If he hadn't been assassinated? How would history have rated him, in comparison with his older brother?
Most people would say yes...
People with more political knowledge point to the fact that Humphrey would have won the 1968 nomination in any case, having more delegates and all...
But Maybe if he can stage a comeback in 1972 or 1976...
It is possible that Nixon could have still won. I think Kennedy would have had a better chance than Humphrey.
So. That said I believe RFK could win. It's not the most probable result or anything, Nixon was a disciplined and formidable man who had arguably the best campaign team ever assembled up to that point, but it could be done.Arthur Schlesinger said:Richard Harwood of the Washington Post and other newspapermen began to change their minds about the clamorous crowds. Maybe there was something more to it than demagoguery. "We discovered in 1968," Harwood said later, "this deep, almost mystical bond that existed between Robert Kennedy and the Other America. It was a disquieting experience for reporters.... We were forced to recognize in Watts and Gary and Chimney Rock [Nebraska] that the real stake in the American electoral process involved not the fate of speech-writers and fund-raisers but the lives of millions of people seeking hope out of despair."
Mitchell J. Freedman (How Bobby Kennedy Wins The 1968 Election) said:The largely unspoken fear, buried deep inside the consciousness of everyone surrounding Robert Kennedy, was that some nut was “out there” waiting to kill him. This unspoken fear was in the air before June 4, 1968 and was likely to intensify as Kennedy closed in on the nomination and the choice of a vice presidential running mate was being considered. Therefore, one would expect the kingmakers or those with “influence,” such as Mayor Daley, Walter Reuther of the United Auto Workers union, and other political insiders, to be adamant that Kennedy not choose a “nobody” governor the way Nixon did with the largely unknown Maryland governor, Spiro T. Agnew.
It was therefore probable that the choice would be a Southern Senator who was not up for re-election in 1968, and was willing to run on a national, presidential and vice presidential “ticket.” This immediately narrowed the field to Senator George Smathers of Florida and Senator Ralph Yarborough of Texas. Kennedy might also have considered a Midwestern Senator, such as Indiana’s Senator Vance Hartke, also a close Kennedy friend, with Indiana being a State that “thought South” on racial and other cultural issues. But Harkte was an elitist sort of personality compared to Smathers and Yarborough and would not likely have sufficient “coattails” to help Kennedy win in Indiana, let alone any other State.
There is a strong possibility that many leading Kennedy campaign managers would have counseled Kennedy to concentrate on the West, Mid-west and Northeast—and forget the South altogether. After all, Kennedy’s campaign had largely written off the South during the nomination process through June 4, 1968. However, Kennedy would have been the first to recognize he had to run a national campaign to defeat Nixon and keep Wallace from winning a plurality that would more likely send the nation into a political crisis that would remind people of 1860 more than any other presidential year. Therefore, Kennedy would have wanted to win the Electoral College votes of at least one of the two largest populated Southern States, which were (and remain) Texas and Florida, even if Kennedy failed to receive at least 50% of the popular vote against Nixon and Wallace.
Knowing what we know about Robert Kennedy’s experience in planning a successful political campaign, and with seasoned veteran advisers such as Larry O’Brien, Kenny O’Donnell, Joe Dolan, and Mayor Richard Daley—who each knew the importance of placating union leaders and members—Yarborough becomes the most likely choice by a process of elimination. Yarborough was a prairie liberal, more inclined to a “down-home” tone and phrasing that was beginning to be viewed as “conservative” in both urban and suburban environments. Yarborough was also a fearless and principled person who spoke with genuine feeling to white and black working class people. To understand Ralph Yarborough, who is largely forgotten today, one may think of Vermont’s independent politician, Bernie Sanders, with a Southern accent—but even that analogy may not really explain Yarborough’s appeal at that particular time.
A Kennedy-Yarborough ticket would likely have had a diverse and powerful punch that would put both Wallace and Nixon on the defensive, which would be the best way for Democrats to have won a campaign in an environment where more than half of registered Americans were still voting in national elections, where union voters constituted over 40% of the total national voters, and where farmers in rural mid-western States were very much caught up in Kennedy nostalgia, as Kennedy himself saw in rural Nebraska and Kansas where Kennedy traveled in the spring of 1968.
Does Robert Kennedy win in a “landslide,” meaning with 55% or more of the total “popular” vote? No. If Kennedy wins, which is likely, he wins with just over 50% of the vote. But, that popular vote victory also translates into a solid Electoral College win for Kennedy, based upon the demographic breakdown of States at that time. This would, among the factors, include a Kennedy victory over Nixon in Nixon’s home state of California (Nixon barely won against a lackluster Humphrey effort), and the Kennedy-Yarborough ticket winning Texas.
