VK36.01 in 1942

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Deleted member 1487

http://www.achtungpanzer.com/heu.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiger_I
What if instead of the Tiger, the VK36.01 produced in 1942? It had much the same armor except on the turret and sides, while fielding the 7.5cm L/70 tank gun that had better armor penetration than the 8.8cm tank gun of the Tiger.
It was also about 40 tons completed, perhaps slightly heavier with the non-tapered bore version of the 75mm gun. The Panther by contrast was 44.8 tons while the Tiger was almost 57 tons. The VK36.01 had the same engine as the much heavier Tiger, so would have been able to achieve a 40km/h speed, while having the same effective firepower of the Panther, while being available in 1942 without the same sorts of engine issues as the Tiger or Panther.
Its frontal armor was more than strong enough to handle the contemporary Soviet 76mm tank guns and could engage the 85mm Soviet gun outside its effective range against it armor.

IOTL the shock of encountering the T-34 and KV-1 created a huge demand for quantum leaps in tank technology, leading the Germans to focus on the heavy Tiger and Panther tanks as a means to get ahead of the Soviets, causing them to cancel existing advanced projects instead of using them to get a comparable, competitive model in the field that wouldn't have the teething issues of the OTL German 'advanced' tanks that were rushed into service.

So instead of throwing away the research that had already been done, let's say the Heer, with Hitler's blessing, keeps the current research to put a decent tank in the field, while working on getting the 'next generation' ready in a less rushed manner.
That gives us a VK36.01 Panzer V in July-August 1942 that is a matured design, rather than the overweight, rushed Tiger that showed up in late September and was slaughtered in its first engagement.

It would probably look similar to a Tiger hull with less side armor and have a Panther turret. It would be lighter than the Panther, but still have much of the Tiger level of armor on the front hull. The turret would have Panther level armor. IOTL it seems the Panther turret was designed for the VK36.01, but when the VK36.01 was cancelled the VK30.02 project (the Panther) took over the turret for the MAN version of the Panther.

Obviously this tank would not be as advanced as the Panther was, but being lighter and sticking to it original design weight, it wouldn't have nearly as many mechanical issues (the Panther was originally supposed to be designed as a 30 ton tanks, not a 45 ton monster). Having the 75mm L/70 would also be extremely helpful in 1942. It would be cheaper and easier to produce than the Tiger and the extra time it would have by entering production in 1942 would mean it would have sizable numbers by 1943 and be mechanically reliable. That would be a big help for the Kursk battle and the following Soviet offensives, not to mention on other fronts as well. By 1944 it could field significant improvements, including slopped armor and an 88mm L/71 gun that the Tiger II fielded, while precluding the resources that went into the Tiger I, II, and Panther. It could have enough numbers to be the MBT of the German army, while maintaining the technical superiority of the OTL later German tanks AND have the numbers and mobility to correct for the issues of the OTL Panther and Tigers.

Is this a viable option?
 
vk3601_sm.jpg


You mean this beasty??

267px-VK_3601_(H)_rear_left.jpg
 
There would likely be a number of problems that would mitigate it's effectiveness in combat, as with the Tiger and Panther, as the weather conditions and constant movement would wear done the vehicle far faster than it's designers in Germany could predict. They would also have to deal with transitioning from the production of other tanks to the VK, so it won't be available in large numbers in 1942.

In terms of combat impact in 1942 I'd rate it's effectiveness as negligible. In the winter of 1942-43 it likewise wouldn't have much of an impact, as German defeats were primarily due to a decline in infantry strength rather than raw vehicle numbers/quality.

In summer 1943 it's offensive effectiveness would again be negated by strong Soviet defenses. On the defensive it would prove useful, but nothing decisive.
 

Deleted member 1487

There would likely be a number of problems that would mitigate it's effectiveness in combat, as with the Tiger and Panther, as the weather conditions and constant movement would wear done the vehicle far faster than it's designers in Germany could predict. They would also have to deal with transitioning from the production of other tanks to the VK, so it won't be available in large numbers in 1942.

In terms of combat impact in 1942 I'd rate it's effectiveness as negligible. In the winter of 1942-43 it likewise wouldn't have much of an impact, as German defeats were primarily due to a decline in infantry strength rather than raw vehicle numbers/quality.

In summer 1943 it's offensive effectiveness would again be negated by strong Soviet defenses. On the defensive it would prove useful, but nothing decisive.

