I can see kamikaze tactics taking out the US carrier force in 1942, after all, they got 4 out of 6 without them. But actually winning the Guadalcanal campaign as well? That I doubt.
What if Japan adopts Kamikaze tactics in 1942?
- Thread starter steel_captain
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I can see kamikaze tactics taking out the US carrier force in 1942, after all, they got 4 out of 6 without them. But actually winning the Guadalcanal campaign as well? That I doubt.
Here is the July 1942 reorganization,
The Tateyama and Yokosuka Air Groups (Tokyo area) alone had 48 x B5N1. These were carrier capable aircraft. I don't see where the OP specified "Kate" crews either. The entire point to kamikazes was that training could be curtailed, so using elite aviators would be suboptimal.
Assuming the first wave is about 18 Zeroes and 36 kamikaze aircraft, then none of the attacking bombers in the first wave taking the brunt of the CAP defense would be amongst the elite of the IJN's attack aircrews. Assuming the 2nd Wave was the other 18 Kamikazes and 36 torpedo bombers, then by the time they arrive the defending CAP would be spent and the carrier decks probably knocked out. In terms of the IJN at Eastern Solomons, the 2nd wave of 27 dive bombers missed the target, but none of the B5N2's were even launched.
It is quite possible that if the USN lost 2 carriers at Eastern Solomons that the remaining two would be withdrawn from the region.
Certainly not in 1944 against hundreds of Hellcats, but in 1942 vs. dozens of Wildcats the B5N1 should be good enough to plant an 1800lbs bomb on target, given that USN CAP performance at the time was not adequate. The problem for the IJN was that B5N2's were lacking in numbers for both roles, the D3A1's were best suited as dive bombers. The A6M2 or A6M3 might have been available in time with a 500lbs bomb in place of the drop tank. After that, the D1A1 might have done the trick, but seems less suitable than any of the others.
Without a single carrier to counter the IJN's use of carriers to attack the Cactus Airforce how long would it be before the allied planes based on Guadalcanal be so decimated in numbers that they would no longer make daylight incursions by IJN ships to the island untenable and with the IJN able to standoff Lunga Point 24hrs a day, how long before the Marines would be unable to defend Henderson Field?
Purely as a theoretical exercise for 1942, rather than the B5N1 how about the A5M with a 250kg bomb as a kamikaze. It's agile and reasonably fast so it has some capability to dodge any USN fighters that might get past the A6M escort to attack the kamikazes. The B5N is slow and lumbering, plus it's multicrew ( though probably they will only carry a pilot and a gunner), however it could carry a bigger bombload.
The objective being the same as OTL, the kamikaze crashes into the US carrier damaging it's deck, stopping or severely hobbling flight operations, disrupting the CAP operations etc., thus making it more vulnerable to the killing blow from D3A and B5N conventional attacks.
The objective being the same as OTL, the kamikaze crashes into the US carrier damaging it's deck, stopping or severely hobbling flight operations, disrupting the CAP operations etc., thus making it more vulnerable to the killing blow from D3A and B5N conventional attacks.
I doubt the IJN could keep Henderson knocked out, and the jungle canopy would allow the Marines to disperse and ride out bombardments.
Should be noted that Kamikaze tactics really didn't occur until 1944.
Should also be noted that the US Navy didn't have proximity fuse AA shells in until 1944.
A source cited on the Wikipedia article for proximity fuses says that the adoption of proximity fuses made Kamikaze attacks SEVEN TIMES less effective. It's fair to say that Kamikaze attacks didn't have a major impact on the war because it was implemented most after the adoption of the proximity fuse by the US Navy.
If Japan adopts Kamikaze attacks in 1942, that's 2 whole years of no proximity fuses. It's not a war winner but the US Navy is going to take significantly more losses.
Should also be noted that the US Navy didn't have proximity fuse AA shells in until 1944.
A source cited on the Wikipedia article for proximity fuses says that the adoption of proximity fuses made Kamikaze attacks SEVEN TIMES less effective. It's fair to say that Kamikaze attacks didn't have a major impact on the war because it was implemented most after the adoption of the proximity fuse by the US Navy.
