AHC: Best Case for Germany by March 1918

The month that saw the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk also saw the start of the Spring Offensive, which, though poorly planned, still saw seemingly remarkable success in its early phases. Still, Germany was running against the clock -- not only to achieve success on the Western Front before the Americans fully mobilized, but to bring the war to a favorable (or as favorable as possible) conclusion before starvation and war weariness collapsed German society from within. (To say nothing of their allies.)

So, with no PoDs prior to this month, how well could Germany do after the war? If they can still win, how? If the cannot, what do they need to do in these final months for the defeat to be as soft as possible, and how much better (if at all) can this peace be for them? And, with these questions answered, how would history be different if the war had ended in this alternate way?
 
Spanish Influenza

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Bankruptcy

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Famine

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US Entry

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Defeat of the U-Boats

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US Loans to the Entente

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Collapse of the Other Central Powers

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Machinegun proof British tanks


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Hopelessness for Imperial Germany:(
 
I read somewhere attacking British troops rather than French was a big mistake. What if they had done the opposite? My Kaiserschlatch knowledge isn't as good as I'd like to, so I could be wrong.
 
They can win the Continental war in March-April - see Zabecki The German 1918 Offensives. After that forget it.

If they do, there could be a long naval war with GB and US, but no way for either side to knock out the other. So presumably there has to be a negotiated peace of some kind, as neither side can really get at the other.

If they fail, there's little chance of the later offensives achieving anything decisive, so things probably go much as OTL.
 
How about Ludendorff's two sons not being killed in action?

Somehow when discussing the General's conduct this never seems to come up (its not even in his Wikipedia entry), that the collapse in co-ordination and organisation of the German Army and the 1918 spring offensive could have come about due to something as simple as Human Nature is a poorly discussed area.

That Ludendorff was suffering from something as straightforward as PTSD, would explain a lot, especially things like the Black Day of the German Army comment!?
 
They can win the Continental war in March-April - see Zabecki The German 1918 Offensives.

I recall Ludendorff's bungling here -- his dismissiveness of having a well developed objective to the Michael Offensive did not help. "I object to the term 'operation. We will punch a hole into their line. For the rest, we shall see." Would having Amiens as a goal for the operation from the beginning be the big change needed? If said rail-hub is taken early enough in the offensive, what is left for Germany before it "wins" the Continental War, as you say?

And if Germany achieves this by summer, as you say, that only leaves them in a naval standoff with GB and the US, at best; meanwhile, the home-front is still suffering from the blockade, and the revolution is still brewing. Can Germany get her negotiated peace before this happens? If she can, what are the terms? For example, do they recognize the "gains" the Central Powers made in Eastern Europe? What of the world beyond Europe -- of German colonies, of the Ottoman Empire, what have you?


Now that you mention it, Ludendorff was acting pretty loopy around this time -- for example, he had developed a morbid attachment to his stepson's corpse, refusing to send it home to his wife because he couldn't bear to be apart from him.
 
I recall Ludendorff's bungling here -- his dismissiveness of having a well developed objective to the Michael Offensive did not help. "I object to the term 'operation. We will punch a hole into their line. For the rest, we shall see." Would having Amiens as a goal for the operation from the beginning be the big change needed? If said rail-hub is taken early enough in the offensive, what is left for Germany before it "wins" the Continental War, as you say?

The BEF had improvised plans to fall back behind Abbeville if Amiens fell, but these would have required nearly 90% of its arms and equipment to be abandoned or destroyed, so it will need rearming and reequipping virtually from scratch (Zabecki again). So the French Army now faces the Germans more or less alone. If that weren't enough, the British defeat means the loss of the Bethune coal mines which supplied 70% of the fuel for the munitions factories around Paris - so the French will be hit with crippling shortages at the worst possible moment.

So the Germans have an opportunity to defeat France. If they can push bit further south than OTL, they sever the rail links between Paris and the French armies, so cutting off their supplies. This leaves them no option but to fall back south, uncovering Paris. Since Paris is France's main industrial region, and the hub of all rail communications in the northern half of the country, it's pretty well all up for them.

I understand that the AEF was getting much of its supplies from the French, so they are in trouble too, and unlikely to be able to intervene in time to really help.

And if Germany achieves this by summer, as you say, that only leaves them in a naval standoff with GB and the US, at best; meanwhile, the home-front is still suffering from the blockade, and the revolution is still brewing. Can Germany get her negotiated peace before this happens? If she can, what are the terms? For example, do they recognize the "gains" the Central Powers made in Eastern Europe? What of the world beyond Europe -- of German colonies, of the Ottoman Empire, what have you?

