Great War Questions

How early (month and year estimate) would France have surrendered without American aid and support?

And would Britain really follow behind them, just seeking an armistice?

Was it really a war Britain did not want to get into? And they were just seeking to protect Belgium?


Now let's say that the rules of this thread

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=150698

are implemented. With Germany having a very small fleet and significantly more armies to use in war. How long does it take for Germany to win the war?

Thoughts & comments are welcome.
 
How early (month and year estimate) would France have surrendered without American aid and support?

And would Britain really follow behind them, just seeking an armistice?

Was it really a war Britain did not want to get into? And they were just seeking to protect Belgium?


Now let's say that the rules of this thread

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=150698

are implemented. With Germany having a very small fleet and significantly more armies to use in war. How long does it take for Germany to win the war?

Thoughts & comments are welcome.

US intervention is pretty much insignificant to determine France surrender or not-surrender.
To put it bluntly, the french did not give a damn about it.

If you are looking for a turning-point event, I advice the fall (or the not-fall) of Paris
 
If the central powers did nothing to provoke an American entry such as
no Zimmermann note
no unrestricted submarine warfare
then it is likely that they could have overrun the french forces. this would change the rest of the 20th century
 
mailinutile2

Did the Americans not sell thousands of tons of supplies to the French in the early war years? Particularly American arms and munition companies?

And wasnt the German capture of Paris negated by fresh British troops? I suppose in the second scenario I mentioned it would be possible, with more soldiers at the German's disposable to defeat the British.

smurat91

Well of course it would change everything! Its alternate history!
 
mailinutile2

Did the Americans not sell thousands of tons of supplies to the French in the early war years? Particularly American arms and munition companies?

There's the difference between Aid and Trade. The Americans SOLD many thousands of tons of supplies to the French, it was not given in aid in the same way as in the Second World War. Had the French not bought from the Americans, they would have bought from the Swede's or, heaven forbid, the English.

And wasnt the German capture of Paris negated by fresh British troops? I suppose in the second scenario I mentioned it would be possible, with more soldiers at the German's disposable to defeat the British.

Paris was never captured so there was nothing to Negate. In practice probably the biggest things preventing the encirclement and capture of Paris were political manouverings within the Imperial German army which weakened, beyond high command revisions, the Schliefen plan to the extent, the Right Wing of the invasion would not have broken through even if the BEF hadn't intervened.
plus, the Paris Taxi mobilisation ensured that enough troops were moved fast enough to the battle for the French to have held the line themselves.

please, read up on the pre-war and years and the opening year of WW1.
 
American intervention was largely irrelevent, France doesn't fall if they do or don't jump into the war - that POD is too late to defeat France.

Britain didn't really care that much about Belgium, it was a pretty decent excuse to cripple the HSF which was begining to challenge the RN, pick up German colonies and ensure the status quo on the continent. 'Defending poor Belgium' is just a good way of selling the war to the public with a bit of emotional Rhetoric.

In the event France is defeated, there is pretty much continued stalemate on the Western front. The British don't have the army to take the fight to the Germans and the Germans don't have the fleet to take the fight to Britain - in that scenario the Russian front would decide the war
 
How early (month and year estimate) would France have surrendered without American aid and support?

The crucial change will be financial.

Britain has no collateral left in North America to put against secured loans from the US, and cannot get unsecured ones while the US remains neutral. So her purchasing power is drastically curtailed. She was in fact already reducing purchases in late 1916 and early 1917. [1]

This isn't necessarily fatal to Britain's own war effort, but from what I've read around on the subject, would have made it impossible for her to continue subsidising France and the other Allies. So France, Italy et al would almost certainly have to leave the war by the end of 1917.


And would Britain really follow behind them, just seeking an armistice?

Depends what terms we (and France) could get.

In some ways, paradoxically, fighting without allies would be easier, since the large amount of shipping tied up in supplying those allies could now be used for Britain's own needs. However, if the German/French armistice gives German u-boats and surface vessels the use of French ports, then we face a "Battle of the Atlantic" situation, with no Russian Front, no Lend-Lease, and facing a bigger German navy than in WW2. At best, I suspect, we're looking at a bad peace treaty, and (see next paragraph) an uncertain future.

