Techically this is my first proper attempt at a timeline. I apprieciate any feedback.
The following is an alternate version of the Peninsula Campaign and, possibly, the Civil War in which General Joseph E. Johnston is not wounded at Seven Pines and keeps command. The timeline will be told in battles. Politics may be touched on later but I'm not that well versed in Civil War Politics. The timeline with begin at the start of the Peninsula Campaign.
Peninsula Campaign
Battle of Williamsburg
Prelude
In April 1862 General Joseph E. Johnston had received directions from General Robert E. Lee – the Confederate General-in-Chief in all but name – to move the last of his army save Ewell and Jackson’s divisions and Field’s Brigade to Yorktown to reinforce the Yorktown Lines. After leaving instruction to Jackson, Ewell and Field to use their initiative in his absence as he would be too far away to control event in Northern Virginia Johnston sent his forces moving to the Capitol and travelled ahead of it to Richmond himself. There he learnt that neither President Jefferson Davis, Robert E. Lee or Secretary of War George W. Randolph had visited the front themselves or sent any of their subordinates to view it personally and report back so therefore he made it perfectly clear that he was not prepared to commit to any plans until he had visited the front himself.
Taking W.H.C. Whiting with him Johnston set off to tour the Confederate defences at Yorktown, Williamsburg and Norfolk. Arriving at Yorktown however he found the defences half finished and haphazardly placed, lacking usable artillery, easily outflanked by naval vessels and overlooked by several positions to the east from which fire could be poured into the lines with ease. This combined with the testimony of Generals D.H. Hill and John B. Magruder as to the weakness of the position and the increase of illness amongst the troops left Johnston in no doubt that the position would be easily overwhelmed.
With this in mind he cut his tour short and headed straight to the capitol without delay. There he conferred with Davis, Lee, Randolph and Generals James Longstreet and Gustavus W. Smith on the plans for the campaign. Longstreet and Smith were present because Johnston had asked for them to be but both proved to be unhelpful to his cause.
Smith’s unhelpfulness was a particular blow to Johnston as Smith was one of his closest confidents, had been promoted on his recommendations and he had had to beg for Smith to be present in the first place. Only a short while into the conference Smith pleaded illness and asked to be excused, with the permission given Smith retired to the next room and fell asleep on a sofa. Johnston complained bitterly to Whiting afterwards that Smith had left him isolated and outnumbered.
With Longstreet Johnston was more forgiving as he had never held him in close confidence before and the South Carolinian had recently lost three children to scarlet fever in a week and almost lost another to the same illness shortly thereafter. Following his personal tragedies Longstreet had become withdrawn and taciturn and Johnston had not expected a great input from him but had brought him in the hope of presenting a stronger front for his cause.
Johnston would have preferred to have brought Whiting but Whiting had angered Davis over the winter months and was not welcome in the same city as the President so there was no way he could have been brought to the meeting.
Johnston argued for a withdrawal to Richmond itself. He argued that the Carolina’s and Georgia should be weakened to support his army and that the Peninsula was untenable due to the Federal Naval dominance and the haphazard, partly finished defences of Yorktown. He wanted to combine forces into a major army around Richmond so he could face McClellan on near parity, neutralize him then turn to clear Northern Virginia.
Lee argued that weakening the Carolina’s and Georgia at that time would be hazardous as there were powerful Federal forces deployed in those states threatening them and the poor state of Southern Railroad, combined with their unreliability in the hands of civilians, meant that if they were moved then they would be in transit as battles in each of those states began and be of no use. He called for a stage by stage defence of the Peninsula itself to buy time for more troops to be trained so they could replace the more experienced troops in the Carolina’s and Georgia, the experienced troops from those state massed around Richmond and more war material could be bought or manufactured and distributed.
Davis was swayed by Lee’s arguments and ordered Johnston to head to Yorktown and fight a stage by stage withdrawal.
Johnston reorganized his forces at Yorktown by moving Magruder to command the right flank, keeping D.H. Hill in command of the left flank, putting G.W. Smith in the centre and putting Longstreet at the rear. Had Johnston not been so annoyed and discontent with Smith he would have place him to the rear to command what Johnston believed would be the most important section of his lines - the one designed to move quickly to the rear to protect his line of retreat should the Federals move via the rivers.
When McClellan began to bombard the position in early May, Johnston began his withdrawal. Longstreet hastened to Barhamsville to oppose any attempt to land a Federal force to the rear; with him he took Magruder’s division, the first Virginia Cavalry and some of the reserve artillery. Smith withdrew in front of Hill and took up position at Williamsburg; Hill withdrew a day before the federals overran the position at Yorktown.
