What if Yugoslavia was split in two after WW2?

[Fehérvári]

Let's say that during the war, the Western part of Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia) was liberated by the Western Allies and non-Communist partisans, while the Eastern part (Serbia, Montenegro, etc.) was liberated by Tito's partisans and the Soviets. Both sides set up their own governments and claim themselves to be the legitimate government of all Yugoslavia. Like so, West Yugoslavia aligns with the Western Bloc, and East Yugoslavia aligns with the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War.

How could these two Yugoslavias develop through the second half of the 20th century and beyond? I imagine Tito ITTL could ill-afford to oppose Stalin as much as he did IOTL. East Yugoslavia would also probably be part of the Warsaw Pact, which would influence Albanian affairs as well. What kind of repercussions would the Warsaw Pact having a more direct access to the Mediterranean have ITTL?

Would the two Yugoslavias cling onto the idea of "being Yugoslavia" or would they eventually evolve into simply being "Croatia" and "Serbia"? West Yugoslavia would still be quite diverse so the Yugoslav idea would be important for the sake of national cohesion, but what about the East? Serbs would be by far the largest ethnic group and they would dominate the country. How long could such state keep up the facade of being the country of the South Slavs, and not just of the Serbs?

What about the end of the Cold War? If it still happens similarly in a similar timeframe, how could it affect the Yugoslavias? Would reunification still by viable by that point? If not, then what? Would either Yugoslavias fall apart? Maybe East Yugoslavia more likely? If does fall apart, would it happen peacefully or violently?

What are your thoughts?

 

[ArtosStark]

Let's say that during the war, the Western part of Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia) was liberated by the Western Allies and non-Communist partisans, while the Eastern part (Serbia, Montenegro, etc.) was liberated by Tito's partisans and the Soviets. Both sides set up their own governments and claim themselves to be the legitimate government of all Yugoslavia. Like so, West Yugoslavia aligns with the Western Bloc, and East Yugoslavia aligns with the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War

The locations seem almost reversed. IIRC Tito had the most support in Croatia and Bosnia where the communist pan-Yugoslavian sentiment with less Serb supremacy won him initial recruits that became more attached to the Communist ideology as time and service went on. Serbia and Montenegro were by far the most hostile to him. This was the Chetnik heartland, who, though much reduced by the end of the war, were basically the only other resistance group of note left by that point.

If you were going to have a Yugoslavia divided in only two parts, it seems to be a more likely division is for Serbia and Montenegro to be Western friendly and Tito to control the rest.

A Chetnik movement more acceptable to the Allies (ie, less willing to work with the Germans to fight the Communists. Or at least less visible in doing so as Tito’s group did some of this as well) or an alliance between the Yugoslavian Royal government in exile and the Chetniks (either through the Chetniks being set up officially prewar and thus being more directly controlled by the King or the King joining the Chetniks at the end of the war, giving them legitimacy in exchange for keeping his throne) might both be possible.

 

[Giant Man Eating Rabbits]

I think the only way this is remotely possible if the Allies after clearing out North Africa in late 1942 then just avoid Italy and land in then go through Greece then move Northwards and liberate both Albania & Yugoslavia and thus have a bargaining chip in the division of Europe between the WAllies and the Soviets.

Trouble is if they can liberate Albania & Yugoslavia it also means that there's a good chance they can push on into Bulgaria, Romania and further North.

It then comes a moot point in if Yugoslavia can get divided between the WAllies and Soviets.

 

[Fehérvári]

@ArtosStark @Giant Man Eating Rabbits Then what about Partisans playing a lesser role and the Allied armies being the primary liberating forces?
As for how the WAllies get to Croatia, what about Churchill getting his way and we get a landing in Dalmatia instead of in Southern France ITTL?

An interesting consequence of this could be Tito not becoming leader of either Yugoslavia. Who could be the Muscovite candidate to lead East Yugoslavia?

 

[raharris1973]

Trouble is if they can liberate Albania & Yugoslavia it also means that there's a good chance they can push on into Bulgaria, Romania and further North.

Is there a good chance? Really?