Was it really a war Britain did not want to get into? And they were just seeking to protect Belgium?

Belgium made a convenient excuse, but the real problem was that we couldn't let Germany control the continent. With France and Russia broken, she could then switch resources from her army to her navy, and build a bigger fleet than ours. With command of the waters around the British Isles, she could then starve us into surrender. However, the Belgian issue made it easier for us to get in quickly and with unity.


[1] Depending on Germany's own actions, we might have also been facing American economic sanctions. US public opinion was getting riled up about various blockade measures, notably the blacklisting of US firms which were considered "pro-German" for being insufficiently co-operative with the Allied blockade of the CPs. In September 1916, Congress gave President Wilson extensive powers to retaliate against countries behaving in this way, by denying them the use of American ports, and/or restricting trade with them. In the event, he held off from doing this until after his peace proposals at the end of the year, and before that was out of the way, the Germans had made it all academic by proclaiming unrestricted u-boat warfare on Jan 31. Had they waited a bit longer, Anglo-US relations could have got really nasty.
 

Riain

Banned
America traded with Britian and France during the war but not Germany, which gives these two powers a great advatage.

Later on America's contribution was financial, which by 1916 had become crucial for Britain and France.

Thirdly in April 1917 was the promise of the American army of millions, meaning that France needn't surrender due to lack of manpower.

If you take all of these things away the allied job becomes that much tougher, but I don't know if it would swing the balance enough to cause the allies to sue for peace.
 
There's the difference between Aid and Trade. The Americans SOLD many thousands of tons of supplies to the French, it was not given in aid in the same way as in the Second World War. Had the French not bought from the Americans, they would have bought from the Swede's or, heaven forbid, the English.



Paris was never captured so there was nothing to Negate. In practice probably the biggest things preventing the encirclement and capture of Paris were political manouverings within the Imperial German army which weakened, beyond high command revisions, the Schliefen plan to the extent, the Right Wing of the invasion would not have broken through even if the BEF hadn't intervened.
plus, the Paris Taxi mobilisation ensured that enough troops were moved fast enough to the battle for the French to have held the line themselves.

please, read up on the pre-war and years and the opening year of WW1.

Excuse me, I believe you misunderstood my post. I did not say that the Germans captured Paris, only that the location of British soldiers negated any chance of the Germans capturing Paris.

And being that British troops were stationed in the path of the right wing, and the French were able to move more troops into the path of the left wing, does it not make sense if that: the British are not in the path of the right wing the french will need to put soldiers in the path of the right wing, and will be overextended?

And without British soldiers, is it not possible that the Germans could win the race to the sea, and curl the French line?

Thanks for all of the enlightening responses!
 
How early (month and year estimate) would France have surrendered without American aid and support?

I consider the bonus of American aid short of its DOW not significant enough to bring about a French defeat if removed. However, the entry of the USA very much influenced the events of 1918.

The decisive factor in WW1 is morale. Imagine a map of Europe with a sandclock on each Great Power. Once the sand has trickled down, this nation has lost its will to continue the war and is out. Now some of these clocks trickle faster, some slower. I can think of very few events which would equal the addition of sand...the American entry into the war is one.

Russia's upper half is empty by mid-1917. They went out.

Germany's clock began to trickle increasingly fast after the big offensives failed in 1918. In November, it was empty, the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian ones were bit
faster.

Now, it is debateable how empty the other Entente powers' clocks were. The French trickled fast when its soldiers went on strike in 1917. The French High Command
undertook a lot of reforms and changes to remove the causes of this soldier-strike,
but it cannot be denied that the idea of a possible victory was very much revigorated with the advent of optimistic American soldiers. So, the French
themselves stopped the acceleration of trickling, but the American entry meant some additional sand.
We talk about 1,000,000 men by the summer of 1918. A number rising by 10,000 each DAY. Now, even on a good day, the German army couldn't kill much more
men than that. Now, World War I is in large parts a game of numbers. Remove a million men (out of promised 5 million IIRC) out of the equasion, and there
will be effects. Will this enable the Germans to "overrun" France?

