What would that have changed. Would Norway and Sweden join Britain, or would they try to resist the invasion and side with the Germans in the war?
What would in either case the consequences have been for the future of the war?
The following sentences are extracted from a book-chapter by Earl F. Ziemke the official U.S. army historian in a US Army book on the war (should be public domain as a work of the army), to give a background and info on what almost happened, twice....
"The British plan which was adopted was more modest. While ostensibly intended to bring Allied troops to the Finnish front, it laid its main emphasis on operations in northern Norway and Sweden. The main striking force was to land at Narvik and advance along the railroad to its eastern terminus at Lulea, occupying Kiruna and Gallivare along the way. By late April two Allied brigades were to be established along that line. Two additional brigades would then be sent to Finland.
The British held back two divisions from France, intending to put them into the field in Norway, and planned to expand their force eventually to 100,000 men. The French intended to commit about 50,000. The British and French staffs agreed that the latter half of March would be the best time for going into Norway; but, aside from the desire to exploit the situation created by the Russo-Finnish conflict, they saw no compelling reason to act quickly since they were convinced that the important Trondheim-Narvik area was beyond the Germans' reach and could be taken at any time.
At the last minute, on 12 March, still hoping for an appeal from the Finns, the Allies decided, at the suggestion of the French, to attempt a semipeaceable invasion of Scandinavia. Assuming that the recent diplomatic responses of the Norwegian and Swedish Governments ran counter to public opinion in those countries, they proposed to "test on the Norwegian beaches the firmness of the opposition." A landing was to be made at Narvik; if it succeeded, it would be followed by one at Trondheim. Forces for Bergen and Stavanger were to be held ready. The objectives were to take Narvik, the railroad, and the Swedish ore fields; but the landing and the advance into Norway and Sweden were to take place only if they could be accomplished without serious fighting.
The Germans observed British submarines concentrated off the Skagerrak on the 13th, and an intercepted radio message setting March as the deadline for preparation of transport groups indicated that the Allied operation was getting under way. But another message, intercepted on the 15th, ordering the submarines to disperse revealed that the peace had disrupted the Allied plan.
The fact remained that the Allies had intended to go into Scandinavia, and for Hitler that was enough. He was convinced, he stated, that the British would not abandon their strategic aim of cutting off the German ore imports and believed that the possibility of a future Allied occupation still existed; therefore, WESERUEBUNG would have to be executed.
[H]itler ... was more nearly right in his estimate of Allied intentions than he knew. ...at a meeting of the Supreme War Council, the Scandinavian question again came under consideration. The new Scandinavian undertaking was to consist of two separate but related operations, WILFRED and Plan R 4. WILFRED involved the laying of two mine fields in Norwegian waters, one in the approaches to the Vest Fjord north of Bodo, and the other between Ålesund and Bergen, with the pretended laying of a third near Molde.
The supposition was that WILFRED would provoke German counteraction, and Plan R 4 was to become effective the moment the Germans landed in Norway "or showed they intended to do so."
Narvik and the railroad to the Swedish frontier formed the principal objectives of Plan R 4. The port was to be occupied by one infantry brigade and an antiaircraft battery, with the total strength to be built up eventually to 18,000 men.
One battalion, in a transport escorted by two cruisers, was to sail within a few hours after the mines had been laid. Five battalions were to be employed in occupying Trondheim and Bergen and in a raid on Stavanger to destroy Sola airfield, the largest in Norway and the closest to the British Isles. The plan depended heavily on the assumption that the Norwegians would not offer resistance; and, strangely, the possibility of a strong German reaction was left almost entirely out of account.
When it became known on the morning of the 8th that the German Fleet, which had been sighted by aircraft in the North Sea on the previous day, was at sea in the vicinity of Norway the mine-laying force was withdrawn and Plan R 4 was abandoned.