If Japan adopts Kamikaze attacks in 1942, that's 2 whole years of no proximity fuses. It's not a war winner but the US Navy is going to take significantly more losses.
Most of the Cactus airforce, other than B-17s, PBYs, and C-47s flew to Henderson field from aircraft carriers, since they lacked the range to fly there themselves. CVE-1 USS Long Island brought the first contingent on Aug 19-20. So replacing the Cactus airforce's very high attrition rate would be difficult with no carriers. An airbase in the Santa Cruz Islands would have helped.
Edit: Much of the Cactus Airforce was made of Naval planes that could not make it back the their carriers. Henderson Field had the advantage that is was unsinkable.
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This was exactly the point I was trying to make when I posed this ATL...Kamikaze tactics earlier in the war likely would have been far deadlier because we still didn't have proximity fuses and were still far from upgunning every BB and cruiser with maximum AA batteries plus we still only had the F4F for CAP.
Because of all these, I believe the IJN might have mopped the floor with the USN in the 2nd half of 1942. It might have even caused the USN to retreat back to PH leaving Guadalcanal to fall to Japan and for the sealanes with Australia to be severed.
Oh, please. They're not severing the line to Australia, period. They don't have the ground forces on hand to pull off FS successfully, even without American carriers around causing trouble.
And again: if the USN takes more carrier losses early in the campaign they're going to play cautiously and not commit to battle later on. OTL Santa Cruz was already reckless, if the odds are worse they simply won't engage.
The Marine Defence Battalions had a couple of batteries of 5”/51 guns for coastal artillery. Those did not nullify Japanese shore bombardment missions IOTL, so they would not to ITTL either, but they would keep everything short of a BB standing at range and moving around.
It has been discussed in other threads if there are no USN carriers available to protect ships moving between Espirito Santo and Lungga Pt. how do the Marines and Cactus Airforce get resupplied and then how long before they are out of fuel and ammo? Once that happens, Iron bottom Sound is owned by the IJN in the daylight as well as the night. Once Henderson Field falls to the Japanese, how are the trade lines to Australia not endangered even if there is no FS? Also, what does Japan winning at Guadalcanal do for the allies in New Guinea?
So saying by October 42 all the USN carriers are either sunk or so badly damaged to require returning to the CONUS the SW Pacific is a Japanese victory and I say using Kamikaze tactics that early in the war (especially at Eastern Solomons) just might have tipped the scales for that to occur.
So saying by October 42 all the USN carriers are either sunk or so badly damaged to require returning to the CONUS the SW Pacific is a Japanese victory and I say using Kamikaze tactics that early in the war (especially at Eastern Solomons) just might have tipped the scales for that to occur.
Okay, I'm going to try and explain this again. If the Japanese use kamikaze tactics at Eastern Solomons, and if, as you claim, they are more effective at knocking out the American carriers - Wasp is still in the combat zone, having been off refueling during Eastern Solomons. Hornet got there mid-August. They have two carriers.
Until October the Americans weren't interested in risking those carriers against Japanese fleet units that weren't doing much to change the situation, and by October the Americans were and are so badly outnumbered that they're not going to give battle, as they did not IOTL for a solid two weeks in the runup to Santa Cruz. This is especially true if Wasp is still torpedoed and sunk as OTL - there's no way in hell even the aggressive-to-a-fault Halsey is going to give battle with only a single carrier.
This is the point I've been trying to hammer home: more Japanese success at Eastern Solomons means more cautious American use of their carriers later in the campaign, not them banzaiing their limited carrier decks into the teeth of the Japanese fleet.
And no, the trade lines to Australia aren't endangered solely by the loss of Guadalcanal. The island's too far north. It's over 1200 miles to Brisbane, the northernmost Australian port, and that's pushing the outer limits of the G4M's range. Traffic bound to Sydney and Melbourne is too far away.