Certainly not. There is no such thing as overrunning in Western Europe after the 1st Marne. Even if the Germans do better in the last offensives of early
1918 (not because they fight fewer Americans, but because the Entente forces would be spread a bit more thinly), you wouldn't spot the difference in the
frontlines on a map in a history book from this timeline and OTL. The difference might make just one 1km, 5km, 10km, maybe 50. But that's about it. They would most
probably not reach Paris. But they reached neither Petrograd nor Moscow. The Russian clock had trickled nevertheless.

Would a new offensive against France and Britain be thinkable? Yes. Same goes for a prolongation of the war. With America being
a full player in 1919, it was not possible. The OHL relized it, the German soliders realized it, and in the end the civilians as well. The German sandclock
sees avalanches after the summer of OTL-1918.

Now we have to take another things into consideration. Without the additional pressure of the march of millions across the Ocean (the German OHL didn't
take them seriously as soldiers, but even as disposable cannonfodder they wouldn't be much fun for them), the German planning for 1918 might very well
have been different.

Germany had been very much on the defensive on the Western Front since Verdun, even giving up territory in a few places in order to have a shorter,
thoroughly fortified frontline ("Siegfriendlinie"). Instead they took out the weakest links of the Entente. Serbia. Romania. Surprisingly - Russia.
Now the logical next step would have been Italy. In late 1917, they took a severe beating in the battle of Caporetto, for a while, the Italian sand
trickled very very fast.
A successful offensive on the maximum scale the CP were capable of with massive German support might have forced the Italians to evacuate Venetia.
A frontline on the Po river or the
Adige river and alongside Lake Garda would be a dream, it would massively stabilize Austria-Hungary. If Italia goes back to neutral in such a situation,
that would be even better.

But the AEF poured into France. In full strength, it would seriously tip the balance and make a German victory impossible. The German OHL feared that
a victory in France in 1918 through offensive means was possible and necessary. The offensives were spectacular, but burned down Germany's reserves of
any kind. In the end, they were a blunder; a blunder France and especially Britain could exploit during the 100 days - also because they could by then
pass calmer sectors of the Western front on to the Americans.

Now I won't directly make a prediction when France would collapse without the American entry. I admit that the Entente still stands a good chance to win
the war, maybe this chance even stands at 70 or 80%.

But I could imagine Italy to be out by September 1918, if seriously beaten by a German offensive into Venetia (Germany being on the defensive, giving
up very little, on the Western Front).
For France and Britain at this point of time, there would be little reason to expect victory soon. They would be the only two Allies left. They would
be in some financial trouble.
In 1919, I expect Germany on its last two legs, but it probably would stabilize Anatolia, develop Anti-Tank tactis and still deny the Entente really
big gains in Belgium and France. Maybe it would make diplomatic offers (it should!).

The sand in the French and German clocks would both be very, very low when summer 1919 comes.

And would Britain really follow behind them, just seeking an armistice?

Britain would play for time a little to show the victory-drunk Germans that things wouldn't be all to easy. Maybe there would finally be several
naval clashes. There would be long talks with the American ambassador. I reckon that these would be decisive. If the US enters the war, there would be
another round.

In WW2, Britain fought alone...for a while. Churchill had reason to believe that at some point of time, there would be very powerful allies indeed.
In the Napoleonic Wars, Britain found allies again and again.

Either Britain finds new allies in 1919, or there would be negotiations.

Was it really a war Britain did not want to get into? And they were just seeking to protect Belgium?

I leave that to the British to answer, but I encourage you to do a little research on Greece in WW1. These two cases are not comparable, but should
be known.


Now let's say that the rules of this thread

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=150698

are implemented. With Germany having a very small fleet and significantly more armies to use in war. How long does it take for Germany to win the war?

