WI: US Military gets the go ahead to invade North Vietnam?

[aktarian]

What are goals (short/medium/long term)? How much of those goals are actually feasible? How much of those goals will China buy?

If the goal is occupation and instalation of friendly government it has all the making of a disaster. Initial phase would likely tilt in US favour (depending on all sorts of factors) and US could occupy at least urban centres and such. Next phase is very problematic. US could say "we'll move in, kick ass, leave" but once insurgency starts it's hard to withdraw fast without looking like they are pulling out under fire and are in fact kicked out. Staying longer means more casualties.

If it's just a "raid in force" designed to show serious intentions and power and disrupt flow of supplies south but staying away from cities that has more chances of success. Of course, that runs same risks, once US stops on its own and withdraws Vietnamese will claim they stopped them and pushed out.

Another possible option (how likely I don't know) is US to occupy parts of North Vietnam to cut Hochiminh trail at the beginning and condition withdrawal with Vietnam cutting aid to VC. This would shift fighting away from south, though with US tied up in North and ARVN being what they were how much good that will do in south is another question.

Note that Chinese direct intervention means whole different ball game and opens whole new set of possibilities.

Eh, ninja'd somewhat

 

[Johnestauffer]

It might be interesting if the US placed the South Vet forces in the lead.
Then it could be a situation of the US supporting the actions of a allied nation.
With two idealogically opposed "countries" I doubt anything positive would come of the invasion in any situation.

While I was in the military during that time period, one proposed solution for the Vetnam war was to sent Seabee & Army construction battalions to the DMZ - one group would go north, one group would go south, and they would pave the country and turn it into a gigantic parking lot for China

 

[Dave Howery]

what about a limited invasion, such as occupying not the whole place, but just a 'buffer zone' in the bottom part of NV, with the idea of drawing most of the fighting up north and out of SV. Which will ultimately still be pointless, since SV's utterly corrupt government is completely uninspiring to the average south Vietnamese citizen; they still have no reason to support it...

 

[aktarian]

what about a limited invasion, such as occupying not the whole place, but just a 'buffer zone' in the bottom part of NV, with the idea of drawing most of the fighting up north and out of SV. Which will ultimately still be pointless, since SV's utterly corrupt government is completely uninspiring to the average south Vietnamese citizen; they still have no reason to support it...

Something I proposed.....

 

[BigWillyG]

what about a limited invasion, such as occupying not the whole place, but just a 'buffer zone' in the bottom part of NV, with the idea of drawing most of the fighting up north and out of SV. Which will ultimately still be pointless, since SV's utterly corrupt government is completely uninspiring to the average south Vietnamese citizen; they still have no reason to support it...

How about a naval landing to seize Haiphong rather than the mining which occurred IOTL?

 

[Rich Rostrom]

What would happen if they get the go ahead?

It depends on when and how much.

One reason the U.S. stayed out of NVN on the ground was the fear of Chinese intervention as in Korea.

We now know that from 1965 on, China was internally convulsed by the Great Cultural Revolution, and it's doubtful that China could have launched any great military moves at that time.

It's also far from clear that China would want to intervene, or feel confident about intervening, even without the GCR.

The Korean intervention cost China a huge number of casualties, and China got nothing out of it but the survival of an untrustworthy buffer state. Why do it again?

As for capacity:

Korea is adjacent to China's industrial core in Manchuria, with several connecting rail lines. Vietnam is at the far end of the country, and there are only two rail lines.

I'm sure the Chinese Army studied the Korean campaign, and even through Red-colored glasses they would see that they were fairly lucky in Korea. The UN forces were relatively weak (the US had just started rebuilding from the post-WW II near-total demobilization). Macarthur ignored the warning signs of Chinese attack, and allowed his forces to be taken by surprise.

Neither of those factors would apply in Vietnam. The U.S. could apply its full power in Vietnam. American commanders and units would be very alert for Chinese movements. The Chinese would be aware of this, and it could deter them.

Another question is the draw on American resources. The U.S. deployed over 500,000 men to Vietnam. These forces were fully engaged in South Vietnam, so would another 500,000 men be need in the North. No, because a very large part of the effort in the South was defending the South against attack from the North. If the North is occupied by U.S. and allied troops (ARVN, RoKs), it's not a base area for attacks on the South.

Also, if the U.S. is willing to go into the North, then ISTM the U.S. blows off the pretense of Laotian and Cambodian neutrality, and drives out the Communists in both countries. I think Sihanouk cooperates rather than fight a suicide war; the Laotian regime was fighting Communists themselves low-level. (The Communists can hold out in northern Laos on the Chinese border, but that's hundreds of kilometers from South Vietnam. At the very least, they don't have the Ho Chi Minh Trail for pouring arms and troops into the South.)