In the end the Allied venture accomplished nothing and gave Hitler the excuse he needed for WESERUEBUNG."
http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_02.htm
What would in either case the consequences have been for the future of the war?
The following sentences are extracted from a book-chapter by Earl F. Ziemke the official U.S. army historian in a US Army book on the war (should be public domain as a work of the army), to give a background and info on what almost happened, twice....
"The British plan which was adopted was more modest. While ostensibly intended to bring Allied troops to the Finnish front, it laid its main emphasis on operations in northern Norway and Sweden. The main striking force was to land at Narvik and advance along the railroad to its eastern terminus at Lulea, occupying Kiruna and Gallivare along the way. By late April two Allied brigades were to be established along that line. Two additional brigades would then be sent to Finland.
The British held back two divisions from France, intending to put them into the field in Norway, and planned to expand their force eventually to 100,000 men. The French intended to commit about 50,000. The British and French staffs agreed that the latter half of March would be the best time for going into Norway; but, aside from the desire to exploit the situation created by the Russo-Finnish conflict, they saw no compelling reason to act quickly since they were convinced that the important Trondheim-Narvik area was beyond the Germans' reach and could be taken at any time.
At the last minute, on 12 March, still hoping for an appeal from the Finns, the Allies decided, at the suggestion of the French, to attempt a semipeaceable invasion of Scandinavia. Assuming that the recent diplomatic responses of the Norwegian and Swedish Governments ran counter to public opinion in those countries, they proposed to "test on the Norwegian beaches the firmness of the opposition." A landing was to be made at Narvik; if it succeeded, it would be followed by one at Trondheim. Forces for Bergen and Stavanger were to be held ready. The objectives were to take Narvik, the railroad, and the Swedish ore fields; but the landing and the advance into Norway and Sweden were to take place only if they could be accomplished without serious fighting.
The Germans observed British submarines concentrated off the Skagerrak on the 13th, and an intercepted radio message setting March as the deadline for preparation of transport groups indicated that the Allied operation was getting under way. But another message, intercepted on the 15th, ordering the submarines to disperse revealed that the peace had disrupted the Allied plan.
The fact remained that the Allies had intended to go into Scandinavia, and for Hitler that was enough. He was convinced, he stated, that the British would not abandon their strategic aim of cutting off the German ore imports and believed that the possibility of a future Allied occupation still existed; therefore, WESERUEBUNG would have to be executed.
[H]itler ... was more nearly right in his estimate of Allied intentions than he knew. ...at a meeting of the Supreme War Council, the Scandinavian question again came under consideration. The new Scandinavian undertaking was to consist of two separate but related operations, WILFRED and Plan R 4. WILFRED involved the laying of two mine fields in Norwegian waters, one in the approaches to the Vest Fjord north of Bodo, and the other between Ålesund and Bergen, with the pretended laying of a third near Molde.
The supposition was that WILFRED would provoke German counteraction, and Plan R 4 was to become effective the moment the Germans landed in Norway "or showed they intended to do so."
Narvik and the railroad to the Swedish frontier formed the principal objectives of Plan R 4. The port was to be occupied by one infantry brigade and an antiaircraft battery, with the total strength to be built up eventually to 18,000 men.
One battalion, in a transport escorted by two cruisers, was to sail within a few hours after the mines had been laid. Five battalions were to be employed in occupying Trondheim and Bergen and in a raid on Stavanger to destroy Sola airfield, the largest in Norway and the closest to the British Isles. The plan depended heavily on the assumption that the Norwegians would not offer resistance; and, strangely, the possibility of a strong German reaction was left almost entirely out of account.
When it became known on the morning of the 8th that the German Fleet, which had been sighted by aircraft in the North Sea on the previous day, was at sea in the vicinity of Norway the mine-laying force was withdrawn and Plan R 4 was abandoned.
In the end the Allied venture accomplished nothing and gave Hitler the excuse he needed for WESERUEBUNG."
http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_02.htm