The French victory at the Battle of Fontenoy led to France's occupation of much of the Austrian Netherlands and nearly led to the realization of France's centuries long dream to conquer the (at the time) Austrian Netherlands. Unfortunately for France, Louis XV wanted to be seen as an arbiter and not as a conqueror, and returned the Netherlands to Austria in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. So what if Louis XV decides he wants to be more like his great-grandfather the Sun King and keeps the Netherlands. How would this change history?
WI: France keeps the Austrian Netherlands?
- Thread starter Emperor Constantine
- Start date
Louis XV did not only return the then newly austrian netherlands because he wanted to be seen as a fair king and an arbiter. He also did it because he was convinced by some of his advisers that if he did not, he would have an everlasting war against Great Britain.
On this point he was both right and stupidly wrong.
He was right because that was obviously right. The french holding the Netherlands was the absolute casus belli for Britain.
But he was stupidly wrong because in fact the truer casus belli for England was any power threatening its beginning sea and trade domination, on which it had just supplanted the dutch. So he would have war anyway, war to the death.
This returning of the Netherlands was a very strong incentive for Great Britain to start the seven years war. Britain knew France was led by a poor king who did not know to negotiate to the best of his interests.
I thing the french keeping a firm control of the Netherlands in 1748 changes everything and brings you to a "God is a frenchman" scenario.
Bonus it you have the french benefit from a few more days of conflict in 1748 and retain control of Madras.
If you basically have Louis XV not be one of the worst kings of France (chich he really was, much worse than his grandson), this means France industrializing faster and stronger. And probably retaining its north american possessions and also not screwing-up the indian domination Dupleix had started to build before he was brought to trial and let Clive copy his winning strategy.
On this point he was both right and stupidly wrong.
He was right because that was obviously right. The french holding the Netherlands was the absolute casus belli for Britain.
But he was stupidly wrong because in fact the truer casus belli for England was any power threatening its beginning sea and trade domination, on which it had just supplanted the dutch. So he would have war anyway, war to the death.
This returning of the Netherlands was a very strong incentive for Great Britain to start the seven years war. Britain knew France was led by a poor king who did not know to negotiate to the best of his interests.
I thing the french keeping a firm control of the Netherlands in 1748 changes everything and brings you to a "God is a frenchman" scenario.
Bonus it you have the french benefit from a few more days of conflict in 1748 and retain control of Madras.
If you basically have Louis XV not be one of the worst kings of France (chich he really was, much worse than his grandson), this means France industrializing faster and stronger. And probably retaining its north american possessions and also not screwing-up the indian domination Dupleix had started to build before he was brought to trial and let Clive copy his winning strategy.
Oh I agree that Britain would never tolerate such a threat to their Sea Domination but would they really have had a choice? Wasn't their army for the most part smashed at Fontenoy? So would they really be able to threaten France with anything other than their fleets? Personally I doubt it. Anyway it wasn't like Austria really wanted it in the first place. Austria tried to use the Netherlands as a bargaining chip at least 3 times in the 18th century so I doubt they would really kick up a fight.
But with a French victory in the Austrian war, would we see the diplomatic Revolution that occurred during the years between that war and the 7 years war? And what effects would a French Netherlands bring down the road besides a potential cause of war? Both good and bad effects please.
Sorry if I did not make myself understood.
The point is that in 1748 (I do agree with you) Great Britain was in fact not in a position to demand the return of the austrian netherlands.
It was a kind of divine surprise that France offered to return it : in real History, it happened that God was an englishman and not a frenchman. The brits should have erected a statue in memory of Louis XV or named Trafalgar's square Louis XV's square. Louis XV was more important in establishing british world domination than Nelson.
Had I been a british old member of parliament, I would have died laughing at tne news of the french negotiating position.
If France had not had such a stupid king, it would have retained the netherlands once and for all.
There would have been a diplomatic revolution because the british could then not have invested so much ressources in their navy.
There would no longer have been the structural cause for conflict between France and Habsburg Austria. The french just had to find a good compensation for the austrians.
