AHC: Make Sealion very unlikely

[ScrewySqrl]

Wouldn't a zeppelin be relatively easy to hit with a WW2 AA-gun?
And they're highly flammable too.

AA Arty, yes. And the flammability of Hindenburg was the paint more than the hydrogen. Not that hydrogen isn't flammable, but paint made out of Thermite worsened the situation.

the tactical goal is putting everything that can fly to protect the zeps to achieve a local, temporary air superiority long enough to unload your cargo. the whole RAF is gonna come play too.

Its not perfect, but it ups success chances from 0 to maybe 25-30%

I haven't done a story with this yet, because this also basically gives you a slower version of Airmobile cavalry 25 years early, with knock-on effects from invading Poland forward, if not sooner.

 

[RodentRevolution]

AA Arty, yes. And the flammability of Hindenburg was the paint more than the hydrogen. Not that hydrogen isn't flammable, but paint made out of Thermite worsened the situation.

the tactical goal is putting everything that can fly to protect the zeps to achieve a local, temporary air superiority long enough to unload your cargo. the whole RAF is gonna come play too.

Its not perfect, but it ups success chances from 0 to maybe 25-30%

I haven't done a story with this yet, because this also basically gives you a slower version of Airmobile cavalry 25 years early, with knock-on effects from invading Poland forward, if not sooner.

You realise that a Zeppelin with a cargo capacity of 100 tonnes is going to be *4%£$^**^ huge? Also not good in a storm.

 

[ScrewySqrl]

You realise that a Zeppelin with a cargo capacity of 100 tonnes is going to be *4%£$^**^ huge? Also not good in a storm.

It'd be about the same size as Hindenburg, maybe a a bit longer. (Hindenburg's gondola was about 100 tons fully loaded)

 

[Barry Bull]

AA Arty, yes. And the flammability of Hindenburg was the paint more than the hydrogen. Not that hydrogen isn't flammable, but paint made out of Thermite worsened the situation.

the tactical goal is putting everything that can fly to protect the zeps to achieve a local, temporary air superiority long enough to unload your cargo. the whole RAF is gonna come play too.

Its not perfect, but it ups success chances from 0 to maybe 25-30%

I haven't done a story with this yet, because this also basically gives you a slower version of Airmobile cavalry 25 years early, with knock-on effects from invading Poland forward, if not sooner.

The Zeps would be so vulnerable to weather and RAF, the plan is worse than the original Sealion plan.

 

[DerWonderWaffles]

The main impossibility for Sea Lion isn't landing troops to begin with - that's difficult, but the odds were heavily against the French being rolled up so quickly, too. An epic disaster at Dunkirk, featuring heavy losses by the RAF and Royal Navy due to panic-driven stupidity and Lady Luck sleeping with the Reich (she pretty much was already...) might have given that opening.

The real impossibility is supplying the troops. Sea Lion involved using completely unsuitable craft - most notably river barges - that just can't survive repeated trips across the Channel, and no matter how badly mauled the Royal Navy is locally, there's far more than enough ships in foreign waters to retake the Channel. If we accept 'success' as "Panic the British to the point that they come to the negotiating table," though, then supplying the troops long term isn't required.

What if they had Marinefahrprahm landing craft?

Compared to the barges, they could go double the speed (7-8 knots), were more than seaworthy for use, and could actually be landed upon a beach and return back multiple times before being needed to fuel again.

Unlike the barges, which they planned to stop a few hundred feet away from the sea and just throw everything in the water.It is so hard not to laugh with what they were thinking when it came to the barges. That to me was the biggest blunder of the plan.

Granted it won't make it succeed. But hey, I can see it making its chances increase more likely.

 

[steamboy]

The problem with building landing craft is that it will alarm everyone in the baltic and make the UK narrow its eyes. Also the Germans would have to be prescient.

Germany is a land power (largely) and its got France and the Low Countries to the West and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to the East. Building landing craft pre-war serves what purpose? The Germans are not going to carry out a landing on the French coast because Denmark, Holland and Belgium are kind of in the way first. They can't launch an attack directly at France because Maginot Line shaped shredder is sitting there. So they HAVE to attack the low countries.

