Wir Sind Spartakus!
- Thread starter Zimmerwald1915
- Start date
Valdemar II
Banned
The hand look better with red in the middle and golden edges (and you should avoid crosses).
Zimmerwald1915
Banned
If it's annoying people, I'll stop, but I think I've finally got it right this time.
Also, update will probably be over [American] Thanksgiving weekend.
Also, update will probably be over [American] Thanksgiving weekend.
Zimmerwald1915
Banned
Post-Flag Update
The events at Kronstadt beginning on March 17, and the creation of the New Economic Policy in Soviet Russia, sparked a decade-long battle for the soul of the Comintern. It has been previously remarked that the suppression of the Kronstadt Mutiny began contacts between the left of the Bolshevik Party and the leadership of the VKPD in Germany. Among the very first letters carried by the Bureau of Correspondence they set up was a fifteen-page summary and critique of the New Economic Policy by Myasnikov to August Thalheimer, the People’s Commissioner for Agriculture who was at the time collectivizing the Junker estates in Pomerainia and Silesia. This letter, reprinted in pamplet form and distributed all over Germany, characterized the policy—which confirmed a peasant’s ownership of his land and the right of his children to inherit it, as well as to the produce of that land minus a hefty tax in kind—as a “capitulation to private property, to the germ of capitalism, that must sprout and crack the rock of socialism if not checked in time.” Thalheimer did not deign to reply individually, but a meeting of the VKPD Central Committee composed a secret, less verbose response, urging the left Bolsheviks to organize as a faction to oppose “further anti-worker measures, principally the concentration of power in the hands of individual property-owners, of managers, rather than the workers’ soviets”. Shortly after this letter was posted, the majority of the Bolshevik party banned internal factions, stressing the need for national unity.
This last appeal was roundly criticized by Luxemburg in Die Rote Fahne. Suppression of dissent within the Party, she exclaimed, was “totally contrary to the spirit of 1917, and in total harmony with the spirit of 1914. National unity is nothing more than the conversion of the nation into one vast prison camp.” Nikolai Bukharin, in turn, took Luxemburg to task in the pages of Pravda, accusing her of “transposing German conditions onto a Russian landscape”. The problem was only confused by the interventions of other national parties. The Bulgarians wholeheartedly followed the Russian line. The Italians, whose own peasant revolts in the south had produced short-lived (before being crushed) cooperatives rather than the parceling out of the great estates endorsed the German position, and noted in particular that “Russian conditions” obtained in the German eastern provinces, and land was being collectivized there under the auspices of peasants’ cooperatives without NEP-like measures. Bordiga muddied the waters still further by critiquing the Bolsheviks’ model of centralism. Free debate, according to him, was to be prized higher than unity of action: the latter would follow from the former if the former were given enough scope. The Hungarians ended meaningful dispute by going on record that their land policy—which mirrored the Germans’ except the peasants’ cooperatives were created and managed by the state rather than spontaneously generated—would not change in the immediate future. The new Chinese party, founded in June after the leftists’ arguments came to naught in terms of influencing Russian policy, nevertheless gave its comment that in their country, small plots of land were an obstacle to growth rather than a means to it, but that nevertheless they hoped to learn from the Russian experience. The French said much the same thing, but with a political spin: smallholders had been counterrevolutionary since 1790, and would become so in Russia. It can be seen that the land question, and the question of violence within the class, were producing two distinct wings within the world Communist movement.
This dispute over the correct line did not yet effect relations between the Communist states. They were too isolated to act otherwise. For example, during the whole controversy over the NEP, Germany continued to receive shipments of Russian grain. This was then “Germanized” through purchase and storage, then shipped to France along with Ruhr and Silesian coal and iron, chemicals, timber, and other goods as in-kind reparation payments. Part of this was then diverted to Great Britain, which country was largely paying for the expansion of Russian light industry through the medium of the trade agreement signed on March 18. Powering all this activity were the loans that American bankers continued to extend to the British and the French. Acutely aware of the incongruity of supporting Europe economically while still being technically at war with Germany, the United States and Germany signed a white peace in Kiel on July 2. The Coolidge Administration’s anticommunist credentials suffered due to this move. Their credibility took a further blow with the asseessment by the Allies of a $25 billion reparation payment from Germany—of which the US was to receive none directly. Though theoretically the reparations would be used to pay back the Allied war debts owed the United States, the Germans were expected to take fifty years or more to pay off this amount.