The Federals pursued and to oppose this Johnston ordered a rear guard action to be fought.
Battle
May 5
G.W. Smith had placed all his forces in Fort Magruder bar one brigade – A.P. Hill’s – which he kept to the rear. His only task was to delay the Federal advance long enough for D.H. Hill to pull his own forces further towards Richmond at which time he was to extricate himself.
Smith was convinced any attack was to come from the north. He believed this because he thought J.E.B. Stuart was guarding his southern flank. In truth Stuart had been almost cut off from the rest of the army by the rapid advance of General Hooker’s division and was forced to ride far around his flank to rejoin the Confederate army. As a result Smith spent the morning and the early afternoon waiting for an attack from the north.
Smith was caught totally by surprise therefore to find Joseph Hooker’s division emerging to his rear where his flank was almost completely overrun before A.P. Hill, acting on his own initiative, moved his brigade forward and blunted the federal attack. Smith panicked at having his expectations proven completely wrong and failed to issue any further clear orders during the day, leaving his brigade commanders to command themselves.
Smith’s brigades began to deploy against Hooker and at first Hooker held but John Bell Hood’s Texas Brigade struck his flank hard and he was driven back and almost overwhelmed but he managed to withdraw and strengthen his line. At this point a federal victory could have been achieved if an attack had come from the north but Winfield Scott Hancock had eventually been forced to halt by Edwin Vose Sumner after Sumner – in defacto command of the battle – became overly worried about Hooker and sent all forces he could to reinforce his southern flank in a static defensive position.
J.E.B Stuart stumbled across D.H. Hill’s division on the march and warned them that the Federals were nearby, shortly after Fitzhugh Lee arrived at Hill’s HQ with news that Smith was hard pressed and an attack from the north could destroy Smith’s entire division.
D.H. Hill wasted no time in turning his division around and marching to the battle. His brigades immediately took up position to defend the northern flank of Smith’s line but Hill was annoyed to find Smith in a panic in his HQ with no idea of what was happening and worrying that he was about to be overrun.
Hill became the defacto commander of the Confederate forces and sent Johnston a dispatch - informing him of the immediate situation, his plans and Smith’s breakdown – while settling in to defend the position until sunset at which time he would extricate the two division and march as quickly as possible to link up with the rest of the Army further west.
Jubal Early was convinced that the federals in front of him were weak and exposed and convinced Hill that a chance existed for him to attack and capture several artillery pieces with little trouble. Johnston, who had spurred his horse to the battle as soon as he found Hill had become engaged, arrived in time to hear this proposal and deferred to Hill and Smith. Smith and Hill both agreed to the attack. Early's judgement was wrong however as his brigade ran into W.S. Hancock’s division with artillery and was badly mauled before pulling back to his own line. It was his own fault for not doing any reconaissence.
Nothing more of note happened before night fall and Hill managed to extricate the forces without hassle. Sumner had convinced himself that the whole Confederate Army opposed him and that he would soon be overrun himself so did nothing but dig in, allowing Hill to escape.
Aftermath
Hill and Smith’s divisions linked up with the rest of the Confederate army three days later at Baltimore Crossroads. There Smith submitted a heavily edited version of what happened at Williamsburg that painted himself in a better light while D.H. Hill found himself so busy with his duties that he wouldn’t be able to submit his version until a year later.
In his edited version Smith claimed that he had ordered A. P. Hill to counter-attack, that he had put all his force in the South and reinforced A.P. Hill’s success, that he had sent Fitzhugh Lee specifically to find D.H. Hill and get him back to the battle and that he had made all the command decisions once D.H. Hill arrived. This version was opposed by all involved but many of their versions would not appear until much later.
Johnston had received several dispatches from his subordinates which painted Smith in a poor light and lessened his worth in Johnston’s eyes even further yet Johnston was not prepared to condemn him outright. Smith could have been having an off day and Johnston, having been the man to get Smith promoted to high office in the first place, felt that he had to show some loyalty.
As a result Smith retained command of the division but his worth had greatly decreased in the eyes of the army and of Johnston who had not been happy with him since the conference in April.
McClellan believed Sumner had made a complete mess of the battle and cost him the chance of a great victory. He criticised Sumner in private for over-caution and for mishandling the battle but in public felt he could not say or do anything as Sumner had been appointed by Lincoln.