But then they also HAVE to know that Sickle Cut WILL work and won't be the huge throw of a dice that it was. And then they also have to know that Belgium and Holland will fall and the British army will loose most of its equipment and withdraw and so on and so on, and again this requires prescience or future knowledge. We can write 'if they armed them with Fruit cakes then sure! it would have worked!' because we have nearly 80 years of knowledge on the War and can write with hindsight. At the time, they couldn't know that all this would work, all this would happen and so forth.

They also HAVE to know that upon seeing these ships or learning of them that you're building pre-war for NO reason, that the UK won't get its knickers in a twist and trying to go to Sweden, Finland, Norway and Denmark and the UK as well as Estonia etc and say "Yeaah they are...car...ferries..armed to deal with..Pirates in the Baltic?" isn't going to fool anyone.

So pre WW2 the Germans have to know exactly what is going to happen in the future in regards to OTL, and that once France has fallen in a shockingly fast period of time, (which they couldn't have counted on) and have a stockpile of ships built for landing troops built up and hanging around without a purpose for years as well as learning how to use them, getting practice in Beach landings etc. Again, for NO REASON WHAT SO EVER! HONEST!!! Whilst everyone else ignores these ships and just carries on exactly as per OTL.

this is where improving upon sealion basically falls apart. Sure you could have the Germans build up a HUGE amphibious force from the mid 30's onwards, complete with a simple LST and all the shenanigans, and have them practice landings until they feel confident with them. At which point the UK is going "Okay..why are you doing this?" that panicked sweat you can smell is Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland shitting collective bricks, whilst France is happy with you diverting all these resources into something that won't affect them in any way, shape or form. And then you've got to get the countries that would be attacked by Germany to not just lick the lead paint, but grind up pure lead and start snorting it by the metric fuckton and have them do noooooooooooooothing.

Changing X to improve Y will affect A, B, C and R.

Carrying out a seaborn invasion isn't just a case of

A - Load men into boats
B - Land men on beach.
C - Gott in himmel!
D - Victory!

Its why a lot of techwanks unless done right are just sigh worthy, especially when you try to pass it off as being not ASB.

"In 1937 the Germans decide to build the VK*insert number and letter here* as their main tank with a long 75mm gun at first with others having the 88mm gun arriving in 1939!"

"Okay, what's the driver for this? Why have they gone from the Panzer 3 and its 37mm gun which was the main tank of the Panzerwaffe to this, by the standards of the times HUGE tank, that's massive overkill?"

"Because!"

"No, sorry old chap, going to need more than that."

"Just because okay!"

They won't just go "Hey we need a tank that looks suspiciously like a tiger II." for no reason in the 30's there simply wasn't a need for such a monster, the Panzer III was one of the worlds better tanks at the time There's simply no need to suddenly disrupt their production schedule and make a massive new tank with a gun thats so absurd overkill against its opponents that its almost comical. To do something like a "We need an amphibious assault craft!" you need a 'driver', something that pushes it forwards. And unless you know that France and the Low Countries is going to fall in 6 weeks, you don't divert resources to something that might well worry some neighbours and also tip off your opponents.

If you want a good example of a story that is basically a bit of a tech wank but without it being a "JAH! ALL OVER MY FACE!!!" tit job from Guderian and co, have a look at

https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/ahc-peerless-air-ministry.445025/

Here the tech changes are within the constraints of reality and without it being a blatant wank. That's how you make a story work. Its not a case of "Suddenly the RAF has Hawker Tempest II's in 1939 waiting for the Luftwaffe!" the changes are within reason, and are beset by problems in training, production etc. Stories like this are how you do a decent tech change/improvement. Also see

https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...-reap-the-whirlwind-story-only-thread.343760/

As a tour de force in how to do a tech change story well. Because even with the main character being a man who has our level of hindsight, he runs into the realities of things, industrial problems, beuaracratic obstructionism etc, poor leadership and management etc etc. And the battles to get things done and changed which he knows WILL work, are often struggles against the most bitter of opposition.

The Germans suddenly building landing craft, in the baltic, in the 30's literally makes NO sense. Who's your target? Why are you wasting resources on them on the off chance that when you beat france you can threaten the UK that you can't possibly know will happen without hindsight or being able to see the future.