So because it wouldn't be a war winner, it shouldn't be discussed?
I'm not saying it would be available in huge numbers right off the bat, but looking at the numbers of Tigers and Panthers, both models would be replaced here by the lighter, cheaper VK3601, produced in 1943 it was over 2000 units. Having a lighter, cheaper tank that is more maneuverable and reliable than either the Panther or Tiger while retaining the same firepower in 1943 would be seriously helpful during and after Kursk. I don't think its unreasonable to say that around 3000 of this type would be built in 1943 alone. In 1942 it more difficult to predict, but I'd expect several hundred, as it was much easier to build than the Tiger and it lack of mechanical issues would mean it wouldn't be reduced in numbers by constant breakdowns and repairs. It could also be built in more factories than just Henschel's plan thanks to being the only factory with the necessary heavy equipment for the Tiger.

But the most important point would be that the battle of Kursk wouldn't be delayed until July instead of the planned jump off date was in May (it was delayed to get the Panther into service and combat). That lack of delay would mean hundreds of these tanks would be available in the front line in May, instead of the several dozen of virtually immobile (due to mechanical issues) of Panthers and Tigers. Perhaps more importantly the lack of delay means the Germans attack before the Soviets could build up massive defenses, which from May to July increased substantially. Once the German forces broke through those defenses IOTL they slaughtered Soviet armor; without the defenses being such an obstacle German armor can break into the open at a much lower cost and still inflict major losses to Soviet armor.

Also the other issue is that the Germans can launch and wrap up Kursk before the Allied invasion of Sicily. A major reason Kursk was cancelled IOTL was the invasion of Sicily and the need to transfer forces around. Here they can take care of both independently; plus if the Soviets feel the need to follow up Kursk with their OTL offensives, they will happen earlier than IOTL, which means they will be weaker than IOTL, while the German forces will be relatively stronger thanks to lower losses at Kursk, thanks to it being launched before defenses could be built up to the OTL July levels.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kursk
They first set the attack for 4 May, but delayed in order to allow more time for new weapons to arrive from Germany. Hitler postponed the offensive several more times. On 5 May, the launch date became 12 June. Due to the potential threat of an Allied landing in Italy and delays in armor deliveries, Hitler next set the launch date to 20 June. On 17 June, he further postponed it until 3 July, and then later to 5 July.[28][nb 11][29]

It took four months before Hitler allowed Manstein to attack, by which time the Germans had added 90 Ferdinand Panzerjäger tank destroyers, all 79 flyable Henschel Hs 129 ground attack aircraft,[45] as well as 270 Tigers, late-model Panzer Mark-IVs and even a number of captured T-34s.[46]

So the effect of not having a Tiger or Panther and instead having the VK3601 creates some major butterflies.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kursk#Reasons_for_the_failure_of_Zitadelle
Repeated delays by Hitler gave the Red Army enough time to fortify the bulge around Kursk. High officers like Manstein and Zeitzler pushed for a fast attack to catch the Red Army unprepared and low on morale after the third battle of Kharkov. The overlap with the Allied invasion of Sicily made Hitler's date for the attack the "most adverse possible".[93]

They won't have to wait with sufficient VK3601s on hand, which would have a the armor-killing main gun, which IOTL only appeared in very limited numbers in July. Here though there would be several hundred in service, more than the OTL Tiger and Panther numbers at Kursk in July combined, thanks to being introduced sooner and being cheaper to produce, not to mention far more mechanically reliable than either of the above.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kursk#Background
Marshal Georgiy Zhukov had already predicted the site of the German attack as early as 8 April, recommending to Stavka (the Red Army General Staff) a defensive strategy:

According to the situation of the Soviet-German front, the enemy will attempt to cut off the Kursk salient, encircle and destroy the Soviet forces of Central Front and Voronezh Front deployed here. At the moment, both fronts only have 15 tank divisions, meanwhile the German forces at Belgorod – Kharkov direction have alreadly gathered 17 tank divisions, most of them include the new types of tanks such as Tiger I, improvised Panther, Jagdpanzer IV and some kinds of tank destroyers such as Marder II, Marder III.[35]

Anastas Mikoyan wrote in his memoirs that he was notified about the attack in general details by Stalin on 27 March.[36]

At first, Stalin did not accept Zhukov's conclusion. However, from 12 to 15 April 1943, when Stalin consulted the opinions of the Soviet Front commanders and high officers of the General Staff, all agreed that Kursk was the likely German target. It is Kursk.[37]

