WI: British Experimental Mechanised (later Armoured) Force wan't disbanded

I've been reading up on British Tanks design and production during the inter-war period, and I came across the Experimental Mechanised Force. This was a brigade-sized formation of the British Army in was intended to investigate and develop techniques and equipment for armoured warfare. It was an all-arms brigade, composed of:
a Tank Battalion;
2 reconnaissance groups;
a Mechanized Infantry Battalion;
Mechanised Artillery Brigade;
Mechanized Light Artillery Battery;
and a Mechanised Royal Engineers Company.

This force existed for about 2 years, during which time it participated in numerous exercises, nearly always being successful, before being disbanded in 1929 due to opponents and several problems, such as the need for armoured personnel carriers for the infantry to keep up with the tanks, that were too expensive to solve.

So, my question is:
How would British Tank design of the inter-war period develop if the Experimental Mechanised Force was not disbanded in 1929, but instead was continued, and indeed expanded?

Would British tactics with regards to tanks and mechanised infantry brigades alter from operating independently to operating as an all-arms doctrine?

Would Britain even develop the "Cruiser", "Medium" and "Infantry" tank doctrine if the EMF was not disbanded?

Have a look for the tank force Britain sent to Egypt in response to italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1936. I think the 36 force used much of the 29 force's gear.

pedmore1202 said:

How would British Tank design of the inter-war period develop if the Experimental Mechanised Force was not disbanded in 1929, but instead was continued, and indeed expanded? Would British tactics with regards to tanks and mechanised infantry brigades alter from operating independently to operating as an all-arms doctrine? Would Britain even develop the "Cruiser", "Medium" and "Infantry" tank doctrine if the EMF was not disbanded?

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I've been led to believe that up until the 30s Britain was actually following medium 'universal' tank paired with a light tank for reconnaissance strategy, it was the failures of the two A6 and A7 tank development programmes - both technical problems and cost issues IIRC - at around the same time that caused them to reconsider things and decide on the cruiser/infantry tank split. The easiest thing to avoid this then that I can see is to have one of the programmes be more successful, have the government decide that they're worth the money or decide that third time's the charm and continue with another universal tank attempt.

I actually asked this question about eight months back with the No British Cruiser/Infantry Tank Split? thread. It's got some very interesting examples such as the seven British B11E5 armoured half-tracks which were part of the Mechanised Force that would make an intersting starting point for an armoured personnel carrier. The German Katzchen and Swedish PBV301 that grew out of the Czech pre-war Panzer 38(T) are also pretty good.

I think the major changes would be in armoured div organisation early war, the 42 structure division from the start rather than the abomination of the early war structure and shown up the flaws in armoured doctrine and proven an AT doctrine.
In terms of equipment not so much due to finance. There might be a slightly better cruiser in 40 but on paper at least A13 is a good tank for 1939-40 and reasonable in 41. Crusader is reasonable in 42 and if it had had a decent HE round. No likely BEF force is going to save France given OTL events.
I think debates about infantry tanks miss the point that the rich armies (UK and US) did use infantry accompanying tanks throughout the war successfully, see the Churchill and M4 in independent tank bn in US service.

Gannt the chartist said:

There might be a slightly better cruiser in 40 but on paper at least A13 is a good tank for 1939-40 and reasonable in 41. Crusader is reasonable in 42 and if it had had a decent HE round.

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Hell, the Matilda II was pretty much a match for anything the Germans and Italians had in the first year or two of the war IIRC. All you really need to do is have them actually manufacture the high-explosive shell for the two punder gun and thin out the armour a bit in places for a more universal design so that it's lighter and hopefully therefore somewhat faster and more reliable.

One thing it might do is lead to joint infantry-armor training & doctrine, which butterflies the persistent British stupidity in the desert...& probably means victory even over Rommel.

If you mean the tanks charging ahead I thought that had more to do with the tank guns not having the range to match the German anti-tank guns so they had to close it as quickly as possible, unfortunately meaning they outpaced their infantry support. That or they could of just been overcome by the usual cavalry silliness.

Simon said:

If you mean the tanks charging ahead I thought that had more to do with the tank guns not having the range to match the German anti-tank guns so they had to close it as quickly as possible, unfortunately meaning they outpaced their infantry support. That or they could of just been overcome by the usual cavalry silliness.

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Nope you're right, the main issue with the "charge" was the need to close that so that they coould get their guns into action. Once the Grant/Lee was available they finally had a weapon that could fire a HE shell at a decent range and the need to close the gap diminished.

I have never understood the cavalry charge to close the distance. This is exactly what smoke is intended for. To either screen tanks while they withdraw or osbcure the vision of the enemy while you close with him. Hence the 3.7ln Mortar(Howitzer) Ordnance QF Mk 1 fitted to a proportion of British early war tanks. Never mind ordinary artillery and mortar smoke rounds. Wind direction (if not strength) is not so important if you are dropping the smoke rounds on the enemy positions.

Having had it done to me I can assure you that there is no way you would see any advancing tank until it is within pointy stick distance.

a small but perfectly formed BEF armoured component

I asked a similar question on a another forum some time ago

http://panzercentral.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=93&t=48178

I am in the embryonic stages of a AH story (rewriting something a started some time ago) that envisages a better funded (though similarly sized) BEF which takes as an assumption that the EMF carrys on and that doctrine by 1940 is more combined arms - as indeed it was in 1918 rather than OTL.

I think as one of the other respondents said that the main changes would have been doctrinal rather than radical changes to force structures - the BEF was already mechanised much more than its horse drawn contemporaries.

