This is one of the best-known what-ifs of Finnish military history, but I haven't seen a thread about it around here yet.
The background:
The Finnish Army was one of the last Axis forces to conduct offensive operations in Soviet territory in winter 1941 - in fact the Finnish forces halted after capturing Povenets on 6th of December, 1941 - coincidentally on the same day when United Kingdom officially declared war to Finland, Hungary and Romania.
On the same time Finnish HQ was considering their future options. Despite the relatively heavy casualties of the offensive phase of late summer and autumn of 1941, Finnish troops had achieved their immediate operational goals: all territories lost in the Winter War had been recaptured, and the frontlines had been pushed deep to Eastern Karelia to isthmuses between Ladoga, Onega and to Medvezegorsk and Povenets.
Initially Finnish CnC, Mannerheim, seemed rather eager for joint German-Finnish offensive operations against Murmansk Railroad. "According to his view, Murmansk, Kandalaksha, and Sorokka (Belomorsk) must be taken during the present winter - the sooner, the better. He advocated the beginning of January as the best time to launch a winter offensive."
"On 14th of December, following a staff conference at Finnish Army Headquarters, Mannerheim and Falkenhorst met at Falkenhorst's headquarters in Rovaniemi. By then, because of the railroad situation, which he described as catastrophic, Mannerheim was taking a dim view of the Kandalaksha operation--so dim, according to Falkenhorst, that he was unwilling to risk involving Finnish troops in it.
On the other hand, he maintained that the British declaration of war on Finland and the United States' entry into the war had given the Murmansk Railroad greatly increased significance, and it would have to be cut. He believed Belomorsk was the key point and proposed converging attacks from the west and southwest by combined German and Finnish forces. The OKW promptly accepted the change in the operation and offered him the 7th Mountain Division, then still expected to arrive in Finland during the winter.
Before long, however, as the Soviet winter offensive developed, Mannerheim's determination flagged again. On 20 January, General der Infanterie Waldemar Erfurth, chief of the OKW liaison staff at Finnish Army Headquarters, reported that the question of a Belomorsk operation was completely up in the air and Mannerheim would not make a positive decision unless the situation on the German front, particularly around Leningrad, improved. Erfurth could only recommend that all possible means of persuasion be brought to bear on Mannerheim. The other Finnish officers he thought were less pessimistic, but none of them had any influence.
During the following months ~27300 Finns, veterans from the fighting of Winter War and previous summer were busily preparing for the operation, along with the already famous Armored Brigade of the Finnish Army. These same units had advanced accross the lightly fortified new Soviet-Finnish border region in summer 1941 and then moved forth hundreds of kilometers in a similar terrain. They were poised to strike against these troops (Operational strength of the Soviet troops in Kotskoma Group was apprx. 12 000) - effectively giving them a force ratio of 2,3 against 1. They were planning to advance apprx. 60 kilometers to the shores of the White Sea, thus severing the northern line of the Murmansk Railway.
German units in Lappland were willing to participate with a paraller offensive against Kandalakasha to tie down Soviet troops, that were otherwisely committed to battles further south in any case. The chances to capture Belomorsk and severe the Murmansk Railway were better than ever, and greater part of the troops were already in readiness.
On March, however, the US began to exert diplomatic pressure on the Finns to have them reach an agreement with the Soviets or at least refrain from attacking the Murmansk Railroad. In late October and early November 1941 the American embassy in Helsinki had passed on a peace feeler from the Soviet Union, accompanied by a warning of the dire consequences for US-Finnish relations if the Murmansk Railroad was attacked from territories under Finnish control.
The pressure on Finland came at a time when the Finns and Germans were deeply involved in discussions about the offensive against the Soviets in Kandalaksha (Kantalahti) and Sorokka (Belomorsk), and undoubtedly influenced the outcome of these negotiations. Most likely the discussions may have been leaked to Swedish intelligence, that in turn informed the US.
The US basically told Finnish government that if Finland moved against the Murmansk Railway, an official DOW would follow. This information divided the Finnish leadership: Some, like Mannerheim, considered Western goodwill vital for the survival of Finland. Others felt that it would in effect only bring another name to the already long list of countries in the upcoming peace conference.
POD: On late December, Mannerheim nearly sufocates on a fish bone after eating zander, his favourite dish. While his life is saved he is bedridden and unconscious, and chances of recovery are dim, but the matter is hidden from public knowledge due the huge symbolic importance that the old Marshal has for the morale of Finnish war effort.
General Aalto, the Chief of the Operational Department of Finnish HQ, takes over the leadership of the war he has in effect planned and led from the beginning, even though Mannerheim has had the final say to all strategic decisions.
As in OTL, the matter of attacking towards Belomorsk is presented to President Ryti, who leaves the issue to be decided by the military.
The OTL plan was to seize Belomorsk and give the task of defending the area to the recently reorganized German XXXVI Gebirgskorps. Aalto decides to give it a go, and the offensive begins in first days of March 1942.
Now, what happens next?
Given that the Finns had numbers that had enabled them to conduct more difficult offensives in equal terrain against equally strong Red Army opposition, the actual chances for success were good, especially since Germans were eager to support by a feint against Kandalaksha. So, let's for the sake of argument assume that by late March 1942, the Murmansk Railway is severed.
What are the short- and long-term effects to the amount of Lend-Lease Aid reaching Soviet lines, the Soviet strategic planning and late-war operations in Eastern Karelia and Finland proper?
