If carried out without any increase in the number of fighting units, triangularization would not have had much of an effect on the requirements for officers. That is, without creating any new units other than the headquarters for new infantry divisions, the German authorities would have been able to convert 50 square divisions into 67 triangular divisions. (The additional infantry regiment needed to do this was, along with 16 other "excess" infantry regiments, was already available.)
The means to create headquarters for the 17 new infantry divisions could easily be found among the generals, adjutants, ordinance officers, clerks, grooms, horses, wagons, map chests, and sets of mess equipment made redundant by the dissolution of 100 infantry brigade headquarters.
Triangularization would also reduce the number of army corps in the peacetime order of battle of the German Army, from 25 to 24. (The easiest way to do this would have been the dissolution of the corps headquarters of the Guard Corps and the use of Guard Corps units to fill gaps in other formations.) This, in turn, would have made additional resources available for the creation of the new division headquarters.
In the years before 1914, the officer shortage within the German Army was entirely a matter of subalterns. According to the 1913 issue of the authoritative annual
Loebells Jahresberichte, there were about 3,000 billets for lieutenants that were being filled by senior non-commissioned officers.
If, in the course of triangularization, the German authorities wished to form the "excess" infantry regiments into infantry divisions, they would have to find ways of providing those new formations with cavalry, field artillery, engineers, and the like. The easiest way to provide cavalry to triangular formations would have been the replacement divisional cavalry regiments with corps-level cavalry brigades. (This would have avoided both the splitting of existing cavalry regiments and the need to create new ones.) Similarly, a scheme that allocate two battalions of field guns to each triangular division (for a total of 144) and two battalions of light field howitzers to each triangular army corps (for a total of 48) would have left the reorganized peacetime army with a surplus of eight battalions of light field howitzers.
As far as engineers go, triangularization would fit in nicely with the way that they were employed. Under the square organizational scheme, the three pioneer companies of each army corps were allocated to infantry divisions in an asymmetric fashion, with one division receiving two companies and the other but one. Triangularization would provide each infantry division with a single pioneer company of its own.