Major Japaneses victory in the Imjin War

PoeFacedKilla

PoeFacedKilla

Banned
Historyman 14 said:
What if Japan had won the Imjin War? Could major victories like at Haengju, Hansan Island, or Jinju make it happen?
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What do you mean by win? Controlling all of Korea and the Ming; thats not possible.

controlling Korea, is possible but difficult if you can somehow knock the Ming out of the war. I don't see that as likely since, as a comparison, France is 3x Britains size and they were never able to directly stand up against France especially not on their own territory; now times that by 3 as China is about 10x Japans size and you see how difficult that is. It would take such a decisive battle that the Chinese don't want to continue on, and from what little I know about Chinese history that would be a hell of a lot more than the Japanese can throw.

Now maybe somehow you could seriously mess up China to where the Japanese are able to pull a Britain in India and found a new dynasty but then that would change the face of the war all together.
 

MonAngel

Historyman 14 said:
What if Japan had won the Imjin War? Could major victories like at Haengju, Hansan Island, or Jinju make it happen?
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I think Japanese practically won the war, but they didn't had any clear goal. What was goal of Imjin War?
- The base for invasion of Ming : - Totally impossible. This is just ridiculous idea that Japan could have inavde Ming.
- Fully occupy Korea peninsula: - Practically impossible. Han, Tang, Khitans, Mongols and Qing show us that cost of occupying Korea was very high. I doubt Japan could shoulder such a cost.
- Make Korea puppet regime : - It is most plausible scenario. Making Korea like Goryeo under Yuan was very possible. In order to do it Japanese need to win big against Ming, then force Ming to accept Korea becoming Japanese puppet.
 

WhatIsAUserName

MonAngel said:
I think Japanese practically won the war, but they didn't had any clear goal. What was goal of Imjin War?
- The base for invasion of Ming : - Totally impossible. This is just ridiculous idea that Japan could have inavde Ming.
- Fully occupy Korea peninsula: - Practically impossible. Han, Tang, Khitans, Mongols and Qing show us that cost of occupying Korea was very high. I doubt Japan could shoulder such a cost.
- Make Korea puppet regime : - It is most plausible scenario. Making Korea like Goryeo under Yuan was very possible. In order to do it Japanese need to win big against Ming, then force Ming to accept Korea becoming Japanese puppet.
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How would Japan make Korea a puppet state without occupying the whole peninsula? Far more people fought against the Japanese, while basically nobody fought for them.

Japan could easily have caught King Sŏnjo. Apparently there was the idea that he would flee to the northeast instead of the area along the Yalu. But if that was the case, it'd be likely that Kato Kiyomasa's forces would have caught him, since Kato's men found two other princes that had fled there. If Japanese forces caught the Korean crown prince (who I think would be with the king), then at the very minimum the Japanese would have enough for a puppet government.

After that, the more difficult challenge would be persuading the Ming government not to get involved. There were people who opposed the Ming intervention, but not enough to change the Emperor's mind.
 

Captain Jack

There was a timeline on the Old version of the board about this very subject. IIRC Japan won due to Spanish assistance (in the form of ships) which enabled them to defeat the Korean navy. Pretty good read.
 

democracy101

Historyman 14 said:
What if Japan had won the Imjin War? Could major victories like at Haengju, Hansan Island, or Jinju make it happen?
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Essentially impossible for various reasons. Here are some of the points I made previously in other threads:

democracy101 said:
This is virtually impossible. While Japan might have been able to hold the peninsula for a few years if things had turned out differently, the invaders would almost certainly be pushed out after the brief occupation. This was mostly because most of the Korean navy and army, which was scattered throughout the peninsula, operated independently of the weak government, and conducted numerous guerrilla operations in order to stall the Japanese . . . your scenario is technically possible only if the vast majority of the generals and admirals are assassinated or butterflied away, which is ASB in itself, and probably not even then, as others will take their place.

It might have had a large army, but the fact that the Koreans matched them in terms of manpower within 1-2 years, despite the fact that it had half the population and was completely unprepared for an attack from the south, suggests that the Japanese would not be able to make significant progress, regardless of the situation. The Koreans had consistently maintained a standing military for centuries . . . In addition, the Koreans were vastly outnumbered in specific key battles, but won many of them, mostly due to the geography and stiff resistance.

Most likely not, as the military assistance by the Ming during the Imjin War was mostly conducted by a token force, and the navy was largely uninvolved.
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democracy101 said:
Extremely unlikely . . . the Japanese would either have to sweep through most of the peninsula, but bypass several key regions, allowing guerrilla forces to eventually wreck havoc, or take Gyeongsang and Jeolla, but allow the Korean army and navy to recover and eventually drive the Japanese out.

