TLIAF: You Can Quote Me On That

Alright, what’s all this, then?

An NZ-centred TLIAF.

Oh, you’re having another go at Shuffling the Deck in New Zealand?

Not as such.

Good, because you made a right balls-up of that last ti-

*thwack* *splud* *thunk*

...



You hit him with a shovel!

I needed to bury an old failure. And hit him. The two rather came together.

Is he alive?

Yeah, just out cold.

Ah, like There Is No Depression.

Hey, I updated that last week!

Yeah, after what, three months?

Thesis.

And what about that TL-191 rehash, Captain Originality?

Thesis. And literary constipation.

Gross.

You asked, smartarse.

So what’s with the back-and-forth with yourself? What, you think you’re Meadow now?

Oh please; I’m just living up to the format.

And trying to ingratiate yourself with the Politibrits.

And trying to ingratiate myself with th- hey!

So what’s this about, anyway?

NZ Prime Ministers.

So it is a do-over of Shuffling the Deck!

Not as such. It’s a quick history of NZ PM’s, except here they’re all the ones who got screwed over, passed over, or just forgotten about.

And the title’s relevance to this is…

Reference to the framing device.

How does that work, then?

Read on and find out. It's literally the first chapter.

Will there be a title card?

Ha! Fat chance. We’ll be lucky if there’s an ending.

First time for everything, I suppose.

It's a fortnight and I haven't got a lot of work on. Trust me, we'll be done by Easter. Probably even this year's one.
 
Introduction: Michael Joseph Savage
You Can Quote Me On That

A new Prime Minister. A new age, people are saying, of hope and change and opportunity.

Some, of course, decry this new age. Too much personality, they reckon, and not enough attention to policy (who are these old fogeys, you ask? Let’s just say that as I type, the ominous gaze of my editor sears my soul like the Eye of Sauron). I aim to prove them wrong, to show that we’ve always fixated upon the personality at the top and that, if we’re honest, we’ve never had the attention span to do more than focus on a few key moments anyway.

So over the next few weeks, I’ll be focusing my columns here and online on the soundbites which defined New Zealand’s leaders since the First Labour Government, for better and for worse. To start the ball rolling easily, here’s the big one:


220px-Michael_Joseph_Savage_Portrait.jpg

“We are only a small and young nation, but we march with a union of hearts and souls to a common destiny.”

Michael Joseph Savage (1935-1941†)


It's a fair bet that if you’re reading this column, you’re sufficiently politically clued-up to know the basics of probably our highest-profile Prime Minister ever. Depression, Labour, welfare state, cradle-to-grave, World War Two, taken too soon. That’s all fairly elementary, and has been hammered into us over the last decade by Labour leaders seeking to claw back votes by appealing to a glorious past. Instead, I want to focus on why I picked this quote.

First off, as you’ll notice, I didn’t go with “Where she stands, we stand; where she goes, we go”. While it’s the go-to line to know of Micky Savage’s, and nicely signifies New Zealand’s historical reluctance to cut the umbilical cord tying us to Britain, it fails to capture the optimism and sheer revolutionary spirit his ministry inspired in a country gripped by Depression. Rather, I have selected the subsequent sentence from the same speech, which says so much more in so few words about the country he led and left upon his death.

New Zealand was, in 1935, both small and young. About one-and-a-half million people, living in a country which identified itself as “Better Britain” and “the Empire’s Farm,” where you either showed yourself to be a member of the culturally British majority or else you were an outsider. The Pakeha population was still largely composed of immigrants from the Mother Country, or else their sons and daughters. Culture, with a few exceptions for advertising purposes, orbited around London. Even our few literary figures had to make their pilgrimage to Britain to be regarded seriously: Katherine Mansfield produced much of her work in Europe. This dependence upon Britain also left it prone to suffering at the hands of external economic circumstances; the Depression was hitting New Zealand hard, and thousands were experiencing unprecedented suffering in a land of plenty. Disillusionment was widespread here as in the rest of the world, and stolidly commonsensical people were open to radical solutions to the problems of the day.

Enter Michael Joseph Savage.

Laying out his vision for New Zealand through some of the best oration this country has ever known, Savage came to power with a practically religious fervour towards his cause. What Savage’s time in office encouraged more than anything else in this respect was a common destiny for all, hardwiring the egalitarian spirit of New Zealand’s society into its political system and giving his party – and by extension his society – a goal to march towards. He breathed hope into a hopeless nation during the darkest period of its history. It is impossible to understate that achievement.

The Second World War was further emblematic of that; the crusade against fascism demanded New Zealanders pull together to help contribute to securing the outside world, in order to ensure the stable external conditions needed to continue the domestic project Savage envisaged. However, the manner in which Savage pursued this, as part of “a moral foreign policy” which left room for polite disagreement with Britain, as on prewar appeasement, also encouraged New Zealand to do so as an increasingly independent young nation. By the time New Zealand celebrated its centenary in 1940, it was not independent, but it was far, far closer than it had been in 1935 – by 1945, when New Zealand signed up to the United Nations, Savage’s successors would feel confident enough in New Zealand’s ability to stand up for itself that they accepted Britain’s Statute of Westminster and formally established New Zealand’s independence from the United Kingdom.

