WI: Soviet invasion of Europe in summer 1941

[Blackfox5]

I wonder what the diplomatic consequences would be.

As yet another victim of Hitler's aggression, Churchill could easily swing public opinion in favor of alliance with Moscow. With Stalin as aggressor Churchill would need to be much more cautious. He can't be seen as advocating a Communist conquest of Eastern Europe. Once the Red Army suffers a defeat and is pushed back on Russian soil, it may be easier to extend help. Instead of defending what appears to be Communist aggression against Eastern Europe, he can claim the Soviets were trying to pre-empt a Nazi invasion and deserves support of Britain.

For the same reason, I think this complicates any Lend Lease given to the Soviet Union. I don't see any aid being given until it is apparent the Soviets are on the defensive. How much farther does this push aid approval and eventual receipt than OTL? Six months? More? Furthermore, I think there will be far more restrictions on aid. It may even require the Soviets to renounce their post-1939 border changes.

In terms of the battlefield, I can see Soviet losses being much greater, but I question whether this materially changes the battlelines very much at end of 1941 from OTL.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

As yet another victim of Hitler's aggression, Churchill could easily swing public opinion in favor of alliance with Moscow. With Stalin as aggressor Churchill would need to be much more cautious. He can't be seen as advocating a Communist conquest of Eastern Europe. Once the Red Army suffers a defeat and is pushed back on Russian soil, it may be easier to extend help. Instead of defending what appears to be Communist aggression against Eastern Europe, he can claim the Soviets were trying to pre-empt a Nazi invasion and deserves support of Britain.

For the same reason, I think this complicates any Lend Lease given to the Soviet Union. I don't see any aid being given until it is apparent the Soviets are on the defensive. How much farther does this push aid approval and eventual receipt than OTL? Six months? More? Furthermore, I think there will be far more restrictions on aid. It may even require the Soviets to renounce their post-1939 border changes.

It probably doesn't affect lend-lease, since that wasn't extended until November, at all for the reasons you stated. Pre-lend lease will be affected, but only up until the Soviets start getting thrown back on the defensive in June-July.

In terms of the battlefield, I can see Soviet losses being much greater, but I question whether this materially changes the battlelines very much at end of 1941 from OTL.

That depends on what the Soviets can muster after ITTLs Vyazma-Bryansk encirclement. Which is an unknowable to be sure.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

What would the casualties of a Soviet offensive be? IOTL they mobilized at least 8 million men, so even losing say 2-3 million casualties, while very painful especially with their equipment, won't be fatal, as it wasn't IOTL when the first two strategic echelons were wiped out. It also buys more time to mobilize fully and distribute all equipment, but it does delay industrial evacuation. How many losses would the Axis take due to a Soviet offensive compared to OTL?

 

[ObssesedNuker]

What would the casualties of a Soviet offensive be?

1st and 2nd Strategic Echelons as of the start of the war were some ~4 million so... near that, probably. Not all of it as some elements will undoubtedly manage to escape eastwards, if fewer then IOTL, but it gives us a good upper limit.

It also buys more time to mobilize fully and distribute all equipment, but it does delay industrial evacuation.

I don't see that. The Soviets were able to conduct evacuations alongside all of the IOTL mobilizations under the conditions of surprise attack. ITTL, the mobilizations will be further along when the industrial evacuation begins so the Soviets should have an easier time of it, if anything.

How many losses would the Axis take due to a Soviet offensive compared to OTL?

Probably less then they did running through those defenses... although... do the Soviets achieve surprise? It occurs to me that that would probably affect at least how much damage the Germans take.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

1st and 2nd Strategic Echelons as of the start of the war were some ~4 million so... near that, probably. Not all of it as some elements will undoubtedly manage to escape eastwards, if fewer then IOTL, but it gives us a good upper limit.

That seems excessive. IIRC from 'Colossus' the Zhukov plan was for about 150 divisions for the attack, which would be what, 2-3 million men? According to Glantz that was even less than the 1st strategic echelon used in DP41 IOTL (Glantz Barbarossa p. 16). Even with the 2nd Strategic echelon fed in to reinforce a failing offensive to save off pockets or whatever would still be less than 3 million in the bag, assuming you could bag all that many anyway. As it was IOTL not all the 1st and 2nd echelons were bagged.

