As a result of WWII and the Cold War, the US acquired forward bases in Western Europe and the Pacific Rim which were used to provide deterrence against potential foes and assurance for allies, as a way to proactively keep the balance of power favorable to Washington. That force posture remained even ten years after the fall of the USSR.
Geir Lundestad has called at least the European portion, America's "Empire by invitation".
The predominant reaction in the Pacific Rim and Western Europe was popular support or popular apathy. The prickliest public opinion was found probably in Greece and South Korea. Some portion of the electorate opposed the US presence. The US presence also encouraged social mixing, intermarriage and tourism, even as frictions existed.
The patience of the partners on both sides of the sea went a long way towards preventing further Communist expansion.
It was generally accepted that whatever one felt about the US presence, it was a political or diplomatic issue. French dissatisfaction was resolved by their ouster of NATO and NATO's compliance with that decision. A failure to resolve compensation for the bases resulted in the US evacuation of its Philippine bases with little hard feelings. In other words, governments were deemed competent to make these decisions, France didn't need to reactivate the Maquis to get the US out. At the most extreme, some Greek politicians were soft on the Nov 17th terrorists who narrowly focused their murders on western military reps and diplomats.
Meet the Persian Gulf, where the US presence is seen as a much more critical threat by more people, despite the lack of fraternization with the local population. Furthermore, simply by allowing US forces in, that gave many people the idea that the government (Saudis and other Gulf states) had instantly lost its competence to make such a decision, and furthermore, any agreements for deployment of forces were tantamount to occupation, justifying not only Maquis-style resistance, but a right to use unlimited tactics to get the foreigner to leave.
This obviously made the US doctrine of dual containment of Iran and Iraq, and its protection of GCC states, much more risky than the maintenance of NATO.
Looking around outside the Arabian peninsula for safe, uncomplicated bases for a deterrent force, it doesn't get much better.
In every country on the East coast of Africa, US bases would probably offend some major faction of the population and some rebel group. Same goes for other Indian Ocean areas like Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia. Picking up a base almost anywhere in the Indian Ocean would make the US un-neutral in somebody's civil war. That leaves Diego Garcia in the Chagos islands, but thats pretty small and already a bit distant from the area you're trying to stabilize (Persian Gulf). Besides, the Chagos islanders are suing to get their land back, it was confiscated by Britain.
So, the challenge is, set up a situation where the US can have as stable relations with Indian Ocean states as it did with Pacific Rim or West European states, and still be in a position to oppose any would-be local hegemon.
Alternatively, we can flip the what-if and try top construct a situation where the reaction to the US presence was as violent, allergic and disproportionate in West Europe or the Pacific Rim as it has been in OTL's Persian Gulf. In other, make the USA p[olitically radioactive in Europe or Pacific, as in, their presence itself is a defilement kind of radioactive.
Geir Lundestad has called at least the European portion, America's "Empire by invitation".
The predominant reaction in the Pacific Rim and Western Europe was popular support or popular apathy. The prickliest public opinion was found probably in Greece and South Korea. Some portion of the electorate opposed the US presence. The US presence also encouraged social mixing, intermarriage and tourism, even as frictions existed.
The patience of the partners on both sides of the sea went a long way towards preventing further Communist expansion.
It was generally accepted that whatever one felt about the US presence, it was a political or diplomatic issue. French dissatisfaction was resolved by their ouster of NATO and NATO's compliance with that decision. A failure to resolve compensation for the bases resulted in the US evacuation of its Philippine bases with little hard feelings. In other words, governments were deemed competent to make these decisions, France didn't need to reactivate the Maquis to get the US out. At the most extreme, some Greek politicians were soft on the Nov 17th terrorists who narrowly focused their murders on western military reps and diplomats.
Meet the Persian Gulf, where the US presence is seen as a much more critical threat by more people, despite the lack of fraternization with the local population. Furthermore, simply by allowing US forces in, that gave many people the idea that the government (Saudis and other Gulf states) had instantly lost its competence to make such a decision, and furthermore, any agreements for deployment of forces were tantamount to occupation, justifying not only Maquis-style resistance, but a right to use unlimited tactics to get the foreigner to leave.
This obviously made the US doctrine of dual containment of Iran and Iraq, and its protection of GCC states, much more risky than the maintenance of NATO.
Looking around outside the Arabian peninsula for safe, uncomplicated bases for a deterrent force, it doesn't get much better.
In every country on the East coast of Africa, US bases would probably offend some major faction of the population and some rebel group. Same goes for other Indian Ocean areas like Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia. Picking up a base almost anywhere in the Indian Ocean would make the US un-neutral in somebody's civil war. That leaves Diego Garcia in the Chagos islands, but thats pretty small and already a bit distant from the area you're trying to stabilize (Persian Gulf). Besides, the Chagos islanders are suing to get their land back, it was confiscated by Britain.
So, the challenge is, set up a situation where the US can have as stable relations with Indian Ocean states as it did with Pacific Rim or West European states, and still be in a position to oppose any would-be local hegemon.
Alternatively, we can flip the what-if and try top construct a situation where the reaction to the US presence was as violent, allergic and disproportionate in West Europe or the Pacific Rim as it has been in OTL's Persian Gulf. In other, make the USA p[olitically radioactive in Europe or Pacific, as in, their presence itself is a defilement kind of radioactive.
