British Cold War: Facts and Figures thread.

[KillerT]

Yes you'll be jealous of me. As a lad aged about 10 (might have been older) or so I happened to one day have a play with four prototype models that a friends father had brought over from ROF Barnbow, one of those was rather Chieftan like but looking rather different...

Also once got taken on an open day and can remember seeing the huge machine that manipulated a Chieftan turret.

 

[edgeworthy]

Britain is the only country to have successfully developed and then abandoned a satellite launch capability.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Arrow

 

[Yes]

Britain is the only country to have successfully developed and then abandoned a satellite launch capability.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Arrow

Few things encapsulate postwar British science, British industry, and British defen(c)e procurement in one project quite so well.

 

[Riain]

An F.6 equipped with Red Top missiles can climb to 36,000 ft, accelerate to Mach 1.8, and intercept a target at 135 NM only 10.7 min after brake release. A 2g level turn allows a rear-quarter re-attack 1.6 min later. Following a best-range cruise and descent, the Lightning enters the landing pattern with 800 lb of fuel remaining with a total mission time of 35 min.

An F.6 equipped with Red Top missiles can climb to 36,000 ft and cruise at Mach 0.87 to a loiter or intercept area 370 NM distant. It then has 15 minutes on station to complete the intercept or identification task before returning to base. The afterburners are not used during this profile, and the total mission time is 112 min.

The second scenario would be similar to what the Argentine Mirages were doing over the Falklands.

 

[Riain]

An email trail between myself and a RAN officer who transferred from the RN.

I served in 2 Type 42s (BIRMINGHAM & NEWCASTLE) and a Type 21 (ALACRITY), among others while in the RN and can attest that the T42s were built entirely of steel. In the case of both T21s ARDENT and ANTELOPE, they were abandoned (and ARDENT was already sinking and beyond saving) well before fire took hold of the superstructure. The later Type 22 Frigate had some aluminium in the superstructure, the Types 23 and 45 are all steel.

It is also forgotten that the Exocet that hit SHEFFIELD did little structural damage to the ship. She was abandoned because the fire was out of control and it was feared that the Sea Dart and 4.5 magazines were at risk of explosion, in the event the automatic spray systems and their reserve tanks prevented this from happening and she was revisited later with a view to salvage. She eventually sank under tow some days later because the rough seas were gradually filling the hull through the missile's entry hole and other open hatches. Had SHEFFIELD suffered the same damage in the English Channel she could easily have been towed to (say) Portsmouth and dry docked.

The attached image show sonar scans of the wrecks of ARDENT and ANTELOPE respectively and while both ships' backs are broken, the steel hulls are complete and recognisable but the aluminium superstructures are completely gone.

As an aside, the BOI reports to all 4 losses are available on the MoD website and make interesting reading.

See also USS BELKNAP but note also that the new Independence-class littoral combat ship is made of aluminium.

I've read that the Sheffield's water main was united (or not united, I don't know what it means) to facilitate weapon loading and that had something to do with fighting the fire.

So Navy types are out there, can anyone make any sense of the above gibberish?

The Type 42 had a fire main than ran around the ship on 2 deck. There were 4 fire pumps, one in each of the main machinery spaces (engine rooms). At action stations, all 4 pumps were brought on line and connected to the fire main which was configured as a single loop around the ship. The idea was that if 1,2 or 3 were lost, the remaining 3,2 or 1 pump(s) would continue the supply of water. It missed the fact that the ring main was at almost the exact height that a sea skimming missile would hit the ship. SHEFFIELD's fire main was ruptured by the missile and so pressure was lost throughout the ship. That quickly let the fire gain hold and soon power to the pumps was lost. The back up fire pump was a Rover gas turbine that could be connected to the fire main or directly to a hose but they were notoriously temperamental.

Post Falklands, the doctrine changed. During cruising watches, the firemain remained configured as a single loop with 1 pump running an 1 on standby. At action stations the firemain was isolated into 4 sections, each fed by a different fire pump. Now a single event could not take away water throughout the ship. If a pump was lost, its firemain could be connect to an adjacent section and if the main itself were split, hoses could still be run in from adjacent sections. The Rover pump was supplemented by diesel driven 'Godiva' portable pumps and in subsequent designs of ship, the firemain is at different levels on each side of the ship.

The SHEFFIELD BOI report is on line and goes into more detail.

I think I get it. If the firemain was used in 4 sections the exocet would have only broken that section and knocked out that pump but the other 3 would have been OK and fought the fire and contained it. Since then they've moved the firemain to different levels which I imagine makes the change in doctrine even more effective.

But what about the weapon loading thing, that was given as a reason to keep the firemain in a single loop? Do they use the mains pressure to ram missiles up to their launcher rail or something?

Keep in mind I read this ages ago and didn't really understand it, so might be way off base.