Another facet of continued Communist cooperation was in the military sphere. Germany’s government had been markedly less successful in convincing high-ranking officers to stay in service than had Russia, and while the General Staff documents and manuals were still available, the lack of teachers for new officers—and militia “coordinators” who filled much the same role in the parallel quasi-military system meant to support the Freiwehr—was being felt acutely. Accordingly, Germany made its military records, as well as examples of hardware and training methods (at which the lower-level officers were adept) to the Russians. A secret joint procurement plan for equipment was agreed upon, with Russia being the official owner of new tank, airplane, and ship designs to be built and tested in Russia but meant to be transferred to and used by Germany at some future date. This program would pay dividends slowly, and mostly in the theoretical sphere. The Germans, for example, were introduced to Tukachevsky’s ideas and began adapting them to their own experiences recorded in the General Staff history, and to their limited manpower and unweildy dual-structure needs.
The League of Nations, backed by the French, British, and Italian militaries, began to act decisively in international affairs. Among its more notable decisions during this period were the transfer of Aland to Sweden (which was considered a more reliable guardian than Finland), and the creation of the kingdoms of Transjordan and Iraq, both mandated to Britain. Another important international development was the capture of Mongolia by the Red Army in July: this gave them a base from which to influence events in China. The Chinese Communist Party was created shortly before this capture, and quickly aligned itself with the Russians on principle. It would maintain a hostile stance towards the KMT, which it saw as opportunist at best, a mystification for both ordinary workers and CCP members at worst. Finally, the war between the Greeks and Turks continued to rage, with the Turks having driven the Greeks from the confines of Ankara. The Second Comintern Congress saw the Bolsheviks turn from support of the Turkish republic to opposition. This unfriendliness did not prevent the Russians from signing the Treaty of Kars with the Turks, as they desired set boundaries in the Caucusus just as much as the Turks did. The French, attempting to convince the Greeks to quit while they were ahead, ended their own war with Turkey on October 20, accepting a border on the Taurus Mountains though their sphere of influence remained undiminished.
-------
Appended is a map of the situation on October 20, 1921, at the signature of the Treaty of Ankara by the French.
You will notice that major cities are now marked, and that certain countries have been given new or different colors. This is for your viewing pleasure.
The events at Kronstadt beginning on March 17, and the creation of the New Economic Policy in Soviet Russia, sparked a decade-long battle for the soul of the Comintern. It has been previously remarked that the suppression of the Kronstadt Mutiny began contacts between the left of the Bolshevik Party and the leadership of the VKPD in Germany. Among the very first letters carried by the Bureau of Correspondence they set up was a fifteen-page summary and critique of the New Economic Policy by Myasnikov to August Thalheimer, the People’s Commissioner for Agriculture who was at the time collectivizing the Junker estates in Pomerainia and Silesia. This letter, reprinted in pamplet form and distributed all over Germany, characterized the policy—which confirmed a peasant’s ownership of his land and the right of his children to inherit it, as well as to the produce of that land minus a hefty tax in kind—as a “capitulation to private property, to the germ of capitalism, that must sprout and crack the rock of socialism if not checked in time.” Thalheimer did not deign to reply individually, but a meeting of the VKPD Central Committee composed a secret, less verbose response, urging the left Bolsheviks to organize as a faction to oppose “further anti-worker measures, principally the concentration of power in the hands of individual property-owners, of managers, rather than the workers’ soviets”. Shortly after this letter was posted, the majority of the Bolshevik party banned internal factions, stressing the need for national unity.
