Germany does not invade Belguim in 1914. What does Britain do?

[BooNZ]

So let's see....if "Britain is going to enter the war later or not at all" is wrong, then every other assumption you list is wrong.

If Belgium is neutral I would argue the list of assumptions remains mostly valid. Without Belgium territory, the British army cannot effectively participate on the continent. Britain cannot influence the outcome on the eastern front in any case. British coin and coal cannot buy Italian courage to attack A-H defensive positons if Russia is already on the run. A British blockade going to be less effective with a neutral Belgium and Italy.

From my understanding, it is clear the Belgium would have actively defended its neutrality against all comers, but this may not have been apparent at the time. There were a number of German war games that contemplated Belgium belligerence, but there was likely no nexus between German military/ diplomatic thinking/ assessment. British designs on Belgium appear to be reliant on being invited by Belgium, which given the likely German response was unlikely. Joffre was as keen as mustard to use Belgium as a thoroughfare, but his French political masters prioritized the relationship with Britain and the French Army was poorly equipped for such adventures.

However, I recall you have had a few interesting theories about Belgium. Please share, ideally with references. ​

 

[Anchises]

It was about Europe, not Britain. Had Britain stayed out Europe may have transitioned to its current form earlier and without the drama.


So let's see....if "Britain is going to enter the war later or not at all" is wrong, then every other assumption you list is wrong.

1) Not waging WW1 would have affected the Empire too. And I think it is pretty naive to assume that Europe would have "transformed to its current form earlier". History tends to avoid butterfly nets.

2) Just saying "all you said is wrong" won't lead to a productive discussion. And I am still amazed, how people completely ignore, that the hawks in London would have been hard pressed to lead the country into a war, without a proper casus belli.

 

[Glenn239]

"Can you point to any war the British army and navy ever fought half-assed?"

The American War of Independence.

How could the British even be in a war in North America if Belgium hadn't been invaded? :^)

 

[Glenn239]

If Belgium is neutral I would argue the list of assumptions remains mostly valid. Without Belgium territory, the British army cannot effectively participate on the continent. Britain cannot influence the outcome on the eastern front in any case. British coin and coal cannot buy Italian courage to attack A-H defensive positons if Russia is already on the run. A British blockade going to be less effective with a neutral Belgium and Italy.

From my understanding, it is clear the Belgium would have actively defended its neutrality against all comers, but this may not have been apparent at the time. There were a number of German war games that contemplated Belgium belligerence, but there was likely no nexus between German military/ diplomatic thinking/ assessment. British designs on Belgium appear to be reliant on being invited by Belgium, which given the likely German response was unlikely. Joffre was as keen as mustard to use Belgium as a thoroughfare, but his French political masters prioritized the relationship with Britain and the French Army was poorly equipped for such adventures.

However, I recall you have had a few interesting theories about Belgium. Please share, ideally with references. ​

If Belgium was prepared to defend the Ardennes then why did the German 3rd and 4th Armies cross it without any Belgian interference and succeed in surprising and badly defeating the French 3rd and 4th armies on the other side?

Why would Joffre's political masters forbid a move into the Ardennes on the basis of the British attitude when the British themselves had confirmed in cabinet at the end of July 1914 that a minor violation of Belgium would not influence British policy?

 

[Glenn239]

One issue that will affect a "Britain stays neutral in 1915" will be the complicated British domestic political situation.

Right, which is another reason why Britain can't be neutral in 1915.

 

[NoMommsen]

If Belgium was prepared to defend the Ardennes then why did the German 3rd and 4th Armies cross it without any Belgian interference and succeed in surprising and badly defeating the French 3rd and 4th armies on the other side?

Belgium was NOT or only very limited enabled to defend the Ardennes with armed forces, at least their is no contingency about I know off.Their plan was to defend the belgian northern and soo well foritied part.

Why would Joffre's political masters forbid a move into the Ardennes on the basis of the British attitude when the British themselves had confirmed in cabinet at the end of July 1914 that a minor violation of Belgium would not influence British policy?

Simply because no frenchman, neither diplomat, politician or military knew about this the british cabinets decisions.

For everyone outside Downing Stree 10 it was simply "Belgium" without any restrictions, whens or ifs.

 

[NoMommsen]

One issue that will affect a "Britain stays neutral in 1915" will be the complicated British domestic political situation.

Right, which is another reason why Britain can't be neutral in 1915.

Huh ?Ccould you pls explain, why domestic problems are a reason for the british parliament to go to some unrelated war ??

 

[MichaelWest]

1) Not waging WW1 would have affected the Empire too. And I think it is pretty naive to assume that Europe would have "transformed to its current form earlier". History tends to avoid butterfly nets.

2) Just saying "all you said is wrong" won't lead to a productive discussion. And I am still amazed, how people completely ignore, that the hawks in London would have been hard pressed to lead the country into a war, without a proper casus belli.