Whenever anybody suggests a Balkan alternative they get leapt on by multiple people, including @CalBear and mercilessly pummelled, and told how bad an idea it is, how horrible to logistics and infrastructure conditions are for advance, how it's like Italy but 10x worse.

So it is never quite specified what that means in terms of mileage achieveable by western ops in the Balkans, it sounds more like, "can't get more the 100 or 200 miles from the Aegean" than, "going to Romania and beyond".

 

[raharris1973]

@ArtosStark @Giant Man Eating Rabbits Then what about Partisans playing a lesser role and the Allied armies being the primary liberating forces?
As for how the WAllies get to Croatia, what about Churchill getting his way and we get a landing in Dalmatia instead of in Southern France ITTL?

An interesting consequence of this could be Tito not becoming leader of either Yugoslavia. Who could be the Muscovite candidate to lead East Yugoslavia?

I think that is the only way to get your idea done, have the outside armies, and their operational convenience, be the driving force, rather than the native partisan factions.

How could these two Yugoslavias develop through the second half of the 20th century and beyond? I imagine Tito ITTL could ill-afford to oppose Stalin as much as he did IOTL. East Yugoslavia would also probably be part of the Warsaw Pact, which would influence Albanian affairs as well. What kind of repercussions would the Warsaw Pact having a more direct access to the Mediterranean have ITTL?

I think this interpretation has it right. A Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Tito or no Tito, facing a western backed power contender on part of its country, couldn't take a Soviet-independent path.

West Yugoslavia would still be quite diverse so the Yugoslav idea would be important for the sake of national cohesion,

This would still be a tremendously awkward situation. The West Yugoslav state would, geographically, be almost identical to the wartime Ustashe Croatian Fascist state, with Slovenia and other bits picked off by Hungary and Italy added back on.

Because of the diversity, reviving the Yugoslav identity would be "the right thing to do" and the most inclusive. Presumably this means restoring the Yugoslav King, even if from a non-traditional western capital, and even though the King's ancestral house is Serbian.

The majority, or at least plurality, ethnonational group in this West Yugoslavia would be Croatian, and would feel like are being very "generous" to the Yugoslava collective idea to emphasize this over Croatian identity and to reembrace the Karageorgoviches. At the same time, whether West Yugoslavia is internally structured with Banovinas or the traditional realms of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, the Serbs will feel nominally unrepresented. The Serbs of the state will feel like they are being asked to take a massive leap of faith being loyal to state where the plurality Croatians outnumber them and Muslim Bosniaks, who generally sided with the Ustashe state, are not that much smaller a group than them. It's like being asked to live in the new, improved, reformed henhouse with the foxes who were trying to eat you alive during the war. Serbs in the state will always be worried about Croatians having too much military, police, administrative, or judicial power. East Yugoslavia will lampoon West Yugoslavia as an unaccountable continuation of the Ustashe state, now coopted by Wall Street fat cats.

 

[Giant Man Eating Rabbits]

Is there a good chance? Really?

Personally I feel it would be a better bet than going through Italy as you're not constrained by the width of the country which made Italy easily to defend for eg The Gustav Line etc.

That issue doesn't arise in Greece and the surrounding countries as unlike Italy there's plenty of opportunity to out flank enemy forces despite also still being mountainous. Plus you have the Joker in the pack which are the Greek and Yugoslav Partisans which can seriously disrupt Axis forces and plans.

In OTL timeline the African Campaign finished in late 1942 and Sicily (Operation Husky) was in June 1943. If Husky goes into Greece instead (as well as Crete to create a unsinkable aircraft carrier) that's a full twelve months before D-Day in OTL.

If basing advances on Western Front levels of an average of 600 miles in 11 months, although it would still make the end of the war sometime around May/June as it's nearly double the distance between Athens and Berlin it would have the effect of getting Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia under WAllies control. The WAllies might even get lucky and be able to push on into Poland as a bonus thus getting half if not all that country under WAllies control.

Don't forget, these countries are full aware of the Soviet juggernaut coming towards them on the Eastern Front and know it would be better to be under WAllies control than the Soviets. I'd rather suspect those governments seeing how the wind is blowing would switch sides in a instant if WAllies forces entered of came along their borders despite how fast the Soviets managed to advance.