So. It would have been pretty nasty I admit but I could see RFK winning. The general, on the other hand, would be a bitch. Could he win? Maybe. Nixon has the edge, to be sure, but RFK has the name and… well, honesty.
Assuming a fight between Nixon and Kennedy, I'm almost at the position where I can't really see Kennedy losing, tbh, barring ASB. Obviously, it's not going to be a landslide, but Humprey came within under one percent of winning the popular vote. And this is Hubert Humphrey we're talking about. This is with Humphrey's personality, and his lacklustre campaign, and all the rest of it.
Surely Kennedy could have bettered this? Surely?
In 1968 Kennedy v. Reagan is a walk-over for Kennedy. You forget the times, four years earlier Goldwater, the Reagan exemplar had been destroyed, and Nixon was a moderate Republican. The country was not yet ready for the "Reagan Revolution".
Few points to ponder:
1) Nixon was not seen as a "crook" till after the 72 election.
2) Wallace is taking the 11 "solid South" states out of the Democratic fold because of the Civil Rights Act of 65
3) Reagan may not be eligible to be VP as he is a resident(read citizen) of the same state as Nixon (California).
It would have been tough given the War and the backlash at the CRA-65 for the Dem's to win, just note the much nastier defeat they suffered in 72 even though Nixon had not yet gotten the troops out of Nam.
As a Gene McCarthy volunteer in that campaign, I doubt it. First, the nomination process leading to the Chicago convention was heavily weighted in favor of party bosses and pro-war LBJ Democrats. Secondly, the presence of two antiwar candidates at the convention would have split the antiwar vote. There was no way McCarthy would have backed out to give RFK Room - we viewed Bobby as a shallow opportunist who only entered the campaign after McCarthy pushed the door open for him. Had Bobby not been assasinated, one of two things probably would have happened in Chicago: (1) Humphrey isnominated in the face of bitter opposition by a minority of the delegates in Chicago and with the street war even worse, or (2) Bobby cops out and accepts the VP position on a Humphrey-led ticket. (1) is essentially OTL, (2) could be interesting. I suspect a Humphry/Kennedy ticket would have won in November as there would be fewer "new Democrats" opting out of the general election.
Mitchell J. Freedman (How Bobby Kennedy Wins The 1968 Election) said:Let us begin with why people might reasonably conclude that Kennedy would not likely have won the presidential nomination. On the night Kennedy was shot, and despite having won the California and South Dakota primary elections, Kennedy was a distant second in pledged delegates to his main opponent, US Vice President, Hubert H. Humphrey. Humphrey, even after Kennedy’s victories in California and South Dakota, had amassed 994 pledged delegates to Kennedy’s 524 1/2 delegates. Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy, the other major candidate seeking the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination, was a distant third with just over 200 delegates. The “magic number” to secure the Democratic Party’s nomination for president that year was 1,312 delegates—which meant Humphrey appeared well on his way to winning the nomination.
If there was anything that should have worried Kennedy, it was the fact that, even in June 1968, almost half the delegates had not pledged to any of the three candidates, Humphrey, Kennedy or McCarthy. Some of these “undecided” delegates were pledged, instead, to what were (and still are) called “favorite son” candidates. Favorite son candidates were local or State candidates who were not actually running for president, but were merely a name for delegates to rally around, at least up to the beginning of the national convention, where the actual candidate would be chosen. As of June 4, 1968, there were 1,310 delegates who had not yet pledged to any candidate—which was almost half of the available delegates going to the convention.
Humphrey’s reaction to events leading up to the California primary, which, again, he did not enter, was strangely passive for a man who needed to kick it up a gear to defeat a charging Robert Kennedy. Unlike Eugene McCarthy, who had, by June 1968, become obsessed with anger against Kennedy, Humphrey retained a genuinely positive feeling for Kennedy. Just before the California primary election, Humphrey was in Denver, Colorado with one of his then-closest campaign managers, Ted Van Dyk. Humphrey told Van Dyk regarding the California election: “I want Robert Kennedy to win decisively. Robert Kennedy and I understand each other, we’re essentially straight-line liberal Democrats...”