I don't see that. The Soviets were able to conduct evacuations alongside all of the IOTL mobilizations under the conditions of surprise attack. ITTL, the mobilizations will be further along when the industrial evacuation begins so the Soviets should have an easier time of it, if anything.

Yes, but at the expense of being able to properly supply defensive operations. Also the planning for evacuation happened before the German invasion, which might well not happen if Stalin has faith in the offensive plans and then it has to be improvised on the fly. When on defensive operations then yes evacuations can happen because mobilization would likely be complete ITTL by the time major factories were reached and all equipment and supplies on hand distributed to depots.

Probably less then they did running through those defenses... although... do the Soviets achieve surprise? It occurs to me that that would probably affect at least how much damage the Germans take.

I doubt it would be possible to achieve surprise given the sigint and aerial recon going on and the Axis special operations going on already in Ukraine and the Baltic that Glantz mentions in his 'Barbarossa'. Also Stalin would likely have to declare open mobilization to really prepare unless he wants to leave the 2nd Strategic echelon to slowly mobilize with the secret mobilization of OTL that wasn't complete on June 22nd.

I'd also imagine the Germans would parachute saboteurs in as per OTL to disrupt the offensive once it began. BTW weren't the Soviets seriously short of radios too during OTL Barbarossa? I remember reading something about that in the Osprey campaign series on Barbarossa. That would make CiC really tough on the offensive especially with spec ops and ethnic separatists cutting landlines as per OTL. Certain operations might be a surprise like the the planned paratrooper drops at night on Romanian airfields. Of course given the historical track record of Soviet night drops during WW2 that would not go well.

 

[galveston bay]

This is more likely and Hitler would probably assume the Soviets were better than they were. This may be a way to get the Soviets to make really big mistakes.
I wonder if the 1940-42 purge would happen then?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purge_of_the_Red_Army_in_1941
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Army#Doctrinal_development_in_the_1920s_and_1930s

For one thing armor would be dispersed still, so would be even less effective than IOTL.

according to this book "Ivan's War" and some other books I have read the Red Army stumbled into Poland in September 1939 and only the fact that the Poles had bigger problems stopped that from being as big a debacle as the Winter War turned out to be. The Red Army at that point was more akin to Trotsky's Revolutionary Red Army than a professional fighting force, because the Purges got rid of most of the professional reforms (and their officers) and Stalin didn't have the Winter War and the Fall of France to examine.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

according to this book "Ivan's War" and some other books I have read the Red Army stumbled into Poland in September 1939 and only the fact that the Poles had bigger problems stopped that from being as big a debacle as the Winter War turned out to be. The Red Army at that point was more akin to Trotsky's Revolutionary Red Army than a professional fighting force, because the Purges got rid of most of the professional reforms (and their officers) and Stalin didn't have the Winter War and the Fall of France to examine.

I wonder if that alone would be enough to dissuade Stalin, but maybe not

 

[ObssesedNuker]

That seems excessive. IIRC from 'Colossus' the Zhukov plan was for about 150 divisions for the attack, which would be what, 2-3 million men?

I'd imagine 150 divisions in the first operational echelon, I can believe sure. But for the entire assault the Soviets would undoubtedly concentrate the bulk of their forces. If the Soviets attack in '41, their not going to be holding back any appreciable amount of their pre-war forces.

If, for whatever reason, they do hold back an appreciable amount of their pre-war forces as a strategic reserve... well, that changes the dynamic of the campaign a bit.

Yes, but at the expense of being able to properly supply defensive operations.

The industrial evacuations and mobilization of forces didn't interfere that much with the supply of both defensive and offensive operations IOTL. If anything, with mobilization being further along and better reorganization of the logistical apparatus it will be eased.

Also the planning for evacuation happened before the German invasion, which might well not happen if Stalin has faith in the offensive plans and then it has to be improvised on the fly.

Erm... yeah the planning was all done before the German invasion. It was all done before even World War 2 broke out. The plans will still all be there once things start to go south and evacuations are ordered, so there will be no need to improvise any more then IOTL.

