marine Proteus engines to be built. That is 18 in place of the Dark class already mentioned and 12 in place of the preceding Gay class.

However, I think my initial estimate of having sea trial of the Marine Olympus begin in 1953 is about right and that it won't be possible to put an operational warship with Olympus-Tyne machinery into service before 1960.

 

[Zen9]

I would suggest that having chosen the marine Sapphire and considering how far that could be developed, it is questionable to fund the marine Olympus.

I'd also ponder the government funding for the Gyron. Having found the benefits of marine GT's, it's arguable they'd extend the effort behind DH's steel monster.
This would mate in a logical fashion as Sapphires develop to 20,000shp. An Olympus from 20,000shp to 30,000shp is not much further. While on reflection I'd argue that the Gyron could start closer 30,000shp and reach for 40,000shp.

However in this GT effort might parallel the process of getting Brakemine GAP into service. In fact it seems the decision to take missiles away from artillery is fairly questionable and centers on one individual. Prior to that there was a process to develop a Guided Artillery Projectile Directorate and focused at Westcott Arsenal as the Royal Projectile Factory.

 

[Schlock]

A CVA-01 with a COSAG plant built around Gyron/YARD type machinery would mean that the carrier would be able to make full speed on the Gas Turbines alone while using the steam from the four YARD boilers to generate the steam for the catapults.

There would also be the temptation for the design to grow a bit to make use of that excess power as well, maybe ending up a bit bigger than the OTL CVA-01 design.

 

[Riain]

They could have gone to 58,000t but above 54,000t they needed 4 shafts which drove up costs considerably for little operational benefit. If sufficient trunking could be found for 8 GTs then the RN might have a big carrier on the cheap.

 

[Zen9]

4 Gyron? Say reaching 40,000shp for a total of 160,000shp. Tynes for a total of 20,000shp?
Or Steam either Y100 or YEAD 1 for 10,000shp or 30,000shp each.
4 sets for Y300 or just 2 for YEAD1.

But pulling steam out of propulsion ought to save 50-100 personnel.

Shafts and props are fine for such figures.
A ship between 40-60,000tons is reasonable. Drydock limitations still apply.

Self defence SAM Brakemine or Brakemine successor.

Search set based on electro-mechanical scanning, ADA CMS.

 

[PMN1]

They could have gone to 58,000t but above 54,000t they needed 4 shafts which drove up costs considerably for little operational benefit. If sufficient trunking could be found for 8 GTs then the RN might have a big carrier on the cheap.

If you use the approach used by the current QE class then trunking becomes less of an issue.

 

[StevoJH]

Is there any difference between IEP and Turbo-Electric? Because i’m Failing to see one.

That could definitely be an option as long as powerful enough turbines can be designed and built. If not, then the turbines themselves will take up a lot of space.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I would suggest that having chosen the marine Sapphire and considering how far that could be developed, it is questionable to fund the marine Olympus.

I'd also ponder the government funding for the Gyron. Having found the benefits of marine GT's, it's arguable they'd extend the effort behind DH's steel monster.
This would mate in a logical fashion as Sapphires develop to 20,000shp. An Olympus from 20,000shp to 30,000shp is not much further. While on reflection I'd argue that the Gyron could start closer 30,000shp and reach for 40,000shp.

However in this GT effort might parallel the process of getting Brakemine GAP into service. In fact it seems the decision to take missiles away from artillery is fairly questionable and centers on one individual. Prior to that there was a process to develop a Guided Artillery Projectile Directorate and focused at Westcott Arsenal as the Royal Projectile Factory.

I think the British aerospace companies should have been forced to merge into larger units at the end of the 1940s instead of the end of the 1950s. So, for example, Armstrong-Siddeley and Bristol Aero Engines would have become Bristol Siddeley Engines (BSE) in 1949 instead of 1959.

In that situation and with what you wrote about the development potential of the Sapphire in mind, would it have been better to cancel the Olympus completely in 1950 and concentrate the resources released on developing the Sapphire?

It might help the RAF logistically if the Vulcan Mk 1 and Victor Mk 1 had Sapphire engines instead of only the Victor.

Might more powerful versions of the Sapphire be available for aviation and marine applications in the late 1950s ITTL? E.g. could all the Mk 1 Victors and Vulcans be built to Mk 2 standard ITTL?

However, later on it means no Olympus for the TSR2 and Concorde. Could the Sapphire be developed that far?

 

[Zen9]

No I think they are complimentary engines, Bristol never got much traction with any conceptual competitor to the Avon. Merging with AS would give them a wider spectrum of engines.....though it would also give them Orpheus and Adder, which means dominance over small jet engines.

 

[Riain]

Leaving aside carriers for the moment, if the Type 82 and not the T21 was the RNs first class of warship without steam, and thus without the long and expensive refits would that change the equation enough during the 1965 defence review? The numbers of ships required was arrived at by starting with 2 carriers as the standard tactical unit, what it took to defend such ships at sea, a few other odd jobs such as sub hunts and refuelling and then adding 1/3 for the steam power-plant driven long refit schedule. If you only have to add 1/4 or even 1/5 more ships because GTs are repair by replacement and removing those fixed big spending decision points around the steam overhauls then the Treasury can't say that the real cost of CVA01 is actually 500 million pounds for a 2nd carrier and 8 Type 82s because the requirement is only 5 or 6 Type 82s making at 450 million or whatever.