It was that vision which meant that, when Savage’s colon cancer – operated upon in 1938 (after extensive convincing from his Cabinet) and near-constantly through 1940 – killed him on February 12, 1941, leading to an outpouring of grief unparalleled by any other New Zealand political figure, Savage secured his legacy as his fellows took it upon themselves to complete the vision of their late lamented leader. Here, then, was the union of hearts and souls, marching towards the common destiny of peace and prosperity for all in accordance with the divine writ of their departed messiah.

In this light, it was perhaps unfair for the mantle of leadership to fall to his successor; nobody could be reasonably expected to mobilise the same support across the breadth of New Zealand society. Still, it was a challenge the new Prime Minister ably rose to, even as he tried to resolve within himself the dilemma of being a pacifist forced to become a wartime leader. But that's a story for another day.
 
Last edited:
1: Walter Nash
200px-Walter_Nash_Portrait.jpg

“I want to get rid of poverty because it is bad, it is wrong, it is immoral, it is unethical, it is un-Christian, it is unfair, and it is unjust and it is everything bad.”


Walter Nash (1941-1947)

A firm believer in his mission and prone to expounding the philosophy behind it at considerable, sometimes clumsy, length, Walter Nash was a well-spoken Englishman who smoothed the rough edges off the Labour Party at a time when many still suspected it of being a carefully-concealed ploy to pull everyone out of the cities and have them tilling the fields the Red hordes would seize from the farmers.

Originally, the chain of command would have indicated that Peter Fraser, Minister of Health and Savage’s right-hand man would have become PM. However, he became severely ill towards the end of 1940 and almost, according to some accounts, died. While he was recovered by the time of Savage’s death, it was felt that in the depths of crisis overseas and at home (both in New Zealand and the Labour Party itself, still smarting over the Lee Affair) the executive needed to offer stable, dependable leadership. Reluctantly, Fraser stepped aside for Nash, the third member of the First Labour Government’s triumvirate.

Entering the premiership at the darkest hour of World War Two, with tens of thousands of men already serving in Egypt thanks in large part to Labour’s Emergency Regulations passed the previous year (causing Nash, Fraser, and other caucus members who had been imprisoned and persecuted for their conscientious objections to World War One no end of moral dilemmas) and tens of thousands more being trained for military service. Rationing, growing shortages and blackout restrictions, and a sense of unease among Labour’s organised labour base that the party would abandon them in preference of “wartime necessities” all threatened the survival of Nash’s Government.

The Battle of Crete, where the New Zealanders played a crucial role in blunting the German attempt at taking the island with paratroopers, securing what Winston Churchill called “the first victory of many…the end of the beginning”, offered an easy early victory for Nash and allowed him to navigate his other challenge: John A. Lee, the socialist veteran author who is worth a column or two of his own.

Fortunately for Nash and the Labour Party, the new PM’s insistence upon following the rules of New Zealand democracy and holding the election on schedule in November 1941 despite wartime conditions meant that Nash was able to maintain sufficient party discipline (and touch the still-raw nerve of Lee’s harsh attacks on the still-warm Savage which he’d been ejected for in the first place) to prevent any defections to Lee’s embryonic Democratic Labour Party; the short timeframe between the scandal and the election, as well as the wave of patriotic feeling resulting from the victory on Crete, meant Lee was unable to split the Labour vote as he had hoped.

The 1941 election, where Nash played strictly by the book and outfoxed his opponents by doing so, was a harbinger of the next six years as Nash, continuing to hold his role of Finance Minister while sitting in the Prime Ministerial seat, wielded a degree of power few New Zealanders can claim to have matched, before or since. His organisational skill allowed him to successfully mobilise New Zealand in the all-encompassing manner a total war required, and to successfully mobilise his party in the all-encompassing manner modern politics required; both tasks in which he was aided immeasurably by his hyper-competent deputy Peter Fraser, Minister of External Affairs and later mover and shaker in the United Nations.

His determination to pursue the eradication of poverty, however admirable, did come with the price of lending his leadership an almost monomaniacal bent. This became especially pronounced after the 1944 election, when Labour was returned to government with a reduced majority as Sid Holland shaped National into a credible alternative government. Nash became more convinced than ever that social welfare needed to be pursued if Labour was to win in 1947, and began to micromanage the economic aspects of government policy to achieve this.

Where Walter Nash failed in this was not the policy; his Ministry passed significant legislation regarding the minimum wage, working conditions, protections for workers in case of sickness or accident, the implementation of Keynesianism, the establishment of a unified Milk Marketing Commission to represent dairy farmers’ interests (later Labourites would rue this), housing laws, improvements to the education system, laws focused specifically on Maori wellbeing, the establishment of a free and comprehensive healthcare system, and the construction of state houses afforded to thousands of returned soldiers (which helped Labour in 1944 and 1947); all of these are crucial parts of the First Labour Government’s legacy. No, where Nash failed was his gradual alienation of his party colleagues in pursuit of these goals. He lacked the charisma of Savage and relied too heavily upon the organisational skills of Fraser to achieve his goals. While Nash was a good communicator, he was often seen as indecisive and, once he’d made his decisions, too narrow-minded.