This last appeal was roundly criticized by Luxemburg in Die Rote Fahne. Suppression of dissent within the Party, she exclaimed, was “totally contrary to the spirit of 1917, and in total harmony with the spirit of 1914. National unity is nothing more than the conversion of the nation into one vast prison camp.” Nikolai Bukharin, in turn, took Luxemburg to task in the pages of Pravda, accusing her of “transposing German conditions onto a Russian landscape”. The problem was only confused by the interventions of other national parties. The Bulgarians wholeheartedly followed the Russian line. The Italians, whose own peasant revolts in the south had produced short-lived (before being crushed) cooperatives rather than the parceling out of the great estates endorsed the German position, and noted in particular that “Russian conditions” obtained in the German eastern provinces, and land was being collectivized there under the auspices of peasants’ cooperatives without NEP-like measures. Bordiga muddied the waters still further by critiquing the Bolsheviks’ model of centralism. Free debate, according to him, was to be prized higher than unity of action: the latter would follow from the former if the former were given enough scope. The Hungarians ended meaningful dispute by going on record that their land policy—which mirrored the Germans’ except the peasants’ cooperatives were created and managed by the state rather than spontaneously generated—would not change in the immediate future. The new Chinese party, founded in June after the leftists’ arguments came to naught in terms of influencing Russian policy, nevertheless gave its comment that in their country, small plots of land were an obstacle to growth rather than a means to it, but that nevertheless they hoped to learn from the Russian experience. The French said much the same thing, but with a political spin: smallholders had been counterrevolutionary since 1790, and would become so in Russia. It can be seen that the land question, and the question of violence within the class, were producing two distinct wings within the world Communist movement.
This dispute over the correct line did not yet effect relations between the Communist states. They were too isolated to act otherwise. For example, during the whole controversy over the NEP, Germany continued to receive shipments of Russian grain. This was then “Germanized” through purchase and storage, then shipped to France along with Ruhr and Silesian coal and iron, chemicals, timber, and other goods as in-kind reparation payments. Part of this was then diverted to Great Britain, which country was largely paying for the expansion of Russian light industry through the medium of the trade agreement signed on March 18. Powering all this activity were the loans that American bankers continued to extend to the British and the French. Acutely aware of the incongruity of supporting Europe economically while still being technically at war with Germany, the United States and Germany signed a white peace in Kiel on July 2. The Coolidge Administration’s anticommunist credentials suffered due to this move. Their credibility took a further blow with the asseessment by the Allies of a $25 billion reparation payment from Germany—of which the US was to receive none directly. Though theoretically the reparations would be used to pay back the Allied war debts owed the United States, the Germans were expected to take fifty years or more to pay off this amount.
Another facet of continued Communist cooperation was in the military sphere. Germany’s government had been markedly less successful in convincing high-ranking officers to stay in service than had Russia, and while the General Staff documents and manuals were still available, the lack of teachers for new officers—and militia “coordinators” who filled much the same role in the parallel quasi-military system meant to support the Freiwehr—was being felt acutely. Accordingly, Germany made its military records, as well as examples of hardware and training methods (at which the lower-level officers were adept) to the Russians. A secret joint procurement plan for equipment was agreed upon, with Russia being the official owner of new tank, airplane, and ship designs to be built and tested in Russia but meant to be transferred to and used by Germany at some future date. This program would pay dividends slowly, and mostly in the theoretical sphere. The Germans, for example, were introduced to Tukachevsky’s ideas and began adapting them to their own experiences recorded in the General Staff history, and to their limited manpower and unweildy dual-structure needs.
The League of Nations, backed by the French, British, and Italian militaries, began to act decisively in international affairs. Among its more notable decisions during this period were the transfer of Aland to Sweden (which was considered a more reliable guardian than Finland), and the creation of the kingdoms of Transjordan and Iraq, both mandated to Britain. Another important international development was the capture of Mongolia by the Red Army in July: this gave them a base from which to influence events in China. The Chinese Communist Party was created shortly before this capture, and quickly aligned itself with the Russians on principle. It would maintain a hostile stance towards the KMT, which it saw as opportunist at best, a mystification for both ordinary workers and CCP members at worst. Finally, the war between the Greeks and Turks continued to rage, with the Turks having driven the Greeks from the confines of Ankara. The Second Comintern Congress saw the Bolsheviks turn from support of the Turkish republic to opposition. This unfriendliness did not prevent the Russians from signing the Treaty of Kars with the Turks, as they desired set boundaries in the Caucusus just as much as the Turks did. The French, attempting to convince the Greeks to quit while they were ahead, ended their own war with Turkey on October 20, accepting a border on the Taurus Mountains though their sphere of influence remained undiminished.