The small fleet might change a lot as there is a small chance to draw Britain into entering the Triple-Alliance. There had been negotiations prior
to the war and the German "Flottenpolitik" was the biggest obstacle against better Anglo-German relations. Without this issue, Wilhelm II's anglophilia
might also take over completely (he was a grandson of Queen Victoria and in OTL had a hatelove relationship towards Britain).
However, this POD would probably change everything prior to 1914 already. France and Russia might be unwilling to risk a war over Serbia at all! Germany
would not feel encircled and make different diplomatic decisions.
I doubt that the German taxpayer would be willing to pay for an even larger army. Scaling down the expensive fleet might a larger army, but the taxpayer
would need to be convinced. There was serious political opposition towards fleetbuilding as well, and such an army-expansion might run into different
political interests.
If there would still be war and Britain neutral, you wouldn't even need a larger German army. You also wouldn't need to march into Paris to change
everything. Just figure the CP without the blockade. With full access to the international markets.


And finally: "And without British soldiers, is it not possible that the Germans could win the race to the sea, and curl the French line?"

Now that is an interesting idea. France might be forced to opt for a shorter front anyways in order to man it. I expect the frontline to freeze
along the river Somme, all the way to the coast.
The race to the sea might be different, however. Capturing/securing the Channel ports might be less crucial in case of a British neutrality. On the other
hand, it might ensure complete German control of Belgium. With Britain neutral, might the possibility to continue the war without fighting on Belgium soil
open up a possibility to negotiate with the Belgian government before Germany's war aims concerning Belgium go over the top?

@bobbis14

Where do you expect the fronlines of the Western front to be in case of a France armistice? A map would be welcome.

"in that scenario the Russian front would decide the war"

Good for the Germans. You know they won the war against Russia? :cool:
 
There's the difference between Aid and Trade. The Americans SOLD many thousands of tons of supplies to the French, it was not given in aid in the same way as in the Second World War. Had the French not bought from the Americans, they would have bought from the Swede's or, heaven forbid, the English.

The thing is that trade between France and America could not be completely be negated by subsidization courtesy of the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom did not have the resources to arm its own war effort and also that of France, which did most of the heavy fighting on the Western Front. America was a major economic partner of many countries fighting the war. Cutting that off entirely would do more bad than good for the French, and as a whole, Allied war effort.
 
Britain would play for time a little to show the victory-drunk Germans that things wouldn't be all to easy. Maybe there would finally be several naval clashes. There would be long talks with the American ambassador. I reckon that these would be decisive. If the US enters the war, there would be another round.

What exactly would we be talking to the US Ambassador about?

Apart from the fact that even OTL President Wilson regarded Ambassador Page as hopelessly biased toward Britain, and largely ignored his reports, on this TL Anglo/US relations are strained to breaking point. As I mentioned earlier, Americans are fed up to their back teeth with British interference with her trade and blacklisting of her firms. and Wilson has already acquired Congressional authority to retaliate. This changed only when Germany proclaimed USW - in other words declared American ships "fair game" for the u-boats. On this TL, presumably they haven't done that (else why is America staying neutral?) so US/Allied relations don't improve.

This puts Britain on the spot. With the shrinking of imports from the US, her prospects of winning the war are already dropping fast, so the last thing she can do is weaken the blockade, which is one of her few remaining weapons. OTOH, if she doesn't relax it, American hostility is going to get even worse. It won't come to a shooting war [1], but Britain and America will be lucky to avoid a "trade war" of some kind, unless the Germans avert it for them as they were kind enough to do OTL.

In WW2, Britain fought alone...for a while. Churchill had reason to believe that at some point of time, there would be very powerful allies indeed.

Churchill was looking toward the US and (reluctantly, but needs must) the SU. Well, in 1917 Russia is dropping out, not coming in, and absent German "assistance" similar to OTL's, relations with the US are going from bad to dreadful, so there's nothing to look for there.

[1] In my opinion anyway. In late 1916 House and Lansing expressed concern that the Allies might declare war on America if she pushed them too hard to negotiate with the CPs, but Wilson (surely rightly) dismissed this as impossible.
 
What exactly would we be talking to the US Ambassador about?