There was also, by 1947, an element of voter fatigue. National’s new leader had seen the conservatives of New Zealand accept the welfare state as a necessary condition for electability; promising comfort for most rather than emancipation for the poorest – a far smaller constituency after twelve years of Labour – and amidst growing impatience with increasingly bold and radical unionism, it was unsurprising that New Zealanders voted for change in 1947. Nash clung to the leadership, supported by Fraser, until a second defeat in 1950 saw him quietly resign in favour of a new, less grating, man. He continued on as perhaps the Grand Old Man of Labour until 1968, when he passed away peacefully at the age of 86 (by which time he was the Grand Old Man of New Zealand democracy as a whole, setting an age record for a sitting MP which has yet to be surpassed).

Walter Nash often tops the lists of New Zealand’s most effective Prime Ministers. While this might seem unfair given that he was “just” the foreman overseeing the implementation of the blueprint drawn up by Michael Joseph Savage, the consummate professionalism with which he undertook the difficult task of completing Savage’s vision deserves nothing less than the highest accolades.
 
Last edited:
Nice to see Nash getting a better reputation than OTL. Although Lee would have been a lot more... interesting.

I was tempted. Believe me, I was tempted. But I realised that PM Lee wasn't happening without two things: ASB on the one hand, and Literally Communism on the other (or worse yet, Literally Social Credit).[1] Though I may just be recalling that TL from a couple years back where Lee leads to a pacifist NZ staying out of WWII and triggering a Civil War won by Sid Holland's corporatist-rightist forces.

[1] I didn't even realise the tasteless joke until I'd written the rest of the post. I apologise for nothing.
 
2. Adam Hamilton
220px-Adam_Hamilton_%281926%29.jpg

“A man is beaten solely when he allows it.”


Adam Hamilton (1947-1951†)

After the prophetic charisma of Savage and the quietly determined Nash, New Zealand was shocked by a tall, rugged Southlander who lurched into power at age 65 with neither fire in his belly nor flashing from his eyes. Instead, they got a coolly competent manager of the National Party and the Nation of New Zealand.

Hamilton was something of a dark horse even within the National Party: the merger of the United and Reform parties had been a messy business, with Gordon Coates wresting control of the new centre-right party away from Forbes of the old United Party in a brutal spectacle of backstabbing that all but handed the 1938 election to Labour. Hamilton, a Coates loyalist, became finance spokesman for National, and attacked Labour viciously over their ‘socialistic’ policies. The vitriol he launched against Savage (from the safety of Coates’ shadow) won him back some credit with the United wing which made up for his association with Coates as a Party coup saw Charles Wilkinson become leader and Coates sent off into the wilderness. And then the balloon went up, Savage died, and the world turned upside down.

Walter Nash, deciding unity was important during wartime (as well as to shore up his leadership), invited Hamilton and Coates, in their capacities as two of the Grand Old Men of the National Party, to join the War Cabinet in 1941. The two eagerly accepted, which bothered their Party comrades who argued that it was impossible to be a member of National and align with the Godless Socialists. Hamilton told Wilkinson to go hang, and was in turn relegated to the backbenches to languish with his mentor Coates. The 1941 election washout gave Hamilton the last laugh, as Wilkinson promptly resigned the leadership and was replaced by Sid Holland, who reconciled the feuding wings of the party (welcoming Hamilton back into the fold and frontbench in the process) and set about consolidating National’s presence in the countryside and the business community, both of which were patriotic but resented some of Labour’s domestic wartime measures. 1944 was a close-run thing, and the strength of Holland’s leadership was proven by the caucus maintaining him as leader by acclamation. Heading into 1946, with Nash’s government burning itself out, Holland was a sure bet for PM.

Then, of course, he slipped on the stairs of Parliament and broke his neck.

Scrambling to find a replacement for the man who’d placed himself at the heart of the party’s organisation, National raced desperately for a sufficiently qualified candidate who was palatable to all within the party, could campaign without being completely hopeless, and had some sort of organisational skill. Adam Hamilton, practically through process of elimination, met all of these prerequisites. That he had probably had a part in the Post Office’s jamming of a pro-Labour broadcast before the 1935 election didn’t hurt his standing, either.

It took several ballots, but Hamilton eventually became leader in October 1946, and led National into the election the following November with a campaign every bit as aggressive as that of 1938. His accusations that Labour had gone too far in providing a safety net for New Zealanders were balanced with reassurances that he and his party had taken on commitments to the essential features of the welfare state with which most of National’s supporters had become quite comfortable, thank you very much.

He was further assisted by the fact that many influential figures within the party who didn’t particularly like him took one look at the alternative (as Nash took a second look at the possibility of raising taxes on the wealthy further yet) and decided to give him all the support an unexpected leader could ever hope for.

For all the sound and fury, Hamilton’s term was not particularly remarkable; even the abortive dockworkers’ strike of 1951, which should have provided Hamilton with prime fodder to act upon the rhetoric of his campaign and shore up his leadership, was ended by forces beyond his control – historians generally agree that, despite appearances, the dissolution of the union campaign had more to do with the horses turning and eating one another thanks to a poorly-worded speech by Labour’s new leader (in which he stated Labour’s support for unionism but its opposition to the strike) than any decisive leadership on the PM’s part.

But then, as the country leapt into Korea to prove its dedication to the United Nations, that wasn’t really why people wanted Hamilton. His appeal was precisely that he wasn’t dynamic or crusading or charismatic: rather, he was competent, placing one steady hand on the tiller while the other was laid comfortingly paternalistically on the nation’s shoulder. To use another phrase of his, he let the country get down to the business of getting down to business.