 

[RodentRevolution]

It'd be about the same size as Hindenburg, maybe a a bit longer. (Hindenburg's gondola was about 100 tons fully loaded)

You can save weight on fuel and you want to save weight on structure and you don't expect these things to fold like paper at the first lateral breeze....or the sudden upwards lift when you unpack a 100 tonnes from them? That will mean dumping a lot of hydrogen which means tanking up for a long old while on the return home.

PS the deadweight for the Hindenburg was 118 tonnes, as I thought you are stripping out the entire internal structure not just the gondola, all up fully laden it massed in at a shade under 216 tonnes, of which 62 tonnes was sufficient fuel and oil for a trans-Atlantic trip which is really the one area you can save weight here.

Remember though when you load 100 tonnes of cargo aboard you will need to add structure in order to be able to bear its concentrated weight.

 

[TDM]

I'll go with my wildly "out there" proposition:

Instead of building the 4 big battleships (Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Bismark, Tirpitz), that steel goes into making ~200 bare-bones cargo Zeppelins each with ~100 tons carrying capacity, also develop a paint for the canvas that isn't basically thermite.

thats enough for a 30 minute jaunt from Calais to Dover. stack the entire luftwaffe over the zeps and drop 5 divisions per trip (every 3-4 hours).

An airborne division or two seizes an airport for the zeps to land.

still plenty of potential for trouble, but it does bypass the #1 problem: the Royal Navy

OK so I love zeps but you going to have a few problems

Zeppelins where not the most maneuverable responsive things in general I can't help but think a bare bones version will be worse. A fleet of 200 of them is insanely huge, any air field that can handle 200 of them even just taking off and landing let alone supporting infrastructure is going to be huge (and thus vulnerable) or a series of air field spread out (and vulnerable and increase transit time). Especially as even the hindenburg could manage at tops 80mph. Calais to Dover might be 30 mins in theory at slower cruising speed, but take off and landing will add significant time to that. Take off and landing will also be when this fleet is at it#s most vulnerable, and given there's 200 of them plus the supporting LW, they are going to be pretty easy to see coming.

Then of course you've chosen Dover, possibly because it's the shortest distance to calais, only say you park 200 zeps outside Dover what then? (i'm not even sure there's suitable ground to do this, so you might be going further inland). You also mention an airport only Dover doesn't have one, I guess you thinking close RAF airfields or the like?


Trying to get a flotilla of 200 of these things to take off, form up, travel together across the channel and then land is going to be virtually impossible for even the best crews.

On which even if we assume we can shave off 50% of the crew needs on the bare bones version compared to hindenburg you talking about 4,000 trained crew to fly 200 (and you'll want spare crew) let alone ground crew etc. That's a lot of specialised people.

On the LW protecting. Yeah you need them to protect them only trying to protect a flotilla that's slowing lifting off, travelling and landing is gong to be hard. In order to protect them even at their max of 80 mph they going to have basically form up and maintain a defensive lufbery circle, just to keep pace and position. This will make them vulnerable in terms of air combat as they're basically static, so their choice will stay in position to protect the zeps but get shot down, or engage thus increasing their own survival but leaving the zeps vulnerable.

There is going to be lots of AA in SE england at this time, also if you do decide to land all these in a large field just outside Dover, chances are the RN is going to shell the landing zone as well, and pretty soon the RAF bomber wing will be bombing it as well.

 

[NoMommsen]

...

The Germans suddenly building landing craft, in the baltic, in the 30's literally makes NO sense. Who's your target? Why are you wasting resources on them on the off chance that when you beat france you can threaten the UK that you can't possibly know will happen without hindsight or being able to see the future.

I would like to be even more daring :

- not building them in the 30's (or only to a less extent)
but
- building/developing them in the 20's already​

I think @DerWonderWaffles question is also about the ability of the germans to build landingcrafts at that point of time - after the defeat of France - at all. This ability was ... rather low, as historical there were only some "Pferdeboot" from pre- and war-time of WW 1 as well as the PioneerLandingBoat 39, according to "The Gröner" first developed in 1938. Both serving and/or intended 'only' for the purpose of getting heavies material for Marine-Corps pioneers ashore.