Indeed, if the British had sat it out I see the potential for much of the Empire wanking so popular from the Anglophile commentators. Thus it is perplexing that many of these same folks will not stand for a neutral Britain. I realize it is not so easy to get this Britain to merely step aside and it does have the odious air of dishonor to it, but then the French still will think her perfidious no matter and having to deal with the Germans as your peer may be better than the Americans as your master.

And yet the debate is just that, the weight of critique is that one cannot simply stop the hawks, Britain was going to war "no matter" what which strikes me as painting Britain as black and dastardly as the vile Huns, warmongering to their core, so devious and conspiratorial as to defy sanity itself. It seems the real burning desire is to have Britain go to war and win it, Britain Uber Alles as it were. And fair enough, the Germanophobes should write that timeline and push out the Germany screws or dystopian horrors of another world war and yet more evil Germany. A sound critique of how to steer Britain free of the war is most welcome, the frustration is that some just do not like that it could be.

 

[MichaelWest]

If Belgium was prepared to defend the Ardennes then why did the German 3rd and 4th Armies cross it without any Belgian interference and succeed in surprising and badly defeating the French 3rd and 4th armies on the other side?

Why would Joffre's political masters forbid a move into the Ardennes on the basis of the British attitude when the British themselves had confirmed in cabinet at the end of July 1914 that a minor violation of Belgium would not influence British policy?

I think both sides assumed the southern tip of Belgium was the likely avenue, boldly Moltke expanded his vision to cross the densely defended part, either over confident of Belgian neutrality or blindly confident of his ability to overwhelm her. It might make an interesting tweak if Moltke held to just a fraction of violating Belgium and avoids the carnage, the British are still in the war but Germany has done far less villainy.

And to the flip-side, what if in Germany standing defensive, bleeding off Armies to the East and leaving Belgium be had made the British blink, would Joffre used the opportunity to strike at Germany? Would Paris approve since it looks like perfidious Britain is not coming, better to take the war to Germany and settle up now? It really twists things to have France drive up through Belgium towards the Germans, maybe not a "rape of Belgium" but how does that shatter the position of the British hawks and France's image?

 

[Catspoke]

In a Germany doesn't invade Belgium scenario, there is a period of of time for politics of about 3 weeks. Britain could push for a conference, people could agree to stop at Belgrade (or NOT). What would really be awkward if people agree on stop at Belgrade and the Austrians couldn't occupy Belgrade!!!

Regardless
1) It would probably take a couple of weeks for Germany to rail first and maybe first and second army east. No into Russia German offensive is going to happen before the 20th of August.
2) OTL the Russians didn't invade East Prussia before the 17th, in this situation they can wait longer.
3) Does Conrad deploy the Austrian armies forward or back against Russia? (does he know about the German change of plans). OTL the Austrians invaded Poland August 20th. Of course here they don't have to worry about the Russians invading east Prussia so they could wait.
3) Awkwardly the Austrians lose OTL the battle of Cer August 19th thru 24th, so any stop at Belgrade talk ends then and the war has to continue.

Basically the Eastern Front will engage on or about the 20th of August, but maybe a week later. It doesn't make a whole lot of sense for the French to attack before then either, best to coordinate with the Russians. That gives them 3 weeks to get the British to agree to them moving through Belgium (east of the Meuse).

The Austrians have miffed on their invasion of Serbia, so both sides really have no choice to continue fighting after then.

So the French attack Metz and fail, The Germans meet the Russians on the frontier and the Germans win. The Austrians meet the Russians on the frontier and lose, but can't really exploit the situation as in OTL. The Serbians are doing fine.

At that point the French are going to push the British on allowing them to cross Belgium (and to press the British to at least declare war on Germany for the extra political pressure).

 

[Glenn239]

I think both sides assumed the southern tip of Belgium was the likely avenue.

Every square inch of Belgian territory is neutral, or its not. I don't think the Germans ever assumed the French would operate north of the Meuse, but I do think they'd concluded that the Ardennes was enough that the whole French army could get in on the attack, making a defense stance (and an eastern German offensive) utterly foolish, given the proximity of the Ruhr to the Belgian Ardennes.

boldly Moltke expanded his vision to cross the densely defended part, either over confident of Belgian neutrality or blindly confident of his ability to overwhelm her. It might make an interesting tweak if Moltke held to just a fraction of violating Belgium and avoids the carnage, the British are still in the war but Germany has done far less villainy.

Moltke wasn't a great general, but he wasn't a gullible fool either. He understood perfectly well that the British weren't going to allow him to violate one inch of Belgian territory, but that they would take the opposite view for the French. That's what alliances and loyalty are all about. So Moltke, being a Prussian general type choses between all in or all out and picks all in, in classic Prussian fashion.