The steady hand on the tiller would stiffen with rigor mortis before too long: on December 4, 1951, Adam Hamilton closed his eyes behind the desk in the Prime Minister’s office and never opened them again. His death was not met with the same outpouring of grief as Savage's, and maybe that was appropriate. Savage had been a histrionic zealot who championed his cause until it killed him; Hamilton had been a quietly determined man who clung on until the bitter end. It was an ethos future leaders of the National Party would take to heart as the new two-party system cemented itself.

This leaves us with the question of the day: why the quote? Hamilton was not an especially quotable individual; he was to all intents and purposes the epitome of the taciturn Southerner. But this line – apocryphally uttered by him either to Coates before the 1939 leadership vote in a characteristically uncharismatic attempt at consolation, or during the Depression while Minister of Works – encapsulates the sheer bloody-mindedness of a man whose career should have, by rights, ended in 1935 when the government he was associated with fell from grace. Bulldog tenacity was Adam Hamilton’s essential feature: it has endured as that of the National Party.
 
Last edited:
3. Keith Holyoake
1048-max

“Democracy postulates that all men are equal throughout the country, and each man is equal in Parliament…I am bound to say that in our organisation that some tend to be a little more equal than others; I think this is inevitable.”

Keith Holyoake (1951-53)


Keith Holyoake, the son of a shopkeeper from Mangamutu, had been elected to Parliament in a 1932 by-election at age 28, becoming New Zealand’s youngest-ever MP. He was groomed for Great Things from early on, becoming a member of National’s frontbench in 1941 and being promoted by the soon-to-be-late Sid Holland to his shadow Cabinet in 1946. Selected by Hamilton for deputy leader in the interests of both stability (Holyoake had also been a Reform man in the 1930s, and had maintained cordial relations with Hamilton during the fractious war years) and allowing National to present a more youthful image than the aging Labour Party (which is to say that Holyoake offered a nice contrast to Hamilton, Nash, and Fraser by dint of having a discernible pulse).

It worked; Holyoake became Deputy Prime Minister in 1947 at the relatively tender age of 43, and was placed in charge of the Agriculture portfolio. Though considered a graveyard of a posting where nothing happened, it allowed him to prove himself a competent administrator: the mechanisation of farms and their connection to the National Grid was encouraged, war controls on production were eased and rationing ended altogether in early 1948 (popular with producers and consumers alike), and as Minister responsible for the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research oversaw the first moves to implement large-scale aerial topdressing. A harbinger of things to come was also visible in the way this research allowed poisoned bait to be dropped in order to deal with the South Island’s ongoing rabbit infestation: by 1956 the now much-maligned 1080 would be the poison of choice for pest control, and the vaguely-switched-on reader will already know where that story ends.

If this seems like an unnecessary diversion from Holyoake’s time as PM, it’s because he didn’t really have much else to his name. While Holyoake could claim credit (if unjustly) for the wool boom of the early 1950s, and the general uptick in demand for agricultural products resulting from New Zealand’s involvement in the Korean War, he failed to make the same popular impact as his predecessors or successors. This was a problem from the get-go, as it had been expected that Hamilton would retire some time around 1953 when Holyoake had more experience; the sudden turn of events in late 1951 meant National had to hastily try to brand their new leader as “Kiwi Keith,” to which Labour Deputy Rex Mason famously retorted that “[he was] indeed a Kiwi: short-sighted, shuffling around in the murky undergrowth, poking his beak in where it isn’t welcome.”

And Mason was on to something: Holyoake may have been a born and bred New Zealander (there was no mistaking those drawling vowel sounds), but his Received Pronunciation lent him an imperious manner which made him appear a toffee-nosed upstart to the man on the street (alas, those swallowed ‘r’s; every one moving Holyoake a little further from everyday “Nyoo Zealandahs”). True, Adam Hamilton had been a bit of a country toff as well, but he had had the good grace not to sound like Little Lord Fauntleroy. This is the reasoning behind today’s quote: while Holyoake wasn’t in any way undemocratic, he couldn’t help exuding a certain aristocratic air. When asked to speak on the nature of Cabinet, he prefaced his answer with a wordy little treatise on the egalitarian nature of democracy, and promptly flubbed it with a tepidly Orwellian tagline that “some are a little more equal than others.”

And so it was that while the working man was perhaps a bit less enamoured with Labour than he had been in 1950 (bad blood remained over the failed strike action), he was still more able to sympathise with their middle-class intellectuals than the faintly condescending upper crust Holyoake seemed to represent. Many ex-servicemen were reminded of some of the British officers they had served alongside or occasionally under in the North African and Italian Campaigns, and it was not a fond recollection – or worse yet, of a bank manager or jumped-up shop clerk with pretentions to authority he hadn’t properly earned. The middle classes, for their part, were simply uninspired; there was contentment with Holyoake’s hand on the tiller, but as 1952 lengthened into 1953 and the end of the Korean War made the Red Menace a lot less menacing Holyoake’s implication that Labour’s socialism was communism by the back door held a lot less weight.

