If they'd tried to force a landing at Dörtyol instead of Gallipoli they might well have ended the Ottomans several years earlier than OTL.
Alexandretta was suggested....
Barr, James (2011-10-27). A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the struggle that shaped the Middle East (Kindle Location 265). Simon & Schuster UK. Kindle Edition.
Alexandretta, in the crook of the Mediterranean where modern-day Turkey joins Syria, lay near the railway connecting Constantinople to Baghdad and Damascus, the main administrative centres in the Ottomans’ Arab empire. Sykes was certain that this plan had war-winning potential. In a typically energetic letter to Churchill, who had moved into politics and was by now First Lord of the Admiralty, Sykes argued that once the Ottomans surrendered the Germans would be far more vulnerable.
Addressing his letter to ‘the only man I know who will take risks’, he wondered: ‘Could you by June be fighting towards Vienna, you would have got your knife somewhere near the monster’s vitals’, enticing Churchill to throw his weight behind the plan. But longer-term considerations drew others to this scheme. ‘The only place from which a fleet can operate against Egypt is Alexandretta,’ explained a junior intelligence officer based in Cairo at that time. ‘It is a splendid natural naval base (which we don’t want but which no one else can have without detriment to us).’ The name of this young strategist? It was T. E. Lawrence.
The Alexandretta scheme alarmed the French ambassador in Cairo. Suspecting that the British were reneging on their 1912 commitment about Syria, he warned his government of their ally’s likely motives.
On 8 February 1915 the French foreign minister, Théophile Delcassé, reminded Grey of their two-year-old agreement and forcefully asked him to stop his officials plotting. Tall, thin and tired, and perpetually torn between the lure of power in Westminster and the solitary pleasures of fly-fishing on the chalk streams of southern England, Grey was the man who had warned France not to trespass on the Nile two decades earlier.
But in the intervening period his attitude towards the French had changed completely. By the time he became Britain’s foreign secretary in 1905, he had reached the conclusion that the Germans were now the greater threat and that a pact with France was necessary to defeat them. That conviction, and exhaustion after ten years’ trying to avert war through intricate and often rather secretive diplomacy, now shaped his decision to concede to Delcassé. ‘I think it is important to let the French have what they want,’ Grey wrote soon after Delcassé had complained. ‘It will be fatal to cordial cooperation in the Mediterranean and perhaps everywhere if we arouse their suspicions as to anything in the region of Syria.’
He then ordered British officials in Egypt to stop pressing for the Alexandretta plan. ‘It would mean a break with France,’ he repeated a few days later, ‘if we put forward any claims in Syria and Lebanon.’ French pressure had forced the British to drop a brilliant plan. As the German field marshal, von Hindenburg, admitted afterwards, ‘Perhaps not the whole course of the war, but certainly the fate of our Ottoman Ally, could have been settled out of hand, if England had secured a decision in that region, or even seriously attempted it.
Possession of the country south of the Taurus [mountains] would have been lost to Turkey at a blow if the English had succeeded in landing in the Gulf of Alexandretta.’
Instead, as a consequence of French concerns, six weeks later an ill-fated, predominantly British force landed in the Dardanelles. It was 25 April 1915. Constantinople, and victory, were just one hundred and fifty miles away.
My text....Given the subsequent events both at Gallipoli and in the region after WW1, its a shame we didn't tell the French where to go.....