If the U.S. occupies Haiphong, that cuts off the considerable supply of arms by sea from the USSR.

Another key question is what happens in occupied/liberated North Vietnam. North Vietnam was a brutal Stalinist dictatorship. Such governments can and have mustered considerable military force, but that doesn't mean they're universally popular either. As of 1964, the Communists had been in power for only 10 years. A lot of people could be happy to see them gone. It would depend on U.S. policy in the occupation zone.

There would be guerrilla resistance, but generous U.S. reconstruction aid and "gentle" occupation could win over most of the population. (The U.S. won over the population of the Philippines in 1900-1910, and we didn't have any Green Berets trained in counterinsurgency.) OTOH letting RVN officials run rampant could be disastrous.

In either case, NVN population that comes under U.S. occupation won't be subject to conscription into the NVA, which means fewer enemy troops to fight. Some may even be recruitable into U.S. allied forces.

I suppose all this seems rather optimistic - but I regard the trio of Johnson, Macnamara, and Rusk as a perfect storm of strategic incompetence. I'll grant that they (and the U.S. military) didn't know about the Cultural Revolution, the developing divisions between Communist states, or Mao's feeling of having been stiffed in Korea. So their fear of Chinese intervention, though mistaken, was understandable.

But they didn't examine the question critically, and instead allowed a casual assumption to dictate following choices. Bruce Catton has a passage about a badly thought out Union campaign in the Civil War. The book is packed, but I'll paraphrase as best I can: One starts with what appear to be obvious facts, make what appear to be logical deductions, and end in a land of crippling nonsense, pouring enormous resources into inefficient and inffective efforts. Catton was discussing the Union campaign near Charleston in 1863 - the long and costly siege of Fort Wagner, and later on, massive bombardments of Fort Sumter until long after it was wrecked.

In the case of Vietnam, the comparable action was attempts to close the Ho Chi Minh trail by having B-52s drop millions of pounds of bombs on the Mu Gia Pass on the NVN/Laotian border. This was almost literally pounding sand. After one of these raids, the road through the pass would be blocked by landslides and craters. And within a few days, NVN laborers with shovels and wheelbarrows would have it open again.

There were many other acts of comparable folly, all in obedience to the Johnson/Mcnamara/Rusk insistence on respecting diplomatic fictions about "neutral" Cambodia and Laos and the division of Vietnam as iron realities.

End those contortions, and the U.S. effort becomes enormously more effective.

 

[DG Valdron]

We now know that from 1965 on, China was internally convulsed by the Great Cultural Revolution, and it's doubtful that China could have launched any great military moves at that time.

It's also far from clear that China would want to intervene, or feel confident about intervening, even without the GCR.

The Korean intervention cost China a huge number of casualties, and China got nothing out of it but the survival of an untrustworthy buffer state. Why do it again?

Just to be clear with everyone here.... You're actually betting on Mao making a rational decision? The 'Cultural Revolution' guy? That Mao?

Another question is the draw on American resources. The U.S. deployed over 500,000 men to Vietnam. These forces were fully engaged in South Vietnam, so would another 500,000 men be need in the North. No, because a very large part of the effort in the South was defending the South against attack from the North. If the North is occupied by U.S. and allied troops (ARVN, RoKs), it's not a base area for attacks on the South.

The trouble is that the SVA was not a stable or steady place at the best of times.

Another key question is what happens in occupied/liberated North Vietnam. North Vietnam was a brutal Stalinist dictatorship. Such governments can and have mustered considerable military force, but that doesn't mean they're universally popular either. As of 1964, the Communists had been in power for only 10 years. A lot of people could be happy to see them gone. It would depend on U.S. policy in the occupation zone.

That's pretty fraught with wishful thinking. There's nothing to suggest that the US as an invader would be popular.

There would be guerrilla resistance, but generous U.S. reconstruction aid and "gentle" occupation could win over most of the population. (The U.S. won over the population of the Philippines in 1900-1910, and we didn't have any Green Berets trained in counterinsurgency.)

That's a dramatically rose coloured view in many respects. The US has been accused of genocide in the Phillipine insurrection, and estimates of Phillipine casualties run as high as 1.4 million in a country of 8 or 9 million. Even then, the Phillipines were essentially a collection of isolated islands with poor communication, easily divided up. And the US big promise was to get the hell out, in various ways and degrees, in 1902, 1916, 1934 and 1946.