Keeping the EM(A)F together and combining it with Lidden-Hearts theories would basically equal Britskrieg. If it was embraced by the armed forces and government (all this mechanised stuff is expensive and we're a bit pinched for cash now..) and the UK tanks steer clear of the one tank for one role AND ONLY ONE ROLE! trap it fell into then perhaps with adequate funding it could change the outcome of the battle of france, but even then you're still weighed down by the French and their utterly obsolete doctrine.

Well the British army was already fairly highly motorised, IIRC all their troops were at the least lorried infantry plus their supply chains unlike the Germans who were still using freaking horses. The main things I think are going to be possibly adoption of blitzkrieg warfare type tactics and coming from that/parallel with that the introduction of infantry half-tracks or full-on armoured personnel carriers. Which considering how compared to the Americans the British had a much more limited supply of infantry would be a major benefit in itself, witness Operation Goodwood.

Simon said:

If you mean the tanks charging ahead

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I was thinking more of the completely separate doctrine & operational theory. IIRC, Wavell tried to fix it, only to have his new methods thrown out by Monty.

Charging tanks

This is more than trying to close the range. Though the crews probably were doing that.

It is a genuine belief by significant elements of the British armoured establishment (RAC more than RTR) that tanks could do anything and did not need infantry or artillery support.

The 39/40 amd div gives 6 tanks to 2 inf Bn and 2 troops of medium guns. There is really no option for a british armoured division commander with that structure other than to charge.

The EMF is on paper at least more balanced and if experimentation continued its likely that something like the 42 division with 3 amd Rgt, 4 inf Bn and two Field regiments.

But I dont think you will ever see a Panzer division type maneuver organisation The British were not planning nor did they need to fight a rapid war of maneuver in order to defeat their enemies. War planning would see a genuine difference in the needs of a formation tasked with breaking into a dug german position on the new western front and a formation tasked with rapid exploitation after the breakthrough.

In terms of sexy theory written about pre war the first becomes a Shock army loaded with KV/JS and SU direct fire weapons to blast a hole the second an Operational maneuver group loaded with T26 as supply columns and map depots dont fight back.

Very quickly (42) the British become a tank heavy force anyway and the practical difference between a British armoured and Infantry division in europe is verging on the cosmetic (same for US) hence the 2nd NZ infantry div's semi official german designation is 2nd New Zealand Panzer Grenadier Division (shock) just to get the point over.

"Very quickly (42) the British become a tank heavy force anyway and the practical difference between a British armoured and Infantry division in europe is verging on the cosmetic (same for US) hence the 2nd NZ infantry div's semi official german designation is 2nd New Zealand Panzer Grenadier Division (shock) just to get the point over."

Really? That is pretty funny. I may start referring to them as that.

"My great uncle was a Panzer Grenadier when we fought the Hitlerites"

The real importance of the Experimental Force is that it founded modern armoured warfare. The Germans obtained a copy of the Force's Report of Proceedings through the British traitor Baillie-Stewart, and the Russians got a copy through the ARCOS spy-ring (together with the plans of the 'Independent' tank which inspired the T35). Years ago an author claimed that the US also had one, though he didn't specify how this happened. In each case the report was translated and issued as the doctrine for armoured warfare...

Julius

If you really want to impress you can add that the intel document with that had a note beside it - ALARM, detection of this formations means an attack within 24 hours and MUST be reported to fuhrerheadquarters.

which upon discovery led to lots of people and things with appropriate formation signs appearing all over the place.

Gannt the Chartist said:

It is a genuine belief by significant elements of the British armoured establishment (Royal Armoured Corps more than Royal Tank Regiment) that tanks could do anything and did not need infantry or artillery support. The 39/40 armoured division gives 6 tank to 2 infantry battalions and 2 troops of medium guns. There is really no option for a British armoured division commander with that structure other than to charge. The Experimental Mechanized Force is on paper at least more balanced and if experimentation continued its likely that something like the 42 division with 3 armoured regiments, 4 infantry battalions and two field regiments.

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Hhmm. You think they might end up going for something roughly similar to modern day set-up of an armoured division made up of a pair of square brigades containing two armoured regiments and a pair of lorried infantry battalions? Or would they stick to keeping the armour and infantry in separate brigades?

I think the organisation would have separate brigades, the practice maybe not not so much its really only swapping out one Tk bn for an inf bn.

In the end with experience all armoured forces ended up with roughly the same shape and I expect post war organisations reflected late war actual practice. (except the pentanomic but thats due to LSD being legal at the time)

Simon said:

If you mean the tanks charging ahead I thought that had more to do with the tank guns not having the range to match the German anti-tank guns so they had to close it as quickly as possible, unfortunately meaning they outpaced their infantry support. That or they could of just been overcome by the usual cavalry silliness.

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The best way to deal with anti-tank guns is with an artillery and/or air strike. British tanks were charging anti-tank guns or gun lines even when they were 37mm in calibre, it happened at least twice in France 1940 - first at the battle of Arras it was because the other troops had been picked off, and secondly (I think it was at Abeville) because artillery support had been promised but never arrived (in the second action, a German 37mm anti-tank gunner won the Iron Cross for staying with his gun and knocking out the British tanks).

Do you think a 40mm (2 pdr) HE shell would be much better than a 40mm AP shell at knocking out an anti-tank gun? Some people argue that there was no need for an HE shell because the small calibre meant an HE shell wouldn't do much damage.