* http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-EF-Decision/USA-EF-Decision-11.html#fn10
The background:
The Finnish Army was one of the last Axis forces to conduct offensive operations in Soviet territory in winter 1941 - in fact the Finnish forces halted after capturing Povenets on 6th of December, 1941 - coincidentally on the same day when United Kingdom officially declared war to Finland, Hungary and Romania.
On the same time Finnish HQ was considering their future options. Despite the relatively heavy casualties of the offensive phase of late summer and autumn of 1941, Finnish troops had achieved their immediate operational goals: all territories lost in the Winter War had been recaptured, and the frontlines had been pushed deep to Eastern Karelia to isthmuses between Ladoga, Onega and to Medvezegorsk and Povenets.
Initially Finnish CnC, Mannerheim, seemed rather eager for joint German-Finnish offensive operations against Murmansk Railroad. "According to his view, Murmansk, Kandalaksha, and Sorokka (Belomorsk) must be taken during the present winter - the sooner, the better. He advocated the beginning of January as the best time to launch a winter offensive."
"On 14th of December, following a staff conference at Finnish Army Headquarters, Mannerheim and Falkenhorst met at Falkenhorst's headquarters in Rovaniemi. By then, because of the railroad situation, which he described as catastrophic, Mannerheim was taking a dim view of the Kandalaksha operation--so dim, according to Falkenhorst, that he was unwilling to risk involving Finnish troops in it.
On the other hand, he maintained that the British declaration of war on Finland and the United States' entry into the war had given the Murmansk Railroad greatly increased significance, and it would have to be cut. He believed Belomorsk was the key point and proposed converging attacks from the west and southwest by combined German and Finnish forces. The OKW promptly accepted the change in the operation and offered him the 7th Mountain Division, then still expected to arrive in Finland during the winter.
Before long, however, as the Soviet winter offensive developed, Mannerheim's determination flagged again. On 20 January, General der Infanterie Waldemar Erfurth, chief of the OKW liaison staff at Finnish Army Headquarters, reported that the question of a Belomorsk operation was completely up in the air and Mannerheim would not make a positive decision unless the situation on the German front, particularly around Leningrad, improved. Erfurth could only recommend that all possible means of persuasion be brought to bear on Mannerheim. The other Finnish officers he thought were less pessimistic, but none of them had any influence.
During the following months ~27300 Finns, veterans from the fighting of Winter War and previous summer were busily preparing for the operation, along with the already famous Armored Brigade of the Finnish Army. These same units had advanced accross the lightly fortified new Soviet-Finnish border region in summer 1941 and then moved forth hundreds of kilometers in a similar terrain. They were poised to strike against these troops (Operational strength of the Soviet troops in Kotskoma Group was apprx. 12 000) - effectively giving them a force ratio of 2,3 against 1. They were planning to advance apprx. 60 kilometers to the shores of the White Sea, thus severing the northern line of the Murmansk Railway.
German units in Lappland were willing to participate with a paraller offensive against Kandalakasha to tie down Soviet troops, that were otherwisely committed to battles further south in any case. The chances to capture Belomorsk and severe the Murmansk Railway were better than ever, and greater part of the troops were already in readiness.
On March, however, the US began to exert diplomatic pressure on the Finns to have them reach an agreement with the Soviets or at least refrain from attacking the Murmansk Railroad. In late October and early November 1941 the American embassy in Helsinki had passed on a peace feeler from the Soviet Union, accompanied by a warning of the dire consequences for US-Finnish relations if the Murmansk Railroad was attacked from territories under Finnish control.
The pressure on Finland came at a time when the Finns and Germans were deeply involved in discussions about the offensive against the Soviets in Kandalaksha (Kantalahti) and Sorokka (Belomorsk), and undoubtedly influenced the outcome of these negotiations. Most likely the discussions may have been leaked to Swedish intelligence, that in turn informed the US.
The US basically told Finnish government that if Finland moved against the Murmansk Railway, an official DOW would follow. This information divided the Finnish leadership: Some, like Mannerheim, considered Western goodwill vital for the survival of Finland. Others felt that it would in effect only bring another name to the already long list of countries in the upcoming peace conference.
POD: On late December, Mannerheim nearly sufocates on a fish bone after eating zander, his favourite dish. While his life is saved he is bedridden and unconscious, and chances of recovery are dim, but the matter is hidden from public knowledge due the huge symbolic importance that the old Marshal has for the morale of Finnish war effort.
General Aalto, the Chief of the Operational Department of Finnish HQ, takes over the leadership of the war he has in effect planned and led from the beginning, even though Mannerheim has had the final say to all strategic decisions.
As in OTL, the matter of attacking towards Belomorsk is presented to President Ryti, who leaves the issue to be decided by the military.
The OTL plan was to seize Belomorsk and give the task of defending the area to the recently reorganized German XXXVI Gebirgskorps. Aalto decides to give it a go, and the offensive begins in first days of March 1942.
Now, what happens next?
Given that the Finns had numbers that had enabled them to conduct more difficult offensives in equal terrain against equally strong Red Army opposition, the actual chances for success were good, especially since Germans were eager to support by a feint against Kandalaksha. So, let's for the sake of argument assume that by late March 1942, the Murmansk Railway is severed.
What are the short- and long-term effects to the amount of Lend-Lease Aid reaching Soviet lines, the Soviet strategic planning and late-war operations in Eastern Karelia and Finland proper?
* http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-EF-Decision/USA-EF-Decision-11.html#fn10
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