Your understanding of my rambling about the fire main is correct. With regards to the weapons, the gun and Sea Dart missile systems used hydraulic power to load shells and missiles (each system had its own pump). The problem was the magazines. Each one is a large space filled with a lot of explosive. They pretty much fill most of the space between the bridge screen and the gun and extend down to 4 deck. A fire in there would require a lot of water very quickly to flood the magazines; even all 4 pumps would struggle to keep up with that much demand. The solution was a large tank of water, pressurised by a compressed air bottle. If one of the spray heads in the magazine went off, the tank would supply the initial demand while more pumps were brought on line (and in the case of inadvertent operation, you shut valve 254 to close the supply).

And it worked! SHEFFIELD was finally abandoned because the fire was working its way forward and was approaching the magazines. There was no fire main pressure to back up the water tank and if either magazine went up there would be very little left. However, the spray tank worked and stopped the fire in its tracks. Footage of the ship taken a day or 2 later shows the burnt out centre section scorched and still smouldering but the forward part of the ship is unmarked. There are similar systems in other magazines and none of SHEFFIELD's went up.

 

[WILDGEESE]

An email trail between myself and a RAN officer who transferred from the RN.

I served in 2 Type 42s (BIRMINGHAM & NEWCASTLE) and a Type 21 (ALACRITY), among others while in the RN and can attest that the T42s were built entirely of steel. In the case of both T21s ARDENT and ANTELOPE, they were abandoned (and ARDENT was already sinking and beyond saving) well before fire took hold of the superstructure. The later Type 22 Frigate had some aluminium in the superstructure, the Types 23 and 45 are all steel.

It is also forgotten that the Exocet that hit SHEFFIELD did little structural damage to the ship. She was abandoned because the fire was out of control and it was feared that the Sea Dart and 4.5 magazines were at risk of explosion, in the event the automatic spray systems and their reserve tanks prevented this from happening and she was revisited later with a view to salvage. She eventually sank under tow some days later because the rough seas were gradually filling the hull through the missile's entry hole and other open hatches. Had SHEFFIELD suffered the same damage in the English Channel she could easily have been towed to (say) Portsmouth and dry docked.

The attached image show sonar scans of the wrecks of ARDENT and ANTELOPE respectively and while both ships' backs are broken, the steel hulls are complete and recognisable but the aluminium superstructures are completely gone.

As an aside, the BOI reports to all 4 losses are available on the MoD website and make interesting reading.

See also USS BELKNAP but note also that the new Independence-class littoral combat ship is made of aluminium.

I've read that the Sheffield's water main was united (or not united, I don't know what it means) to facilitate weapon loading and that had something to do with fighting the fire.

So Navy types are out there, can anyone make any sense of the above gibberish?

The Type 42 had a fire main than ran around the ship on 2 deck. There were 4 fire pumps, one in each of the main machinery spaces (engine rooms). At action stations, all 4 pumps were brought on line and connected to the fire main which was configured as a single loop around the ship. The idea was that if 1,2 or 3 were lost, the remaining 3,2 or 1 pump(s) would continue the supply of water. It missed the fact that the ring main was at almost the exact height that a sea skimming missile would hit the ship. SHEFFIELD's fire main was ruptured by the missile and so pressure was lost throughout the ship. That quickly let the fire gain hold and soon power to the pumps was lost. The back up fire pump was a Rover gas turbine that could be connected to the fire main or directly to a hose but they were notoriously temperamental.

Post Falklands, the doctrine changed. During cruising watches, the firemain remained configured as a single loop with 1 pump running an 1 on standby. At action stations the firemain was isolated into 4 sections, each fed by a different fire pump. Now a single event could not take away water throughout the ship. If a pump was lost, its firemain could be connect to an adjacent section and if the main itself were split, hoses could still be run in from adjacent sections. The Rover pump was supplemented by diesel driven 'Godiva' portable pumps and in subsequent designs of ship, the firemain is at different levels on each side of the ship.

The SHEFFIELD BOI report is on line and goes into more detail.

I think I get it. If the firemain was used in 4 sections the exocet would have only broken that section and knocked out that pump but the other 3 would have been OK and fought the fire and contained it. Since then they've moved the firemain to different levels which I imagine makes the change in doctrine even more effective.

But what about the weapon loading thing, that was given as a reason to keep the firemain in a single loop? Do they use the mains pressure to ram missiles up to their launcher rail or something?

Keep in mind I read this ages ago and didn't really understand it, so might be way off base.

Your understanding of my rambling about the fire main is correct. With regards to the weapons, the gun and Sea Dart missile systems used hydraulic power to load shells and missiles (each system had its own pump). The problem was the magazines. Each one is a large space filled with a lot of explosive. They pretty much fill most of the space between the bridge screen and the gun and extend down to 4 deck. A fire in there would require a lot of water very quickly to flood the magazines; even all 4 pumps would struggle to keep up with that much demand. The solution was a large tank of water, pressurised by a compressed air bottle. If one of the spray heads in the magazine went off, the tank would supply the initial demand while more pumps were brought on line (and in the case of inadvertent operation, you shut valve 254 to close the supply).

