The Ace and the Deuce--Germany's Best Plan for the 1940s

In a couple of other threads, I had talked about a better German Strategy achieving hegemony in Europe, in threads that discussed wildly different ideas (and as a consequence, were ignored). Each thread moved well away from Hitler's stated intentions in Mein Kampf, but I think the right move is for Germany to get away from Hitler and Nazism all together.

In terms of Government, I propose that the Red Baron; von Richthofen; becomes military leader of Germany--The Nazi Firebrands might be crushed or they might be a nuisance. The KPD, in comparison, has been outlawed. In any case, Richthofen has replaced the ailing Hindenburg as President; an allied politican becomes Kanzler.

As is often the case, a military government decides to answer problems at home by starting a war with another country. But Richtofen is not Adolf Hitler, and he understand the situation in Europe far better than Hitler does.
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But who to target for this kind of victorious war? Some choices should be entirely discarded. Fighting the Western Allies a second time can not possibly lead to a German victory--even if France were somehow defeated (which they were not in 1914), Germany has no answers for defeating the United Kingdom. The Submarine blockaded of the Isle of Britian had ultimately provoked a military response from the United States that proved insurmountable.

If fighting France could only be won in a long, difficult war, and the UK could not be beaten at all, also out of the running would be attacking a Benelux country or Denmark--Democratic countries that might not put up much of a fight on their own but would likely draw countries that could.

This left two options--going East, or going South. But going East posed other problems as well. Poland's army was considerable, and beyond Poland is a country of essentially endless size--the Soviet Union. Fortunately for Germany, the Soviet Union is reclusive on the world stage (in actuality, it was murdering its own people by the hundreds of thousands).

To be fair, Richtofen has some idea of how bad the situation is in the Soviet Union. But there is at least one simple maxim that comes to mind--never interrupt an enemy while they are making a Mistake. If Stalin decides to rip his own foundation out from under his own feet, so much the better. But unless the Soviets toppled themselves, the price would be millions of German men and boys and the likely result would be similar to WW1--the Allies would stop Germany from collecting its spoils and these loses would be in vain.

This leaves going south as an option. Austria--a country mostly German in ethnicity--had been forbidden to united with Germany under the Treaty of Versallies. But Richtoften's Foreign Minister saw through the letter of the law to the spirit of the Allies. It would not be easy for them to justify denying "national self-determination" to the people of Austria. Austria, however, was backed by the erratic Italian midget dictator, Benito Mussolini.

And so, Germany would slowly (at about half the pace of OTL) rearm, using a variety of pretexts, such as fighting a communist insurgency (an exaggeration but not an outright lie), national defense, and that Versallies was an unjust treaty. Although France and the United Kingdom had every right to be upset over this situation, certain actions weren't taken.

Germany didn't even bother building a navy, and the German Rhineland remained demilitarized. With the Military Junta's long term plan in mind, negotiations with Poland for a rail line to East Prussia via Danzig were successful, as were negotiations with Czechloslovkia for ensuring the well being of the German minority in the country. With such negotiations in play, the Sudenten Germans would play a critical role in keeping Prague neutral in the coming showdown over Austria.

Meanwhile, the Duce was getting into serious trouble. A Civil War in Spain led to heavy Italian involvement in that crisis. A small Balkan country, Albania, was outright annexed by Italy. But most provocatively of all, Italy invaded Ethiopia. Against a far more modern opponent, the Ethiopians had little chance of winning.

But they could be a pressure issue. Ultimately, Italy was the one country in Europe that Germany could be fully confident of defeating in a fight. The addition of tiny Hungary to Germany's list of enemies would be a non-starter, but Italy's betrayal of its allies and its subsequent failure to achieve a meaningful victory woud be long remembered. Germany, of course, had the benefit of excellent officers and commanders on its side. Italy would have no such advantage.

By the time Germany declared to the world that it was going to unite with Austria in 1940 unilaterally, only two countries would raise an objection. The first, Hungary, was informed that Germany was willing to fight a war over this issue--and made the correct decision to back down.

Italy, now embargoed for its attack against Ethiopia and entirely lacking in friends, finds its bluff called. Mussolini's resultant declaration of war against Germany would be the greatest mistake of his career, not that would remain intact for much longer.

With the world supporting a German right to self determination over a blustering fool's right to forge an empire, Germany need never have worried as much as it had over the consequences of the war. And to their great surprise, the Italian Army fought with even less skill and competence than the German Wehrmacht had even dared to believe.