Also don't forget Operation Bagration didn't kick off until June '44 and it wasn't on a selected area but across the entire Eastern Front. Question is

How quick do the Germans retreat in this scenario?
How fast can the Soviets advance to stop further WAllies gains in Eastern Europe?

 

[Giant Man Eating Rabbits]

@ArtosStark @Giant Man Eating Rabbits Then what about Partisans playing a lesser role and the Allied armies being the primary liberating forces?
As for how the WAllies get to Croatia, what about Churchill getting his way and we get a landing in Dalmatia instead of in Southern France ITTL?

An interesting consequence of this could be Tito not becoming leader of either Yugoslavia. Who could be the Muscovite candidate to lead East Yugoslavia?

Personally not using the Partisans is a complete big and utter no-no!

If they can tie up thousands of Axis troops, they sure can do the same thing to the WAllies trying to advance through Albania, Yugoslavia and Greece!

I thinking that the WAllies seeing the bigger picture will come to some agreement such as

"Help us come through your land and kick the Axis forces out of your country then after the war we can all go home and leave you be!"

Then when the war is over, they'd be quickly shit on by the WAllies (like Poland was) when West leaning governments are installed and started liquidating the "insurrectionists"

 

[Discernible]

There were individual non-Communist Partisans but they weren't in separate formations. They were integrated in units with Communists who ensured they were the leaders of the anti-fascist movement. Whilst it was multi-ethnic, Serbs were disproportionately larger in the western areas in relation to their population. Many of the non-Communists were Croatian republicans. Therefore you've got a Communist dominated resistance with a larger than population proportion who are Serb in the western Yugoslavia half.

The Chetniks as a "resistance" group were unreliable, almost wholly driven by Greater Serbianism (with few exceptions to the rule), and latterly either inactive (mainly in Serbia) or, in the latter part of the war, actively collaborating with Axis forces against the Partisans in Bosnia and Croatia. Their reluctance to go on the offensive was why Churchill abandoned them for the Partisans.

As the war was coming to a close many Chetniks (mainly in Serbia proper) defected to the Partisans in an amnesty announced by Tito. Serbia was quite passive for most of the war after an initial Partisan uprising in its western areas which resulted in them retreating into Bosnia. The Chetnik groups were basically inactive in Serbia proper for most of the war plus the collaborationist government there had been so successful in pacifying it they boasted of helping make it Juden Frei.

Montenegro also had an initial uprising which was also crushed with the Montenegrin Partisan forces again retreating into Bosnia to link up with the main Partisan forces. Meanwhile Montenegrin Chetniks moved from being allied with the Partisans until they left, passivity after, followed by collaboration with the Germans after the Italian surrender.

In Slovenia the only resistance group of any note was again the Communist dominated Partisans. For most of the war they were cut off from the main Partisan forces who were mainly fighting in Bosnia. Macedonia was a similar picture.

So you have a situation where the major resistance are Communist and/or republican in the western half whilst the eastern half are largely passive or collaborating, and of a right-wing, monarchist nature.

As someone has said you'd probably need a western Allied intervention to have some attempt at a western Yugoslav state but it might face a Greek situation. Meanwhile in the eastern half - assuming the Tito amnesty and Partisan link up with the Red Army didn't happen - you'd have a Communist state being imposed on an area where Axis collaborators were the dominant forces.

Therefore the question is how do you untangle those 'facts on the ground' to create a western aligned west Yugoslavia when your allies on the ground are led by Communists with no desire for a monarchy, never mind a Serbian one; and how do you create a Soviet aligned east Yugoslavia when they need the Communist led Partisans based in the western half to control it?

 

[Fehérvári]

This would still be a tremendously awkward situation. The West Yugoslav state would, geographically, be almost identical to the wartime Ustashe Croatian Fascist state, with Slovenia and other bits picked off by Hungary and Italy added back on.

I suppose West Yugoslavia then might need to be subjected to prolonged WAllied military presence and/or a "denazification" policy similar to that of Germany.