And it worked! SHEFFIELD was finally abandoned because the fire was working its way forward and was approaching the magazines. There was no fire main pressure to back up the water tank and if either magazine went up there would be very little left. However, the spray tank worked and stopped the fire in its tracks. Footage of the ship taken a day or 2 later shows the burnt out centre section scorched and still smouldering but the forward part of the ship is unmarked. There are similar systems in other magazines and none of SHEFFIELD's went up.

Playing devils advocate . . .

!) Would you still have the conversation with the RAN/RN officer if . . . if . . . the HMS Sheffield was at "Battle stations" thus allowing proper defensive measures to be done when the attack came instead of her communicating on her SCOTLINK system which rendered her blind?

2) Again, would you be having this conversation if . . . if . . . the MOD weren't in such a penny pinching mood that they forced the original ship to be shortened by 40 or so feet to save money, which in turn cost more in the long term, which in turn could have been spent on installing either a Point Defence System (SeaWolf) or a VLS SeaDart system?

Regards filers

 

[Riain]

Playing devils advocate . . .

!) Would you still have the conversation with the RAN/RN officer if . . . if . . . the HMS Sheffield was at "Battle stations" thus allowing proper defensive measures to be done when the attack came instead of her communicating on her SCOTLINK system which rendered her blind?

2) Again, would you be having this conversation if . . . if . . . the MOD weren't in such a penny pinching mood that they forced the original ship to be shortened by 40 or so feet to save money, which in turn cost more in the long term, which in turn could have been spent on installing either a Point Defence System (SeaWolf) or a VLS SeaDart system?

Regards filers

At the risk of derailing a Facts and Figures thread with conjecture I'll answer a question with a question/scenario, linking it back to an earlier post.

Would I have had that conversation if the OC of Op Corporate was FOF3 (FKA FOCAS) the Vice Admiral who commanded the Carriers and LPD and escorts instead of FOF1 the Rear Admiral who commanded a couple of Country class DLGs and 3 Destroyer sqn and 1, 7 & 8 Frigate sqns? (Given that Sea Harrier CAP detected something strange in the minutes before the Sheffield was hit, but was called off by FOF1 (a former submariner) to conduct a visual surface search of an empty piece of sea)
http://www.naval-history.net/xGW-RNOrganisation1947-2013.htm#5TF

Also there was no VLS Sea Dart of Sea Wolf in 1970 when the T42s were first ordered, the 40-50' meant that Sea Dart magazine held 22 rather than 40 rounds, which sucks because they were normally fired in pairs. I think if the British weren't such penny pinchers from 1966 they would have ordered the T82 with either the Type 988 broomstick radar or failing that the Type 985 electronic version of the Type 984 mechanical/vacuum tube radar.

 

[Riain]

Hermes' port cat (1966+) was a BS4A, rated to launch a 50,000 lb aircraft at 87 knots deck speed.

Eagle's & Ark Royal's bow catapults were BS-5s, rated to launch a 50,000 lb aircraft at 91 knots deck speed.
Eagle's (1964+) & Ark Royal's (1970+) waist catapults were BS5As, rated to launch a 50,000 lb aircraft at 105 knots deck speed, or a 60,000 lb aircraft at 95 knots deck speed.

The FG.1 had a "combat take-off" weight of ~40,000 lb and a max take-off weight of ~58,000 lb. Its minimum launch speeds were 125 knots total at 44,600 lb, and 130 knots total at 50,000 lbs.

130 minus 91 for the BS5 means that the had to be at least 38 knots, while the waist BS-5A only required 25 knots WOD.

Hermes, on the other hand, would have required 43 knots WOD, and with her 28 knot maximum speed, this would require 15+ knots of actual wind for any form of strike mission.

The 31 knot speed of Ark & Eagle would reduce this to 12 knots for a bow launch, and the BS-5A waist cat could do launches in nearly all wind conditions, with a max-weight launch possible with only 4 knots or so of wind!

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Hermes' port cat (1966+) was a BS4A, rated to launch a 50,000 lb aircraft at 87 knots deck speed.

Eagle's & Ark Royal's bow catapults were BS-5s, rated to launch a 50,000 lb aircraft at 91 knots deck speed.
Eagle's (1964+) & Ark Royal's (1970+) waist catapults were BS5As, rated to launch a 50,000 lb aircraft at 105 knots deck speed, or a 60,000 lb aircraft at 95 knots deck speed.

The FG.1 had a "combat take-off" weight of ~40,000 lb and a max take-off weight of ~58,000 lb. Its minimum launch speeds were 125 knots total at 44,600 lb, and 130 knots total at 50,000 lbs.

130 minus 91 for the BS5 means that the had to be at least 38 knots, while the waist BS-5A only required 25 knots WOD.

Hermes, on the other hand, would have required 43 knots WOD, and with her 28 knot maximum speed, this would require 15+ knots of actual wind for any form of strike mission.

The 31 knot speed of Ark & Eagle would reduce this to 12 knots for a bow launch, and the BS-5A waist cat could do launches in nearly all wind conditions, with a max-weight launch possible with only 4 knots or so of wind!

Fascinating! Do you have equivalent figures for Centaur and Victorious?