-------
Appended is a map of the situation on October 20, 1921, at the signature of the Treaty of Ankara by the French.
You will notice that major cities are now marked, and that certain countries have been given new or different colors. This is for your viewing pleasure.
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Not entirely an empty BUMP:
Querry: I wonder about the situation of Communist Germany in regard to Great Depression. Is it plausible for Germany to isolate from European/World markets and/or build-up enough self-sufficiency to avoid its harderst blows? Perhaps by that point the butterflies will be severe enough to significantly modify the Depression itself?
Querry: I wonder about the situation of Communist Germany in regard to Great Depression. Is it plausible for Germany to isolate from European/World markets and/or build-up enough self-sufficiency to avoid its harderst blows? Perhaps by that point the butterflies will be severe enough to significantly modify the Depression itself?
A fantastic timeline that deserves this bump to the frontpage. Also: Is there any chance of a continuation? *pretty please*
After receiving a link to this most excellent Timeline I must commend you Sir 
If you would consider resuming updates I and many others I am sure would be most ecstatic!
If you would consider resuming updates I and many others I am sure would be most ecstatic!A very interesting timeline, for all it only covers a couple of years. I'd never considered a successful revolution in Germany a real possibility before.
I would have liked to see more examinations of the political and economic evolution of Germany through the revolutionary period.
I must say, I am quite dubious that the Rhenish republic would be at all viable - much like the Russian White Republics all lost viability when it was clear that the Bolsheviks were triumphant in the Russian core, I don't see how the Rhenish republic can maintain a sense of separateness among their citizens. It simply isn't Germany, and however red Germany might be, once the reds win, they will still be seen as the legitimate German government. And I don't see how they can avoid being tainted by the association with the French and the Belgians - both countries did a good job of alienating the German people with the unpleasantness of their OTL occupations of German soil.
I'm not sure Bavaria would submit quietly to the new order though. Bavaria at this time had a strong sense of separate identity, and the Communists deciding to have a centralized system is going to annoy most everyone in the Kingdom of Bavaria, including the Bavarian Communists. The other German states had lesser, but still significant regional identities. They were Germans AND Hanoverians/Prussians/Saxons/what have you. I don't know if this would be a fighting issue in other states, but it would certainly be a cause of argument and discontent.
Assuming the Bavarian Reds and German Reds avoid a fight, I'd really love to see what Silvio Gesell and Gustave Landour are up to in the new Communist Germany...
Curious if Hungary will be able to avoid self-destructing in this more Communist Europe... Seems to me that it is still very likely, alas. Hungary avoiding the white terror would be a much happier place.
Prussia is going to be really interesting... Unlike the Rhennish lands, I can buy Prussia forging an independant identity for itself (as I understand it, the province was extremely loyal to the Hohenzollerns - the family had ruled it pretty well for a long time). I doubt that there will be many refugees from the German Revolution (it is a very, very different beast from the Russian Revolution - less violent and Germany is a more comfortable place to live - much like the Jews of OTL, many people will figure that it is better to stay with their property, family and friends and wait for the political storm to pass), but I expect there will be an influx of White Armies, capitalist refugees, highly political types (particularly Hohenzollern loyalists). Those, as well as the relatively good infrastructure and industry for the region will give the Prussians a jump start to developing the province into a regional power. My bet is the Prussian propaganda would be very anti-communist, and their practical policies being very anti-polish.
A strong leader among the small Baltic countries would also dramatically shift the diplomatic dynamic. That could have all sorts of interesting effects...