I suppose all this seems rather optimistic -

Rather an understatement.

but I regard the trio of Johnson, Macnamara, and Rusk as a perfect storm of strategic incompetence.

Nixon, Kissinger and Haig did no better, near as I can tell. Overall, their policies were similar. And in the large geopolitical arena, I'd argue that their policies and actions proved out.

I'll grant that they (and the U.S. military) didn't know about the Cultural Revolution, the developing divisions between Communist states, or Mao's feeling of having been stiffed in Korea. So their fear of Chinese intervention, though mistaken, was understandable.

One wonders what faith they placed in Mao's ability or willingness to act rationally.

End those contortions, and the U.S. effort becomes enormously more effective.

Or disastrous. You make an interesting case, I'll grant. But it strikes me that it is premised on rather optimistic assessments and a certain amount of wishful thinking. I'm rather more cynical and have substantially less faith in the world ordering itself to our liking.

 

[LeX]

On the Cultural Revolution

I think that Mao would've been delighted at the prospect of another Korea. The Cultural Revolution was already partly motivated by the need to rile up the populace somehow (Mao said, our young people have not fought a war yet), and a US invasion of north Vietnam would give him the perfect opportunity to exercise an example of his 'revolutionary guidance' over the PLA, as well as provide a goldmine of propaganda to put the Chinese people into an even greater (and more convincing) frenzy.

This could seriously damage US-China relations for the foreseeable future. No Nixon trip for sure.

 

[LeX]

Another motive of Mao in intervening in Vietnam would be, ironically, to make sure that Vietnam becomes fucked up beyond all recognition through the protractment of the conflict, and as a way of expanding Chinese as opposed to Soviet influence in that country. The losses would doubtless be huge but the death of a million PLA men or enthusiastic Red Guards would likely be no object when there are millions to replace them.

EDIT: Losses would probably be even worse than in Korea. The Red Guards were just teenage punks in a clique millions-strong with uniforms and in some cases guns. Imagine the Volkssturm, then imagine the Volkssturm actually trying to invade something.

 

[chris N]

I think that Chinese intervention in the Vietnamese War would be very unlikely. Unlike the previous conflict in Korea a US Invasion of North Vietnam did not threaten China's industrial North nor its Capital.
Instead the region of southern China is not as well developed and generally lacks a transportation network that could support a war.
The Soviet Union used to ship military goods to North Vietnam by sea and rail. It however, stopped all rail transportation when it found out that the Chinese were removing weapons from the trains so that they could reverse Engineer them.
The Hostility between Red China and the Soviet Union grew during this period and one needs to remember that there was a number of border clashes between the forces of both nations.
The elimination of the North Vietnamese to receive supplies would force a settlement on US terms.
The commander of the North Vietnamese Military has openly admitted that if the US had kept up the Bombing his nation would have sued for peace.
Thus an invasion of the country might have resulted that happening much earlier.
There were still a lot of people in the North who had little love for the Communist and who would have been quite happy to take up arms.

No China would not want to intervene because it would then be caght between the Bear and the Eagle.

 

[NickBana]

Agreed. Nice to see commies don't like something...

 

[Rich Rostrom]

Originally Posted by Rich Rostrom
It's also far from clear that China would want to intervene, or feel confident about intervening, even without the GCR.

The Korean intervention cost China a huge number of casualties, and China got nothing out of it but the survival of an untrustworthy buffer state. Why do it again?

Just to be clear with everyone here.... You're actually betting on Mao making a rational decision? The 'Cultural Revolution' guy? That Mao?

People who are irrational about some things are not generally irrational about everything. Those who are are considered demented and get locked up. Mao was the functioning ruler of a major state for decades.

If the North is occupied by U.S. and allied troops (ARVN, RoKs), it's not a base area for attacks on the South.
The trouble is that the SVA was not a stable or steady place at the best of times.

SVA? Do you mean the South Vietnamese army? (which is not a place, and usually referred to as ARVN)

ARVN was not the IDF or the Wehrmacht, but neither was it rice-paper fluff to be blown away by any small gust. The NVA intervened in South Vietnam because ARVN (and the Green Berets) were defeating the Viet Cong. ARVN stood up to NVA attack in 1973 and stopped it. (That was after a major U.S. effort to upgrade its training and equipment.) ARVN stiffened by 50,000 US forces could keep South Vietnam secure if the stream of troops and arms from North Vietnam stopped; and 400,000 U.S. and allied forces could do that.

