Deleted member 1487
I found this old post on a different forum and wanted to share it hear to get some opinions while I still worked on my other TL. I just wanted to hear some opinions; I'm NOT starting another TL just yet.
Just a bit of background, Norman Stone, author of the only decent book on the overview of the Eastern Front in WW1 also wrote an article in German about the messed up AH mobilization of August 1914. He talks about the event a bit in his book and cites his paper in the foot notes. Having received that article in PDF through inter-library loan (the magazine it was published in no longer exists), I muddled my way through, thanks to the maps included. Several variants of the AH mobilization were included and this What If is based on the information therein.
Historically Conrad von Hötzendorf proved ridiculously indecisive when it mattered most: at the start of World War One.
http://www.firstworldwar.com/maps/easternfront.htm (though some maps are a bit off)
As the Chief of Staff of the Austro-Hungarian general Staff, Armee Ober Kommando (AOK), he was in charge of prewar planning. He had his staff create some flexibility in mobilization by creating three groups: A-Staffel, three armies, the 1st, 3rd, and 4th; B-Staffel, 2nd army of 6 corps and one cavalry division; and Minimal Gruppe Balkan (MG-B), the 5th and 6th armies (really only the strength of 1 army), to hold the Balkan front against Serbia. A-Staffel was supposed to be deployed against Russia, MG-B against Serbia, and B-Staffel could go either way.
As war was declared he vacillated and only mobilized MG-B and B-Staffel for war against Serbia, despite knowing that Russia would support her Balkan ally, which meant that Russia was able to mobilize before AH, the latter only doing so in response to the Russia declaration. This meant that only half the army was headed to Eastern Front and the crucial reinforcements, B-Staffel, would have to first go to the Balkans only to turn around and head to the Eastern Front. Historically they arrived only to be caught up in the retreat after the AHs lost the battle of Lemberg, losing important equipment and manpower.
So, what if Conrad had ordered total preparation for mobilization of the whole army on July 25th, as he did historially with MG-B and B-Staffel, but instead of sending B-Staffel to the Balkans, it headed to the Eastern Front immediately?
Now just to make something clear, Franz Josef's approval was necessary to declare full mobilization. What I am proposing then, in light of Franz Josef's reluctance to immediately authorize full mobilization, is that Conrad waits for the 'Russian Clarification of Intentions' before deploying B-Staffel. He also would already issue a general warning order to the whole army on the 25th, canceled leave, called up officers, and readied rail and telegraph staff and offices that will be needed for deployment, all things NOT historically done on July 25th. So the first day of mobilization is July 30th for A- and B-Staffel. Waiting an extra few days wouldn't have hurt the Serbian Front, but instead would save AH the muddle it suffered historically. So THAT is what I am proposing: Conrad having the sense to wait and prepare instead of going off half-cocked and messing up mobilization.
First and foremost the AHs would not attack in the Balkans, they would solely defend, avoiding the defeats and losses that historically occurred, and probably would draw out the Serbs, who would start the war being defeated as they attacked AH, which they only did in September. Their morale from the defeat and losses would change from our historical level, potentially leaving the Serbs worse off when the AHs are ready to attack. Historically the AHs had better and more artillery than the Serbs, cutting them to ribbons when attacked from prepared positions.
This would also mean that within 21-25 days of the order the AH army would be totally mobilized in Galicia. That would be between August 20th and August 24th. Historically the 'attack group' in Galicia, the 1st and 4th armies, were mobilized the quickest, 16 days for the 1st army, 18 for the 4th, though the latter received reinforcements even later than this from B-Staffel. Here these would all arrive with the rest of the army. These armies would still be on track to attack, just maybe a few days earlier than OTL.
There are a few variables though: historically Conrad deployed his armies behind the San-Dniester river lines in defensive positions, as his necessary attack forces were not available, what with the 2nd army (B-Staffel) in the Balkans. He was forced to attack after Kaiser Wilhelm, supporting Moltke's plan, 'requested' Franz Josef have his armies attack to draw off the Russians. Conrad responded with his offensive.
Here though, with all his armies available up front, he would deploy forward near the border. Historically the AH armies were forced to march across their own country and wore themselves out before even reaching the border. Then they had to march to battle, leaving the Russians able to advance farther forward in East Galicia than the AHs.
With a more forward deployment, the AHs would be less tired, but would take longer to assemble. This probably adds about 1-2 days to the mobilization of the 1st and 4th armies respectively, but historically they had to spend several days marching forward to the border, so this would probably be a wash. However, it would telegraph AH intentions...