Because of the diversity, reviving the Yugoslav identity would be "the right thing to do" and the most inclusive. Presumably this means restoring the Yugoslav King, even if from a non-traditional western capital, and even though the King's ancestral house is Serbian.

The restoration of Peter II would be in order, I agree. Without him, the West Yugoslavian government could hardly base its legitimacy on much, imo. Serbia falling outside of the reach of the Karađorđević realm would certainly be a great oddity though.

The majority, or at least plurality, ethnonational group in this West Yugoslavia would be Croatian, and would feel like are being very "generous" to the Yugoslava collective idea to emphasize this over Croatian identity and to reembrace the Karageorgoviches. At the same time, whether West Yugoslavia is internally structured with Banovinas or the traditional realms of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, the Serbs will feel nominally unrepresented. The Serbs of the state will feel like they are being asked to take a massive leap of faith being loyal to state where the plurality Croatians outnumber them and Muslim Bosniaks, who generally sided with the Ustashe state, are not that much smaller a group than them. Serbs in the state will always be worried about Croatians having too much military, police, administrative, or judicial power.

Perhaps the Yugoslavian denazification policy could produce the effect of Croat political marginalisation in the first few decades of the Cold War. The administrative-political organisation of the state could also be designed so to maximalise Serbian (or non-Croat) political power (maybe even through anti-democratic means). Of course, this could not be kept up perpetually, and tensions would be gradually rising. West Yugoslavia might experience a political crisis as a result of this sometime in the '60s, maybe.

Perhaps to prolong the disproportional Serb influence in the government, Peter II could follow his father's example and establish a royal dictatorship in the country. This state of affairs then could last for some time, maybe until Peter's death in 1970 or perhaps until 1973, when the oil crisis and the subsequent economic fallout could trigger a revolution of some sort and force a regime change.

East Yugoslavia will lampoon West Yugoslavia as an unaccountable continuation of the Ustashe state, now coopted by Wall Street fat cats.

Yeah, such rethoric is likely to develop. Even if there are denazification policies in place, they could be easily dismissed as insufficient or superficial in propaganda.


Now then, what about East Yugoslavia? Is there anything interesting that could be discussed about it?

 

[Fehérvári]

@Discernible What immediately came to my mind is the case of South Korea. The area was rather packed with sympathisers of communism prior to the Korean War, AFAIK.

Autumn Uprising of 1946 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Jeju uprising - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

So maybe something along these lines?

 

[Aichi72]

The restoration of Peter II would be in order, I agree. Without him, the West Yugoslavian government could hardly base its legitimacy on much, imo. Serbia falling outside of the reach of the Karađorđević realm would certainly be a great oddity though.

Restore Otto and hearken back to the Habsburg era for legitimacy? Not sure how possible that is though.

 

[raharris1973]

Personally I feel it would be a better bet than going through Italy as you're not constrained by the width of the country which made Italy easily to defend for eg The Gustav Line etc.

That issue doesn't arise in Greece and the surrounding countries as unlike Italy there's plenty of opportunity to out flank enemy forces despite also still being mountainous. Plus you have the Joker in the pack which are the Greek and Yugoslav Partisans which can seriously disrupt Axis forces and plans.

I sympathize with this line of argument that the lateral *width* of the front, and the presence of Partisan forces who really *hate the Germans*, and want to *muck up their rear* and *ambush them whenever possible*, should some positives for Allied invaders of the Balkans that were not there in Italy. I do. Even though few seem to give it much credit. I think it matters. Even if port capacity was crappier in the wider Balkans than in Italy, and quality, already constructed airfields were fewer and further between.

In OTL timeline the African Campaign finished in late 1942 and Sicily (Operation Husky) was in June 1943. If Husky goes into Greece instead

Nice thing is that gets you on mainland terrain (although broken, chokepointable terrain, the Peloponnesus. North African airfields can adequately support this?

If Husky goes into Greece instead (as well as Crete to create a unsinkable aircraft carrier) that's a full twelve months before D-Day in OTL.

If we are getting Greece/the Peloponnesus at the same time, doesn't that make Crete a little superfluous? Better to save forces for mainland ops and let the Germans on the island whither on the vine. I know "unsinkable aircraft carrier" is a cute metaphor for an island, but if you've got a land airfield secure enough even closer to enemy targets, there's nothing inherent about island terrain that makes the land better quality for airfields.