I doubt it would be possible to achieve surprise given the sigint and aerial recon going on and the Axis special operations going on already in Ukraine and the Baltic that Glantz mentions in his 'Barbarossa'. Also Stalin would likely have to declare open mobilization to really prepare unless he wants to leave the 2nd Strategic echelon to slowly mobilize with the secret mobilization of OTL that wasn't complete on June 22nd.

On the other hand, the Soviets preparing to attack are going to ruthlessely crack down on all of that as opposed to IOTL where they let it go for fear of provoking the Germans, vastly limiting German intel intake. Given that German intelligence gathering was criminally deficient as it was and German arrogance in underestimating the Russians, it isn't unforeseeable.

Either way, if the Soviets achieve surprise then German casualties might indeed be higher then their OTL attack, if only slightly. If they don't achieve surprise, we can expect a reduction of German casualties.

BTW weren't the Soviets seriously short of radios too during OTL Barbarossa? I remember reading something about that in the Osprey campaign series on Barbarossa.

Along with their league of other issues, yeah. It's just one more nail in the offensives coffin, though.

That would make CiC really tough on the offensive especially with spec ops and ethnic separatists cutting landlines as per OTL.

Actually, that's one thing that would be reduced as part of the preparations would be to adequately secure the land-lines, something which the Soviets neglected to do IOTL.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I'd imagine 150 divisions in the first operational echelon, I can believe sure. But for the entire assault the Soviets would undoubtedly concentrate the bulk of their forces. If the Soviets attack in '41, their not going to be holding back any appreciable amount of their pre-war forces.

I think they'd push out whatever could be made ready in time, which IIRC is why Zhukov only wanted about half the army instead of the whole thing, plus of course the garrison for the Finnish border and Far East.

If, for whatever reason, they do hold back an appreciable amount of their pre-war forces as a strategic reserve... well, that changes the dynamic of the campaign a bit.

I think Glantz said that Zhukov thought only about half the army could be made ready for an offensive, so the parts held back would be the least ready to fight and those shorted on personnel, equipment, supplies, and weapons. So strategic reserve is probably generous. Its more the left behinds and the garrison for the Far East.

On the other hand, the Soviets preparing to attack are going to ruthlessely crack down on all of that as opposed to IOTL where they let it go for fear of provoking the Germans, vastly limiting German intel intake. Given that German intelligence gathering was criminally deficient as it was and German arrogance in underestimating the Russians, it isn't unforeseeable.

Why would it have provoked the Germans to crack down on such activity IOTL? It seems like they tried pretty hard based on the issues the NKVD were running around trying to stamp out in the Baltics just before the invasion; the NKVD motorized division in Riga had to run around the days before the invasion trying to tamp down such threats so weren't in the city until later on invasion day trying to secure it against uprisings that were attempted.

It might be different ITTL if there is no Winter War as a POD, that was THE major event that made the Germans and Hitler not take them seriously. The Spanish Civil War and fighting against the Japanese had seemed to show the Soviets as a competent force despite the purges, but the Winter War blew that all apart.

Either way, if the Soviets achieve surprise then German casualties might indeed be higher then their OTL attack, if only slightly. If they don't achieve surprise, we can expect a reduction of German casualties.

If they did somehow then yes, they'd probably catch them unprepared for an attack, but I'd think the general Soviet problems and road conditions would mitigate that a great deal as the offensive stumbled over itself and gave the Axis forces time to react. The Soviet air force might have a better time of it, but early warning systems would probably give them away so there isn't a reverse version of OTL Barbarossa's first aerial strike on airfields.

Actually, that's one thing that would be reduced as part of the preparations would be to adequately secure the land-lines, something which the Soviets neglected to do IOTL.

I imagine they'd be much more prepared if they were going to mobilize and attack than they were IOTL.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

I think Glantz said that Zhukov thought only about half the army could be made ready for an offensive, so the parts held back would be the least ready to fight and those shorted on personnel, equipment, supplies, and weapons. So strategic reserve is probably generous. Its more the left behinds and the garrison for the Far East.

I'll have to re-read Stumbling Colossus at some point.

Why would it have provoked the Germans to crack down on such activity IOTL?

I don't know, but Stalin figured it would have somehow. He kept refusing permission to shoot down German reconnaissance planes that violated Soviet air space and sending back German agents with nothing more then a slap on the wrist. He showed no hesitation in shooting the local spies that the Germans recruited, naturally, but those made up only a small part of German intelligence gathering efforts.