Humphrey had also said, in a television interview about a week before the California primary election, that he was also willing to terminate his candidacy and step aside if Lyndon Johnson changed his mind and decided to seek re-nomination for president. When considering these statements, made in what was supposed to be a heated presidential nomination race, it becomes reasonable to conclude that Humphrey simply did not have as much “fire in the belly” as Robert Francis Kennedy to fight for the presidential nomination of his party. Unlike Humphrey, Kennedy was fighting to win and did not hesitate to criticize Humphrey. In a national interview with CBS newsman Roger Mudd, just before the California election, Kennedy belittled the “policies” Humphrey “espoused,” saying they would be neither “successful” for the Democratic Party or “the country…” Kennedy also tauntingly said that Humphrey would not fight the difficult fight to secure the nomination, reminding Mudd that Humphrey had abruptly dropped his previous campaign for president in 1960 after losing the primary in West Virginia to Jack Kennedy.
For those who still believe Humphrey would have won the nomination even if Kennedy had not been killed, consider that, after Kennedy was killed, and with Humphrey far ahead of McCarthy, the Democratic Party failed to immediately coalesce around Humphrey. In fact, Humphrey’s campaign essentially stalled. Mayor Daley, for example, believed Humphrey would be unable to carry Daley’s home state of Illinois against Nixon and would falter in other regions of the US, particularly in culturally conservative union strongholds such as New Jersey, Maryland, and non-union blue-collar states such as Florida. Throughout June and July, and up to a week before the national convention, Daley voiced criticisms of Humphrey with various elected officials and was attempting to recruit alternative presidential candidates, including the now martyred Robert Kennedy’s younger brother, the US Senator from Massachusetts, Edward “Ted” Kennedy.
Under an alternative scenario, where Robert Kennedy is alive and actively seeking the presidential nomination, consider that Robert Kennedy, unlike a relative loner such as McCarthy, had already impressed his fellow politicians as having a will to win. There were also more than a few powerful Senate colleagues who respected Kennedy for acting from principle in coming to his positions on the war in Vietnam and the “war” against poverty. On the stump as a presidential candidate, Kennedy had impressed more and more voters around the nation. This was a significant turnaround for Kennedy from 1967, where at least one poll showed Kennedy had a reputation among white voters (more professional class than working class, though) for “courting minorities,” or worse, a candidate who could not “unite” the voting public.
As for McCarthy and his advisers, before they heard the news about Kennedy being shot, they recognized that McCarthy’s opportunity to secure the nomination had collapsed with Kennedy’s latest victories. Worse for McCarthy, who by now was enraged at Kennedy for derailing his campaign, he had nobody but Kennedy to whom he could throw his support. If he threw his support to Humphrey, most of McCarthy’s supporters would have screamed that McCarthy “sold out”—because of Humphrey’s public stance supporting the continuation of the Vietnam War.As for McCarthy and his advisers, before they heard the news about Kennedy being shot, they recognized that McCarthy’s opportunity to secure the nomination had collapsed with Kennedy’s latest victories. Worse for McCarthy, who by now was enraged at Kennedy for derailing his campaign, he had nobody but Kennedy to whom he could throw his support. If he threw his support to Humphrey, most of McCarthy’s supporters would have screamed that McCarthy “sold out”—because of Humphrey’s public stance supporting the continuation of the Vietnam War.
In the early part of 1968, McCarthy famously cut down a Republican presidential contender, George Romney, who had criticized American generals for trying to “brainwash” him during a briefing on the Vietnam War. McCarthy’s response was that Romney’s brain would not need a “washing” to be fooled; only a “light rinse.” One could reasonably conclude that McCarthy’s acerbic wit and his anger against Robert Kennedy were two trains likely to collide, and produce a major “gaffe,” if Kennedy had stayed alive and in the race for the presidential nomination.
If the momentum continued to swing Kennedy’s way in the aftermath of Kennedy’s primary victory in California, and there is reason to believe the momentum had turned Kennedy’s way, Kennedy was going to win the New York primary on June 18, 1968. Again, with media attention focusing on the election as a “horse race” and openly discussing whether a candidate was “up” or “down” in the race to the nomination, and further, with Kennedy surrogates aggressively moving to secure the pledges of delegates around the country, there is also reason to believe that by the end of June 1968, Kennedy would likely be catching up to Humphrey—and McCarthy would be under great pressure to withdraw.
In Kennedy’s last campaign strategy session before he was shot, Kennedy had informed his staff he was now in a position to catch Humphrey in delegates and win the nomination. Kennedy told his staffers that he was going to meet with Daley and secure Daley’s support. He said if he secured Daley’s support, that would be “the ballgame.” Kennedy also said to his top staff that he was going to “chase Humphrey’s ass all over the country”, which meant he was ready to personally meet with delegates who had not pledged to any candidate, as well as those who had softly pledged to Humphrey.
If he hadn't been assassinated? How would history have rated him, in comparison with his older brother?
You might want to read Would RFK Have Won in 1968? at American Heritage.