However, there was a time when the then Reichsmarine embarked on an "emergency-program" for fast and cheap to be built marine, mainly shore-base assets but also some more high-sea capable ships. They didn't actually wanted them to have been built aside some 'type'-models or testing samples, but to have their plans ready in time of need.
This "emergency" R&D-program began some fes days into February 1923 ... Ruhr-occupation ... when the Reichsmarine had to acknowledge, that they had virtually nothing to defend whatever german coast. ... and that this situation would stay that way for some dearly long time, at least too long a time.
The probably more known 'fruits' out of this program were the S-Boote or 'E-Boats', in the 20's running under names like USZ or similar, several types of "Vorpostenboote", naval trawlers and "Kriegsfischkutter", which's plans all originated in the early 20's.

One of the mayor problems the young Reichswehr had was defending East-Prussia, cut of communication and transportation line by the polish corridor -> how in heavens name then to get troops there ? ... especially if Danzig might very likely also be cut of by polish forces ?
Kind of similar problem was ventilated by the Reichswehr reagrding some enemys attacks together with landings in Pommerania (guess who ? ... naah, I mean Revolutionary Russia - and Poland), How to get troops into tzheir back ?
The OTL 'solution' was to bring the rotten old Pre-Dreads in service as escorts for troop transports. ... though essentially only part of the prob. The troops have somehow to reach the beach. IOTL the transporters dinghys and the like were/had to be rendered sufficient.


Now , let's assume - as a pod - that there is some more 'pressure' towards the Reichsmarine esp. to develop such capacity of landing troops in East-Prussia and/or Pommerania in case of a at that time rather probable war-cases ?
And landing-craft, of higher capacity, better sea-worthyness are included into the mentioned emergency-R&D-program of 1923 ?
What you need for a mass-production of such crfats you need - beside some yards (in that case even the smallest would be capable) - the contruction drawings at hand and some type-boats as models.

That way you might have in the late 30's some 'car'- or 'horse'-ferries operating in german coastal waters, across the Stettin, Vistula or Curonian Lagoon in form of the Marinefährprahm or for further like towards Scandinavia or Gotland something similar to the japanese No.101 or SS-class landing ships. Over the years further developed in some small steps, optimized for the intended mass-production.

And in 1939 when planning of whatever campaigns become pressing ... there might be some ideas for these to be used, not only in a Norway-operation but maybe also against - as 'proposesd' - an operation for the Netherlands etc.
The ability would then be there, probably building would start only summer/late 1939, so not much available in time for Weserübung, but ... with production comming 'online' ... there might be a consideral number be availabe in late 1940 and even more in 1941.

edit :
I forgot : the shipping-troops-to-East-Prussia-story would/could be usable everytime to explain some amphibious capacity of the german Baltic-Sea part of navy.

But ... ofc the James Bonds of this time would smell the fish already in 1929 and take according steps against some 10 years later ...
No way a landing on british soil might ever be possible.

 

[TDM]

I would like to be even more daring :

- not building them in the 30's (or only to a less extent)
but
- building/developing them in the 20's already​

I think @DerWonderWaffles question is also about the ability of the germans to build landingcrafts at that point of time - after the defeat of France - at all. This ability was ... rather low, as historical there were only some "Pferdeboot" from pre- and war-time of WW 1 as well as the PioneerLandingBoat 39, according to "The Gröner" first developed in 1938. Both serving and/or intended 'only' for the purpose of getting heavies material for Marine-Corps pioneers ashore.

However, there was a time when the then Reichsmarine embarked on an "emergency-program" for fast and cheap to be built marine, mainly shore-base assets but also some more high-sea capable ships. They didn't actually wanted them to have been built aside some 'type'-models or testing samples, but to have their plans ready in time of need.
This "emergency" R&D-program began some fes days into February 1923 ... Ruhr-occupation ... when the Reichsmarine had to acknowledge, that they had virtually nothing to defend whatever german coast. ... and that this situation would stay that way for some dearly long time, at least too long a time.
The probably more known 'fruits' out of this program were the S-Boote or 'E-Boats', in the 20's running under names like USZ or similar, several types of "Vorpostenboote", naval trawlers and "Kriegsfischkutter", which's plans all originated in the early 20's.