1953 also saw the emergence of the Social Credit Party as a force in New Zealand politics; their seizure of over eleven per cent of the vote took nine votes from National for every one it took from Labour. As Holyoake’s worthy opponent ran rings around him in the realm of finance, the net – perhaps inevitable – result of a narrow National loss – six recounts were called in marginal seats, and the election overall was decided by fewer than a thousand votes. By the time the dust settled, Labour had won with a majority of exactly one.

Holyoake was able to defend his patch as leader; the royal visit the next month rather overshadowed the election in the public consciousness and there was a feeling in caucus that it was unseemly to present a disunited front to the country at a time of patriotic feeling. However, his failure to take back Parliament in 1956 saw him sidelined in favour of a different man in whom caucus had greater confidence. While Kiwi Keith was kept about for another twenty years, becoming National’s default elder statesman, his successors would only ever seek his advice as a pro forma ritual. Holyoake was acknowledged, by his party and his country, as the administrator of the national enterprise at a time of generous dividends; however, he lacked the charisma or gravitas to come off as anything other than high-handed in doing so.

Holyoake’s legacy is therefore more cautionary than anything else: while New Zealand was happy to accept a colourless Prime Minister in times of prosperity, the country wouldn’t respond well to being talked down to – at least not in the wrong register. As the boom times continued National and Labour alike would be well-advised to keep this in mind when presenting good news or bad to their electorates. Whether they actually took that advice, of course, was another matter altogether.
 
Cool stuff. I wish I could say more, but I'm a wee bit uneducated when it comes to NZ politics.
 
4. Arnold Nordmeyer

220px-Arnold_Nordmeyer_%281950%29.jpg

"There is not a crisis of confidence in this government."

Arnold Nordmeyer (1953-1959)


A somewhat more down-to-earth and approachable individual than the austere Holyoake, Nordmeyer had come into politics from his Presbyterian ministry upon seeing the plight of workers at the Kurow Hydro scheme in north Otago, and was emblematic of the Christian socialism characterising the First Labour Government. These local chops had allowed Nordmeyer to somewhat miraculously win and cling to the largely rural seat of Oamaru for twelve years, before being ousted by fifty votes in 1947.

This was actually somewhat fortunate, as the three interceding years in the wilderness allowed him to become more deeply involved in the party’s organisational side (coming down on Savage’s side in 1940 didn’t hurt, either: McAloon’s recently-released history of the party argues that, had he voted with Lee, it is doubtful Nordmeyer could have returned to the frontbench) and, upon Peter Fraser’s death, step neatly into the vacant seat of Brooklyn. Heading into the 1953 election, this gave Nordmeyer both experience as a party insider and a warm, human element infinitely more relatable than Holyoake’s distant manner.

That Nordmeyer was viewed as more warm and approachable than Nash and Holyoake alike is somewhat ironic, as he was not only a Presbyterian but also a “wowser”, never touching alcohol. Still, Nordmeyer came with a pedigree Holyoake couldn’t match: he had been Minister of Health under Nash and overseen the revolutionary reforms which put meat on the skeletal health service established by Savage; as Minister of Industries and Commerce he had also become acquainted with the realities of balancing the books in a democratic socialist (or, as his less radical fellows preferred to call it, a social democratic) state.

This experience allowed Nordmeyer to challenge Nash for the leadership in the wake of the 1950 washout, causing an upset as he became leader of the Labour Party by a margin of two caucus votes after only eight days back in Parliament in February 1951. While this provided Adam Hamilton with some ammunition to fling at Labour as a “den of vipers”, the otherwise destabilising effect was overshadowed by National’s own transitional crisis upon Hamilton’s death nine months later. With the bareboned headstart he had on Holyoake, Nordmeyer was able to secure his victory (four percent in the polls, one seat in Parliament, and Matthew Oram, the septuagenarian National MP, retained as MP to preserve Labour’s majority. In fairness, he was kept neutral by dint of being asleep in his chair half the time).

So on to his actual time as Prime Minister; as with the previous two PMs, I’ve focused on the smoke-filled rooms to get around the fact that his was another “steady as she goes” administration; while New Zealand’s UN delegate broke while its formal American ally (leftist or no, Nordmeyer wasn’t going to throw out the ANZUS Pact in the tense air of the mid-Fifties) to condemn its part in Guatemala’s 1954 coup, this was counterbalanced by the country’s extensive bipartisan support – alongside Australia – for the Anglo-French-Israeli seizure of the Suez Canal in 1956, as well as continuing deployments in support of the British in Malaya. New Zealand thus stuck to its guns on the world stage.

Domestically, things were even less eventful: although a moderate tax increase in 1955 raised some hackles, the electorate was content enough with “Nordy” to let him bludgeon Holyoake in 1956 with a majority of five. The Second Labour Government at last had some breathing space, and as the country headed into 1957, when the only interesting event on the horizon was the decimalisation of the New Zealand pound courtesy of Rex Mason (newspapers from the time are full of heroic complaints to the editor, which as the dollar in your pocket can tell you did exactly zilch to stop that), it seemed like Labour had gained some breathing space.

So of course there was a crisis.