I'm not sure what you mean by "revolution brewing". That only became a real threat in October, when the German government asked for an armistice, thus openly confessing defeat, and morale collapsed as a result. Even then, of course, it was a pretty half-hearted affair, with the dynasties falling but the rest of the ruling class staying pretty much in the saddle. Attempts at a real revolution were easily stomped by right-wing Freikorps. And that was after their leaders had led them to disastrous defeat! The blockade (combined with inefficient food distribution) certainly caused misery, but it only accentuated the collapse of morale brought on by the military failure. It didn't cause Germany's collapse, or come anywhere near to doing so. That was caused by events on the battlefield.
 
I'm not sure what you mean by "revolution brewing". That only became a real threat in October, when the German government asked for an armistice, thus openly confessing defeat, and morale collapsed as a result. Even then, of course, it was a pretty half-hearted affair, with the dynasties falling but the rest of the ruling class staying pretty much in the saddle. Attempts at a real revolution were easily stomped by right-wing Freikorps. And that was after their leaders had led them to disastrous defeat! The blockade (combined with inefficient food distribution) certainly caused misery, but it only accentuated the collapse of morale brought on by the military failure. It didn't cause Germany's collapse, or come anywhere near to doing so. That was caused by events on the battlefield.

I certainly respect this analysis; I've come across it before, though more recently I've been seeing more of the idea* that pacifism and defeatism were becoming rampant in Germany, and that massive social unrest (I think I misspoke when I said "revolution") was already brewing by 1918. It seems to be a matter of contentious historical debate, and one I don't feel qualified to definitively comment on here.

*Hew Strachman for the moment, though it also came up over Thanksgiving talking to a friend who I can safely say was more familiar with WWI than I
 
I certainly respect this analysis; I've come across it before, though more recently I've been seeing more of the idea* that pacifism and defeatism were becoming rampant in Germany, and that massive social unrest (I think I misspoke when I said "revolution") was already brewing by 1918.I


I think it depends what is meant by defeatism.

If it just means pessimism, I have no problem with that. I've no doubt at all that by 1918 many Germans were very pessimistic. Indeed I'd have thought that any German with eyes to see must have been getting pessimistic ever since (at least) April 1917.

If it means that Germans were so sick of the war that they preferred to lose it rather than continue it, I can't see much evidence for that prior to September 1918 at the earliest. As recently as June, when the Independent Socialists voted against the peace treaty with Rumania, their reward was to lose two Reichstag seats in by-elections. And Haig, in September, noted the sharp increase that month in German troops surrendering, observing that this was a new phenomenon, never observed before.

The civilian population, more removed from actual events at the front, was slower to change its mood, though it did so fast enough when the true situation was revealed.

All in all, the German situation in 1918 reminds me a lot of the French in 1917. Had Petain been a thicko like Ludendorff, and the year had ended in a French collapse, historians could find plenty of "inevitable" reasons for that.
 

Deleted member 1487

The point about defeatism in 1917-1918 was largely the result of the draconian labor laws passed by H-L, who tried to militarize labor at the behest of industrialists to break the trade union movement; labor revolted, quite rightly so, which started the various strikes and peace movements. This was the final insult of the Hindenburg Programm, which had caused the economic and food issues of with Winter 1916-17.
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gesetz_über_den_vaterländischen_Hilfsdienst

So the social unrest was a function of the labor-capital struggle that the military had been taken sides on for the whole war (Falkenhayn sided with labor, while Ludendorff tried to use the war as an excuse to pass laws to enact the fantasies of his industrialist supports) rather than it being a statement on ending the war immediately. That only came about after the German military was fully crushed in the field and it was obvious the military command had lost the war; continuing at that point was stupid and with the nation falling apart in late 1918 the revolutionaries, radicalized by the war and military's actions against them, moved to tear down the whole structure while they had the chance. Ludendorff tried to paint them as the reason Germany lost the war after the fact while he was in exile in Sweden avoiding war crimes trials and the anger of the German people. The Stabbed in the Back Myth thus was his attempt to rehabilitate himself so he could come home, while Allied generals praised him and helped him narrative.
 

Ah, now it's starting to make sense -- in short then, the pacifism and defeatism spreading in Germany around this time was the labor movement revolting against the Hindenburg Program. (Man, and I thought I disliked Ludendorff before when I mostly knew him for his role in the Beer Hall Putsch.)
 

Deleted member 1487

Ah, now it's starting to make sense -- in short then, the pacifism and defeatism spreading in Germany around this time was the labor movement revolting against the Hindenburg Program. (Man, and I thought I disliked Ludendorff before when I mostly knew him for his role in the Beer Hall Putsch.)