 

[Riain]

Fascinating! Do you have equivalent figures for Centaur and Victorious?

BS4C ...139ft...175ft...35,000lb@99kt...Centaur 1958

The Vic has 145' BS4A, so would be 50,000lbs at 87kt.

 

[Riain]

Evolution of the RAF Transport Force 1947-57 not including helicopters, fixed wing short range transport aircraft and communications aircraft.

LRT = Long Range Transport
MRT = Medium Range Transport
HF = Heavy Freighter
ABF = Airborne Forces​

Actual Position 31/12/1947 - 213 aircraft (56 LRT, 128 MRT, 24 ABF and 5 flying boat) in 28 squadrons

Transport Command - Total 144 aircraft in 19 squadrons

56 aircraft in 7 LRT squadrons
64 aircraft in 8 MRT squadrons
24 aircraft in 4 ABF squadrons​

Mediterranean and Middle East Command (M.E.D.M.E.)

40 aircraft in 5 MRT squadrons​

Air Command Far East (A.C.F.E.) - 29 aircraft in 4 squadrons

24 aircraft in 3 MRT squadrons
5 aircraft in one flying boat transport squadron​

Source: National Archives File AIR20/6766/31265 Plan F​

Actual Position 31/03/1950 - 152 aircraft (72 LRT and 80 MRT) in 19 squadrons

Transport Command - 88 aircraft in 11 squadrons

72 in 9 LRT squadrons
16 in 2 MRT squadrons​

Middle East Air Force (formerly M.E.D.M.E.)

40 aircraft in 5 MRT squadrons​

Far East Air Force (formerly A.C.F.E.)

24 aircraft in 3 MRT squadrons​

Source: National Archives File AIR20/7085/31265 Plan G​

Actual Position 30/06/1952 - 114 aircraft (40 LRT and 74 MRT) in 15 squadrons

Transport Command - 50 aircraft in 7 squadrons

40 Hastings in 5 LRT squadrons
10 Valettas in 2 MRT squadrons - one regular at 8 U.E. and one RAuxAF at 2 UE.​

Middle East Air Force

40 Valettas in 5 MRT squadrons​

Far East Air Force

24 Valettas in 3 MRT squadrons​

Source National Archives file AIR20/8714/31265 Plan J Stage II​

The above was also the actual position on 31/12/1952 and 31/03/1953 - Source: National Archives File AIR20/8714/31265 Plan K

Actual Position 31/03/1954 - 116 aircraft(40 LRT and 76 MRT) in 14 squadrons

Transport Command - 52 aircraft in 6 squadrons

40 Hastings in 5 LRT squadrons
12 Valettas in one MRT Squadron​

Middle East Air Force

40 Valettas in 5 MRT squadrons​

Far East Air Force

24 Valettas in 3 MRT squadrons​

Source: National Archives File AIR20/15110/30150 Plan K (Star)​

Actual Position 31/12/1954 - 108 aircraft (40 LRT and 68 MRT) in 13 squadrons

Transport Command - 52 aircraft in 6 squadrons

40 Hastings in 5 LRT squadrons
12 Valettas in one MRT Squadron​

Middle East Air Force

32 Valettas in 4 MRT squadrons​

Far East Air Force

24 Valettas in 3 MRT squadrons​

Source: National Archives File AIR20/15110/30150 Plan L​

Actual Position 31/12/1956 - 104 aircraft (50 LRT, 8 HF and 10 MRT) in 11½ squadrons

Transport Command - 64 aircraft in 7 squadrons

40 Hastings in 4 LRT squadrons
6 Comets in one LRT squadron
8 Beverleys in one HF squadron
10 Valettas in one MRT squadron​

Middle East Air Force - 16 aircraft in 1½ squadrons

4 Hastings in half a LRT/HF squadron
12 Valettas in one MRT squadron​

Far East Air Force

24 Valettas in 3 MRT squadrons​

Source: National Archives File AIR02/14707/300150 Plan L​

Actual Position 30/06/1957 - 116 aircraft (48 LRT, 24 HF and 44 MRT) in 13 squadrons

Transport Command - 64 aircraft in 7 squadrons

30 Hastings in 3 LRT squadrons
10 Comets in one LRT squadron
24 Beverleys in 3 HF squadrons​

Middle East Air Force - 28 aircraft in 3 squadrons

AHQ Levant

8 Hastings in one LRT/HF squadron
8 Valettas in one MRT squadron​

British Forces Arabian Peninsular

12 Valettas in one MRT squadron​

Far East Air Force

24 Valettas in 3 MRT squadrons​

Source: National Archives File AIR02/14707/300150 Plan L​

 

[Riain]

Evolution of the RAF Transport Force 1957-75 not including helicopters and communications aircraft.
Actual Position 30/06/1957 - 112 aircraft (48 LRT, 24 HF and 44 MRT) in 13 squadrons