One of the mayor problems the young Reichswehr had was defending East-Prussia, cut of communication and transportation line by the polish corridor -> how in heavens name then to get troops there ? ... especially if Danzig might very likely also be cut of by polish forces ?
Kind of similar problem was ventilated by the Reichswehr reagrding some enemys attacks together with landings in Pommerania (guess who ? ... naah, I mean Revolutionary Russia - and Poland), How to get troops into tzheir back ?
The OTL 'solution' was to bring the rotten old Pre-Dreads in service as escorts for troop transports. ... though essentially only part of the prob. The troops have somehow to reach the beach. IOTL the transporters dinghys and the like were/had to be rendered sufficient.


Now , let's assume - as a pod - that there is some more 'pressure' towards the Reichsmarine esp. to develop such capacity of landing troops in East-Prussia and/or Pommerania in case of a at that time rather probable war-cases ?
And landing-craft, of higher capacity, better sea-worthyness are included into the mentioned emergency-R&D-program of 1923 ?
What you need for a mass-production of such crfats you need - beside some yards (in that case even the smallest would be capable) - the contruction drawings at hand and some type-boats as models.

That way you might have in the late 30's some 'car'- or 'horse'-ferries operating in german coastal waters, across the Stettin, Vistula or Curonian Lagoon in form of the Marinefährprahm or for further like towards Scandinavia or Gotland something similar to the japanese No.101 or SS-class landing ships. Over the years further developed in some small steps, optimized for the intended mass-production.

And in 1939 when planning of whatever campaigns become pressing ... there might be some ideas for these to be used, not only in a Norway-operation but maybe also against - as 'proposesd' - an operation for the Netherlands etc.
The ability would then be there, probably building would start only summer/late 1939, so not much available in time for Weserübung, but ... with production comming 'online' ... there might be a consideral number be availabe in late 1940 and even more in 1941.

But ... ofc the James Bonds of this time would smell the fish already in 1929 and take according steps against some 10 years later ...
No way a landing on british soil might ever be possible.

I can't help but think that with the question of defending east Prussia, the Germans will stick to their well established strengths which is having a fast, hard hitting land army rather than trying to do seaborne landings which they need to develop the tools and training from scratch to do. A big part of the reason why the RM/KM had to scrabble for funding is basically the widely held attitude in the German military establishment and in their thinking 'why does Germany need navy spending'? (Especially when they has the RN parked on the north sea). Even when there was top down demands for a big navy (i.e run up to WW1) and a lot of money, resources and time sunk into getting one what did it get them in WW1? The RN just has too big a head start here.

 

[Tanc49]

Question: a lot of the essentials, like food, clothing... could be less fragile than other things while still taking bulks.
Could it be launched like in Jules Vernes' Journey to the Moon, or in V2 like apparels? Basically shoot it from afar, maybe have it landed with parachutes.
Given the distance to England from Northern France, it might help reducing the general requirements for supply transportation?

I realise this might be a stupid idea

 

[NoMommsen]

I can't help but think that with the question of defending east Prussia, the germans will stick to their well established strengths which is having a fast, hard hitting land army rather than trying to do seaborne landings which they need to develop the tools and training from scratch to do. A big part of the reason why the RM/KM had to scrabble for funding is basically the widely held attitude in German military establishment and thinking why does Germany need it? (especially when the it has the RN parked in the north sea). Even when there was top down demands for a big navy (i.e run up to WW1) and a lot of money, resources and time sunk into getting one what did it get them in WW1? The RN just has too big a head start here.

Can't help you either and ofc you're free to think whatever you want.

However, until the rearmament of the Nazis there simply IS no land army capable of dong what you describe. ... and that from 1921 onwards. ... lots of time to trying something 'new from scratch' and train for it ... though ... not too new, remember Operation Albion ?
For the reminder of your argument(s) : keeping over the years some model types of rather small and easy and cheap (part of the specification) wouldn't influence other developments very much, so funding for such until someone might ask for no big problem.

That there is some interest in is the PoD M8.

What 'head start' had the RN regarding amphibious warfare ?
The 'x-lighters' ? ... which were based on ... River-Thames barges ?
Wiki says in the inter-war period there was ONE specialized landing craft aside normal landing boats as might be depicted here.

Beside that : I donm't argue, that the RN was much stronger overall in numbers of ships, men, guns etc., etc..