They had a lot of other issues with the war in general, but also the government and 'mainstream' socialist movements, plus had some support from the navy after the leadership decided to do a suicide mission to salvage the reputation of the naval command at the end of the war (who would not be on the mission AFAIK and why would the sailors want to die in a suicide mission after the war was lost?), so by the end of 1918 there was a confluence of several things that started with the revolt against the labor law. Of course Ludendorff was a horrible person, in fact he was the proto-Hitler and mentored him in the early 1920s, essentially setting him on his path and kindling his genocidal notions about the Jews. Frankly him eating a bullet in 1914 at Liege would have been one of the best things for history.
 
Now that you mentioned it, it's crossed my mind that Lundendorff getting assassinated in our OP month might do wonders to save Germany from incompetence not only on the Western Front, but the homefront as well.
 

Garrison

Donor
I read somewhere attacking British troops rather than French was a big mistake. What if they had done the opposite? My Kaiserschlatch knowledge isn't as good as I'd like to, so I could be wrong.


Thing is the British defences had been weakened by a large scale reorganization of both division structure and defensive doctrine. The French army may have been resitve but they were pretty solid on the defence so it probably wouldn't have made much difference. The reality is the gains the Germans made were largely the allies trading space for time, even if they didn;t quite realize they were doing it.

Now that you mentioned it, it's crossed my mind that Lundendorff getting assassinated in our OP month might do wonders to save Germany from incompetence not only on the Western Front, but the homefront as well.

But who would replace him? Is there anything in the track record of the senior German generals to suggest any of them would do better?

I wonder if the best bet for Germany in 1918 wasn't a pullout in the west, offering the Entente status quo ante, and lookign to hold on to their gains in the east. Of course that assume the Kaiser could be talked into giving up territory and the Entente being sufficiently war weary to take such a deal; neither of which I'm convinced of.
 
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Garrison

Donor
I read somewhere attacking British troops rather than French was a big mistake. What if they had done the opposite? My Kaiserschlatch knowledge isn't as good as I'd like to, so I could be wrong.


Thing is the British defences had been weakened by a large scale reorganization of both division structure and defensive doctrine. The French army may have been resitve but they were pretty solid on the defence so it probably wouldn't have made much difference. The reality is the gains the Germans made were largely the allies trading space for time, even if they didn;t quite realize they were doing it.
 
So the consensus seems to be: Germany can defeat the Allies if they capture Amiens during the Spring Offensive. Otherwise they will end up just as bad as OTL, if not worse off.

Sound right?
 

Deleted member 1487

So the consensus seems to be: Germany can defeat the Allies if they capture Amiens during the Spring Offensive. Otherwise they will end up just as bad as OTL, if not worse off.

Sound right?

Basically yes, but it requires then the capture of Hazebrouk in Flanders thereafter to make it a war winner. Once that is done Britain is defeated and a non-factor for several months if not up to a full year or more thanks to losing all their heavy equipment, probably the government falling, their having to be evacuated from the continent and reformed in Britain, needing to defend Britain to placate the public over invasion fears, and of course the huge investments needed to defend the English Channel now that the Dover Barrage and Patrol are useless. France is basically on its own and its munitions factories are now shut down around Paris, so they are going to be short of shells and new weapons, which probably prevents the US from being a factor until its too late. The French army's morale is likely shot, as it now is defending an even longer line than ever, while the Germans gain hundreds of thousands of soldiers that have been freed up from having to fight the British north of the Somme. The Germans outnumber them significantly, even with whatever US forces are available and whatever Allied troops they can muster for their reserves. The Germans will breakthrough at some point, at which point the French either ask for an armistice or the Germans eventually take Paris and then the French pretty much capitulate and their army starts dissolving. US manpower is effectively useless as the US depended on the French for weapons, while the French army is beaten and barring some units remaining willing to fight the vast majority will just want to go home and start falling apart like the Russians did in 1917.
 
Basically yes, but it requires then the capture of Hazebrouk in Flanders thereafter to make it a war winner.

Uh... nothing about the geography of this makes it a war-winner. While Amiens is a nice center of rail transport, there are others further west and the channel ports are still in all cases perfectly functional. The BEF is hardly isolated by Amiens falling and the German offensive is incapable of pulling off the requisite encirclement.
 
Uh... nothing about the geography of this makes it a war-winner. While Amiens is a nice center of rail transport, there are others further west and the channel ports are still in all cases perfectly functional. The BEF is hardly isolated by Amiens falling and the German offensive is incapable of pulling off the requisite encirclement.

This is what Google gives me for "France rail 1914":

EuroRailNetwork-.jpg
loc_wf_1916.GIF

WWOne02.gif


So it seems there is a rail-line through Rouen that goes to the sea.
 
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