If basing advances on Western Front levels of an average of 600 miles in 11 months,

Whoa - Why should we suppose Western Front levels of advance? The terrain is much more uneven and elevated in the Balkans compared with northwest Europe (France, Low Countries, Germany), the infrastructure is much poorer, and the Allies are shipping in all their stuff from much further, through the Atlantic, Gibraltar, Med, and Aegean or Adriatic, not just Atlantic and Channel.

Wouldn't a fairer comparative rate of advance be the rate in Italy, adjusted a bit upward to account for the greater width of front (and German difficulty covering it) and Partisan advantages on the Allied side.

Perhaps, and this is *very* rough, and probably on the generous side to the Allies, an *average* of the rate of monthly Allied advance between the Western Front and the Italian Front?

If basing advances on Western Front levels of an average of 600 miles in 11 months, although it would still make the end of the war sometime around May/June as it's nearly double the distance between Athens and Berlin it would have the effect of getting Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia under WAllies control. The WAllies might even get lucky and be able to push on into Poland as a bonus thus getting half if not all that country under WAllies control.

And now we're leaping from optimism to wishville. You think a landing in the Balkans will see a rapid, steady, Allied advance to *southern Poland* before the Soviets could even reach it? Wow.

It would force the Soviets to funnel all their combat power, west of their 1941 border, through just the narrow corridor through the northern half of Poland? That would be quite something.

I think it would require some major, major German force allocation mistakes, probably the Germans doing something wrong on purpose, for the Germans to be on the one hand so weak and ineffective against the WAllied advance from the rugged Balkan southeast and yet so strong against the more massive Soviet advance from straight east across the mostly flat North European plain on the other hand.

If the Soviet advance were all channelled through the north, through a north Polish, Baltic coast corridor, or even just through the whole of Poland north of the Carpathians and Sudetens, that would lead to a lot of wastage from being unable to maximally employ massive Soviet forces simultaneously in flanking maneuvers, and the Western Allies would be having to absorb huge casualties pushing the front south of the Carpathians back through their own efforts and that of just local partners and partisans. With Soviets narrowly channelled to the north like this, they have plenty of forces to spare for the Arctic front, so I wouldn't be surprised if they just go for total defeat and occupation of Finland instead of accepting an armistice and peace, and they continue from Finland to northern Norway, perhaps even trying to compel Sweden to join the war.

Don't forget, these countries are full aware of the Soviet juggernaut coming towards them on the Eastern Front and know it would be better to be under WAllies control than the Soviets. I'd rather suspect those governments seeing how the wind is blowing would switch sides in a instant if WAllies forces entered of came along their borders despite how fast the Soviets managed to advance.

These minor Axis allies, like Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, maybe even puppet Albanians, may all see what is coming and want to switch sides, and do it in a way that opens the door to the Western Allies rather than Soviets, but that is not the same as being able to pull it off.

The Romanians and Bulgarians were able to pull off a switch from the Axis to the Soviet side, getting the combat to roll over them quickly, at the cost of Soviet occupation. The Finns switched sides too, and made concessions to the Soviets, but didn't end up totally occupied. But the Hungarians tried the same thing and failed utterly, because the Germans got to them first and occupied them first, coup'ing out the government. The Italians tried the same thing as well, and only less than half way succeeded, making it a little easier for the Allies to land in southern Italy, and handing over the fleet and Corsica and Sardinia, but the Germans got to occupy all of Italy from Rome north, and Italian Yugoslavia, Greece, Dodecanese, before the Western Allies got close.

It is not a simple matter to switch sides, and the people you want to arrive first don't teleport in with all. their gear.

 

[Giant Man Eating Rabbits]

Nice thing is that gets you on mainland terrain (although broken, chokepointable terrain, the Peloponnesus. North African airfields can adequately support this?

That's why I was thinking that the WAllies would land both sides of the Corinth Canal so to avoid getting stopped then trapped on the Peloponnesus peninsular.

Wouldn't think so for fighters unless they're limited by time over the landings as such what happened at Dieppe.