Transport Command - 64 aircraft in 7 squadrons

30 Hastings in 3 LRT squadrons
10 Comets in one LRT squadron
24 Beverleys in 3 HF squadrons​

Middle East Air Force - 28 aircraft in 3 squadrons

AHQ Levant

8 Hastings in one LRT/HF squadron
8 Valettas in one MRT squadron​

British Forces Arabian Peninsular

12 Valettas in one MRT squadron​

Far East Air Force

24 Valettas in 3 MRT squadrons​

Source: National Archives File AIR02/14707/300150 Plan L​

Actual Position 31/03/1964 - 164 aircraft (130 MRT and 34 Strategic Transport) in 16 squadrons

Transport Command - 96 aircraft (62 MRT and 34 Strategic Transport) in 8 squadrons

23 Britannias in 2 Strategic Transport squadrons
11 Comets (6 C Mk 2 and 5 C Mk 4) in one Strategic Transport squadron
30 Hastings in 2 MRT squadrons
8 Beverleys in one MRT squadron
24 Argossies in 2 MRT squadrons​

Near East Air Force (formerly AHQ Levant)

6 Hastings in one MRT squadron​

Air Forces Middle East (formerly British Forces Arabian Peninsular) - 26 aircraft in 3 squadrons

12 Beverleys in 2 MRT squadrons
14 Argossies in one MRT squadron​

Far East Air Force - 36 aircraft in 4 squadrons

12 Hastings in one MRT squadron
8 Beverleys in one MRT squadron
10 Argossies in one MRT squadron
6 Valettas in one MRT squadron​

Source: National Archives File AIR20/11708/68770 Plan P​

These are the first squadron patterns I have that are after the 1957 Defence Review and they are also the ones that were in force when the TSR.2, P.1154 and HS.681 were cancelled. The transport force was the only part of the RAF that was larger after the 1957 Defence Review.

In Plan P the transport force planned for 31/03/1975 was 102 aircraft (58 MRT and 44 Strategic Transports) in 11 squadrons

Transport Command 70 aircraft in 8 squadrons

15 Britannias in 2 Strategic Transport squadrons
4 Comet Mk 4 in one Strategic Transport squadron
8 Belfasts in one Strategic Transport squadron
13 VC.10s in one Strategic Transport squadron
4 Strategic Transport Replacements
26 HS.681 in 3 MRT squadrons​

Near East Air Force

6 Argossies in one MRT squadron​

Air Forces Middle East

12 HS.681 in 2 MRT squadrons​

Far East Air Force

14 HS.681 in 2 MRT squadrons​

Part of the reason for the reduction in the number of Britannias, Comets, Belfasts (from the 10 ordered) and VC.10s (from the 14 ordered) is that no backing aircraft were provided for the Unit Equipments they were therefore patterned as wasting assets by applying S.D.98 wastage rates. Although the source does not say so the Strategic Transport Replacement was to satisfy Air Staff Operational Requirement No. 364 (ASR.364) for an aircraft to replace the Britannia. There were to have been 21 Britannias on 31/03/1974 so it looks as if 2 ASR.364 replace 3 Britannias. That also fits in with other documents I have saying that 15 C-5 Galaxies were planned to replace the 23 Britannias.

None of the 31 Andovers planned had been delivered at this point and in Plan P they were classed as Short Range Transports (SRT). At 31/03/1964 the fixed wing SRT force consisted of:

20 aircraft (4 Pembrokes and 16 Twin Pioneers) in 3 squadrons in AFME
19 aircraft (9 Pembrokes and 10 Twin Pioneers) in one squadron in FEAF​

The planned fixed wing SRT force for 31/03/1975 was:

8 aircraft (4 Andovers and 4 S.R.T.V.T.O.L.) in one squadron in Transport Command
16 aircraft (8 Andovers and 8 Twin Pioneers) in 2 squadrons in AFME
16 aircraft (8 Andovers and 8 Twin Pioneers) in one squadron in FEAF​

The MRT and Strategic Transport forces that existed on 31/03/1975 were remarkably similar from the force planned in March 1964. There were:

5 strategic transport squadrons (2 Britannia, one Belfast, one Coment and one VC.10) in No. 46 (Transport) Group, RAF Strike Command, but there were more Britannias than planned and no Strategic Transport Replacements;
6 C-130K Hercules squadrons (5 No. 46 Group and one HS.681) instead of 5 HS.681 squadrons and one Argossy squadron. However, 66 Hercules aircraft had been delivered (65 C Mk 1 and 1 W Mk 2) against the 62 HS.681 required to support 52 aircraft in the 7 squadrons and the 6 aircraft needed by the OCU.​

The fixed wing SRT force had fared less well. There was only one Andover squadron and there were no Twin Pioneers because they had been withdrawn from front-line duties at the end of 1968.

This was 3 years after the East of Suez pullout was completed. All that remained (apart from the forces in Hong Kong) were one infantry battalion and supporting units (which with Australian and New Zealand battalions and supporting units formed an infantry brigade), a Whirlwind SRT helicopter squadron and a detachment of Nimrods which were the British contribution to the ANZUK Force in Singapore; one Royal Navy submarine providing the ANZUK naval force's submarine in rotation with the RAN, 6 Royal Navy frigates (2 ANZUK/SEATO, one Persian Gulf, one Beria Patrol, one Hong Kong guard ship and one to allow for refits, leave and time on passage); and the 5 converted Ton class minesweepers that formed the Hong Kong Patrol Squadron.