This would also add at least 3-4 to the 3rd and 2nd armies in East Galicia, but would cut down on their time marching forward, which took several extra days, meaning train travel would actually see them arriving at their historical positions sooner. Furthermore, this means that they will be mobilized along river lines in East Galicia, the 3rd along the Bug and the 2nd along the Sereth. There will be no historical battle of Gnila Lipa with the AHs running into prepared Russian positions being cut to pieces, rather it will be the Russians fighting roughly equal numbers of AHs in terrain of their own choosing.
The other issue is that historically the Russians thought the AHs were preparing to defend, because of their initial deployments, meaning that they attacked based on the assumption the AHs were not attacking (though not everyone made this assumption-Brusilov, Ruszki). Here with further forward AH deployments the Russians will know that AHs will attack, meaning they may defend instead. This could leave the AHs attacking Russians who are defending on their own territory, but it could also mean the Russians don't care and want to fight the AHs in a maneuver battle anyway (which some generals did). I don't know what would happen for sure, but with an educated guess I would say that the Russians will still attack with their 3rd and 8th armies, as these commanders still expected an AH attack historically, based on prewar intelligence and charged forward regardless. The Russian 4th and 5th armies though might opt to defend near Lublin and Cholm instead, as historically they were unaware of the attacking AH forces until too late. Perhaps we would see a reverse situation, where the battles in East Galicia see the Russians defeated, but the AH attacks in Poland bog down and route. However, the Russians would still be mobilizing by the time TTL AH reached them, giving them no time to create trenches and field fortifications. Both Lublin and Cholm were not fortified cities.
Honestly I see the Russians attacking anyway, just so the AHs don't disrupt their mobilization at Lublin and Cholm. With the AHs mobilizing sooner and in a more rested state, they would probably be able to march forward quick enough to disrupt Russian mobilization in Poland. OTL the battles of Krasnik and Komarow saw Russian forces moving out before they were totally mobilized. I assume Conrad would still only attack into Poland while defending East Galicia, because he would still believe the Germans are going to try and support him attacking toward Seydlitz.
Instead of the battles of Krasnik and Komarow, we would see the battles of Lublin and Cholm (maybe their suburbs/flanks), but without the Russians losing the maneuver battle, only being pushed back from their assembly points. They would lose their supply dumps, along with some equipment and probably take longer to put together a solid front, but they wouldn't be at risk of being encircled and have lots of space to fall back on. Meanwhile the Austrians have no rail lines to supply their advance, so taking Lublin and Cholm is the farthest forward they could go. No decisive battle yet, but it would hurt Russian attempts to counter attack. At this point we would probably see them getting bogged down in a see-saw struggle, especially as the Russian 9th army arrives to support them. Basically the historical defensive struggle in Poland in September 1914, but north of Lublin and Cholm.
Meanwhile in East Galicia the AHs would be fighting in rough, hilly, wooded lands where they have recent maps and home field advantage, plus the added bonus of fighting on ground of their choosing with equal numbers of troops and artillery as the enemy. The Russians would have had to march into enemy territory without rail supply and attack the AHs in the hills. They do have the benefit of the Ruthenians supporting them and providing guides for their patrols. But the fighting is going to bog down, with the Russians only able to advance at great cost and no decisive victory. Instead the Austrians will be able to hold them and keep the front in Galicia instead of being forced back to the Carpathians. Furthermore, they will not lose over 100,000 men as prisoners, nor lose the vast quantities of stores and equipment as historically happened.
The opening battles would then be inconclusive, with neither side defeated. There is no Austro-Hungarian emergency, instead Russian troops occupying East Galicia and AHs occupying the South of Russian Poland. Supply is difficult for both sides, but as the Russians get more reinforcements in September the situation gets more desperate for the AHs. In late September the Germans can now support the AHs with their 9th army, probably by attacking Ivangorod and breaking the stalemate in Poland, releasing AH troops to fight in East Galicia. This probably also breaches the Vistula river barrier, forcing the Russians to evacuate Poland like in August 1915.
The AHs avoid the major losses of 1914 and early 1915 because they aren't forced back into the Carpathians, forced to fight after losing massive numbers of men, artillery pieces, and crucial territory. However, the Russians also don't lose large numbers of men trying to break into the Hungarian plain. So in late 1914 and 1915 the Russians are defending their homeland with short supply lines, while the Central Powers are now having to ship everything far forward into enemy territory in the vast plains of the Ukrainian and Polish Steppe.
What do you all think? Am I way off or does this sound plausible. What happens next: a Brussilov-type Russian victory, or an earlier Russian revolution?
Attached is my crappy GIMPed map of army positions.
Edit: AOK would be further forward thanks to Conrad planning on an offensive from day 1. The DN group in the Bukowina is a Dniester group, which Conrad had planned on creating from Landsturm (3rd line troops), cavalry, and a single infantry division for flank defense in this mobilization scenario.