It might be different ITTL if there is no Winter War as a POD, that was THE major event that made the Germans and Hitler not take them seriously. The Spanish Civil War and fighting against the Japanese had seemed to show the Soviets as a competent force despite the purges, but the Winter War blew that all apart.

I'm just running along the OPs implication that Stalin looks at the intelligence at some point OTL April 1941 (?) and goes "Well, let's just hit them first." It's implausible as all hell, but not impossible per-say.

If they did somehow then yes, they'd probably catch them unprepared for an attack, but I'd think the general Soviet problems and road conditions would mitigate that a great deal as the offensive stumbled over itself and gave the Axis forces time to react. The Soviet air force might have a better time of it, but early warning systems would probably give them away so there isn't a reverse version of OTL Barbarossa's first aerial strike on airfields.

Agreed. The differences are going to be rather minor.

I imagine they'd be much more prepared if they were going to mobilize and attack than they were IOTL.

Quite.

 

[Gudestein]

I'm just running along the OPs implication that Stalin looks at the intelligence at some point OTL April 1941 (?) and goes "Well, let's just hit them first." It's implausible as all hell, but not impossible per-say.

I think this quote came from me trying to think how it could happen in the most simplistic way.
I did say "for whatever reason".
I guess my follow-up question from this is: What would Stalin do if he in 1941, for whatever reason", becomes 100% convinced that Germany will indeed attack when the Balkan campaign is over and the roads clear up?

It seems to me that everything in the Soviet doctrine favored attack and thus better to go on a poorly prepared attack that may catch the enemy off guard than to wait for a poorly prepared defense?

A major argument here would be Japan. A quite severe draw-back of the pre-emptive strike idea from OTL, but maybe not entirely unlike Stalin to think the Japanese may be in on this fascist conspiracy?

Lastly, lets assume the Soviets do attack in May 1941, and here I agree it would go quite horrible, but lets have the discussion as a comparison to the quite horrible beginning of Barbarossa.
If it is not pre-prepared would Stalin be able to put more troops into harms way?
In any case, here is my take on the key differences:
1: oviets have a few weeks of progress, but also heavy losses. Germany will have heavy losses and retreats, but comfortably hold their ground were the planned spearheads have been assembled and concentrated. So far its better for the Soviets than OTL, but here comes a bit more.
2:Supporting their break-through exposes the Soviet transport train to air attacks severely hampering Soviet mobility later on.
3: Germany has their defense near their logistics base and will counter-attack from that OTL position after the Soviets have exhausted themselves. Eg. they will face less opposition on the advance and less attrition. The Key factor that lost them the war
4: In the south the Soviets will advance (big question if they get to Ploesti. I think not), but then the factors stated above comes into play here as well and well see the destruction of the southern front unlike OTL.

Yes, I do think that 4 weeks into the battle the Soviets have lost more than OTL week 1 and are in some strategic poor states.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I'll have to re-read Stumbling Colossus at some point.

That makes two of us.

I don't know, but Stalin figured it would have somehow. He kept refusing permission to shoot down German reconnaissance planes that violated Soviet air space and sending back German agents with nothing more then a slap on the wrist. He showed no hesitation in shooting the local spies that the Germans recruited, naturally, but those made up only a small part of German intelligence gathering efforts.

Do you have some quote to support that? My understanding was they were cracking down on guerrilla groups, but they couldn't control the problem in Ukraine or the Baltics. As to aerial recon yeah in the months leading up to the invasion he'd have to enforce air space, but they couldn't stop the Ju86s because they just flew too high to catch and the aircraft that ended up being the solution didn't arrive until 1943. What spies did he hand back? I really like to read more about that. Again even with degrading Axis intelligence gathering it would be impossible to hide mobilization and gearing up for invasion; the Soviets could hide 2nd strategic echelon mobilizing in secret, but not 1st echelon, which was well spotted IOTL.

I'm just running along the OPs implication that Stalin looks at the intelligence at some point OTL April 1941 (?) and goes "Well, let's just hit them first." It's implausible as all hell, but not impossible per-say.