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The following is an alternate version of the Peninsula Campaign and, possibly, the Civil War in which General Joseph E. Johnston is not wounded at Seven Pines and keeps command. The timeline will be told in battles. Politics may be touched on later but I'm not that well versed in Civil War Politics. The timeline with begin at the start of the Peninsula Campaign.
Peninsula Campaign
Battle of Williamsburg
Prelude
In April 1862 General Joseph E. Johnston had received directions from General Robert E. Lee – the Confederate General-in-Chief in all but name – to move the last of his army save Ewell and Jackson’s divisions and Field’s Brigade to Yorktown to reinforce the Yorktown Lines. After leaving instruction to Jackson, Ewell and Field to use their initiative in his absence as he would be too far away to control event in Northern Virginia Johnston sent his forces moving to the Capitol and travelled ahead of it to Richmond himself. There he learnt that neither President Jefferson Davis, Robert E. Lee or Secretary of War George W. Randolph had visited the front themselves or sent any of their subordinates to view it personally and report back so therefore he made it perfectly clear that he was not prepared to commit to any plans until he had visited the front himself.
Taking W.H.C. Whiting with him Johnston set off to tour the Confederate defences at Yorktown, Williamsburg and Norfolk. Arriving at Yorktown however he found the defences half finished and haphazardly placed, lacking usable artillery, easily outflanked by naval vessels and overlooked by several positions to the east from which fire could be poured into the lines with ease. This combined with the testimony of Generals D.H. Hill and John B. Magruder as to the weakness of the position and the increase of illness amongst the troops left Johnston in no doubt that the position would be easily overwhelmed.
With this in mind he cut his tour short and headed straight to the capitol without delay. There he conferred with Davis, Lee, Randolph and Generals James Longstreet and Gustavus W. Smith on the plans for the campaign. Longstreet and Smith were present because Johnston had asked for them to be but both proved to be unhelpful to his cause.
Smith’s unhelpfulness was a particular blow to Johnston as Smith was one of his closest confidents, had been promoted on his recommendations and he had had to beg for Smith to be present in the first place. Only a short while into the conference Smith pleaded illness and asked to be excused, with the permission given Smith retired to the next room and fell asleep on a sofa. Johnston complained bitterly to Whiting afterwards that Smith had left him isolated and outnumbered.
With Longstreet Johnston was more forgiving as he had never held him in close confidence before and the South Carolinian had recently lost three children to scarlet fever in a week and almost lost another to the same illness shortly thereafter. Following his personal tragedies Longstreet had become withdrawn and taciturn and Johnston had not expected a great input from him but had brought him in the hope of presenting a stronger front for his cause.
Johnston would have preferred to have brought Whiting but Whiting had angered Davis over the winter months and was not welcome in the same city as the President so there was no way he could have been brought to the meeting.
Johnston argued for a withdrawal to Richmond itself. He argued that the Carolina’s and Georgia should be weakened to support his army and that the Peninsula was untenable due to the Federal Naval dominance and the haphazard, partly finished defences of Yorktown. He wanted to combine forces into a major army around Richmond so he could face McClellan on near parity, neutralize him then turn to clear Northern Virginia.
Lee argued that weakening the Carolina’s and Georgia at that time would be hazardous as there were powerful Federal forces deployed in those states threatening them and the poor state of Southern Railroad, combined with their unreliability in the hands of civilians, meant that if they were moved then they would be in transit as battles in each of those states began and be of no use. He called for a stage by stage defence of the Peninsula itself to buy time for more troops to be trained so they could replace the more experienced troops in the Carolina’s and Georgia, the experienced troops from those state massed around Richmond and more war material could be bought or manufactured and distributed.
Davis was swayed by Lee’s arguments and ordered Johnston to head to Yorktown and fight a stage by stage withdrawal.
Johnston reorganized his forces at Yorktown by moving Magruder to command the right flank, keeping D.H. Hill in command of the left flank, putting G.W. Smith in the centre and putting Longstreet at the rear. Had Johnston not been so annoyed and discontent with Smith he would have place him to the rear to command what Johnston believed would be the most important section of his lines - the one designed to move quickly to the rear to protect his line of retreat should the Federals move via the rivers.
When McClellan began to bombard the position in early May, Johnston began his withdrawal. Longstreet hastened to Barhamsville to oppose any attempt to land a Federal force to the rear; with him he took Magruder’s division, the first Virginia Cavalry and some of the reserve artillery. Smith withdrew in front of Hill and took up position at Williamsburg; Hill withdrew a day before the federals overran the position at Yorktown.