Just a bit of background, Norman Stone, author of the only decent book on the overview of the Eastern Front in WW1 also wrote an article in German about the messed up AH mobilization of August 1914. He talks about the event a bit in his book and cites his paper in the foot notes. Having received that article in PDF through inter-library loan (the magazine it was published in no longer exists), I muddled my way through, thanks to the maps included. Several variants of the AH mobilization were included and this What If is based on the information therein.
Historically Conrad von Hötzendorf proved ridiculously indecisive when it mattered most: at the start of World War One.
http://www.firstworldwar.com/maps/easternfront.htm (though some maps are a bit off)
As the Chief of Staff of the Austro-Hungarian general Staff, Armee Ober Kommando (AOK), he was in charge of prewar planning. He had his staff create some flexibility in mobilization by creating three groups: A-Staffel, three armies, the 1st, 3rd, and 4th; B-Staffel, 2nd army of 6 corps and one cavalry division; and Minimal Gruppe Balkan (MG-B), the 5th and 6th armies (really only the strength of 1 army), to hold the Balkan front against Serbia. A-Staffel was supposed to be deployed against Russia, MG-B against Serbia, and B-Staffel could go either way.
As war was declared he vacillated and only mobilized MG-B and B-Staffel for war against Serbia, despite knowing that Russia would support her Balkan ally, which meant that Russia was able to mobilize before AH, the latter only doing so in response to the Russia declaration. This meant that only half the army was headed to Eastern Front and the crucial reinforcements, B-Staffel, would have to first go to the Balkans only to turn around and head to the Eastern Front. Historically they arrived only to be caught up in the retreat after the AHs lost the battle of Lemberg, losing important equipment and manpower.
So, what if Conrad had ordered total preparation for mobilization of the whole army on July 25th, as he did historially with MG-B and B-Staffel, but instead of sending B-Staffel to the Balkans, it headed to the Eastern Front immediately?
Now just to make something clear, Franz Josef's approval was necessary to declare full mobilization. What I am proposing then, in light of Franz Josef's reluctance to immediately authorize full mobilization, is that Conrad waits for the 'Russian Clarification of Intentions' before deploying B-Staffel. He also would already issue a general warning order to the whole army on the 25th, canceled leave, called up officers, and readied rail and telegraph staff and offices that will be needed for deployment, all things NOT historically done on July 25th. So the first day of mobilization is July 30th for A- and B-Staffel. Waiting an extra few days wouldn't have hurt the Serbian Front, but instead would save AH the muddle it suffered historically. So THAT is what I am proposing: Conrad having the sense to wait and prepare instead of going off half-cocked and messing up mobilization.
First and foremost the AHs would not attack in the Balkans, they would solely defend, avoiding the defeats and losses that historically occurred, and probably would draw out the Serbs, who would start the war being defeated as they attacked AH, which they only did in September. Their morale from the defeat and losses would change from our historical level, potentially leaving the Serbs worse off when the AHs are ready to attack. Historically the AHs had better and more artillery than the Serbs, cutting them to ribbons when attacked from prepared positions.
This would also mean that within 21-25 days of the order the AH army would be totally mobilized in Galicia. That would be between August 20th and August 24th. Historically the 'attack group' in Galicia, the 1st and 4th armies, were mobilized the quickest, 16 days for the 1st army, 18 for the 4th, though the latter received reinforcements even later than this from B-Staffel. Here these would all arrive with the rest of the army. These armies would still be on track to attack, just maybe a few days earlier than OTL.
There are a few variables though: historically Conrad deployed his armies behind the San-Dniester river lines in defensive positions, as his necessary attack forces were not available, what with the 2nd army (B-Staffel) in the Balkans. He was forced to attack after Kaiser Wilhelm, supporting Moltke's plan, 'requested' Franz Josef have his armies attack to draw off the Russians. Conrad responded with his offensive.
Here though, with all his armies available up front, he would deploy forward near the border. Historically the AH armies were forced to march across their own country and wore themselves out before even reaching the border. Then they had to march to battle, leaving the Russians able to advance farther forward in East Galicia than the AHs.
With a more forward deployment, the AHs would be less tired, but would take longer to assemble. This probably adds about 1-2 days to the mobilization of the 1st and 4th armies respectively, but historically they had to spend several days marching forward to the border, so this would probably be a wash. However, it would telegraph AH intentions...
