Many Timelines concerning “Kornilov putsch” were written, but someone is a bit ASBish, someone were written only in order to glorify the Russian general who could have stopped Bolshevism, someone other to demonize him. All Timelines I saw begin with the assumption that Kornilov wanted absolute power. But he never wanted political power, he wanted only to restore order in Russian Army, to face German-Austrian armies and to protect the new republican Provisional Government from an eventual Bolshevik coup, a clear and present danger since July 1917. Historian Richard Pipes collected a lot of written and oral documentation to demonstrate that the “Kornilov putsch” was only a myth, borne from the mind of Alexander Kerenskij (the pemier of Provisional Government who feared a rightist coup those days) and Bolshevik historiography. The “Kornilov putsch” grew in the minds of Provisional Government, Army generals and Soviet member’s minds after an incredible series of misperceptions and misrepresentation of each other’s intentions. That was an incredible chain of events which eventually led to the complete collapse of Russian military forces and then to the Bolshevik Revolution. The failed “Kornilov putsch” provoked, directly, serious consequences in WW1, on many fronts: Italy, Middle East and Baltic were directly affected by Russian events of August-November 1917. For example, Cadorna put Italian forces on the defensive just after Kornilov affaire. That decision doomed the Italian Army, exposing it to Austro-German counterstrike in Caporetto. A German offensive in Moldova was called off (because it was not necessary anymore) and those forces were re-deployed against Italy: another move which resulted essential for Caporetto’s success. The collapse of Russian army, in September-October 1917, led to German amphibious victory in the Gulf of Riga and then to complete German naval domination in the Baltic. In the Middle East, that same collapse of Russian military forces, gave the Turks the opportunity to re-deploy the newly formed German-Turkish Yilderim Army Group in Palestine, to face mounting British forces. Ottomans were defeated anyway, but that move prevented a quick collapse of Palestinian front. Finally, the Bolshevik revolution and the end of military Russia engagement in WW1, led to German last offensives in France in 1918.
In my opinion (but this is only MY opinion, not History), Entente lost at least 2 great opportunities for strategic victories in that same period (September-October 1917). First: a strong Entente offensive in Italy, in September or October, could have exploited the incredible weakness of A-H Army in that period. And eventually, it could have led A-H to a separate peace. The other great opportunity was lost by Royal Navy. From 12 to 21 October 1917, all the best units of German High Seas Fleet (HSF) were deployed in the Gulf of Riga, to cover the amphibious operations against the Estonian islands. That was a unique opportunity for a British massive incursion in the Baltic, whose entrance was loosely guarded by two neutral states (Denmark and Sweden) and only half of German HSF. That incursion (conceived by admiral Fisher since 1914), could have inflicted a severe defeat to German naval forces, posed a new direct threat to Germany and helped Russia.
Mix together all these “what if’s”, concentrated in just 4 months, and you can have a very different History.
In my opinion (but this is only MY opinion, not History), Entente lost at least 2 great opportunities for strategic victories in that same period (September-October 1917). First: a strong Entente offensive in Italy, in September or October, could have exploited the incredible weakness of A-H Army in that period. And eventually, it could have led A-H to a separate peace. The other great opportunity was lost by Royal Navy. From 12 to 21 October 1917, all the best units of German High Seas Fleet (HSF) were deployed in the Gulf of Riga, to cover the amphibious operations against the Estonian islands. That was a unique opportunity for a British massive incursion in the Baltic, whose entrance was loosely guarded by two neutral states (Denmark and Sweden) and only half of German HSF. That incursion (conceived by admiral Fisher since 1914), could have inflicted a severe defeat to German naval forces, posed a new direct threat to Germany and helped Russia.
Mix together all these “what if’s”, concentrated in just 4 months, and you can have a very different History.