A.k.a Ottoman Empire actually joining the Age of Enlightenment (through Enlightened Absolutism). How early could've the Ottomans, either ousted the Janissaries or started re-centralization before 1800 ? Or instead, could've the empire abolished the Janissaries as early as 1620s under Osman II ?
The earliest possible Ottoman modernization ?
- Thread starter Ridwan Asher
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It may be possible to reform as early as the 1620's, as Janissary privileges were not quite as entrenched (though it was still a major problem), and it may be marginally easier to remove them, provided you can get a force similar to the Nizam-i-Cedid set up. To do this, you would need to get a mentality among Osman II and the other members of the ruling class that reform along Western lines is needed rather than an attempt to go back to the glory days of Suleyman and Mehmed II.
The problem with that is that in 1620, the edge that Europeans had over the Ottomans militarily and economically was slight, and the difference would be difficult if not impossible for a pre-modern monarch to assess.
The problem with that is that in 1620, the edge that Europeans had over the Ottomans militarily and economically was slight, and the difference would be difficult if not impossible for a pre-modern monarch to assess.
Rex Mundi
Banned
Being tired when I read your post, and not knowing who that was, I thought it said "Nazism-El-Cid" the first time.
The Janissaries were developed to be a standing army for the Ottoman Sultan. Sort of a combination of army and Royal Guard. Sadly over the centuries they gained numerous privileges and eventually became the Ottoman Empire's version of the Praetorian Guard, overthrowing the Sultan whenever they (the Sultan) tried to reform the Janissaries or the Ottoman State in general.
But there has to have been a reason why they were formed as slave soldiers, raised from Christian children - what role do they serve that doing such was important?
The Ottomans can certainly afford something as piddling as paying infantrymen a salary, by this point - especially compared to Janissary privileges.
So are the Janissaries as distinct from long service paid men worth it? Assuming they're tamed (or tameable). That's the question Osman II has to answer, and answer carefully.
Deleted member 14881
maybe a paranoid sultan decides to establish a more stabler version of the Janissares.
It's maybe too much to push westernization as early as 1620, but getting rid of Janissary by this early is I think a huge boost. While it'll take a while until the Ottomans realize the necessity of enlightened centralization, the new loyal Turkic force under direct command of the Sultan means enlightened absolutism can be enforced much easier when the time calls for it.
katchen
Banned
Reform wasn't exactly on the Ottoman's minds in the 1620s. For one thing, the Ottomans were engaged in a major war with the Shia Safavids from 1623 to 1639 (has anyone done a time line in which the Safavids won that war?) Then, 40 years later, their last attempt to conquer Vienna.
I suppose Enlightenment reforms might be attempted in the 18th Century. But they would be risky. Fire the Jannisaries and risk the Jannisaries going to the Wahabis who from 1746 on are growing in the Nejd Desert and by 1801 pose as much of a threat to the Ottoman Empire as Napoleon does.
The fact is that if the Ottoman Empire had reformed and liberalized, there might have been an excellent chance of the Medieval Spanish pattern repeating itself (ie. a liberal Caliphate replaced by a Muslim fundamentalist group from further in the Desert, either the Safavids or the Wahabis or the Safavids to be supplanted later by the Wahabis, just as the Caliphate of Cordova was replaced first by the Almoravids and then by the Almohads and only after a few hundrred years of the Almohads, completely reconquered by the Christians.
I suppose Enlightenment reforms might be attempted in the 18th Century. But they would be risky. Fire the Jannisaries and risk the Jannisaries going to the Wahabis who from 1746 on are growing in the Nejd Desert and by 1801 pose as much of a threat to the Ottoman Empire as Napoleon does.
The fact is that if the Ottoman Empire had reformed and liberalized, there might have been an excellent chance of the Medieval Spanish pattern repeating itself (ie. a liberal Caliphate replaced by a Muslim fundamentalist group from further in the Desert, either the Safavids or the Wahabis or the Safavids to be supplanted later by the Wahabis, just as the Caliphate of Cordova was replaced first by the Almoravids and then by the Almohads and only after a few hundrred years of the Almohads, completely reconquered by the Christians.
I suppose you came to this conclusion after weeks of research and reading around the subject area? Some Ottoman Sultans (Such as Osman II and Murad IV) were interested in reform, albeit reforms aimed restoring the government to its early 16th century glory days and removing corruption rather than reforming along Western lines. The wars were one of the reasons why the reforms ultimately failed.
How on earth did you judge that? Napoleon was at the head of a large, modern army which had defeated a number in Europe (and was still defeated by Djezzar Pasha and the Royal Navy). The Wahabis were nothing more than a regional threat, threatening the Ottoman Hijaz, which was less of a priority than you would think for Ottoman Sultans, at least until Abdul-Hamid II. I hardly see why the Janissaries would take up with a group of desert nomads either.
The fact? What fact? By the 18th/19th century, the old pattern of nomads being able to overcome settled Empires fairly easily had been broken in most of the world. Most Nomadic successes were localized. The only reason you seem to think that a Saudi conquest of the whole of the Ottoman Empire is possible is because of your ignorance of the Ottoman Empire, and seemingly of the Middle East in general.