Another key question is what happens in occupied/liberated North Vietnam. North Vietnam was a brutal Stalinist dictatorship. Such governments can and have mustered considerable military force, but that doesn't mean they're universally popular either. As of 1964, the Communists had been in power for only 10 years. A lot of people could be happy to see them gone. It would depend on U.S. policy in the occupation zone.
That's pretty fraught with wishful thinking. There's nothing to suggest that the US as an invader would be popular.

Well, when Nazi Germany marched into the USSR in 1941, they were welcomed by many people as liberators from Stalinist tyranny. This despite the fact that they marched in with the intent of murdering or enslaving the people there. And despite the fact that to support German forces, they confiscated most available food? In spite of those facts, hundreds of thousands volunteered to serve in the German armed forces as Osttruppen or Hilfswiligers.

That's the feeling engendered by Stalinist rule, and Ho was unquestionably a Stalinist. Communist rule provoked open rebellion in several northern provinces in 1954-1957; it was put down by severe repression and retreat from the most offensive policies.

Is it really wishful thinking to suggest that some of the people would welcome an alternative? Especially an alternative which does not want to murder them or exploit them or confiscate their property or conscript their sons into a horrible war? An alternative which hands out food and medical relief?

The U.S. won over the population of the Philippines in 1900-1910, and we didn't have any Green Berets trained in counterinsurgency.
That's a dramatically rose coloured view in many respects. The US has been accused of genocide in the Phillipine insurrection, and estimates of Phillipine casualties run as high as 1.4 million in a country of 8 or 9 million. Even then, the Phillipines were essentially a collection of isolated islands with poor communication, easily divided up. And the US big promise was to get the hell out, in various ways and degrees, in 1902, 1916, 1934 and 1946.

First, are you claiming the U.S. didn't defeat the Philippine insurrection?

Second, the claim of 1.4M dead is many times the estimate accepted by mainstream historians.

Third, the U.S. would have even less intent of ruling North Vietnam for any period than of ruling the Philippines.

Fourth, the Filipinos became the most pro-American people in the world (as they are today).

but I regard the trio of Johnson, Macnamara, and Rusk as a perfect storm of strategic incompetence.
Nixon, Kissinger and Haig did no better, near as I can tell.

They forced North Vietnam to publicly renounce its ambitions and agree to a peace treaty.

Overall, their policies were similar.

Well. Nixon

1) Resumed bombing North Vietnam
2) Sent ARVN into Cambodia to clear out Communist bases there
3) Made that effort (mentioned above) to upgrade ARVN training and equipment. Mcnamara refused even to start such a program because he insisted his strategies would end the war before such training could take effect.

That's three major differences right there.

I'll grant that they (and the U.S. military) didn't know about the Cultural Revolution, the developing divisions between Communist states, or Mao's feeling of having been stiffed in Korea. So their fear of Chinese intervention, though mistaken, was understandable.
One wonders what faith they placed in Mao's ability or willingness to act rationally.

If one decides that Mao is completely irrational, then it doesn't matter what one's own actions are, because he could do anything anyway.

One factor I left out before is that in 1950, Communist rule in China was less than two years old, and there was still a lot of talk about Chiang's forces "returning to the mainland". The UN advance into North Korea looked very much like a precedent for the invasion of China, and Macarthur was known to be an associate of the pro-Chiang "China Lobby".

By 1965, that's a very remote concern for Mao. In 1950, China intervened only after UN forces not only crossed the 38th parallel but stated the intent of occupying all North Korea up to the Chinese border. That could be avoided in Vietnam.

 

[M. Adolphe Thiers]

ARVN was not the IDF or the Wehrmacht, but neither was it rice-paper fluff to be blown away by any small gust. The NVA intervened in South Vietnam because ARVN (and the Green Berets) were defeating the Viet Cong. ARVN stood up to NVA attack in 1973 and stopped it. (That was after a major U.S. effort to upgrade its training and equipment.) ARVN stiffened by 50,000 US forces could keep South Vietnam secure if the stream of troops and arms from North Vietnam stopped; and 400,000 U.S. and allied forces could do that.

Not only that, but the major weakness that South Vietnam had was weak air power. The VNAF had few bomber aircraft, and sales of advanced fighter aircraft got suspended with Watergate. I've heard some accusations that it was intentional, as Washington feared that an independent VNAF could ruin the effect of bombing pauses for trying to induce negotiations, but I'm skeptical.

I think ARVN could have reasonably managed to fend off the 1975 invasion if they had still been resupplied by the United States and better air support capabilities.

 

[ModernKiwi]

The South Vietnamese Air Force had enough trouble maintaining the F-5's and A-37's that they did have. I don't think they'd have wanted the extra effort needed to run F-4's or the like.