I think he could even do so earlier in January. OP doesn't specify date. It would have to be well before April if they want to attack in May or even just June 22nd, which would render OP's question moot if the Germans preempt them before the could attack. Without the Winter War its certainly easier than IOTL, both due to Soviet general preparedness for operations and Stalin being unaware of the problems.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I think this quote came from me trying to think how it could happen in the most simplistic way.
I did say "for whatever reason".
I guess my follow-up question from this is: What would Stalin do if he in 1941, for whatever reason", becomes 100% convinced that Germany will indeed attack when the Balkan campaign is over and the roads clear up?

It depends on what causes him to do that. If IOTL he's more likely to try and buy off the Germans and only belatedly order a mobilization and preparation once he realized he's been unsuccessful. Part of the problem is that the Germans have been doing confounding things, like Hitler writing a personnel note to Stalin explaining the build up and warning him against his own generals trying to provoke war and asking Stalin to personally inform him of border violations; that really threw Stalin for a loop and convinced him Hitler was on the level, especially when the build up resulted in the invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece in April-May and then the invasion of Crete and basing of offensive air units on the island. None of that made sense to preparing for an invasion of the USSR in June. Also when the first German invasion date of May 15th came and went and then later proposed dates came and went Stalin stopped believing intelligence IOTL. So it might well be very difficult to get him to believe anything given the extensive efforts the Germans made to convince Stalin that the build up in the east was entirely reasonable given their plans against Britain:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Haifisch
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Harpune

It seems to me that everything in the Soviet doctrine favored attack and thus better to go on a poorly prepared attack that may catch the enemy off guard than to wait for a poorly prepared defense?

Indeed, which is why Zhukov proposed that and all previous Soviet warplans for war with Germany were offensive. So you'd need something to convince Stalin that the war was coming in 1941 regardless AND that the Red Army was ready for attack.

A major argument here would be Japan. A quite severe draw-back of the pre-emptive strike idea from OTL, but maybe not entirely unlike Stalin to think the Japanese may be in on this fascist conspiracy?

Agreed, but Stalin could keep the OTL forces there to defend and be okay, but Vladivostok would be blockaded no matter what he could do.

Lastly, lets assume the Soviets do attack in May 1941, and here I agree it would go quite horrible, but lets have the discussion as a comparison to the quite horrible beginning of Barbarossa.
If it is not pre-prepared would Stalin be able to put more troops into harms way?

What do you mean if not pre-prepared? I think the initial invasion force would be all that the Soviets could attack with and they'd likely get slaughtered and give Hitler his casus belli that he always dreamed of, while then preempting Crete and forcing the XI and VIII Fliegerkorps to rush to the East to fight, saving the Germans a lot of unnecessary losses in the Mediterranean. The Soviets would probably be taken down with fewer losses to the Germans than IOTL and drag in everyone, but the Finns who fought in the East IOTL (the Hungarians and Italians took a bit to join in). The benefit for the Soviets though is that it throws off German offensive preparations. It burns up supplies and disorganizes the mobilizing attackers, who then can't go for their meticulously planned invasion as they wanted, but have to react to the Soviet invasion, deal with it, and then reorient and build up for a Minsk type attack against the 2nd strategic echelon waiting on the border. Assuming that the border battles then play out roughly similar to OTL in the Baltic and Belarus and better in Ukraine (due to Soviet armor getting wiped out in the offensive and then not being there for the defensive) then the Axis needs to take a pause to repair all the rail line damage that happened in Poland and along the border, rather than leaping on to Smolensk or beyond. This buys Stalin time to evacuate industry and mobilize any remaining forces he's got left and rush newly build weapons to the front. At this point the situation is extremely bad because the majority of the pre-war army is gone, Japan is perhaps threatening something in the East, equipment and supplies are at an all time low, the routes to the Soviet major cities are open, and all that's left are militia and older reserves. But logistics are still holding the Germans back and even 4 million militia with the bare minimum of equipment and weapons, plus whatever trickle of new modern stuff coming in is still a significant speed bump.

In any case, here is my take on the key differences:
1: oviets have a few weeks of progress, but also heavy losses. Germany will have heavy losses and retreats, but comfortably hold their ground were the planned spearheads have been assembled and concentrated. So far its better for the Soviets than OTL, but here comes a bit more.