All these transport aircraft (and the 3 Victor tanker squadrons) were needed to send reinforcements to Malaysia and Singapore from the UK Strategic Reserve as part of the 5 power defence agreement between those two countries, Australia, New Zealand and the UK. IIRC there were several exercises to practice this in the first half of the 1970s. The British naval forces permanently based East of Suez were supplemented by twice yearly deployments of a task force with one Tiger class cruiser or County class destroyer, some frigates and a nuclear hunter-killer submarine. This was partly why the Royal Navy's commando carriers and Fearless class LPDs survived the East of Suez pullout although they had also found a new role, which was to reinforce NATO's flanks.

In fact the rapid reinforcement of British forces overseas from a strategic reserve located in the British Isles was the reason for the expansion of the RAF's transport force and the modernisation of the Royal Navy's amphibious forces under the 1957 Defence Review.

The UK abandoned its remaining East of Suez commitments (apart from Hong Kong where the forces were reduced) under the Mason Defence Review of 1974. This also led to the disbanding of 7 of the 12 fixed wing transport squadrons (leaving one VC.10 and 4 Hercules squadrons) and one of the 3 tanker squadrons. The Royal Navy's amphibious forces were also cut back. Plans to build 2 new commando carriers were abandoned and the 2 existing ships were to be paid off (but it was decided later to keep them as ASW carriers while the Invincible class was being built). Meanwhile one of the Fearless class became the cadet training ship at Dartmouth replacing the frigates in the Dartmouth Training Squadron and was rotated with the other one which was in refit/reserve.

The Mason Review also resulted in the withdrawal of most the forces permanently based in the Mediterranean. Near East Air Force at Cyprus (which at that time had 2 Vulcan squadrons, a Canberra PR squadron, a Lighting squadron, a Hercules squadron and a Wessex SAR squadron) was disbanded. The Vulcan, Canberra and Lighting squadrons were withdrawn to the UK. The NEAF Hercules squadron was one of the 2 Hercules squadrons that were disbanded. The Nimrod squadron at Malta was also disbanded. The destroyer and 2 frigates that were permanently based in the Mediterranean were also withdrawn.

 

[Riain]

Getting to the HMS Invincible.

In 1960 the RN Director of Plans began a series of studies of ships to replace the then authorised 5 cruisers, the main aim being to allow command for independent operations and also free space on carriers by having the large ASW helicopters and an area defence SAM system. Studies 6-9 were to destroyer standards and Study 21 to cruiser standards with Grade II flagship facilities. Studies 6-9 of 1960 looked a fair bit like contemporary Italian helicopter/SAM cruisers; 430-485' long and 5400-6800t with 45-6 Wessex helicopters Study 21, which culminated in Study 21M3 in March 1961 had a through-deck, Sea Slug SAM, twin 4.5" gun turret, 2 x quad Seacat SAM and 9 Wessex helicopter on 11,800t and 570'. It was thought that these ships could provide area SAM coverage and the final 4 County class DLGs would be delayed to build 4 of these ships, they would have the 988 Broomstick radar ADA/TIDE command facilities and cost 16.7 million pounds; this was the plan up to 1963 for ships to enter service in 1969-71.

In 1963, after rejecting a proposal for more helicopter training ships like HMS Engadine, it was decided to convert two Tiger class cruisers to be in service by 1966 and defer the ordering of the Escort Cruisers until 1969 when they could be equipped with the Sea Dart SAM. Blake entered refit in April 1965, work was halted during the 1965 Defence Review, restarted at reduced speed in March 1966, specification changed in in early 1967, caught fire in January 1969 and finally completed in April 1969. The Lion was placed in reserve in January 1966 and the Tiger laid up for preservation in December 1966 for her refit in July 1967, which took until July 1972 and cost over 13 million pounds on the original 5.4 million pound estimate. Virtually nothing in the original estimates back in 1963 proved to be correct in practice, however these conversions effectively killed the 'Escort Cruiser' concept.

In the meantime the CVA01 carrier, costed at 70 million pounds in January 1966, was cancelled in April 1966 and HMG announced the rapid rundown of the carrier force by 1972. In 1967 the Ark Royal went into refit for Phantoms which was presumed to be short and cheap to allow her to run to 1972. In the end this refit took 3 years and cost 32 million pounds. In 1970 the new Conservative Government reversed the Labour decision and prolonged the life of the Ark until 1978.