This would also add at least 3-4 to the 3rd and 2nd armies in East Galicia, but would cut down on their time marching forward, which took several extra days, meaning train travel would actually see them arriving at their historical positions sooner. Furthermore, this means that they will be mobilized along river lines in East Galicia, the 3rd along the Bug and the 2nd along the Sereth. There will be no historical battle of Gnila Lipa with the AHs running into prepared Russian positions being cut to pieces, rather it will be the Russians fighting roughly equal numbers of AHs in terrain of their own choosing.
The other issue is that historically the Russians thought the AHs were preparing to defend, because of their initial deployments, meaning that they attacked based on the assumption the AHs were not attacking (though not everyone made this assumption-Brusilov, Ruszki). Here with further forward AH deployments the Russians will know that AHs will attack, meaning they may defend instead. This could leave the AHs attacking Russians who are defending on their own territory, but it could also mean the Russians don't care and want to fight the AHs in a maneuver battle anyway (which some generals did). I don't know what would happen for sure, but with an educated guess I would say that the Russians will still attack with their 3rd and 8th armies, as these commanders still expected an AH attack historically, based on prewar intelligence and charged forward regardless. The Russian 4th and 5th armies though might opt to defend near Lublin and Cholm instead, as historically they were unaware of the attacking AH forces until too late. Perhaps we would see a reverse situation, where the battles in East Galicia see the Russians defeated, but the AH attacks in Poland bog down and route. However, the Russians would still be mobilizing by the time TTL AH reached them, giving them no time to create trenches and field fortifications. Both Lublin and Cholm were not fortified cities.
Honestly I see the Russians attacking anyway, just so the AHs don't disrupt their mobilization at Lublin and Cholm. With the AHs mobilizing sooner and in a more rested state, they would probably be able to march forward quick enough to disrupt Russian mobilization in Poland. OTL the battles of Krasnik and Komarow saw Russian forces moving out before they were totally mobilized. I assume Conrad would still only attack into Poland while defending East Galicia, because he would still believe the Germans are going to try and support him attacking toward Seydlitz.
Instead of the battles of Krasnik and Komarow, we would see the battles of Lublin and Cholm (maybe their suburbs/flanks), but without the Russians losing the maneuver battle, only being pushed back from their assembly points. They would lose their supply dumps, along with some equipment and probably take longer to put together a solid front, but they wouldn't be at risk of being encircled and have lots of space to fall back on. Meanwhile the Austrians have no rail lines to supply their advance, so taking Lublin and Cholm is the farthest forward they could go. No decisive battle yet, but it would hurt Russian attempts to counter attack. At this point we would probably see them getting bogged down in a see-saw struggle, especially as the Russian 9th army arrives to support them. Basically the historical defensive struggle in Poland in September 1914, but north of Lublin and Cholm.
Meanwhile in East Galicia the AHs would be fighting in rough, hilly, wooded lands where they have recent maps and home field advantage, plus the added bonus of fighting on ground of their choosing with equal numbers of troops and artillery as the enemy. The Russians would have had to march into enemy territory without rail supply and attack the AHs in the hills. They do have the benefit of the Ruthenians supporting them and providing guides for their patrols. But the fighting is going to bog down, with the Russians only able to advance at great cost and no decisive victory. Instead the Austrians will be able to hold them and keep the front in Galicia instead of being forced back to the Carpathians. Furthermore, they will not lose over 100,000 men as prisoners, nor lose the vast quantities of stores and equipment as historically happened.
The opening battles would then be inconclusive, with neither side defeated. There is no Austro-Hungarian emergency, instead Russian troops occupying East Galicia and AHs occupying the South of Russian Poland. Supply is difficult for both sides, but as the Russians get more reinforcements in September the situation gets more desperate for the AHs. In late September the Germans can now support the AHs with their 9th army, probably by attacking Ivangorod and breaking the stalemate in Poland, releasing AH troops to fight in East Galicia. This probably also breaches the Vistula river barrier, forcing the Russians to evacuate Poland like in August 1915.
The AHs avoid the major losses of 1914 and early 1915 because they aren't forced back into the Carpathians, forced to fight after losing massive numbers of men, artillery pieces, and crucial territory. However, the Russians also don't lose large numbers of men trying to break into the Hungarian plain. So in late 1914 and 1915 the Russians are defending their homeland with short supply lines, while the Central Powers are now having to ship everything far forward into enemy territory in the vast plains of the Ukrainian and Polish Steppe.
What do you all think? Am I way off or does this sound plausible. What happens next: a Brussilov-type Russian victory, or an earlier Russian revolution?
Attached is my crappy GIMPed map of army positions.
Edit: AOK would be further forward thanks to Conrad planning on an offensive from day 1. The DN group in the Bukowina is a Dniester group, which Conrad had planned on creating from Landsturm (3rd line troops), cavalry, and a single infantry division for flank defense in this mobilization scenario.
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