 

[Garrison]

I can't help but think that with the question of defending east Prussia, the germans will stick to their well established strengths which is having a fast, hard hitting land army rather than trying to do seaborne landings which they need to develop the tools and training from scratch to do. A big part of the reason why the RM/KM had to scrabble for funding is basically the widely held attitude in German military establishment and thinking why does Germany need it? (especially when the it has the RN parked in the north sea). Even when there was top down demands for a big navy (i.e run up to WW1) and a lot of money, resources and time sunk into getting one what did it get them in WW1? The RN just has too big a head start here.

Post WWI the German fleet was at the bottom of Scapa Flow, the air force was gone and the army was a shadow of its former self, with strict limits on what it could do. To make matters worse the French are a lot more 'proactive' in the 20s than the 30s. Weimar did not simply shrug its shoulders and accept this. They worked diligently to roll back the Versailles Treaty(especially in regard to reparations), they illicitly worked with the soviets on weapons development and tactics and they sought to maintain a civilian aerospace industry that could be used to rebuild an air force in due course. The idea that in the middle of all this someone would propose, 'lets build an amphibious assault capability' and be taken seriously is far fetched to say the least. Also bear in mind that the most recent example of an amphibious assault to draw lessons from was Gallipoli, hardly likely to instill any great enthusiasm for the idea.

 

[TDM]

Can't help you either and ofc you're free to think whatever you want.

However, until the rearmament of the Nazis there simply IS no land army capable of dong what you describe. ... and that from 1921 onwards. ... lots of time to trying something 'new from scratch' and train for it ... though ... not too new, remember Operation Albion ?.

Germany had a history of an army and army operations, rebuilding the army was way different to suddenly creating an amphibious assault capacity.

Operation Albion? look at the force disparity, and it still took two goes for the germans to land, yeah I'm not worried.

For the reminder of your argument(s) : keeping over the years some model types of rather small and easy and cheap (part of the specification) wouldn't influence other developments very much, so funding for such until someone might ask for no big problem..

Right but inter-war Germany is starved of resources so any cost is a concern.

You mentioned Operation Albion, a combined arms assault on a let's face it a few islands that are in total 4000kmsq in the baltic sea that the German navy pretty much had freedom of movement in (having been bottled up there), vs. the Russians that were at that point one revolution in and 3 weeks away from the Nov revolution oh and three RN subs (so not really comparable to the sea invasion of Britain)

and even then here's the list of German naval assets

1 Battlecruiser
10 Dreadnought battleships
9 Light cruiser
1 Mine cruisers
50 Torpedo boats
6 U-boats
19 Transport ship

Thats a lot of floating steel in 1917. And it does a good job of making the point that if your doing this kind of thing you need a lot of floating steel even for small versions. Take that list and check what the Germans had in 1940 to play with in OTL, then work out where the equivalent scaled up list for a scaled up attack on Britain would come from. (For instance take a look at what the wallies took to d-day).

That there is some interest in is the PoD M8.

What 'head start' had the RN regarding amphibious warfare ?
The 'x-lighters' ? ... which were based on ... River-Thames barges ?
Wiki says in the inter-war period there was ONE specialized landing craft aside normal landing boats as might be depicted here.

The head start not about competing amphibious ability (although we still had more experience of that), it about seeing off an amphibious assault with other Naval assets, or just comparative naval capability full stop. FWIW when I mentioned head start I was talking about general navy building Germany vs. Britain, pre and during WW1. The point was Imperial Germany couldn't compete even when it was trying and had resources to try with, and what did it get for it's trouble and resources in terms of WW1?

Beside that : I don't argue, that the RN was much stronger overall in numbers of ships, men, guns etc., etc..

Quite

 

[NoMommsen]

I never said that Operation Albion as it was might be the template of whatever other operation. And I never wanted to compare this operation with the situation of something like Sealion.
All I wanted to point to :

there actually was some experience in Germany the germans could look at
...
and develop whatever scheme of such future operations they might develop, knowing, not to have the same assets at hand they had in 1917
​

Regarding the two goes needed ... well at least this operation on amphibious landing achieved its goal ... contrary to some other amphibious operation tried by the Entente-forces in WW 1 ...

