A Very Conservative Coup
The leadership of Enoch Powell was, by the end of 1970, becoming increasingly irrelevant to the concerns of the country. In a nation where just over half of the workforce was part of a trade union, Powell’s diatribes against the likes of “Communist militants” within the union movement went down like a lead balloon. Policy announcements against trade union power, including Thorneycroft’s proposal of forcing trade unions to foot the bill for lost businesses’ lost revenue during strike action, were miles away from where the country stood on the issue of the labour movement.
The Conservatives were at their lowest in the autumn of 1970, when the post-World Cup polls put Labour twenty-one points ahead of the Conservative Party for a record three months. By the end of November, there was a sense of panic amongst moderate Conservative MPs who didn’t share the leadership’s ideological leanings. Whilst Eric Heffer announced quarterly growth unseen since the booming Macmillan era, Powell and Joseph were arguing for a widespread denationalisation programme and severe cuts to the welfare system. Such radical measures, combined with the fear that they might go further, created a feeling of unease in the country and within the party.
On the 24th January 1971, a small group of leading One Nation Tories met at the Selsdon Park Hotel in Surrey to discuss the possibility of deposing Powell before the Prime Minister could call an early election later in that same year. Robert Carr, Francis Pym, Maurice Macmillan, Anthony Barber and Iain Macleod came together as a group of possible future leaders of the Conservative Party and endeavoured to discuss a plan for who would succeed Powell. The discussions, it was later reported, were practically fruitless in their earlier stages due to the exclusion of the Opposition Chief Whip, William Whitelaw. An experienced One Nation Conservative, he should have been the first of many moderates to be called upon for the forced ousting of Powell. He was, however, adamant that he couldn’t take part in the discussions due to his role as Opposition Chief Whip. To plot against his leader would have been “near-treasonous”. A sense of paranoia grew as the conspirators of the plan, later known as the “Selsdon Plot”, believed that Whitelaw would try to quash their rebellion before it had even begun. He didn’t, however. Had Whitelaw played the role of Powell’s snitch, then the future of the Conservative Party and the 1973 general election would have been very different indeed.
In the early hours of the 25th January, the “Selsdon Five” adjourned their meeting with a moderate leader-in-waiting to thrust forward once the time was right to push Powell aside.
The release of the “Joseph Budget” – a counter-proposal to the Chancellor’s budget in March 1971 – did little to engender confidence in the Tory Party’s claim to being an alternative government. Criticised in Iain Macleod’s anonymous article in The Times as a “patchwork budget”, the Joseph Budget countered Heffer’s tax increases with promises of tax cuts, privatisation and, most unpopularly, the reintroduction of prescription charges. To pay for the rising costs of the National Health Service alongside the population increases in births and migration, the prescription charges were rationalised by the Conservative leadership as a necessary way of “ensuring a quality service”. Taken together, the various measures that the Conservatives were pushing for did not look like a coherent plan but an ideological shopping list of policies. When Keith Joseph organised a press conference on the day of the alternative budget’s announcement, he struggled to keep his cool under intense scrutiny by the press. After being questioned on the fact that the economy was improving and his programme of economic reforms looked unnecessary, Joseph appeared uncharacteristically flustered and simply restated the intention of his programme. “We must – and it is imperative – make the most of Britain’s innovative spirit. It is not enough to coast along whilst keeping British workers in this new serfdom.”
The use of the word “serfdom”, sensationalised in the press as “slavery”, blew up in Joseph’s face with so much force that he considered resigning as Shadow Chancellor. Iain Macleod, a former Shadow Chancellor himself, offered Joseph some very self-interested encouragement to carry on.
Just as had happened during the last days of Maudling’s leadership, soundings were taken amongst the Conservative backbenches to determine who would have the most support in the instance of Powell resigning the leadership. Of 110 backbenchers, sixty-two responded “Iain Macleod”, twenty-three responded “Keith Joseph”, and the remaining twenty-five responded with a variety of names, including “Willie Whitelaw”, “Julian Amery” and “Edward du Cann”.
After making the soundings just prior to the party’s October conference, William Whitelaw reported back to the Selsdon Five to inform them that Macleod had the most support of any hypothetical candidate. However, the Selsdon Five would become the Selsdon Four after Iain Macleod suffered a heart attack and died on the 28th September 1971. The man that the Selsdon Park meeting had decided upon as the alternative leader to Powell and had been reaffirmed by a majority of his Commons colleagues had passed away just before the coup against Powell could come to fruition.
On the 4th October, a new face came to the fore as decided upon by the surviving members of the Selsdon Plot and the wheels were set in motion. A series of shadow cabinet resignations, including Angus Maude as Shadow Education Secretary and William Whitelaw as Opposition Chief Whip, triggered a crisis of confidence in the leadership. When Powell scrambled to find replacements, he found that most MPs were unwilling to join the shadow cabinet so long as Powell led the party. Frustrated, yet unwilling to admit that defeat was imminent, Powell reaffirmed that he would be staying on as leader and he dared any of his critics to come forward and challenge him in an announcement on the 6th October. This was a bold move, but Powell was a bold man.
Later that same day, Edward du Cann made the announcement that he would be standing for the leadership of the Conservative Party and had the backing of a number of MPs and Tory grandees to do so. He had pre-empted Maurice Macmillan’s announcement, which took place the following morning. Nobody truly believed that du Cann had the necessary backing, but the determination to depose Powell was clearly there.
Edward du Cann’s platform concerned the modernisation of the Tory Party – he wanted to make it more professional and business-like. There would be little time for diatribe and racist discourse in his party, especially when even businesses were beginning to see the Conservatives as a dangerous rabble. Thus, du Cann focused heavily on bringing some of Powell’s radical ideas and some of Maudling’s One Nation ideas together to synthesise the two disparate wings of the party.
Macmillan, on the other hand, was campaigning on a platform of consensus. He argued that the Tories had moved so far away from the country and that Powellism was simply populist extremism with no real values to sustain it. It was a message that rang true for many moderate Conservative activists and politicians who still hankered after the days of Maurice’s father. Name connotations were another important part of his campaign, as the name “Macmillan” conjured up more nostalgia in the minds of Conservative MPs than derision.
The first ballot was called on the 12th October, just two weeks before conference was supposed to officially start. 270 votes were cast: 75 for du Cann, 89 for Powell, and 106 for Macmillan. There was no clear winner, though Macmillan had a plurality of the votes. Powell was willing to stay on for the next ballot, but found himself dissuaded by many of his ideological allies in the shadow cabinet. It was subsequently suggested, on the 14th, that Keith Joseph should stand in his place as the standard bearer of Powellism. Joseph rejected the suggestions outright, leading to Julian Amery coming forward to stand in Powell’s place. Though there was some serious unease about Amery standing, the rest of the shadow cabinet stood firmly reluctant to stand. Macmillan and du Cann, emboldened by the votes they received, continued in their campaigns.
On the 18th November, the second ballot took place. The result saw Macmillan take 174 votes, du Cann take 51, and Amery end up with 45 votes. Amery and du Cann promptly withdrew their candidacies and Maurice Macmillan became leader of the Conservative Party.
On the first day of the Conservative Party Conference six days later, Maurice Macmillan took the podium to a round of thunderous applause that lasted for almost ten minutes. It was unprecedented, but to expect less would have bene foolish. Finally, the Tories were out of the wilderness.