I doubt the Germans would suffer heavy losses given the state of the Soviet military in 1941 and the weather and infrastructure issues. The Luftwaffe would do enormous damage to the crowded roads and vulnerable rail heads, which would make the attacking troops easy pickings for counterattacks. The breakdowns in tanks and trucks would be obscene and the horrible disparity in tactical and operational ability between the Axis and Soviets at this point is going to make this look like a cat toying with a mouse. Really the only benefit is they throw off the German invasion plans for a while and burn up German supplies further West. Of course the Germans' goal was to kill the Soviet military as far west as possible so they didn't need to fight deep and supply a deep offensive is aided by Soviet invasion plans here, as they can not only kill the best Soviet troops on their own turf in a replay of Tannenberg writ large, but then kill the rest of the pre-war army west of the Dvina-Dniepr instead of at Smolensk and beyond.

2:Supporting their break-through exposes the Soviet transport train to air attacks severely hampering Soviet mobility later on.

Indeed. Fatally so.

3: Germany has their defense near their logistics base and will counter-attack from that OTL position after the Soviets have exhausted themselves. Eg. they will face less opposition on the advance and less attrition. The Key factor that lost them the war

Indeed.

4: In the south the Soviets will advance (big question if they get to Ploesti. I think not), but then the factors stated above comes into play here as well and well see the destruction of the southern front unlike OTL.

Not even close. They need to cross the Prut river in the face of 3 armies and their air support. The Italians will rush in aircraft and men ASAP to protect their oil too. Likely the Soviets soften up their ability to fight on the defensive by wiping themselves out trying to cross the Prut and wasting their airborne on suicide missions.

Yes, I do think that 4 weeks into the battle the Soviets have lost more than OTL week 1 and are in some strategic poor states.

They've given the Germans and rest of the Axis a major gift in terms of offering their necks for the blade; the Soviets were very tough on the defense in 1941, and have traditionally been very stubborn defenders (check out the battle for Odessa and Sevastopol), but in 1941 they hadn't developed the skills for the offensive yet (see OTL 1941 until December 5th) via combat experience, even less so if there is no Winter War as a POD for coaxing them into attacking. So it would end up making the Minsk counterattack in 1941 look well handled.

 

[cracou]

I don't know what your profession has to do with anything about this topic. I'd suggesting reading him more closely and asking him specific questions about the feasibility of a Soviet attack in 1941 because you've ignored his entire book on the state of the Soviet military in 1941, "Stumbling Colossus", which lays out in detail why it was impossible to do so.

Because you state that Glantz is using a lot of statistics... It's my job to be able to create and read them. It's obviously not yours...

Not an alliance. Japan would lose all of her allies and be completely alone against the US if she didn't declare war as per the treaty. All aid and potential deterrents against US intervention is Asia are gone.

Again, try to read good historiy about Japan. Which allies?

They did have artillery, which would stop all of the Soviet tank arsenal dead. Plus they're not going to be using their handful of T-34s and KV-1s capable of offensive action against the Romanians exactly for this reason.

ok, artillery is going to stop the T34... You're funny

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Because you state that Glantz is using a lot of statistics... It's my job to be able to create and read them. It's obviously not yours...

And? He's not writing for statisticians only, so its in a format that is readable for non-statisticians.

Again, try to read good historiy about Japan. Which allies?

Got any recommendations or passages with quotes that specifically state they had no intention of honoring the pact in the event of a Soviet attack on Germany? The Allies they'd lose would be Germany and everyone signed on to the Axis besides the big three:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tripartite_Pact#Later_signatories

ok, artillery is going to stop the T34... You're funny

Its not like firing on open sights didn't happen all the time, I've read countless 1st hand accounts of that by all sides in the war using it to stop armor. Hell the Germans formed an artillery division that helped check the Soviets in their sector in the winter of 1943-44 on the Dniepr.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Its not like firing on open sights didn't happen all the time, I've read countless 1st hand accounts of that by all sides in the war using it to stop armor.

Also ATGs are considered a specialized sub-category of artillery.