And contrary to ... others I wouldn't compare WW2 operations aka D-day with WW1 operations ... 'apples 'n oranges' IMHO.

 

[TDM]

I never said that Operation Albion as it was might be the template of whatever other operation. And I never wanted to compare this operation with the situation of something like Sealion.
All I wanted to point to :

there actually was some experience in Germany the germans could look at
...
and develop whatever scheme of such future operations they might develop, knowing, not to have the same assets at hand they had in 1917
​

Regarding the two goes needed ... well at least this operation on amphibious landing achieved its goal ... contrary to some other amphibious operation tried by the Entente-forces in WW 1 ...

And contrary to ... others I wouldn't compare WW2 operations aka D-day with WW1 operations ... 'apples 'n oranges' IMHO.

Right but my point was look at what they brought to assault a few islands in the eastern baltic, you might not want to compare it but it tells a tale about how resource intensive this stuff is even when limited in scope. Again look at that list compared to what they had in June 1940 without even scaling it up for sealion I'd say it's better than what they actually had!

Similar with the comparison to d-day, it not about WW1 tech to WW2 tech, it's about if you are going to do a large scale amphibious assault you need a huge amount of stuff, and no a few fast landing craft won't cut it even if you start building them in the 20's when the economy really wasn't great, and the government of the time wasn't that interested in military spending with a view to a european rematch.

Re entente landings in WW1, we stuck the initial landing (the Turkish navy not really being up to much, and this being largely before air superiority is a thing), only a successful amphibious assault takes more than that you have to be able to keep the momentum going and that takes resources, seems to me we learned the lesson.

however even then the naval units devoted to that sad affair was:

1 super dreadnought
3 battlecruisers
28 pre-dreadnoughts
23 cruisers
25 destroyers
13 submarines
1 Seaplane Carrier

again a lot of floating steel

 

[Geordie]

The disparity of forces between the KM and RN is easy to underestimate. During the WAllied withdrawal from Narvik, the number of RN destroyers covering the operation was greater than the number of KM destroyers afloat at the outbreak of hostilities. Thanks to Warspite et al, the number of German destroyers available for any Sea Lion is significantly lower than that starting figure.

The LW can't stop the RN getting to the barges, and the KM sure as hell doesn't have enough hulls to make it vaguely competitive.

Sure, you can attempt to rectify this by a PoD or PoDs but: a) there will be a reacting in the UK (and other countries); b) the scales are still massively weighted against them; c) something else isn't getting built, which will have an effect, likely in the Battle of France.

And that last one is the main problem. These ideas always treat the BoF as a foregone conclusion. It wasn't. Treating it as such will not only cause great consternation in German high command (with potential reactions to said concern); the diverted attention towards Sea Lion decreases the chance of Case Yellow's success.

 

[FBKampfer]

Marinefahrpram gets designed earlier and cranked out in as much secret as possible, U-boats sink the Dunkirk rescue fleet, and magnetic mines are held in strategic reserve until the landings.

These alone bump the odds from "Battle of France goes OTL well" odds, up to simply poor as hell.


Cram most of the U-boat and E boat fleet into the channel to screen capital ships along with the Mines, and perhaps diversionary raids by the Deutschlands and Scharnhorsts, and you'll for sure have a few days to ferry shit over.

After that it depends entirely on how panicky and stupid the British become.

 

[Aber]

you'll for sure have a few days to ferry shit over.

No. You'll just end up with severe losses to the U-boat fleet, and the Sealion fleet. The RN advantage is just too large.

 

[misterwibble]

Marinefahrpram gets designed earlier and cranked out in as much secret as possible, U-boats sink the Dunkirk rescue fleet, and magnetic mines are held in strategic reserve until the landings.

These alone bump the odds from "Battle of France goes OTL well" odds, up to simply poor as hell.


Cram most of the U-boat and E boat fleet into the channel to screen capital ships along with the Mines, and perhaps diversionary raids by the Deutschlands and Scharnhorsts, and you'll for sure have a few days to ferry shit over.

After that it depends entirely on how panicky and stupid the British become.

The KM didn't have any capital ships in September/October 1940. None. Nada. Zilch. It's hard to carry out diversionary raids with ships that are either sunk or in dry dock being repaired.