The pattern of the war up until this point had been one of German offensive success in spring and summer. Blitzkrieg had worked against all opponents, including the Red Army. On the other hand, Soviet forces had attacked with success only during the winter. Although Joseph Stalin and some Stavka officers were eager to strike first, the majority, including Zhukov, advised a more cautious approach. In a letter to Stalin on 8 April 1943 he wrote:

I consider it inadvisable for our forces to go over to the offensive in the very first days of the campaign in order to forestall the enemy. It would be better to make the enemy exhaust himself against our defences, and knock out his tanks and then, bringing up fresh reserves, to go over to the general offensive which would finally finish off his main force.[38]
Hitler delayed the launching of his offensive, which gave the Red Army two months in which to turn the salient into one of the most heavily defended areas in history. They evacuated most of their troops from the outer bulge, leaving a crust of defending infantry there. But at the base of the bulge on both sides, two fronts, the Central on the north face and Voronezh in the south manned the lines, with Steppe Front in nearby reserve.

So if the attack was launched on May 4th, the Soviets would have only a couple of weeks to reinforce and fortify. They would have their tank forces outnumbered and would be vulnerable to a pincer assault thanks to fresh and powerful armor forces being brought up.

If these had their fully complement of Vk3601s then they didn't need to wait for more modern, powerful types to arrive and the attack could go forward on schedule.

IOTL for all of 1942 and up to May 1943 was about 400 units, which is smaller than the number of lighter, cheaper, more reliable Vk3601's that could have been produced. So let's say conservatively that 300 could be on the front lines as of May 4th, with at least 200 either in reserve, not yet delivered, being used in training, or in repair.

That should be enough to let the offensive go forward with much more positive results for the Germans than IOTL. They can then parry the Soviet counter offensives and then be ready to handle the invasion of Sicily come July. Though not a war winner by this point, it still means a major change of the sequence of events and may mean the Germans are able to hold the Eastern Front together longer.
 
Kursk

Hi Wiking

Kursk is probably the wrong battle for this tank, since it was arguably the one battle were the Tiger made the most sense. The intensity of the action meant that a lot of it was under 500m, and the Tiger ability to sustain frontal hits from 76,2mm guns at close range allowed the Tiger units to amass huge scores.
The one moment when early avaiability of the VK36.01 would have made the most impact was if it allowed adicional well equiped PzD to deploy in time to prevent Uranos from succeding. If you can have enouth tanks by late 42 to put an extra four PzD under AG B (without weakening Model's IX Army in AG Centre, who was about to face Mars) and cascade down the older PzIV and III to strenghen the Romanian forces, you might have something big.
If you rethink the German 1943 game plan without Citadel, having larger numbers of VK36.01 rather than Tigers+Panthers will then be a sound choice.
For Citadel, more Tigers for the tank killing role, backed by large numbers of 105mm armed StuH for the defence supression role would be the ideal mix.
Of course going for the VK36.01 as a MBT and cancelling the Panther and Tiger will get you in trouble if the T34/85 and critically IS2 programs go on as OTL...
But that will be in 1944 by wich time the war will be long decided...

You probably regard an early citadel as a large enough game changer, but Manstein might be hugely overplaying its importance in his "Lost Victories". A May attack will mean less prepared defences, and less tanks on both sides, but it will also mean the germans will have more lmited supplies for a sustained battle, and that even a win will not be likely to be decisive. The Russian build up also meant that the bulk of the russian forces were placed within rangeof the german attack and exposed to the german tactical advantage. The Germans didn't do much better in the defensive after Citadel was canceled then they did during the offensive phase.
 
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Just a note on consequences. A more balanced russian front might allow for a bigger Wallie share in beating the Nazis, moving the iron curtain back a few countries. Cynical as it might seem, by 1943/44 the nazis were basically fighting for a free Poland.
 
Does anyone know what the original specification was for the VK36.01 ... what the designers had to play around with? And would it have allowed a quick change to include sloped armour once the T34 was encountered?
 

