Near the end of April the British Chiefs of Staff pointed out that the Western Allies could derive remarkable political advantages from liberating Prague and as much of the rest of Czechoslovakia as possible. General Marshall passed this on to General Eisenhower, adding: "Personally, and aside from all logistic, tactical, or strategical implications, I would be loath to hazard American lives for purely political purposes."
General Eisenhower insisted that the northern thrust-toward Luebeck and Kiel and the southern drive in the direction of Linz and the National Redoubt be given priority. Provided additional means were at hand, he planned to attack the enemy also in Czechoslovakia, Denmark, and Norway. He thought that the Western Allies would be able to deal with Denmark and Norway, but concluded that the Red Army was in a perfect position to clean out Czechoslovakia and would certainly reach Prague before the U.S. forces. He assured General Marshall: "I shall not attempt any move I deem militarily unwise merely to gain a political advantage unless I receive specific orders from the Combined Chiefs of Staff." There is nothing to indicate that they gave him any such orders.
The Supreme Commander informed the Russians on 30 April that, while the operational position was being adjusted along the Elbe and the Mulde, he would cross the lower Elbe to establish a firm flank near Wismar. From the headwaters of the Mulde southward, he intended to hold the line approximately along the 1937 frontiers of Czechoslovakia. Later, Allied forces could advance to Karlsbad, Pilsen, and Budejovice. On the southern flank, he proposed to advance in the general area of Linz. If at any time the situation required the Allies to advance farther, he was willing to take such action.
When, on 4 May, General Eisenhower indicated his willingness to move from the Pilsen-Karlsbad area to the line of the Elbe and Moldau and to clear their western banks, the Russians strongly dissented. To avoid possible incidents, General Antonov asked General Eisenhower not to move his forces in Czechoslovakia east of the line Budejovice-Pilsen-Karlsbad. He pointedly reminded the Supreme Commander that the Red Army had stopped east of Wismar on the Baltic at his request, and hoped by the same token that the Allies would stop their advance in Czechoslovakia. General Eisenhower agreed not to move farther. Thus he left Prague to be liberated by the Russians.
SHAEF was notified on 5 May that Czech partisans had liberated Prague. Before the day's end, German armored forces converged on the city from outside Prague and on the following morning Czechoslovak representatives asked for aid. They also requested that Czechoslovak forces, then with General Bradley's army group, be sent into Prague. Czechoslovak appeals were also made directly to Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., whose forces were near Pilsen. This word reached Col. Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., of the European Allied Contact Section at SHAEF, on the morning of 7 May after the Germans had surrendered at Reims. He naturally said that Prague was included in the terms of surrender and that hostilities had ended.
Unfortunately, seizure of the radio station in Prague by Czechoslovak partisans had led to confusion on the part of Germans in Czechoslovakia, who were inclined to discredit the report and continue fighting. Therefore, although the war was ended, Prague was still in danger from the German forces near that city. Mr. Churchill wired General Eisenhower on 7 May that he hoped the latter's statements as to his intentions would not prevent an advance to Prague if forces were available and they did not meet the Russians first.
More urgent appeals came from the Czechoslovaks on 7 and 8 May, some being made directly to Mr. Churchill. When the Czechs talked later to SHAEF officials, they were told that the proper procedure had been followed, since if Mr. Churchill felt that something could be done he had the facilities for taking up the matter directly with the U.S. Government.
General Eisenhower continued to honor General Antonov's request of 5 May that the U.S. forces remain west of the Pilsen-Karlsbad line, while keeping the Russians informed of Czechoslovak pleas for aid. Thus, when on 8 May the Czechoslovaks asked for bombers to be sent to Prague, SHAEF forwarded the message to Moscow with the comment that no action was being taken. On the same day a report was passed on to the effect that Czech Partisans were under attack by the Germans. The Czechoslovaks were notified that Allied forces had stopped at the request of the Russians and that all appeals for help should go to them.
In order to stop the enemy attacks, a U.S. patrol was sent with a German representative of Admiral Karl Doenitz' headquarters to Field Marshal Ferdinand Schoerner, who commanded the forces in Czechoslovakia, and warned him of the serious consequences which would follow if he did not speedily bring hostilities to an end. General Eisenhower warned all German soldiers by radio that any continuation of hostilities would be severely punished by the Allies.
The Russian forces ultimately entered Prague on 12 May. Some eighteen days passed before they gave permission for Czechoslovaks in General Bradley's army group to come to the city.