Given the strength of Polish nationalism and the quality of its organization, I doubt that Poland would be completely extinguished at this point, but I do think that the Russians would have a border much closer to the Curzon line, and the Germans a border much closer to the 1914 borders. While I think some sort of "Miracle of the Vistula" would happen, just how big the miracle is awfully sensitive to events I think. The greater fear of German or Hungarian intervention and the slightly better Russian position is going to have significant impact on the Polish and Russian performance in those critical battles.
Thanks again for the interesting timeline Zimmerwald, and I hope you enjoy my comment, even if it is 3.5 years late.
fasquardon
I would have liked to see more examinations of the political and economic evolution of Germany through the revolutionary period.
I must say, I am quite dubious that the Rhenish republic would be at all viable - much like the Russian White Republics all lost viability when it was clear that the Bolsheviks were triumphant in the Russian core, I don't see how the Rhenish republic can maintain a sense of separateness among their citizens. It simply isn't Germany, and however red Germany might be, once the reds win, they will still be seen as the legitimate German government. And I don't see how they can avoid being tainted by the association with the French and the Belgians - both countries did a good job of alienating the German people with the unpleasantness of their OTL occupations of German soil.
I'm not sure Bavaria would submit quietly to the new order though. Bavaria at this time had a strong sense of separate identity, and the Communists deciding to have a centralized system is going to annoy most everyone in the Kingdom of Bavaria, including the Bavarian Communists. The other German states had lesser, but still significant regional identities. They were Germans AND Hanoverians/Prussians/Saxons/what have you. I don't know if this would be a fighting issue in other states, but it would certainly be a cause of argument and discontent.
Assuming the Bavarian Reds and German Reds avoid a fight, I'd really love to see what Silvio Gesell and Gustave Landour are up to in the new Communist Germany...
Curious if Hungary will be able to avoid self-destructing in this more Communist Europe... Seems to me that it is still very likely, alas. Hungary avoiding the white terror would be a much happier place.
Prussia is going to be really interesting... Unlike the Rhennish lands, I can buy Prussia forging an independant identity for itself (as I understand it, the province was extremely loyal to the Hohenzollerns - the family had ruled it pretty well for a long time). I doubt that there will be many refugees from the German Revolution (it is a very, very different beast from the Russian Revolution - less violent and Germany is a more comfortable place to live - much like the Jews of OTL, many people will figure that it is better to stay with their property, family and friends and wait for the political storm to pass), but I expect there will be an influx of White Armies, capitalist refugees, highly political types (particularly Hohenzollern loyalists). Those, as well as the relatively good infrastructure and industry for the region will give the Prussians a jump start to developing the province into a regional power. My bet is the Prussian propaganda would be very anti-communist, and their practical policies being very anti-polish.
A strong leader among the small Baltic countries would also dramatically shift the diplomatic dynamic. That could have all sorts of interesting effects...
Given the strength of Polish nationalism and the quality of its organization, I doubt that Poland would be completely extinguished at this point, but I do think that the Russians would have a border much closer to the Curzon line, and the Germans a border much closer to the 1914 borders. While I think some sort of "Miracle of the Vistula" would happen, just how big the miracle is awfully sensitive to events I think. The greater fear of German or Hungarian intervention and the slightly better Russian position is going to have significant impact on the Polish and Russian performance in those critical battles.
Thanks again for the interesting timeline Zimmerwald, and I hope you enjoy my comment, even if it is 3.5 years late.
fasquardon
I know I shouldn't be posting this, but I have been reading your Timeline and it is very good (At least until now) and you don't seem to be a retard anti-communist like many in this forum, and you do know a lot about it, congrats for the TL!
Sorry for (probably) getting the Thread locked. You should continue it!
Sorry for (probably) getting the Thread locked. You should continue it!
Besides the whole "no necromancy" thing, here's a pro-tip: I'd avoid using ableist language when complementing a leftist.
But in the meantime, I'd recommend GlobalHumanism's "The 4th International - Rosa's Reich" TL. AFAIK s/he's still actively writing it.