The point is that in 1748 (I do agree with you) Great Britain was in fact not in a position to demand the return of the austrian netherlands.
It was a kind of divine surprise that France offered to return it : in real History, it happened that God was an englishman and not a frenchman. The brits should have erected a statue in memory of Louis XV or named Trafalgar's square Louis XV's square. Louis XV was more important in establishing british world domination than Nelson.
Had I been a british old member of parliament, I would have died laughing at tne news of the french negotiating position.
If France had not had such a stupid king, it would have retained the netherlands once and for all.
There would have been a diplomatic revolution because the british could then not have invested so much ressources in their navy.
There would no longer have been the structural cause for conflict between France and Habsburg Austria. The french just had to find a good compensation for the austrians.
I've always been partial to a Austro-French Alliance
If Austria gives France their portion of the Netherlands, there's really only one thing I could see that Austria would ever consider to be proper compensation: Retaining Silesia
If France both acknowledges Maria Theresa as legal heir to the Hapsburg Monarchy, and also pledges to defend that claim to all of the remaining Lands in exchange for the Austrian Netherlands, they might be able to get this deal.
Would this be possible? Because if so you could see the Diplomatic Revolution happen Mid War. If Austria agrees to give up some Italian Territory to Spain, which I don't consider impossible, that could also get Spain on their side.
If this came to pass, and France got the Netherlands while Austria retained Silesia, you completely alter the dynamic of the next century of history. France is stronger, it's people less discontented, which may delay or even butterfly any coming Revolution. Austria is much stronger and much richer, and above all else it's territory is now concentrated in one large body rather than having tons of smaller bits just flung onto the map.
Could be Fun.
If Austria gives France their portion of the Netherlands, there's really only one thing I could see that Austria would ever consider to be proper compensation: Retaining Silesia
If France both acknowledges Maria Theresa as legal heir to the Hapsburg Monarchy, and also pledges to defend that claim to all of the remaining Lands in exchange for the Austrian Netherlands, they might be able to get this deal.
Would this be possible? Because if so you could see the Diplomatic Revolution happen Mid War. If Austria agrees to give up some Italian Territory to Spain, which I don't consider impossible, that could also get Spain on their side.
If this came to pass, and France got the Netherlands while Austria retained Silesia, you completely alter the dynamic of the next century of history. France is stronger, it's people less discontented, which may delay or even butterfly any coming Revolution. Austria is much stronger and much richer, and above all else it's territory is now concentrated in one large body rather than having tons of smaller bits just flung onto the map.
Could be Fun.
Well its not like the dutch really mattered at that point. But yes it would be a very interesting TL. I wonder if such an acquisition would be enough to avert the Revolution.
Giving the Austrian Netherlands was resented by the french. There was a saying about the 1748 "bête comme la paix" meaning dumb like the peace and "travailler pour le roi de prusse" working for the king of Prussia. They feel like they fought for nothing and were pretty bitter about it. If thet keept the Austrian netherlands they would not be that unhappy but that would not fix the cause of the revolution. That could also butterfly the death of his son who died of tuberculosis in 1765.
Depends. French revolution was a conjunction of 3 things : debt problems (leading to the convocation of the Generals Estates), political representation problems (which means the General Estates fails), combined with a period of bad harvests (basicaly 1787 to 1818).
Debt problem depends on the number of wars France do in the period, and what it gains in it. Political representation problems isn't going away without a big clash. The king didn't have enough power to break the noble power without the help of the bourgeoisie (in the old meaning, not the marxist one). So in more than 40 years and presumably two kings (and possibly multiple wars), a lot of things are possible, but the acquisition of Austrian Netherlands isn't going to butterfly the French Revolution alone. For the debt, if France do one or two big wars until the end of the century, the debt will be there due to the way the army was financed (basically through two or three kind of taxes), unless you change the French tax system (which is difficult due to the political representation problems).