Deleted member 1487

Hi Wiking

Kursk is probably the wrong battle for this tank, since it was arguably the one battle were the Tiger made the most sense. The intensity of the action meant that a lot of it was under 500m, and the Tiger ability to sustain frontal hits from 76,2mm guns at close range allowed the Tiger units to amass huge scores.
The one moment when early avaiability of the VK36.01 would have made the most impact was if it allowed adicional well equiped PzD to deploy in time to prevent Uranos from succeding. If you can have enouth tanks by late 42 to put an extra four PzD under AG B (without weakening Model's IX Army in AG Centre, who was about to face Mars) and cascade down the older PzIV and III to strenghen the Romanian forces, you might have something big.
If you rethink the German 1943 game plan without Citadel, having larger numbers of VK36.01 rather than Tigers+Panthers will then be a sound choice.
For Citadel, more Tigers for the tank killing role, backed by large numbers of 105mm armed StuH for the defence supression role would be the ideal mix.
Of course going for the VK36.01 as a MBT and cancelling the Panther and Tiger will get you in trouble if the T34/85 and critically IS2 programs go on as OTL...
But that will be in 1944 by wich time the war will be long decided...

You probably regard an early citadel as a large enough game changer, but Manstein might be hugely overplaying its importance in his "Lost Victories". A May attack will mean less prepared defences, and less tanks on both sides, but it will also mean the germans will have more lmited supplies for a sustained battle, and that even a win will not be likely to be decisive. The Russian build up also meant that the bulk of the russian forces were placed within rangeof the german attack and exposed to the german tactical advantage. The Germans didn't do much better in the defensive after Citadel was canceled then they did during the offensive phase.

I have to respectfully disagree with just about all of the above. The issue with delaying Kursk IOTL was the wait for the heavy 'wonder weapons' like the Panther, more Tigers, and the Elefant SP AT gun. Here there would be no need to wait for such weapons, because most of them won't exist. Instead the offensive can be launched on time in early May as per the original plan, when the Soviet defenses were virtually non-existant. There would be no need for the heavy armor of the Tiger, which BTW was a very small part of the OTL tank force. Instead breaking through the defenses of the outer ring of the bulge would be much, much easier and beyond that is only Steppe, which gives excellent long range sight, which IOTL allowed for long range engagement of Soviet tanks. Take for example the Battle of Prokhorovka:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Prokhorovka
Casualties and losses
German:
522 men (97 KIA/MIA)[5]
3[6][7] - 6[8] tanks destroyed
41[7] - 89[8] tanks damaged[9]

Soviet:
~5,500 men
207[10]- 334[11] tanks destroyed
420 tanks damaged[12]
The Soviets charged the Germans and were shot up trying to close with them.
Without the strong defenses built up in May, June, and July the Soviets wouldn't have stopped the northern arm of the offensive, so the Germans would have had even more troops/tanks at the decisive point and chopped off the salient.
So a MBT is exactly what was needed in May before the Soviets built up their defenses; waiting for the 'breakthrough' panzers resulted in needing them. Here there isn't a need to wait for them and the Germans can engage the Soviet tanks on the ground the Germans did best at: open ground maneuver warfare, which the Steppe was perfect for.
 

Deleted member 1487

Thank you ... although I know you already posted that my inherent laziness prevented me from checking ;)

No problem, like I said above, I think by early 1944 a version with sloped armor and a long 88mm gun could/would be in service and look like the Panther Ausf F/Panther II.
 

Deleted member 1487

By comparison:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiger_I#Armour
Armour

The Tiger I's armour reached up to 120 mm on the mantlet.
The Tiger I had frontal hull armour 100 mm (3.9 in) thick and frontal turret armour of 120 mm (4.7 in), as opposed to the 80 mm (3.1 in) frontal hull and 50 mm (2 in) frontal turret armour of contemporary models of the Panzer IV.[4][6] It also had 60 mm (2.4 in) thick hull side plates and 80 mm armour on the side superstructure and rear, turret sides and rear was 80 mm. The top and bottom armour was 25 mm (1 in) thick; from March 1944, the turret roof was thickened to 40 mm (1.6 in).[3] Armour plates were mostly flat, with interlocking construction. The armour joints were of high quality, being stepped and welded rather than riveted and were made of maraging steel.

The nominal armour thickness of the Tiger was reaching up to 200 mm at the mantlet.[7]

http://www.achtungpanzer.com/heu.htm
VK3601(H)
Heavy Tank
Armor (mm/angle):
Front Turret: 100/10
Front Superstructure: 100/8
Front Hull: 100 & 60/23 & 60
Side Turret: 80/0
Side Superstructure: 60/0
Side Hull: 60/0
Rear Turret: 80/0
Rear Superstructure: 60/0
Rear Hull: 80/0
Turret Top / Bottom: 26/90
Superstructure Top / Bottom: 26/90
Hull Top / Bottom: 26/90
Gun Mantlet: 100/0
 
The aim of Citadel was to destroy the Russian reserves (essencially their tank reserves) to prevent the russians from going on the offensive and to allow german freedom of action. If you attack early, you might close the pincers, but they will close on a small prey. An early Kursk is little more than a repeat Kharkov, not a decisive victory.