And to the flip-side, what if in Germany standing defensive, bleeding off Armies to the East and leaving Belgium be had made the British blink, would Joffre used the opportunity to strike at Germany? Would Paris approve since it looks like perfidious Britain is not coming, better to take the war to Germany and settle up now? It really twists things to have France drive up through Belgium towards the Germans, maybe not a "rape of Belgium" but how does that shatter the position of the British hawks and France's image?

The French bled for 4 years without accomplishing anything of note on the offensive, so the only actual issue is whether British interference against the French ignites French anger at Britain or not, who then become the excuse for French failure.

 

[Riain]

Moltke wasn't a great general, but he wasn't a gullible fool either. He understood perfectly well that the British weren't going to allow him to violate one inch of Belgian territory,

In any case his policy direction from the Government was to assume that Britain would be a combatant against Germany in a general war and make plans accordingly.

When it's assumed that Britain would be a combatant foregoing the military advantage against the quick mobilising and readily accessible French by avoiding Belgian territory is imbecility.

 

[Anchises]

The French bled for 4 years without accomplishing anything of note on the offensive, so the only actual issue is whether British interference against the French ignites French anger at Britain or not, who then become the excuse for French failure.

Lets assume a scenario where Germany decides to take a defensive stance in the West initially. With 4 Armies on the Western Front and 3 in the East.

I have serious doubts that France could break through the German defenses even if they decide to violate Belgian neutrality.

Britain would probably support France financially.

Assuming that France bleeds itselfes dry we might see the mutinies sooner. I lean towards the historical interpretation of an offensive strike. The french soldiers just weren't ready to die in pointless offensives anymore.

I think Britain might intervene once Russia or France are in serious trouble. Maybe not with the BEF but at least with a naval blockade of the CPs.

 

[NoMommsen]

...
but I do think they'd concluded that the Ardennes was enough that the whole French army could get in on the attack, making a defense stance (and an eastern German offensive) utterly foolish, given the proximity of the Ruhr to the Belgian Ardennes.
...

At first :
that the Ardennes are a ... "lesser" obstacle is a Post-WW2-Hindsight assesment, that resulted from the germans passing them (quite to the surprise of everybody else) with what can go as all-terrain or heavy-terrain vehicles of thier time (1939).
NOT a contemporary assessment 25 years earlier.

Due to being heavily forrested as well as sparsly populated and probably most important veery badly developed reagrding logistical infrastructure in 1914 it was not only rendered a MAJOR obstacle for every army, including the germans.
The german 4th and 5th army advanced through the Ardennes in the first 3 weeks a distance of about 50-60 km, roughly about a third to a half of what 3rd army achieved - not to speak of the tour-de-Belgique the 1st army.
YES the southern Ardennes WERE an obstacle in 1914.

Then ... "proximity of the Ruhr to the belgian Ardennes..."
Have you ever tried a look it up at the map maybe with google, using the "terraine" function and assed the ... terrain you are speaking of ?
Its southern part west of Luxemburg quite quickly "meets" the Our-valley, which is a really nasty deep valley, naturally built moat that towards the north blends into the Belgian Eifel which to its north blends into the Northern Eifel ... oh, we have reached the dutch border at Aachen (FYI : the Eifel is a mountain-range).

And I somehow doubt, that an attack of larger french forces through this region would resemble a sneak-"blitz"-attack and NOT being detected and accordingly dealt (aka defensive preparation with troop moveements via the especially for this purpose built railways).

Moltke wasn't a great general, but he wasn't a gullible fool either. He understood perfectly well that the British weren't going to allow him to violate one inch of Belgian territory, but that they would take the opposite view for the French. That's what alliances and loyalty are all about. So Moltke, being a Prussian general type choses between all in or all out and picks all in, in classic Prussian fashion.

Didn't you just said :

Every square inch of Belgian territory is neutral, or its not.

Esp. due to their global position also opposite the "neutrals" (and not at least before the domestic press) the Brits can't measure with different yard-sticks.

If they allow the french to violate "minor part" of Belgium for their conduct of war they have to allow it the germans at least in the same parts as well.
What would end in a clash of forces at a line reoughly from Marche.en-Famenne to Arlon (google it)

 

[marathag]

Can you point to any war the British army and navy ever fought half-assed?

Most of their efforts in Africa worked out this way.
Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck says 'Hi'

 

[King Augeas]

If Belgium isn't attacked and the British start off neutral, yet want to support their friends, what scope is there for "acts short of war"? I'm thinking of things like:

Declaring a trade embargo on Germany
Declaring the Channel and southern North Sea to be a total exclusion zone (presumably they'd escort some convoys through to France, Belgium and the Netherlands
Just declaring a blockade and telling anyone who complains to either shut up (Central Powers) or that Britain/France will buy their trade goods instead (the US)
Making a deal with Belgium to send troops in to "guarantee her independence", which would produce a direct threat to northern Germany (I think this is a non-starter for that very reason but it might work if it were expressly limited to the Channel ports)

The naval ones are essentially acts of war against Germany, but the whole point here is that Germany needs to avoid war with Britain and therefore can't retaliate.