If we are getting Greece/the Peloponnesus at the same time, doesn't that make Crete a little superfluous?

I was thinking of the range of the fighters even if they used drop tanks keeping up caps over the landing zones (I mentioned Dieppe above) plus having Crete stops any chance however slight of the Luftwaffe racing units there to hit the landings from the Eastern flanks.

Whoa - Why should we suppose Western Front levels of advance? The terrain is much more uneven and elevated in the Balkans compared with northwest Europe (France, Low Countries, Germany), the infrastructure is much poorer, and the Allies are shipping in all their stuff from much further, through the Atlantic, Gibraltar, Med, and Aegean or Adriatic, not just Atlantic and Channel

The terrain and infrastructure didn't stop the Axis did it?

Balkans campaign (World War II) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

and the Allies are shipping in all their stuff from much further, through the Atlantic, Gibraltar, Med, and Aegean or Adriatic, not just Atlantic and Channel.

The convoys would undoubtedly come straight from the USA and I think it's safe to presume there's plenty of Liberty/Victory ships that can be used. It only takes five days to get to Malta from Gibraltar.

Operation Pedestal - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[raharris1973]

The terrain and infrastructure didn't stop the Axis did it?

Not a great comparison.

The Germans coming was an example of Europe's then mightiest Army coming down and mugging two countries, Yugoslavia and Greece, who paced themselves against enemies closer to their own size, like Italy and Bulgaria, who didn't dare to dream to be able to realistically deal with the Germans.

The Germans were also Nazis with centralized totalitarian decision making who could direct their forces southeast on a dime and throw their forces into a speedy campaign without excessive regard for their own casualties or civilian casualties or criticism is things screwed up. The Anglo-Americans were not built the same way to throw caution to the wind and bowl over risks with speed and brute force and an attitude of "haul ass, bypass, and forget about flank security".

The Western Allies invading the Balkans by contrast would have been dealing with tough, professional German occupying forces who were good at mugging and knew how to protect themselves from getting mugged. Sure there were areas outsourced to the less capable Italians, and behind them, to the Bulgarians, but there were usually stiffening German mobile ground or air forces nearby to react.

 

[Giant Man Eating Rabbits]

The Western Allies invading the Balkans by contrast would have been dealing with tough, professional German occupying forces who were good at mugging and knew how to protect themselves from getting mugged. Sure there were areas outsourced to the less capable Italians, and behind them, to the Bulgarians, but there were usually stiffening German mobile ground or air forces nearby to react.

But you're assuming there's no "Operation Mincemeat"

If there's an double blind "Operation Mincemeat" in other words loading the body with plans for an actual invasion of Sicily forcing the Axis to keep the bulk of there forces in Italy surely that helps the WAllies.

Tbh, I'm having trouble finding sources on Axis forces numbers in the Balkans at the start of 1943.

 

[raharris1973]

But you're assuming there's no "Operation Mincemeat"

If there's an double blind "Operation Mincemeat" in other words loading the body with plans for an actual invasion of Sicily forcing the Axis to keep the bulk of there forces in Italy surely that helps the WAllies.

Tbh, I'm having trouble finding sources on Axis forces numbers in the Balkans at the start of 1943.

Allied deception can mess with and possibly distort the balance of Axis defensive forces between Italy (incl. Sicily) and occupied Greece to bring it to non-optimal levels, but no matter how well deception screws the Axis up, the Axis forces will be better defending those areas of occupied Greece and Yugoslavia than those countries were defending themselves when initially invaded.

 

[lukedalton]

Maybe the Axis have a much more succesfull fifth antipartisan offensive https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Case_Black with the resistance force not being able to breackthrough and so being eliminated/captured, so their influcence and capacity will be greatly diminished than OTL
This bring the allies during the final offensive in the italian campaign to include a thrust in Slovenia and Croatia to deal with the remnant nazist forces

 

[ArtosStark]

This challenge is made much more difficult by the specified division of territory between East and West Yugoslavia. I mentioned earlier why it is more difficult from the perspective of local resistance groups, but it is also very difficult to pull off with conventional Allied Armies.