Apart from the fact that even OTL President Wilson regarded Ambassador Page as hopelessly biased toward Britain, and largely ignored his reports, on this TL Anglo/US relations are strained to breaking point. As I mentioned earlier, Americans are fed up to their back teeth with British interference with her trade and blacklisting of her firms. and Wilson has already acquired Congressional authority to retaliate.

Thank you for your well-informed addition. I was only trying to be eloquent. :D

About what these talks (Lloyd George could as well go to Washington) would be? Britain's last straw, whether the USA would rather see Britain having to negotiate a peace confirming a German hegemony on the European continent or whether the USA might come to support them.

Churchill was looking toward the US and (reluctantly, but needs must) the SU. Well, in 1917 Russia is dropping out, not coming in, and absent German "assistance" similar to OTL's, relations with the US are going from bad to dreadful, so there's nothing to look for there.

That's what I implied. A United Kingdom fighting alone in 1918 or 1919 would see worse prospects than in late 1940 or during the Napoleonic wars.

A new thought comes to me - what are the chances of dominions to drop out of the war in such a situation?
 
Re: No American Aid

By that do you mean no financial aid or no access to the American financial markets for war financing or are you just referring to American direct intervention in April 1917?
 
Thank you for your well-informed addition. I was only trying to be eloquent. :D

No problem.

About what these talks (Lloyd George could as well go to Washington) would be? Britain's last straw, whether the USA would rather see Britain having to negotiate a peace confirming a German hegemony on the European continent or whether the USA might come to support them.

That might be the logical thing to do, but LG has just become Prime Minister on the pledge to fight the war harder than Asquith. For him to turn round and accept a peace brokered by a neutral will be really hard. Also, having only a section of the Liberals behind him, he is dependent on the support of the Unionists, who are all for the "knock-out blow".

Finally, of course, he would have to convince Wilson that German hegemony in Europe is a real possibility. Remember, Britain's financial straits are still a closely guarded secret. As far as most people in America knew, the Allies were getting the better of it. (Indeed, this was also the impression in Germany, which was why they gambled on USW). So he has to confess to this neutral that Britain is broke and totally dependent on his charity - and with no guarantee that Berlin won't get to hear of it.

Indeed, it was also the general belief in Britain, which would have made LG's position very difficult. He would have had to go to a country which was continually being told how our brave lads were giving the Hun a jolly good thrashing, and tell them "Well, no, actually we're losing, and we'll have to accept a peace brokered by Mr Wilson, which won't give us half of what we want". It would not have gone down well, and would probably have been quickly followed either by the return of Asquith or the appointment of Bonar Law.

My guess is that LG (or whoever replaced him) would have acted much as the Germans did a year later - scraped up every spare man and thrown everything into a "do or die" offensive in the hope that we could defeat the German Army before our supplies ran out. If this failed (on past performance surely the way to bet) we are financially bust and defeated in the field as well.



That's what I implied. A United Kingdom fighting alone in 1918 or 1919 would see worse prospects than in late 1940 or during the Napoleonic wars.

It would also be worse internally. In May 1940, WW2 had been on for less than a year, and the British Army's only fighting on land had been the brief Norwegian campaign. The country was still pretty "fresh". In 1917, we had been through 2½ years of bloody trench warfare, lost getting on for half a million dead -and now learned that it had all been for nothing, and at best we were going to have to settle for a peace little better than we could probably have had in 1914. There would have been murder done, (perhaps literally) and it would have been a deeply divided country which sought to continue the war.

A new thought comes to me - what are the chances of dominions to drop out of the war in such a situation?

Very high in the case of South Africa, where there was a lot of pro-German sympathy. Less so in Canada Australia and NZ, but maybe some. In Ireland, of course, there might have been full blown revolt, especially if some idiot tried to enforce conscription there.
 
The US not going in on the Allies side does not entail that their relations with the UK are strained to the breaking point. The US could still be friendly but believe that intervening is not in its best interests for a number of reasons.
 
There's the difference between Aid and Trade. The Americans SOLD many thousands of tons of supplies to the French, it was not given in aid in the same way as in the Second World War. Had the French not bought from the Americans, they would have bought from the Swede's or, heaven forbid, the English.