If people complain today about the excessive emphasis the last few governments have placed on agribusiness for NZ’s economic wellbeing (or whatever the buzzword du jour is), they should look at where we stood in the 1950s. Nine tenths of exports were agricultural, half of those going to Britain, and so when the price of butter crashed over there, the ripple effects began to hit New Zealand in the wallet. The balance of payments began skewing wildly, with import payments far exceeding export receipts, and the PM, his elbow jogged by the persistently present Nash, decided a little belt-tightening was just the ticket to get the country through the rough patch.

The problem was that, in the twenty-some years since the First Labour Government was elected and the ten since it was thrown out, New Zealand had changed. People were used to a boom, not a Depression, and had become accustomed to less immediately unpleasant solutions to their problems. This meant that, although Nordmeyer spoke plainly about the ins and outs of the situation and presented a perfectly admissible argument to the electorate, genial Nordy became penny-pinching Uncle Scrooge almost overnight.

The infamous “crisis of confidence” speech came in 1958, when Nordmeyer tried to defuse spreading rumours of discontent within Cabinet. No sooner had the words left his lips than people began to smell blood in the water – and they weren’t wrong; the Minister of Defence called Nash a “bloody big liar” as three other Ministers questioned the need to raise taxes on beer, tobacco and cars, it being generally inadvisable for a social-democratic party to jack up the price of working class pastimes.

The “Bloody Budget” of 1957 cast a shadow over the rest of Nordmeyer’s ministry, despite the fact that the crisis had passed and taxes lowered back to normal by election year. It’s popular to blame Labour’s 1959 defeat solely on the Bloody Budget, but I’d wager that it’s more due to the greying of Labour. By 1959 most of Cabinet had served under Savage; only four ministers had entered Parliament after 1950. While Nordmeyer’s terms saw a much-needed injection of new blood into the Labour caucus, with Norman Kirk, Frank Kitts, and four other freshman MPs elected in 1953, the leadership was out of step with mainstream New Zealand by its second term. Even if it hadn’t been for a crisis of confidence within Cabinet, then, one within the country was practically inevitable.

While his legacy today is mixed – even his fans have trouble placing him any higher than the “good, but not great” category – Nordmeyer maintains a reasonably respected position in Labour tradition as the man who cemented the party within the fabric of the nation’s politics as a firmly social-democratic movement which could effectively appeal to the centre. It had also learned quite harshly not to try and legislate past popular opinion. The net effect was that National was forced to play defence against Labour for two decades, trying to balance its conservatism with the popular acceptance of Labour’s social security programmes.

Fortunately for National, the new Prime Minister was a master of the game.
 
Good to have the fifties pass without the dead hand of Holyoake, the patrician bastard.

Surely you mean the Sixties, which is when we were saddled with over a decade of Kiwi Keith IOTL (the Fifties of course being dominated by Holland, who was more a paternalistic bastard than a patrician one :closedeyesmile:). Unless you're referring to ITTL, in which case yeah, New Zealand dodged a bullet.

Actually, that brings to mind an issue I've had about bias which I'd like to address. It's an interesting consequence of the way in which one leader would dominate the Nats for a long time IOTL that it's impossible to do a shuffle of PMs without it turning into at least a bit of a screw - Sid Holland dominated the party for fifteen years, Holyoake for a further twelve, Muldoon de facto for twelve more - and so it takes rather a series of unfortunate events to remove or stymie their presences.

Just a thought. Also, sorry for the delay; normal service should resume promptly.
 
Aaargh, yes, the sixties.

And don't worry about making it a screw- one of the advantages of the TLIAD format is that you don't need to worry so much about narrative balance. Embrace the gimmick.
 
5. Jack Marshall
upload_2017-4-10_0-59-37.png


“The basic imperative throughout my political years has been and shall remain the fundamental importance of liberty, property, and security for all.”

Jack Marshall (1959-1968)


Jack Marshall was another comfortably middle-class National leader, somewhat in the mould of Keith Holyoake. Unlike his unlamented and lamentable predecessor, however, Marshall sounded merely educated, rather than aristocratic. Soft-spoken and pleasingly humble where Holyoake had been imperious, and more noticeably “New Zealand” in his speech, “Gentleman Jack” was able to actually connect with the voters in a way none of his predecessors had managed. He was also a decade younger than Nordmeyer, which allowed him to present himself as a convincing breath of fresh air in a political environment which had become rather stale (while Holyoake had been the same age, he’d acted even older than Nash).

This was as true within National as it was on the national stage: Marshall represented the liberal wing of the party, and waxed lyrical in his first speech as Prime Minister of “liberty, property, and security.” Indeed, today’s quote is taken from that speech because it encapsulates the break with tradition his time as leader – thirteen glorious years in all – represented for National. No more was National to act as defender of the old order with all its connotations of class interests: the focus from here on out would be on making New Zealand a country where everyone could hope to go out and live in comfort unparalleled practically anywhere else in the world. And the good times continued to be good under Marshall’s watch: television was introduced in 1960, the economy was booming, and people were happy with Things the Way They Were.

With all of this in mind, and Labour limping to the barn under Nordmeyer and therefore still under the Bloody Budget’s shadow, 1962 was a piece of cake. With the Cold War thermometer at its chilliest point, New Zealanders were not receptive to Communism in any form, and in any case Marshall’s campaign was effective enough at stealing the egalitarian high ground from Labour – see his catchy if cringeworthy slogan, “Jack’s as good as his master” – that there wasn’t really any stopping him. So the National Express chugged into its second term, in time for Marshall to crusade in favour of Voluntary Unionism (having cleverly made it an election issue, dared Labour to take the bait and advocate for compulsory unionism, and thrashed them when they did). This policy aside, the steady hand on the tiller held for the next three years.