The reason for this is the Adriatic. It is by far the best route for launching an invasion of the territory in question. Yet it can be totally controlled from the Italian Peninsula. If you want to liberate German held “West Yugoslavia” while Italy is hostile you have three problems:

1) You have more steps. Crete>Greece>Serbia> “West Yugoslavia”

2) You have to rely on overland supply which will probably leave you bogged down somewhere in central Serbia

3) Assuming you succeed the political shenanigans that would have to ensue to put Serbia and Montenegro into the Soviet sphere while keeping Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia out of it would be incredible.

Thus, the only good option I can see to meet the requirements of the OP is to use the Adriatic. Which means you need Italy. Yet to avoid losing Italy and still have enough troops to attack into the Balkans with, you probably need 2 things :

1) You need to push the Germans far enough up the Peninsula that you have a geographic defensive advantage and can defend with fewer troops. That probably means far into Northern Italy, if not to the border. So you really need the Italian Campaign to go really well.

2) You News the Germans distracted so they are less likely to either reinforce the Balkans or make a strong effort to destroy your line of supply by attacking in Italy. That probably means you want to do this after D-Day when the Germans can’t spare troops. The problem then becomes making sure that you can spare troops from France to hop across the Adriatic (I am guessing from Bari to Split).

That is quite a needle to thread. Maybe not impossible but not terribly probable.

 

[raharris1973]

This challenge is made much more difficult by the specified division of territory between East and West Yugoslavia. I mentioned earlier why it is more difficult from the perspective of local resistance groups, but it is also very difficult to pull off with conventional Allied Armies.

The reason for this is the Adriatic. It is by far the best route for launching an invasion of the territory in question. Yet it can be totally controlled from the Italian Peninsula. If you want to liberate German held “West Yugoslavia” while Italy is hostile you have three problems:

1) You have more steps. Crete>Greece>Serbia> “West Yugoslavia”

2) You have to rely on overland supply which will probably leave you bogged down somewhere in central Serbia

3) Assuming you succeed the political shenanigans that would have to ensue to put Serbia and Montenegro into the Soviet sphere while keeping Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia out of it would be incredible.

Thus, the only good option I can see to meet the requirements of the OP is to use the Adriatic. Which means you need Italy. Yet to avoid losing Italy and still have enough troops to attack into the Balkans with, you probably need 2 things :

1) You need to push the Germans far enough up the Peninsula that you have a geographic defensive advantage and can defend with fewer troops. That probably means far into Northern Italy, if not to the border. So you really need the Italian Campaign to go really well.

2) You News the Germans distracted so they are less likely to either reinforce the Balkans or make a strong effort to destroy your line of supply by attacking in Italy. That probably means you want to do this after D-Day when the Germans can’t spare troops. The problem then becomes making sure that you can spare troops from France to hop across the Adriatic (I am guessing from Bari to Split).

That is quite a needle to thread. Maybe not impossible but not terribly probable.

Maybe you could pull this kind of stuff off if you have a more radical change to the war, like:

a) Earlier, stronger victory in the Battle of the Atlantic, reducing Allied shipping losses, allowing earlier Trans-Atlantic lift of more American and Canadian forces as they are raised and more Lend-Lease throughput for the Soviets to press the Germans on all fronts

b) Japan simply not being in the war, but America still being drawn into the war, either because of incidents at sea pre-Pearl Harbor or pre-US total embargo on Japan [a battle at sea inadvertently with the USS Texas, possibly sinking the ship] or a great increase of incidents at sea in the Atlantic or Hitler loosening submarine ROE attacks against US coastal shipping by early 1942 in reaction to brazen US convoys to Derry and Liverpool. Somehow the US and Japan put their differences on ice, the US mains a deterrent force but not an active war front in the Far East and Pacific, leaving more shipping and air and ground combat capacity for multiple European ops

c) Better Soviet defensive ops from early in its war and faster recovery and counteroffensives, thus leading to faster attrition of German ground forces overall and thinner overall Axis defenses in southern and western Europe, and less ability to "plug holes" when Western Allied forces can operate in strength in mid 1943 and winter 1943-4 and spring-summer 1944.