*Looks at my books on WW1 economics and looks at this statement* I respectfully submit that your statement has very little basis in fact to support it.

The UK and France were in essence bankrupt in 1917 without US entry and the treasury back no more loans occur. France and UK imports crash in their value. Yes both nations fight on just as Germany & A-H did without access to foreign capital but with all sorts of production and social problems. US over all provided about 20% of the war material used and well over 50% of the machineguns.

Its possible even probable that the Germans spring offensive still stalls (assuming there is one at all as no USA changes the dynamics of the need to have an offensive at all). The question is what exactly are the UK and France going to attack with as both nations manpower pools were just about exhausted? Both were disbanding divisions to keep up numbers in other formations. The Germans attack was their last army, if they dig instead and wait for the attack then the French / British are the ones who bled white their last army.

The idea of Sweden being able to replace US material production is any meaningful way is so disconnected from reality it doesn't even require responding to.

Part of the problem with US entry is it really depends on who's history books you read on the subject. The USA had one viewpoint, UK totally different, Germany closer to the USA viewpoint and France in essence defaulted the field to the first three. In short the UK viewpoint is the USA showed up in time for the victory parade and they didn't matter while the USA view point is the AEF saved the day. The truth lies someplace in between the two extremes.

Barring collapse by either side then the most likely result of no US entry is negotiated settlement. At the end of the day both sides will come to the conclusion that Russia's exit from the war allows them to be chucked under the bus to Germany to get the Germans out of occupied France and Belgium.

Michael
 
The US not going in on the Allies side does not entail that their relations with the UK are strained to the breaking point. The US could still be friendly but believe that intervening is not in its best interests for a number of reasons.

I did not say that US/Allied relations had to be strained to breaking point in order for the US not to enter the war. I noted the fact that they rapidly were getting strained to breaking point when the Germans put their foot in it be declaring USW. Had that not happened, Anglo/US relastions would have been far from friendly.
 

Deleted member 1487

The question is what exactly are the UK and France going to attack with as both nations manpower pools were just about exhausted? Both were disbanding divisions to keep up numbers in other formations. The Germans attack was their last army, if they dig instead and wait for the attack then the French / British are the ones who bled white their last army.

While I agree with just about everything you've written, this part is factually incorrect. You are very right about the French, they were forced to use any manpower they could get, especially colonial and recruit labor from abroad. The British were another story. They were the least atritted of all powers, even by the end of the war OTL they had suffered half the losses of Germany proportionally speaking. They still had significant manpower reserves, not just from the colonies. LG was keeping over 300,000 men in Britain to deny the generals military plans for political reasons. Beyond that, there were over 300,000 men in the Middle East and several other divisions at Salonika. Once the Ottomans collapse, which will be in 1918 regardless and the Bulgarians start to fall, this manpower also become available.

That said, the issue of financing this manpower in Europe is another issue entirely. The British will have a hard time holding the line after the French start to collapse financially and morally. Also, they may not be able to pursue the war with the same vigor if their finances are falling apart, meaning events throughout all theaters of war could change, i.e. the Ottomans and Bulgarians having a bit of a respite from the relentless pressure they were experiencing through 1917-1918. Also, the Russians might bow out sooner if the British and French can no longer afford to finance their effort and send weapons and shells.
 
While I agree with just about everything you've written, this part is factually incorrect. You are very right about the French, they were forced to use any manpower they could get, especially colonial and recruit labor from abroad. The British were another story. They were the least atritted of all powers, even by the end of the war OTL they had suffered half the losses of Germany proportionally speaking. They still had significant manpower reserves, not just from the colonies. LG was keeping over 300,000 men in Britain to deny the generals military plans for political reasons. Beyond that, there were over 300,000 men in the Middle East and several other divisions at Salonika. Once the Ottomans collapse, which will be in 1918 regardless and the Bulgarians start to fall, this manpower also become available.

The British Division count was 108 in December 1917 and dropped by 7 divisions in April and only one replacement was raised in July.

Of course Germany had to disband 37 divisions in 1918.

Michael
 
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