Cactus could be supplied in a bare-bones way the way it was OTL. Transport Division 12 was made up of 6 APD high speed transports, converted 4 stack destroyers. They were the only transport to Guadalcanal and Tulagi in the first 6 weeks after the landings. Three of the six had been sunk in the first month of fighting OTL. If supply got really tight the destroyer minesweepers in theatre could be recruited to carry cargo, or even some fleet destroyers, if they could be spared.
I speculated in the previous post that the US Navy could use destroyer minesweepers to carry supplies as well. Well, they thought of it first. DMS-14 USS Zane and DMS-16 Trever carried avgas from Esprito Santo to the Solomons October 25, 1942.
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TDM
Kicked
This +1
Yes kamikaze were a surprise and yes they did damage but yes the USN and RN adapted to the new weapon/tactic
Thing is you are assuming that the Japanese will change something and the wallies will do nothing but the same thing, technology will be deployed at the same rate etc, etc
So if the USN starts getting hit by Kamikazes in 1942 then greater resources well made available to counter this new tactic
Proximity fuzes are great but there not the only counter, and hell if the need is great than they may get pushed forward.
NB, the wiki cite does not say proximity fuzes made kamikazes 7x less effective it says:
That's not nothing by any measure but there was more to stopping and/or mitigating the threat of kamikazes than 5" guns
Don't get me wrong there will be impacts but there will always be responses. But as has been pointed out the context that largely drove the adoption of Kamikaze tactic in 1944 is just not there in 1942, so I think this is all academic the Japanese won't do it for their own reasons long before we have to worry about Wallie responses to it
so no the IJN will not be moping the floor with USN in the 2nd half of 1942
However as Cryhavoc101 says kamikaze is not a wonder weapon it's an act of desperation, and while it was an act of desperation that had at times immediate benefits it comes with many downsides for the Japanese as well
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Let's just say that if the IJN used Kamikaze tactics at Eastern Solomons and had those managed to kill ENTERPRISE outright and damaged SARATOGA severely enough to put her out of combat for the remainder of 1942 there is WASP and HORNET remaining. However you say that under these circumstances that both Nimitz and Halsey would play it safe and not risk Santa Cruz?
If this is the case, then is not the SW Pacific being conceded to the IJN which would have SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU, JUNYO, HIYO, RYUJO & ZUIHO to operate from Rabaul with basically impunity? How the USN stand for that?
I say with the imminent loss of Guadalcanal, the USN would have to keep HORNET and WASP in the SW Pacific and desperately trying to forestall a sweeping Japanese victory. We still would not be at much advantage though as previously mentioned by not having nearly as good AA or CAP assets as will come late in the war. Any human directed cruise missile is always hard to defend against but in 1942 could well be near impossible? "The bombers will always get through"
If this is the case, then is not the SW Pacific being conceded to the IJN which would have SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU, JUNYO, HIYO, RYUJO & ZUIHO to operate from Rabaul with basically impunity? How the USN stand for that?
I say with the imminent loss of Guadalcanal, the USN would have to keep HORNET and WASP in the SW Pacific and desperately trying to forestall a sweeping Japanese victory. We still would not be at much advantage though as previously mentioned by not having nearly as good AA or CAP assets as will come late in the war. Any human directed cruise missile is always hard to defend against but in 1942 could well be near impossible? "The bombers will always get through"
The same way they didn’t concede the field in the run up to Santa Cruz: by dancing around just out of reach, always a threat lurking in the back of the minds of Japanese admirals.
By Santa Cruz the USN had better scouting than the Japanese, something that’s going to be all the more acute with the Japanese throwing away a large chunk of their trained aviators at Eastern Solomons. They kept up that dance for two weeks IOTL with just Hornet; here they’re going to just keep doing it until the Japanese have to quit the field, go back to Truk, and refuel.
nbcman
Donor
How much 'impunity' could the now toothless IJN CVs Shokaku & Zuikaku plus the sunk Ryujo operate when they've expended their kamikaze pilots during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons? This would negatively impact the IJN during the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands by removing their best 2 remaining CVs for that battle.
EDIT: and where is the consideration of the time to train the IJN pilots and any replacements before the Battle of the Eastern Solomons since it is a different skill set between dropping a torpedo / dive bombing to flying your aircraft into a ship.
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