 

[Zheng He]

The naval ones are essentially acts of war against Germany, but the whole point here is that Germany needs to avoid war with Britain and therefore can't retaliate.

Initially I think you see a lot the things the US did in 1939, 1940, and 1941. The question is at what point does an incident drag them into the war? I could see the culmination of neutral Britain's not so neutral activities causing the Kaiser to at some point lash out in frustration against his English cousins.

 

[sloreck]

If Britain is not a belligerent while they could impose an exclusion zone around the British Isles, doing any sort of blockade or interference with trade, especially neutral trade, is simply not doable. Oh certainly the RN could probably do this, but the neutrals, in particular the USA simply won't stand for it. To be effective the RN not only has to intercept shipping to Germany, but stop and search shipping to the low countries and Scandinavia. Furthermore OTL the blockade included essentially anything - food, medical supplies, etc. The USA was displeased with this OTL during the period of neutrality. The RN doing this, one neutral against another, is piracy under maritime law.

Britain can loan money to France (and Russia), they can declare an exclusion zone and keep the HSF out of the Channel, they can sell arms to the French on credit, all of which is perfectly legal for a neutral to do. Britons can join the Legion Étrangere. Stopping neutral ships, even those bound for other neutral countries will only get the UK in trouble. While this won't necessarily lead to fighting between the USA and the UK it is very likely the USA would send armed escorts for convoys to "protect neutral shipping". If the British do this, any hope of the USA being pro-Entente with loans, raw material, food, or actual military goods is gone.

 

[Athelstane]

If "neutral" Britain seizes the Ottoman ships then I would entertain the argument that the Ottomans join the CPs and close the Straights, opening a front that Russia must deal with, potentially forcing Britain to react and pursue an "independent" war against the Ottomans? Anything short of that is a great boon to the CPs who can have the Ottomans enact a blockade on the Russians. Neutrals can still pass but this might bottleneck the flow to add to Russia's internal distribution problems sufficient to drag her economy. Here the CPs get the Ottomans on the cheap so to speak.

If the Sublime Porte no longer has to factor British belligerency (at least in the short term) into its equation, the odds for Turkish entry into the war surely would increase, all things being equal. No other great power posed so a great a danger to the Ottoman Empire, let alone on so many fronts.

Of course, in a timeline where Souchon no longer has to worry as much about the British Mediterranean Fleet, it's a little less certain how quickly he's ordered to run to Constantinople.

 

[Athelstane]

Every square inch of Belgian territory is neutral, or its not. I don't think the Germans ever assumed the French would operate north of the Meuse, but I do think they'd concluded that the Ardennes was enough that the whole French army could get in on the attack, making a defense stance (and an eastern German offensive) utterly foolish, given the proximity of the Ruhr to the Belgian Ardennes.

That does seem to be the way Schlieffen and Moltke the Younger leaned.

And yet: up through 1913, the general staff kept "East-first" deployment plans fully up to date.

Before Schlieffen, of course, the general planned had focused more on Russia. Russian weakness post-1904-05 surely helped make Schlieffen's turn to the West easier to swallow - the French were now the greater danger. Even if that meant having to blast through Belgium, which, of course, it really did. There was no fast path to victory that went through Lorraine - the fortified belt of Verdun-Toul assured that as much as the basic geography did.

In any event, I share the sense of what appears to be the majority view here that a German decision to observe Belgian neutrality almost certainly keeps Britain out of the war, at least in the short-term, with a consensus-minded Asquith opting instead for a pro-Entente non-belligerency, enforcing an exclusion zone in the Channel and most of the North Sea against Germany, and supplying arms and financing to the Entente to the maximum extent possible, hoping perhaps that the Germans are stupid or impulsive enough to furnish them with some casus belli.

For British leadership, after all, Belgium served both a public end, and an indirect strategic end. Publicly, it provided a legal obligation and moral force sufficient to carry the British public and enough of the Liberal Party (thus ensuring Asquith's own grip on power) into war. Indirectly, it was a stand-in for Britain's true strategic interest, which was to avert seeing France crushed as a great power in Western Europe. There was little British strategic interest in Belgium itself, after all, beyond keeping any hostile great power from controlling Belgium's North Sea ports - it made little intrinsic difference to Whitehall who was sitting on (say) Liege or Namur in 1914 any more than it had in 1814. But allowing France to be crushed was not acceptable. And a Germany that refuses to be drawn into Belgium is a Germany that must logically turn away from any immediate effort to crush France, because Lorraine quite obviously offered no easy path to victory. It pretty much demands a German "East-first" strategy.