I personnaly think that when France acquire Austrian Netherlands, every ruler after that will think : why stop here and not at the Rhine? The western bank of the Rhine was only gained for a short time after the revolution but it was already in the mind of Richelieu.
Off topic but this is something that always bugged me. How did the French revolution fix the debt problem? I mean I guess between the sizing of noble and church lands and the reform of the tax system a sizable dent would have been put in the debt but what about the rest? Or did France just de facto default on the loans after the revolutionary wars begun?
Before being solved, France's problem worsened during the revolutionary years because of the disorganization, chaos, civil war and then foreign war.
Then the Directorate stabilized the situation and restored a part of public trust.
During all these years there was a strong inflation.
Then the government made a good bankrupcy on 2/3 of the public debt.
And Bonaparte took much money from the plundering and reparations he took from Italy and Austria in order to lessen the weight of military expense on the budget.
Then the Directorate stabilized the situation and restored a part of public trust.
During all these years there was a strong inflation.
Then the government made a good bankrupcy on 2/3 of the public debt.
And Bonaparte took much money from the plundering and reparations he took from Italy and Austria in order to lessen the weight of military expense on the budget.
Well, if Louis XV is the great king of the french Bourbon dynasty, he may even be seen as a greater king than Louis XIV, whatever are his personnal vices. Because if he made terrible mistakes as far as diplomacy and war were concerned, he was enough authoritarian to know how to make decisions in interior/domestic affairs.
Leading to the revolution is another thing.
Revolution or not, there was a strong movement of modernisation in 18th century France. France perfectly could have taken some kind of british path of gradual political reform for a rather similar final result.
Tocqueville wrote something like what follows. If you considered the structure of the french ruling elite in the 1780's and in the 1820's, you could distinguish no fundamental change. Basically you had the same alliance between the high nobility and the richest bankers and financiers, merchants and businessmen.
The revolution did not much change of that but it completely changed the political values.
Though very unpopular Louis XV had decided and implemented a real revolution with his chancellor Maupeou in the last 3 years of his reign.
But his successor Louis XVI, who had absolutely no authority, had this reform repealed.
As far as Quebec is concerned, and more globally the colonies, il you have France win a decisive victory in the austrian succession war, with as I suggested the french gaining the austrian netherlands and expelling the british from their indian stronghold of Madras, then you can imagine completely different evolutions.
The British will not dare to start a new war only 6 to 8 years after the peace of 1748.
The french profit a lot from their relatively dominant position in India compared to other european powers. On these foundations, they can develop in bigger proportions their trade, their trade and war navies, ... etc. They can maybe send more settlers to north America, so the english colonies remain contained east of the Appalaches.
The British have to find a new land to send their surplus population, which could be Australia. But before this, this situation could cause serious trouble in Britain as well in the british american colonies because of over-population and the containment imposed by the french.
Leading to the revolution is another thing.
Revolution or not, there was a strong movement of modernisation in 18th century France. France perfectly could have taken some kind of british path of gradual political reform for a rather similar final result.
Tocqueville wrote something like what follows. If you considered the structure of the french ruling elite in the 1780's and in the 1820's, you could distinguish no fundamental change. Basically you had the same alliance between the high nobility and the richest bankers and financiers, merchants and businessmen.
The revolution did not much change of that but it completely changed the political values.
Though very unpopular Louis XV had decided and implemented a real revolution with his chancellor Maupeou in the last 3 years of his reign.
But his successor Louis XVI, who had absolutely no authority, had this reform repealed.
As far as Quebec is concerned, and more globally the colonies, il you have France win a decisive victory in the austrian succession war, with as I suggested the french gaining the austrian netherlands and expelling the british from their indian stronghold of Madras, then you can imagine completely different evolutions.
The British will not dare to start a new war only 6 to 8 years after the peace of 1748.
The french profit a lot from their relatively dominant position in India compared to other european powers. On these foundations, they can develop in bigger proportions their trade, their trade and war navies, ... etc. They can maybe send more settlers to north America, so the english colonies remain contained east of the Appalaches.