1965 was mainly surprising in being so stable a year for National: while losing three percent of the vote and two seats, including one to the Social Credit Party (who’d swollen to 14% in the polls), the Government maintained a nice wide majority of four. Marshall thus became the first of only two National PMs to win a third term, and the first man since Massey to be elected PM three times running: naturally, then, caucus considered it a Big Deal.

This made National more receptive to Marshall’s attitude of cautious reform, which in turn led to, if not an outright shift, at least a preparation of the grounds for New Zealand’s place in the world to move later on. While New Zealand eagerly threw men and money at the strange little war in Borneo alongside the British, there was a growing realisation that Britain’s time had passed. This also led Gentleman Jack to take advantage of the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific to court the United States: President Johnson’s visit in 1966 lent Marshall a rather statesmanlike air to go with his domestic populism, and things continued on the face of it to be milk and honey.

Nevertheless, this would prove a rare miscalculation. Marshall’s decision to commit New Zealand troops to Vietnam, while correctly calibrated to signal to the Americans the minimum possible commitment to our alliance, was also a public relations disaster. Students were turning out against the deployment of New Zealand soldiers to fight in a war foreign not only to New Zealand geographically but also politically, socially, and strategically. The by-now-widespread medium of television beamed vivid images of the war to New Zealanders every night at 6pm (or 6:15, for those stumbling in from the pubs), demonstrating the realities of modern warfare to two generations raised on stories of the heroism of Kiwi boys in far-flung North Africa. Against the grainy photographs of tanks and grinning soldiers in the desert, the videos of screaming Vietnamese orphans coated in still-burning napalm was a body blow to morale. And that was without the more insidious effects of the war, as the use of Agent Orange in the swampy forests of South Vietnam would have knock-on effects in the maternity wards of New Zealand once those soldiers returned home.

Marshall’s fourth election was therefore also a bridge too far: a combination of electoral redistribution adding seats to Parliament and lowering the voting age to 20 (incidentally expanding the franchise to a section of the population who were generally rabidly anti-National), declining popularity, and a general drying up of National’s sense of purpose led to Labour picking up ten seats (only three of those new ones) and a majority of two. Marshall was characteristically gracious in defeat, welcoming his successor warmly to office and promptly resigning the leadership of the National Party to, in his words, “make room for a man who will move with the times.”

Regardless of his defeat, Marshall remained popular after retirement – perhaps precisely because, in contrast to all of his predecessors, he had left the leadership before death or a coup could remove him. Big Norm, the man who bested him, had the magnanimity to make him Sir John in 1970, a nice present for Marshall in the same year he wrote his memoirs and, in a faintly eccentric aside, a children’s book (bitter irony given the reputation of the Vietnam War, maybe, but entirely consistent with the avuncular image he presented on the home front). Marshall would leave Parliament of his own accord at the same time the Third National Government ascended to power – the same government which would appoint him Governor-General.

That was all in the future, though. In 1968, Marshall’s fate, like that of the country, was yet to be determined. It now lay with Labour, under the guiding hand of Big Norm, to have a go at shaping it. We all know, of course, how that story panned out.
 
Last edited:
6. Norman Douglas
d091-douglas-norman-vazey-nzh-2.jpg


“The people will govern through a properly-constituted government but never through the trade union movement, irrespective of the dreams of some.”


Norman Douglas (1968-1971)


“Big Norm” Douglas was not, of course, the biggest Norman in the Third Labour Government, but had been given the nickname according to the law of comedic inversion – Norman Kirk, the jovially enormous man who at six foot two and fourteen stone bestrode the benches like a colossus, was named “Little Norm.” Big Norm wasn’t a particularly small man, but his pinned-up left sleeve (he’d lost his arm duck-shooting at age sixteen) and the rather overshadowing presence of Little Norm meant the monikers stuck once both were seen standing next to each other in caucus.

After the 1962 washout he wasn't the frontrunner for the leadership either; Douglas had broken with the Labour frontbench over the Lee Affair in 1940 and joined Lee’s briefly extant Democratic Labour Party in 1941, just in time to get thrashed. After spending the 1940s in the wilderness (if you can call it that, given how much happier he was agitating on behalf of the workers), Lee was further estranged by the events surrounding the abortive waterfronters’ strike of 1951, when Nordmeyer had stated the Labour Party’s opposition to the “counterproductive” motion by the trade union movement and deregistered the Carpenters’ Union, and never mind the sop he’d made to the movement by expressing “Labour’s continued principled support”.

As a big wheel within the trade union movement, Douglas was incandescent at the perceived abandonment of labour by Labour, and decided to wade back into the party to agitate from within. Lee – Douglas’ business partner in the booksellers they’d set up together in 1944 – approved of this, his immense ego seeing it as a way to manoeuvre a proxy into the commanding heights of the party and eventually bring about Truer Socialism. On the other side of events, and looking to broaden the party’s support and reconcile feuding factions he’d been sympathetic to at one time or another, Nordmeyer decided it would look rather good in the lead-up to 1952 to try and make sure the unions were firmly back on side: welcoming Douglas, a former secretary of the Brewers, Wine and Spirit Merchants’ Employees’ Union, the Coach and Car Builders’ Union, and the Auckland Trades Council, back in from the cold sent a good signal. After the Bloody Budget – during which Douglas, as a representative of the working-class wing of the party who stood to lose the most from raising taxes on the common man’s pleasures, made a name for himself as a stalwart of the workers – Big Norm began to emerge as a potential contender for the leadership.