In 1966-67 in the wake of the cancellation of CVA01 and announcement of the rundown of the carrier force the RN successfully argued that a ship was needed to command the future destroyer/ frigate Maritime Contingency Forces (MARCONFOR), whether or not such a ship carried helicopters. One reason HMS Bristol was built after the cancellation of the carriers was because of her command facilities. In 1967 the command ship was the resurrected Escort Cruiser, 10,000 and 30 million pounds, but by 1969 the options were a half-deck ships with 6 Sea Kings and Sea Dart and a full deck ship with 9-12 helicopters. USN experience showed that 6 helicopters was too few leaving the full deck ship as the only option. This was to cost 35 million pounds for 9 helicopters and 36 mil for 12 helicopters in 1968 prices (CVA01 had been cancelled because 70 mill was too much for a strike carrier) and making the hangar big enough for all 12 helos was 37.5 mill but replacing the Sea Dart with Sea Wolf would only save 5 mill.

The command-helicopter ship teams discussed VTOL aircraft but the requirement ]was not justified with reference to it, these were added later and not ordered until 1975;

• 6 years after the GR1 entered service with the RAF.
• 5 years after the decision to end carrier flying was overturned.
• 2 years after the Invincible was laid down.

 

[steamboy]

RE the Invincible class, didn't the RN/MOD kind of not exactly tell the whole truth when trying to get the I's approved for construction, because the Govt didn't want carriers so the RN/MOD was like "Oh no they are NOT carriers...they are through deck cruisers..."

Kind of like what the JMSDF does with its Hyuga/Izumo class ships "Nope! Not carriers, destroyers!"

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Steam Catapults, sorry about the formatting.

Type....Shuttle Run..overall Length.........Capacity...........Classes
USN:
C11-2.....150ft...........203ft.........39,000lb@136kt ....Essex, Midway & FDR waist cat 1960s
.................................................7 0,000lb@108kt

C11-1.....215ft ..........240ft.........45,000lb@132kt...Kitty Hawk 1960s, Oriskany, Coral Sea (all),
.................................................7 0,000lb@108kt...Midway & FDR bow cats

C13........250ft ..........285ft.........78,000lb@139kt ..Enterprise, America 3, Kitty Hawk 1970s

C13-1.....310ft...........345ft.........?@?........... ..........Nimitz, America 1


RN:
BS5........151ft...........220ft.........35,000lb@ 126kt...Eagle 1964 (bow), Ark Royal (bow) 1970
.................................................5 0,000lb@91kt

BS5A......199ft...........268ft.........35,000lb@1 45kt...Eagle 1964 (waist), Ark Royal (waist) 1970
.................................................6 0,000lb@95kt

BS6........250ft...........320ft.........70,000lb@ 100kt...CVA01

BS4.....103ft...160ft...40,000lb@78kt...Mod Majestic, Hermes 1959
................................30,000lb@110kt

BS4M...112ft...169ft...?........................Melbourne 1971+

BS4C ...139ft...175ft...35,000lb@99kt...Centaur 1958

I remembered that I did this early on in the Eagle in the Falklands thread. Though I though (and I may be wrong in doing so) that Hermes was fitted with 2 BS4s with a shuttle run of 151ft when completed in 1959 and that Ark Royal was also completed with a pair of 151ft BS Mk 4 catapults. Also IIRC Victorious had BS Mk 4 catapults with shuttle runs of 145ft.

My guess is that the Admiralty wanted to fit Centaur and Victorious with the version of BS Mk 4 that had the 151ft shuttle run, but that there was insufficient space between the bow and the forward lift.

 

[Riain]

RE the Invincible class, didn't the RN/MOD kind of not exactly tell the whole truth when trying to get the I's approved for construction, because the Govt didn't want carriers so the RN/MOD was like "Oh no they are NOT carriers...they are through deck cruisers..."

Kind of like what the JMSDF does with its Hyuga/Izumo class ships "Nope! Not carriers, destroyers!"

That is a very persistent stop and I used to give it credence, however on close inspection of the history I don't think it's very true in official terms although in the many discussions with many people I'm sure it was bought up.

The through-deck layout was decided on way back in 1961 with Study 21 Escort Cruiser, its the best layout for operating large numbers of helicopters. As can be seen from the drawing below it had a gun turret, Sea Slug and Sea Cat SAMs.

By 1968 Study 22 has evolved somewhat.

But between these ships were Blake and Tiger, showing both the potential of the Command Cruiser and the serious shortfalls of the conversions themselves.

 

[Riain]

From about 1948-49 the Soviet threat loomed large and Britain, like others, developed a strategy to deal with the threat. Much like others they envisaged WW3 to be much like WW2 but with a few nuclear weapons and planned in terms of mass production. To deal with the Soviet sub threat the RN had a choice between an offensive strategy of carriers and amphibious forces or defensive with lots of escort to re-fight the Battle of the Atlantic, the RN chose the defensive/escort option and the ships below were the product of the programme to equip the RN.