The British have to find a new land to send their surplus population, which could be Australia. But before this, this situation could cause serious trouble in Britain as well in the british american colonies because of over-population and the containment imposed by the french.
Interesting thoughts. I didn't know that Louis XV attempted reforms in the last years of his reign. Any direct examples you can think of? I know he closed the Parliaments at one point but other than that not much. Would having his son Louis, Monseigneur le Dauphin survive Tuberculosis help or hurt?
And as to a more developed colonial French Empire, do you think the bigger portions in Indian trade and possibly in North America would help with the French National debt? Especially if the Seven years war doesn't happen, or at least not at the same time as OTL?
Well, Maupeou's reform was the key reform of all the judicial and legal french system.
It was the key to building a modern and no longer feudal legal system.
That was the key to solving all french problems because the courts, which were held by nobles (mostly recent nobles) were blocking any reform that could question the feudal and local privileges.
They blocked any tax reform.
The good heir for Louis XV was probably not his son but his grand son who died in 1761 and who was Louis XVI's elder brother. This grandson of Louis XV had been educated to be king and had the personnality for the job.
It was the key to building a modern and no longer feudal legal system.
That was the key to solving all french problems because the courts, which were held by nobles (mostly recent nobles) were blocking any reform that could question the feudal and local privileges.
They blocked any tax reform.
The good heir for Louis XV was probably not his son but his grand son who died in 1761 and who was Louis XVI's elder brother. This grandson of Louis XV had been educated to be king and had the personnality for the job.
Another question is what would have happened in European diplomacy. If France had kept the Austrian Netherlands, would Austria have still approached it for an alliance? The two nations had been enemies for centuries, so it certainly wasn't inevitable that they would become allies.
There could be a lot of butterflies there: perhaps the Diplomatic Revolution never occurs and a continued Franco-Prussian alliance holds on to Hanover for the duration of the war (as opposed to OTL in which France captured it but then had to withdraw before the war's end), to be exchanged in return for France's lost colonies? And of course if that had happened, Marie Antoinette would presumably have never ended up marrying Louis XVI.
There could be a lot of butterflies there: perhaps the Diplomatic Revolution never occurs and a continued Franco-Prussian alliance holds on to Hanover for the duration of the war (as opposed to OTL in which France captured it but then had to withdraw before the war's end), to be exchanged in return for France's lost colonies? And of course if that had happened, Marie Antoinette would presumably have never ended up marrying Louis XVI.
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France declared bankruptcy in 1788 and stopped paying loans then. The National Assembly then eliminated the tax exemption privileges for the nobility and Church and voted for new taxes to boot.
katchen
Banned
Hanging on to the Austrian Netherlands is the Key to France competing with Great Britain in industrialization. The Belgians have traditionally a textile industry that competed with the British but it dies on the vine OTL and Belgium basically stagmantes until the late 19th Century OTL. Under France, Belgian coal can fuel textile mills, just as in Great Britain. And iron from the Saar can travel down the Moselle to Belgium just as easily as it can travel to the Ruhr in Germany depending on who owns it. If France keeps the Austrian Netherlands, it has the same incentives to manufacture wool as Great Britain, therefore the same economic incentive to enclose farmland for sheep pasture. and the same incentive to seek far pastures in places like Southern Africa, South America and Australia (ie. France Antarctique). It dosen't necessarily ace out Great Britain, but it puts France neck and neck with the UK and on a path to the same kind of high population growth as Germany and Great Britain. And France is not in the situation OTL in which the only industrial area it potentially had with the exception of a narrow belt along the Belgian bornder around Lille was Algeria with all those Arabs.
Britain's textile industry actually started its 'industrial revolution' expansion powered by water rather than by coal/steam.
Having lost the Austrian Netherlands actually could help in French-Austrian relations, as a major hotspot in the relations is now gone. For centuries, France and the Hapsburgs had to fight because with the Burgundian heritage, Vorderösterreich and Milan stood in the way of French expansion.