So when a vote of no confidence was launched against Nordmeyer in 1963, Douglas emerged as the darling of the party’s leftist-conservative wings, promising to keep the party on the formula which had worked for it so far: social security for all, damn the Tories, keep on selling to the Brits and maybe the Yanks. It didn’t take so well in 1965 – Marshall was unassailable on the grounds of policy or personality, having yet to make his commitment to Vietnam – but in 1963 it certainly looked good enough to the riled left (the 1951 affray remains the most public instance of internal dissent within Labour, as branches up and down the country held bitterly-debated votes on the unions’ proposed action) to support Douglas. And so, after three kaleidoscopic ballots, Norman Douglas came from the rear, sweeping aside his competition (Little Norm was seen as inexperienced, Nash was past it, Mason was loyal to Nordmeyer and refused to have his name put forward, Skinner had unexpectedly dropped dead in 1962, and nobody else was really prominent enough to take the stand) and becoming leader.

All of this meant that the old one-armed bandit, as he was often known, was the most working-class PM the country had had in decades, possibly ever. His nasal drawl lacked the stentorian qualities of Holyoake, but was reminiscent of Marshall’s faintly rasping voice and Nordy’s straight talking. Although usually soft-spoken in the manner of Marshall, Douglas was also more prone than most of his predecessors to getting roused into fiery rhetoric, a quality which allowed him to take the fight to Gentleman Jack on the televised 1968 election debate. Although he was seen as rude by many National supporters, the fire in his belly he showed when responding quite passionately to a question on the subject of the voluntary union scheme gave people confidence in his ability to lead the country quite capably.

For a while, it seemed like he’d do just fine: 1969 was the peak of Big Norm’s popularity, not least due to the referendum which led the government to end six o’clock closing in pubs. But it wasn’t just alcoholism; atop the wave of booze floated a raft of social security policies comprising a Domestic Purposes Benefit (right-wing readers: please direct your hate mail to the editor, who will delight in giving me live readings of your comments), incentives for rural GPs, a national shipping company, utility price controls, a removal of practically all penalties on strike and union actions, the abolition of National Service, a disability allowance, and so on and so forth.

Where the Third Labour Government failed – and indeed signed its own death warrant – was its abject failure to navigate Britain’s accession to the European Economic Community, forerunner to today’s European Union. While Marshall had famously “caught the first flight to London” in 1961 when Britain first expressed an interest in joining, and campaigned throughout his time in office on New Zealand’s behalf to keep open a number of options and exceptions to maintain continued tariff-free access for New Zealand agricultural goods to the UK market. Pulling New Zealand’s soldiers out of Vietnam, although it was domestically popular and medical forces remained, did not help the cause of trade diversification either in regard to Australia or the US.

It’s not so much that the Third Labour Government didn’t see these issues – by 1968 you had to be blind not to see them coming – but rather that it had prioritised domestic concerns over maintaining New Zealand’s international commitments. Little Norm did his damnedest as Minister of Foreign Affairs to remind Big Norm of the external realities facing New Zealand as he advocated on the world stage for New Zealand’s “moral foreign policy”, but Douglas was nothing if not determined. He was devoted to expanding the welfare net in a way nobody since Nash had been, and that was where his intrinsic tragedy lies: unionism was the only way he knew how to bring that about, but their time as the primary vehicle of people’s wellbeing was passing.

The Third Labour Government has been called “the last of the traditional Labour governments”, and to a large extent this is true. Big Norm was the last gasp of the “Big Union” phase of the Labour Party, with the backlash against the power of unions leading him to make the comment I’ve quoted today. Listening to the interview where he said it you get a sense of his disillusionment and disappointment in the New Zealand worker for it; here is a man who is accepting that the order he had worked to bring about for his entire adult life is no longer desired by those for whose benefit it was designed. While he accepted it with a certain graceful resignation, it didn’t make for an inspiring governing choice, knowing that the PM didn’t entirely believe in the choices forced upon him by caucus and the electorate. People certainly knew or at least felt by 1971 that Big Norm and the Labour Party cared about them, but they also felt that the way in which that care was expressed was not the right way.

National made a lot of political hay from Douglas’ socialism, with the Dancing Cossacks ad shown during the election campaign playing on the faint rumours of his ties to Moscow. Whether or not it worked, Labour was doomed. The election was a shambles, with attempts to paint National as opportunists failing to resonate with the nation’s mood as news broke of Britain securing EEC membership and the economy looked to be in doubt. Come election night, Labour had lost in a landslide, with strongholds like Mount Albert falling to the blue wave. Douglas was promptly ‘encouraged’ to step down into the obscurity where he remained for the rest of his life, and Labour fell into an identity crisis as the 1970s stretched languidly along. National was back in the saddle, and would stay there for twelve long years.
 
Last edited:
Top