The Federals pursued and to oppose this Johnston ordered a rear guard action to be fought.
Battle
May 5
G.W. Smith had placed all his forces in Fort Magruder bar one brigade – A.P. Hill’s – which he kept to the rear. His only task was to delay the Federal advance long enough for D.H. Hill to pull his own forces further towards Richmond at which time he was to extricate himself.
Smith was convinced any attack was to come from the north. He believed this because he thought J.E.B. Stuart was guarding his southern flank. In truth Stuart had been almost cut off from the rest of the army by the rapid advance of General Hooker’s division and was forced to ride far around his flank to rejoin the Confederate army. As a result Smith spent the morning and the early afternoon waiting for an attack from the north.
Smith was caught totally by surprise therefore to find Joseph Hooker’s division emerging to his rear where his flank was almost completely overrun before A.P. Hill, acting on his own initiative, moved his brigade forward and blunted the federal attack. Smith panicked at having his expectations proven completely wrong and failed to issue any further clear orders during the day, leaving his brigade commanders to command themselves.
Smith’s brigades began to deploy against Hooker and at first Hooker held but John Bell Hood’s Texas Brigade struck his flank hard and he was driven back and almost overwhelmed but he managed to withdraw and strengthen his line. At this point a federal victory could have been achieved if an attack had come from the north but Winfield Scott Hancock had eventually been forced to halt by Edwin Vose Sumner after Sumner – in defacto command of the battle – became overly worried about Hooker and sent all forces he could to reinforce his southern flank in a static defensive position.
J.E.B Stuart stumbled across D.H. Hill’s division on the march and warned them that the Federals were nearby, shortly after Fitzhugh Lee arrived at Hill’s HQ with news that Smith was hard pressed and an attack from the north could destroy Smith’s entire division.
D.H. Hill wasted no time in turning his division around and marching to the battle. His brigades immediately took up position to defend the northern flank of Smith’s line but Hill was annoyed to find Smith in a panic in his HQ with no idea of what was happening and worrying that he was about to be overrun.
Hill became the defacto commander of the Confederate forces and sent Johnston a dispatch - informing him of the immediate situation, his plans and Smith’s breakdown – while settling in to defend the position until sunset at which time he would extricate the two division and march as quickly as possible to link up with the rest of the Army further west.
Jubal Early was convinced that the federals in front of him were weak and exposed and convinced Hill that a chance existed for him to attack and capture several artillery pieces with little trouble. Johnston, who had spurred his horse to the battle as soon as he found Hill had become engaged, arrived in time to hear this proposal and deferred to Hill and Smith. Smith and Hill both agreed to the attack. Early's judgement was wrong however as his brigade ran into W.S. Hancock’s division with artillery and was badly mauled before pulling back to his own line. It was his own fault for not doing any reconaissence.
Nothing more of note happened before night fall and Hill managed to extricate the forces without hassle. Sumner had convinced himself that the whole Confederate Army opposed him and that he would soon be overrun himself so did nothing but dig in, allowing Hill to escape.
Aftermath
Hill and Smith’s divisions linked up with the rest of the Confederate army three days later at Baltimore Crossroads. There Smith submitted a heavily edited version of what happened at Williamsburg that painted himself in a better light while D.H. Hill found himself so busy with his duties that he wouldn’t be able to submit his version until a year later.
In his edited version Smith claimed that he had ordered A. P. Hill to counter-attack, that he had put all his force in the South and reinforced A.P. Hill’s success, that he had sent Fitzhugh Lee specifically to find D.H. Hill and get him back to the battle and that he had made all the command decisions once D.H. Hill arrived. This version was opposed by all involved but many of their versions would not appear until much later.
Johnston had received several dispatches from his subordinates which painted Smith in a poor light and lessened his worth in Johnston’s eyes even further yet Johnston was not prepared to condemn him outright. Smith could have been having an off day and Johnston, having been the man to get Smith promoted to high office in the first place, felt that he had to show some loyalty.
As a result Smith retained command of the division but his worth had greatly decreased in the eyes of the army and of Johnston who had not been happy with him since the conference in April.
McClellan believed Sumner had made a complete mess of the battle and cost him the chance of a great victory. He criticised Sumner in private for over-caution and for mishandling the battle but in public felt he could not say or do anything as Sumner had been appointed by Lincoln.
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