With less force density, yould get the long range action you want, and that would greatly favour the germans. In OTL Kursks, sheer numbers allowed the T34 to often close in under the critical (I'm trusting your numbers) 500m range under wich the VK36.01 would be vulnerable.
So a Citadel in May is not really a Citadel at all, just another large scale engagment. There will then be another larger battle in late Summer, wich would either be another German attack, or a Russian one.

For Citadel to succed, you have to hit the Russians hard enough that you can then move enough forces west to beat back the wallies.

In short, the goal of OTL Citadel was to destroy one year worth of russian tank production, while loosing only half a year worth of German tank production.

Manstein version of "his" early citadel somehow conveys the idea that russian defences will be much weaker, but russian losses about as big as OTL, wich is impraticable.

Since the two biggest victories the Germans scored after typhoon were not Kharkov 1943, but Rjev 1942 (operation Mars) and Kharkov 1942, Manstein is, again, using is very biased POV
 

Deleted member 1487

No problem, like I said above, I think by early 1944 a version with sloped armor and a long 88mm gun could/would be in service and look like the Panther Ausf F/Panther II.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panther_II#Further_development
The early impetus for upgrading the Panther came from the concern of Hitler and others that it lacked sufficient armor. Hitler had already insisted on an increase in its armor once, early in its design process in 1942. Discussions involving Hitler in January 1943 called further increased armor; initially referred to as Panther 2 (it became the Panther II after April 1943). This upgrade increased the glacis plate to 100 mm (3.9 in), the side armor to 60 mm (2.4 in), and the top armor to 30 mm (1.2 in). Production of the Panther 2 was slated to begin in September 1943.

In a meeting on February 10, 1943, further design changes were proposed - including changes to the steering gears and final drives. Another meeting on February 17, 1943 focused on sharing and standardizing parts between the Tiger II tank and the Panther 2, such as the transmission, all-steel roadwheels, and running gear. Additional meetings in February began to outline the various components, including use of the 88 mm L/71 KwK 43 gun. In March 1943, MAN indicated that the first prototype would be completed by August 1943. A number of engines were under consideration, among them the new Maybach HL 234 fuel-injected engine (900 hp operated by an 8-speed hydraulic transmission).

Thus, plans to replace the original Panther design with the Panther II were already underway before the first Panther had even seen combat. But from May to June 1943, work on the Panther II ceased as the focus was shifted to expanding production of the original Panther tank. It is not clear if there was ever an official cancellation - this may have been because the Panther II upgrade pathway was originally started at Hitler's insistence. The direction that the design was headed would not have been consistent with Germany's need for a mass-produced tank, which was the goal of the Reich Ministry of Armament and War Production.

It seems that a Vk3601 version II could have been around as early as late 1943. With prototypes ready by August 1943 if necessary it could be in service by October-November. The armor increases of the Panther II would already be present in the VK3601, but the need to slope them would be there, which would mean the chassis would need to lengthen by several centimeters, as it would need to widen to get a same track width of the Panther.
So its likely the weight goes up to the Panther weight of 45 tons, but it would get a much more powerful engine, which tests showed generated 850hp, instead of the 500hp of its initial engine. If it gets the Schmalturm then it would also have an increased benefit of armor protection too.
 
Or the Henschel VK36.01 buys enough time for MAN to come up with a reliable Panther.
No D and A OTL versions, by late 1943 you get the defenitive AH Panther A (more or less the OTL G) and than Henschel can move from the Vk36.01 to the Tiger II.
 
I have concerns about the turret ring diameter (always a concern) of that vehicle. At 3.14 meters, you probably aren't going to able to shove an 88mm gun into it, which limits the vehicle's potential in future operations. If you make it wider, the added weight will make up the difference between this and the Big Cats.

The Panther is wider and is an overall better platform. You'd be better off making a Panther with a rear mounted transmission (which will greatly increase the vehicle's reliability and decrease its total height by 10-20cm) or going with a vehicle similar to the later E-50.

What most people tend to forget is that AFVs are very, very compactly built around their main gun and that it's actually quite difficult to simply upgrade their components without a lot of thought beforehand.
 
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