From the appendices to Friedman's British Destroyers & Frigates:

Type 62:

1. Marne - Type 62 conversion cancelled 15/5/54
2. Meteor - Type 62 conversion cancelled 15/5/54

Type 15

1. Nepal - planned rebuild cancelled 5/54
2. Rapid - rebuilt 6/51 - 10/53
3. Relentless - rebuilt 1949-51
4. Rocket - rebuilt as prototype Type 15 7/49-51
5. Roebuck - rebuilt 1951-3
6. Troubridge - rebuilt 1955-7
7. Grenville - rebuilt 1953-4
8. Ulster - rebuilt 1954-6
9. Ulysees - rebuilt 1954-5
10. Undaunted - rebuilt 1951-4
11. Undine - rebuilt 1952-4
12. Urania - rebuilt 1953-5
13. Urchin - rebuilt 1952-4
14. Ursa - rebuilt 1952-4
15. Venus - rebuilt 1952-4
16. Verulam - rebuilt 1951-2
17. Vigilant - rebuilt 1951-2
18. Virago - rebuilt 1952-3
19. Volage - rebuilt 1952-4
20. Wakeful - rebuilt 4/51-53
21. Whirlwind - rebuilt 1952-3
22. Wizard - rebuilt 1953-4
23. Wrangler - rebuilt 1951-3
24. Zebra - rebuild started with removal of main armament 1954-5, but discarded instead
25. Zest - rebuilt 2/54-3/56

Type 16

1. Napier - chosen for conversion 6/2/51 but never carried out
2. Nerissa (later renamed Piorun in Polish service during WW2, and Noble on return to the RN) - planned rebuild not undertaken
3. Nizam - planned rebuild not undertaken
4. Norman - planned rebuild not undertaken
5. Orwell - rebuilt 1962
6. Paladin - rebuilt 1952-4
7. Petard (ex Persistent) - rebuilt 5/53 - 12/55
8. Teazer - rebuilt 1953-4
9. Tenacious - rebuilt 1/51-52
10. Termagant - rebuilt 1952-3
11. Terpsichore - rebuilt 1953-4
12. Tumult - rebuilt 1953-4
13. Tuscan - rebuilt 5/52-9/53 but remained in reserve
14. Tyrian - rebuilt 1951-2

Unclear

1. Myngs - placed in reserve pending Frigate conversion but sold to Egypt as El Qaher in 1955 instead

In 1957, again much like other countries, the dual thermonuclear warhead and ballistic missile meant this WW2-esque strategy was no longer appropriate; if countries got over-run like in WW2 the nukes would fly rather than a counter-invasion. Conventional forces would be used to fight 'Limited Wars' and nukes would deter WW3, which was the thrust of the infamous 1957 White Paper, and finally the RN got 5 fleet and lighter fleet carriers and 2 amphibious groups.

 

[Riain]

Though I though (and I may be wrong in doing so) that Hermes was fitted with 2 BS4s with a shuttle run of 151ft when completed in 1959 and that Ark Royal was also completed with a pair of 151ft BS Mk 4 catapults. Also IIRC Victorious had BS Mk 4 catapults with shuttle runs of 145ft.

Hermes was completed with 103' shuttle run BS4s, the same as HMAS Melbourne and other carriers, and was fitted with the 145' shuttle run BS4A in 1964-66 refit the same as the Victorious.

The final configuration of the Eagle and Ark Royal was bow 151' shuttle run BS5 and waist 199' shuttle run BS5A.

CVA01 would have had 250' BS6, but as all catapult talk that is infuriatingly vague and may refer to overall length or shuttle run. Given the early 60s BS5A shuttle run was 199' I think the next logical step would have been a 250' shuttle run in the BS6.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Hermes was completed with 103' shuttle run BS4s, the same as HMAS Melbourne and other carriers, and was fitted with the 145' shuttle run BS4A in 1964-66 refit the same as the Victorious.

To me it is strange that Hermes was completed with steam catapults that were shorter than those fitted to Centaur in her 1956-58 refit. I thought they would have been just as long as I presumed there would have been the same amount of space between the bow and the forward lift. If anything I though there would have been more space because Hermes had a deck edge lift.

I had also thought that the 103ft version of BS4 wasn't powerful enough to launch the Scimitar and Sea Vixen, but it must have been as Hermes operated both between her completion in 1959 and starting her 1964-66 refit.

 

[Zen9]

AI post '57 did continue, after abandoning the twin dish CW system RRE focused initially on frequency modulation of CW. This initially had good results on the ground but always had a backup DP system should things prove too difficult. That proved the case in 1962 flight tests, and the backup FMICW system was proceeded with, which proved a workable system by flight tests in 1964, though previous to this Treasury funding for AI set for the P1154RN began in 1963, this was for a dual band arrangement, X-band for the main set, and Q-band from a seperate set feeding through the same antenna for use in intense ECM.
Cancelation of the P1154RN didn't stop work on this, and it was given a new lease of life with the AFVG only to have that cancelled too.
RRE's AI team had being run down, when in 1970 MRCA requirements for AI set drove the formation of a new team, and with them a new design. Though the older set was reused for research. AI.24 was born and would utilise advancements made since the early 60's. This would undergo a protracted development, leading to no sets available when the first ADV OCU (Tornado F.2 Coningsby) was formed.

Meanwhile.....from the mid-70's onwards advances in Medium PRF lead Ferranti and MEASL to lead the RS&RE (formerly the RRE) to drive work on a lightweight AI set, re-using a development AI.24 set, the results formed the basis of Blue Vixen.