To sum up the situation, the quote in my sig [note: deleted a while ago] roughly translates to "(Your majesty), I still have 12 ships," which was stated by Yi Sun-shin in response to the government's order to . . . join the army in 1597. Won Gyun, after being pressured by the government to enact flawed strategies if he didn't want to be imprisoned for treason, had recently lost virtually his entire navy . . . which left Yi Sun-shin to confront around 333 Japanese ships on October 26th with a barely functioning navy. In other words, the Koreans are going to fight to the end regardless of the situation, which means that even if the Japanese managed to gain de facto control over a significant part of the peninsula, the numerous guerrilla campaigns and holdouts will eventually force the invaders to retreat within a few years.
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democracy101 said:
The Koreans lost most of the initial battles against the Japanese because the latter were better trained, although they were stalled multiple times because [of] guerrillas, led by generals such as Gwak Jae-u and Kwon Yul . . . In addition, the naval battles were extremely one-sided, with only one Japanese victory. Most of the guerrilla campaigns were not recorded, but some, such as conflicts in Ichi and Jeongamjin, prevented the Japanese from invading Jeolla in the first invasion. The two generals also came up with ideas to fool the Japanese into retreating without confronting them directly . . . in Jinju . . . [and] Dokwang . . . [causing] the invaders to retreat.

Meanwhile, most of the [Korean] conventional victories on land . . . occurred in the north, when the Chinese began to gradually send reinforcements . . . Even though many of the initial battles were essentially sieges, the Koreans were unable to defend themselves efficiently mostly due to the lack of training, along with low numbers. However, Haengju, which was under Kwon Yul's command, was a notable example in which the defenders won, even though they were outnumbered around 10:1.

In other words, while the Japanese eventually suffered from numerous conventional defeats, causing them to retreat altogether, they were also stalled and defeated by hit-and-run attacks on both land and sea various times beforehand, which severely disrupted their supply and attack routes throughout the two invasions.
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democracy101 said:
As stated above, the Korean navies technically did not directly confront the Japanese ones in order to completely destroy their fighting capabilities, but in order to prevent them from reaching their objectives . . . The first and second invasions also differ significantly in substance, as the Japanese were forced to bypass Jeolla in the first one in order to head north, allowing the Korean navies and guerrillas to attack and resupply from that region, while the second invasion was limited to Gyeongsang and Jeolla, allowing supplies and reinforcements to be effectively stationed in the north, not to mention the Japanese objectives.

[A] combination of conventional and guerrilla warfare contributed to the invaders' eventual defeat. Although the former eventually provided the final blow, the latter was crucial in order to stall the Japanese significantly and eventually prevent them from taking . . . the peninsula, along with allowing reinforcements to arrive from the north.
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In other words, the Japanese would eventually be pushed out due to widespread resistance.

WhatIsAUserName said:
How would Japan make Korea a puppet state without occupying the whole peninsula? Far more people fought against the Japanese, while basically nobody fought for them.
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In agreement here, given the points that I provided above.

WhatIsAUserName said:
Japan could easily have caught King Sŏnjo. Apparently there was the idea that he would flee to the northeast instead of the area along the Yalu. But if that was the case, it'd be likely that Kato Kiyomasa's forces would have caught him, since Kato's men found two other princes that had fled there. If Japanese forces caught the Korean crown prince (who I think would be with the king), then at the very minimum the Japanese would have enough for a puppet government.
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If the Japanese somehow managed to hold Seonjo hostage, the Japanese might attempt to use this as propaganda, but it wouldn't have made a major difference in the long run. The crown prince was proclaimed due to the war, as there was a deadlock among several candidates, while a potential one had died while fleeing from the Japanese, forcing the ruler to appoint Prince Gwanghae over an unstable prince. Afterwards, while Seonjo continued to head north to the border with the Ming while virtually leaving everyone else behind, the crown prince decided to remain in Pyongyang and resist the invaders by recruiting soldiers while gathering resources in order to aid the people. While I can't find specific figures on the army under Gwanghae's command, I would assume that the majority operated as guerrillas in the mountains, given that they were located in Hamgyeong and Jeolla, suggesting that he actively moved to different regions in need and making it virtually impossible for the Japanese to pinpoint him to a specific location. He also evaded capture when the invaders briefly seized Pyongyang from July of 1592 to January of 1593, again suggesting that he moved around with guerrillas within disparate locations.

These points demonstrate that Prince Gwanghae effectively acted as the de facto ruler after 1592 by commanding troops during the war and supervising the reconstruction process afterwards in place of his father, not to mention that Seonjo personally opposed his son's actions due to the concern that the prince might end up gaining undue influence. As a result, Seonjo's capture might actually cause the people to flock to his son instead, given that he had actively responded to his people's concerns as best as he could.

WhatIsAUserName said:
After that, the more difficult challenge would be persuading the Ming government not to get involved. There were people who opposed the Ming intervention, but not enough to change the Emperor's mind.
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Agreed as well.
 
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