 

[Napoleon IV]

ok, artillery is going to stop the T34... You're funny

Except there aren't enough T-34s to make a difference. Out of the roughly 23,000 Soviet tanks at the time only about 1,500 were T-34 or KV-1 tanks. The rest were T-26 and BT series tanks, which proved inferior to the Germans. And even the T-34s and KV-1s suffered from problems of logistics and leadership. A huge number of tanks broke down and had to be abandoned, and on average the crew of a T-34 had only basic military training and 72 hours of classroom experience. The T-34 is a great weapon, but the Red Army's handling of it in June 1941 was beyond incompetent.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Except there aren't enough T-34s to make a difference. Out of the roughly 23,000 Soviet tanks at the time only about 1,500 were T-34 or KV-1 tanks. The rest were T-26 and BT series tanks, which proved inferior to the Germans. And even the T-34s and KV-1s suffered from problems of logistics and leadership. A huge number of tanks broke down and had to be abandoned, and on average the crew of a T-34 had only basic military training and 72 hours of classroom experience. The T-34 is a great weapon, but the Red Army's handling of it in June 1941 was beyond incompetent.

That and the tank did not have a particularly reliable record during the war:
http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.gr/2012/07/wwii-myths-t-34-best-tank-of-war.html
It was largely a function of it being a new design (the Panther and Tiger had the same issue) and required time to work out the reliability issues, i.e. later than 1941, while also being produced in a cheap and less reliable way because they needed a lot of their quickly and their combat surviveability was low, so it made no sense to make them to high standards. Much like how the V-1 missile or Panzerfaust was designed to be disposable because it was one use, the T-34 was constructed to take into account the fact that they wouldn't be around long enough to utilize long term reliability.

 

[Gudestein]

It depends on what causes him to do that. If IOTL he's more likely to try and buy off the Germans and only belatedly order a mobilization and preparation once he realized he's been unsuccessful. Part of the problem is that the Germans have been doing confounding things, like Hitler writing a personnel note to Stalin explaining the build up and warning him against his own generals trying to provoke war and asking Stalin to personally inform him of border violations; that really threw Stalin for a loop and convinced him Hitler was on the level, especially when the build up resulted in the invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece in April-May and then the invasion of Crete and basing of offensive air units on the island. None of that made sense to preparing for an invasion of the USSR in June. Also when the first German invasion date of May 15th came and went and then later proposed dates came and went Stalin stopped believing intelligence IOTL. So it might well be very difficult to get him to believe anything given the extensive efforts the Germans made to convince Stalin that the build up in the east was entirely reasonable given their plans against Britain:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Haifisch
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Harpune

The last one seems to have been my most agreeable post ever.

I like the way you also put it into the strategic objectives of the Germans. Its a bit imaginative, but could you imagine the Germans wanting Stalin to attack?

Indeed, which is why Zhukov proposed that and all previous Soviet warplans for war with Germany were offensive. So you'd need something to convince Stalin that the war was coming in 1941 regardless AND that the Red Army was ready for attack.

I guess Stalin believing that his army is ready for attack is quite difficult to achieve, but given the way used any opportunity for counter-attacks, would he indeed need to feel ready. If Germany is attacking anyway, why not in the Soviet doctrine conduct a poorly organized attack, rather than a poorly organized defense in your home country.
Yes, I know we see many reasons against it, but it did seem like Stalin took a few months getting into the defensive mode.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I like the way you also put it into the strategic objectives of the Germans. Its a bit imaginative, but could you imagine the Germans wanting Stalin to attack?

I thought someone provided a quote in this thread that specifically said some of the Germans wished they would attack in 1941

I guess Stalin believing that his army is ready for attack is quite difficult to achieve, but given the way used any opportunity for counter-attacks, would he indeed need to feel ready. If Germany is attacking anyway, why not in the Soviet doctrine conduct a poorly organized attack, rather than a poorly organized defense in your home country.
Yes, I know we see many reasons against it, but it did seem like Stalin took a few months getting into the defensive mode.

As we said Zhukov and pre-1941 Soviet planning were offensive, not defensive. Stalin was the one that opted for the defense until the German attacks began, but even in conception the defensive plan was simply getting the Germans to start it so they could launch their counterattacks, Glantz calls the strategy 'the answering strike'. You'd need a reason to get Stalin to think that the Red Army was capable of attacking and winning that attack against the army that just destroyed what everyone thought was the best army in Europe in 6 weeks just a year before.