You know I really doubt that you can impose the Cordoban Caliphates fate onto the Ottomans given how a couple hundred years had passed and how the Berber tribes are far more numerous and important than the Bedouin tribes where.
katchen
Banned
Nasserismo, I question whether it is possible to modernize a military in a vacuum without modernizing the rest of the economic and political system. Russia attempted it during the 18th and early 19th Century and could only take military modernization so far while retaining serfdom. The Japanese did not even want to try for a few hundred years, which was why they imposed seclusion on their country for as long as they judged it safe to do so. Then they modernized everything at once.
The Ottomans will have particular difiiculty modernizing because of the problems that David Price-Jones identifies in his book "The Closed Circle". See articles.latimes.com/.../bk-3556_1_arab-world-arab-psyche-arab-behavior
The problem, as Price-Jones sees it, is that in the Middle East, the tribe is the unit of social behavior and identity. Political behavior is determined by blood relationship and one's position within one's tribe. This leaves little room for abstract concepts such as professionalsim or merit to govern things like bureaucratic or military appointments. And if the Ottoman Empire is to truly modernize, this is what it is up against. It must literally reconquer itself from Istanbul outward. And it will have an easier time in Europe, paadoxically where this "closed circle" is less of an issue than in Anatolia and less of an issue in Anatolia than in the Middle East south of Anatolia.
In fact, this is why the Sultan abolishes the Janissaries at his own peril. The Janissaries are quite literally the only force in the Empire that is not beholden to one tribe or another. Rather than abolishing them, he needs to use them more effectively and mold them into his oprichniki, or secret police and intelligence force to use Ivan IV Grozny's term.
And the real paradox is that Persia under the Safavids can probably assimilate the Enlightenment much more easily than the Ottoman Empire can because of the structure of Shia Islam. Because Shia Islam bases it's authority on a hierarchy of mullahs and immams who are headed up by a council of Experts or Mujtahids also known as Ayatollahs (literally Reflection of Allah) , these Mujtahids will be listened to by the people when they issue religious fatwas mandating reforms. For a Shia believer, a mujtahid is his marja i taqlid or "object of imitation". If his marja-i-taqlid speaks, he will listen and generally obey.
And Shia mujtahids have the right to ijtijhad or innovation in Islamic law. In Sunni jurisprudence, the door to ijtihad was closed around the 10th Century.
So if a Safavid Shaanshah goes to the ulema and says "these reforms are necessary for the good of the kingdom and Islam" and the mujtahid, the Grand Ayatollah agrees and issues a fatwa, the Shah stands a much greater chance of getting his reform fully implemented by the people than an Ottoman Sultan does. And in the 17th or 18th century, the reforms the Shah will be asking for will be a lot more modest and incremental; things like civil service and a professional military and an end to nepotism rather than women's rights, than they would be in the 20th Century IOTL. So in a hyothetical race to Enlightenment and reform, paradoxically, Persia would have am advantage over both the Ottoman Empire and the Muhgal Empire despite the larger size and more direct contact with the West of the latter two simply because it possesses a unique authority structure that makes it easier to sell reform at the grassroots level should the King be able to avail himself of it.
The Ottomans will have particular difiiculty modernizing because of the problems that David Price-Jones identifies in his book "The Closed Circle". See articles.latimes.com/.../bk-3556_1_arab-world-arab-psyche-arab-behavior
The problem, as Price-Jones sees it, is that in the Middle East, the tribe is the unit of social behavior and identity. Political behavior is determined by blood relationship and one's position within one's tribe. This leaves little room for abstract concepts such as professionalsim or merit to govern things like bureaucratic or military appointments. And if the Ottoman Empire is to truly modernize, this is what it is up against. It must literally reconquer itself from Istanbul outward. And it will have an easier time in Europe, paadoxically where this "closed circle" is less of an issue than in Anatolia and less of an issue in Anatolia than in the Middle East south of Anatolia.
In fact, this is why the Sultan abolishes the Janissaries at his own peril. The Janissaries are quite literally the only force in the Empire that is not beholden to one tribe or another. Rather than abolishing them, he needs to use them more effectively and mold them into his oprichniki, or secret police and intelligence force to use Ivan IV Grozny's term.
And the real paradox is that Persia under the Safavids can probably assimilate the Enlightenment much more easily than the Ottoman Empire can because of the structure of Shia Islam. Because Shia Islam bases it's authority on a hierarchy of mullahs and immams who are headed up by a council of Experts or Mujtahids also known as Ayatollahs (literally Reflection of Allah) , these Mujtahids will be listened to by the people when they issue religious fatwas mandating reforms. For a Shia believer, a mujtahid is his marja i taqlid or "object of imitation". If his marja-i-taqlid speaks, he will listen and generally obey.
And Shia mujtahids have the right to ijtijhad or innovation in Islamic law. In Sunni jurisprudence, the door to ijtihad was closed around the 10th Century.
So if a Safavid Shaanshah goes to the ulema and says "these reforms are necessary for the good of the kingdom and Islam" and the mujtahid, the Grand Ayatollah agrees and issues a fatwa, the Shah stands a much greater chance of getting his reform fully implemented by the people than an Ottoman Sultan does. And in the 17th or 18th century, the reforms the Shah will be asking for will be a lot more modest and incremental; things like civil service and a professional military and an end to nepotism rather than women's rights, than they would be in the 20th Century IOTL. So in a hyothetical race to Enlightenment and reform, paradoxically, Persia would have am advantage over both the Ottoman Empire and the Muhgal Empire despite the larger size and more direct contact with the West of the latter two simply because it possesses a unique authority structure that makes it easier to sell reform at the grassroots level should the King be able to avail himself of it.
Yay! It's been forever since I've seen racist outdated Orientalist theories spouted at me with a completely straight face!
This. I wonder if it at all registers with katchen that not all Arabs (myself included) are tribal. Still, who needs actual analysis of the Arab World when discredited racist claptrap is just as acceptable?
But you're a shia. The centralized hierarchical nature of your religion makes you loyal to something other than tribes. Kind of like the exact reason why catholics failed to industrialize or embrace the enlightenment like the protestants did. I love it when racist psuedoscience conflicts with itself.
It always does. Always.
The one thing I would say in there that deserves any recognition at all.
Yes, tribal and traditional loyalty is an issue.
But the problem is less that the tribes are some insurmountable barrier - if they were, Western Europe would never have made it through the Dark Ages - and more that the apparatus of STATE does not exist, and significant areas are dominated by traditional loyalties - the Ottomans would have to rebuild a great deal of their state structure.
Y'know, like France has to as Richelieu pursued pouvoir du roi (google translate, don't shoot).
Among other examples, but let's pick on France because of this idea that Western Europe represents meritocracy and professionalism. And because Richelieu is of the same time as we're talking about for the Ottomans.
I suppose a Shia government with an equal interest in reform and the full cooperation of the clergy (pardon the term) could use that to its advantage, but that second element seems very unlikely for reasons that anyone who knows theologians can answer.
So, yeah, the gist of this is that I think someone might find a few grains of gold dust in that pile of crap that are wondering how they got there, but its still a pile of crap.
If you had to google translate, why translate at all?
Historically, (and here I'm talking first millennium) slave soldiers came from lands outside the Islamic heartland since you can't have Muslim slaves. The Turkish steppes, Circassians, Slavs, black Africans. People who had few ties to the existing power structure and had to get everything they got from ruler. This way they'd be constrained from making too many demands. But who also if they took power, would be seen as illegitimate foreigners and so their takeovers would fail. They would serve as insurance against native elements who if they toppled the ruler really could take legitimate power.
Anyhow, to get back to the actual topic, I think Ridwan Asher's suggestion has the most promise. But as a discussion with AHP on this issue a few years back made me reread things, from what I understand the Janissaries THOUGHT Osman II was going to replace them on his trip south. Is there evidence that Osman II really was going to do this or had plans drawn up in that regard?
Historically, (and here I'm talking first millennium) slave soldiers came from lands outside the Islamic heartland since you can't have Muslim slaves. The Turkish steppes, Circassians, Slavs, black Africans. People who had few ties to the existing power structure and had to get everything they got from ruler. This way they'd be constrained from making too many demands. But who also if they took power, would be seen as illegitimate foreigners and so their takeovers would fail. They would serve as insurance against native elements who if they toppled the ruler really could take legitimate power.
Anyhow, to get back to the actual topic, I think Ridwan Asher's suggestion has the most promise. But as a discussion with AHP on this issue a few years back made me reread things, from what I understand the Janissaries THOUGHT Osman II was going to replace them on his trip south. Is there evidence that Osman II really was going to do this or had plans drawn up in that regard?
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To find out if anyone would demonstrate that they're more concerned with looking superior than actually responding to the point, of course. Why else would I pretend I know French when I make it clear that I don't know it to anyone who knows me?
And I may add - if there is, what would have happened to them?
I have no idea, it just struck me as a very odd thing to do.
It's true that the Ottomans relied very heavily on the support of the army (read: Janissary Corps) but it worked out well for them at first. Though there WERE hints of future problems as early as the 1400s, the Ottomans had such a rash of strong leaders that the early sultans could appease them and still basically do as they wished. But that also leads to another problem. The empire was so enormous that people could do things out of sight of the central government for years and the borders were so vast you might have to let internal problems be for a decade while you dealt with the Persians, or the Austrians, or Poland-Lithuania, or the Russians, or the Spaniards etc.
It would be interesting what an Ottoman domain the size of France, rather than an enormous pan-Sunni empire could accomplish in building a state apparatus. Compare the Russian empire, but Russia had railroads and Christianity, which is more hierarchical until you hit the afterlife.
ED: What would have happened to the Janissaries? That's a good question. My guess is they'd be broken up and integrated into the larger structure. But that would have required the state to build a parallel army of some size first, or as happened in OTL get the support of the other branch of the army, the Sipahis.