Germany had superior aircraft and numbers, as well as better gear for its infantry and better officers. But what was not counted upon was how very unprepared for a war Mussolini was. The Annexation of Austria occured in March of 1940. One year and a day later, the Italian Government was forced to evacuate Rome in the face of the advancing Wehrmacht. Owing to the inevitable, Italy would be forced to surrender unconditionally to Germany.

The Final peace would leave Germany not only with Austria, but also with Venice, Fruili and Lombardy. Albania was liberated, Libya was partitioned between France and the UK as a German appeasement of Western unhappiness with the war, and Ethiopia was given its independece--and Somalia and Erithea.

The Red Baron had won another war, and now could direct his efforts to winning the peace that the addition of Northern Italy and Austria would have provided him...
 

Hashasheen

Banned
Looking good i would like to see another part.
Indeed, but something better would be to give Libya in entirety to France in exchange for remilitrising the Rhineland and Italian East Africa to Britain. or is that implausible?
 
Where to start?

I think you should revise better the cronology if you want this thing to work.

First: IOTL Hitler tried to annex Austria in 1934, but when Mussolini vetoed the anschluss, sendig few division near the border, Hitler withdraw his plans. This happened because italian foreign politic was still geared against Germany and friendly toward France and UK (well, more or less). But after the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 relations between them got strained, forcing the Duce to seek new alliances, id est Germany. In your timeline you should explain:

1) Why Mussolini didn't find any ally.
2) Why Italy should have a bad relations versus Germany
3) Why Italy should defend Austria. (Mussolini could have persuaded UK and France to decide the question during a summit, like Munich IOTL)
4) Why Mussolini declared war? (He was an opportunist, not an idiot. He never declared war to powerful nations, without a more powerful ally... IOTL he joined Germany, just because he was sure that war was going to be really quick and he needed only few thousand dead soldiers to sit at the peace table...)

Second: What about Dolfuss and his regime?

Third: Why UK and France didn't oppose the german rearm? IOTL Mussolini was instrumental to Hitler plans.

Four: Why use force to annex Austria when you could have used a plebiscite?

Five: What about economy? IOTL Germany had to seek war in order to avoid bankruptcy. (I don't know much on the argument, though)

Six: Why Richthofen didn't even consider the idea of regaining the lost german territories? Since your Germany seems on better terms with UK and France, he could have had a chance.

Seven: A minor annotation: many of the german tactics and equipments were tried and perfectionated during tha Spanish civil war.

But let assume for discussion sake that everything goes like you wrote. Do you really think that France and UK would have ever tolerated the creation of a similar German Empire? The whole argument of "colonial appeasement" is silly. They would never have accepted several acres of nothing (because the italian colonies amounted to nothing) in exchange for a powerful Germany. The very best you could obtain is Austria, force a goverment change in Italy and raise any kind of suspicion in UK and France, not to mention Poland...

The idea is funny, but you have piled so many PODs that is pretty ASB (well at least in my opinion :D).

Post Scriptum

Poland's army was considerable

Not to bad mouth the polish army, but do you really think that was so better than the italian army? Or is another POD?
 
Not to bad mouth the polish army, but do you really think that was so better than the italian army? Or is another POD?

Actually, the Polish Army performed way better against the Wehrmacht than they were long given credit for. In several places, among them the Westerplatte, and of course at the famed Battle of Wizna, the Poles held on tenaciously against vastly superior enemy numbers.
In more than one instance, units actually managed to push back the Germans. And some time later, it was actually a Polish General who thought of the first viable anti-blitzkrieg tactics.
The Poles HAD to be good soldiers. They were wedged between two essentially enemy countries for centuries who had constantly shifted the whole damn country around for most of the time.

No disrespect meant to the Italians, but their combat prowess in WWII was so sadly lacking that even today their armed forces (with exception maybe of the Italian navy, they performed excellently) are constantly ridiculed in Germany.

A little, very old joke: What are the titles of the worlds four shortest books?

- 1000 years of German humour
- Cultural history of the United States
- Good English cuisine
- True Italian tales of heroism
 
No disrespect meant to the Italians, but their combat prowess in WWII was so sadly lacking that even today their armed forces (with exception maybe of the Italian navy, they performed excellently) are constantly ridiculed in Germany.
Actually italians fared better than they are credited for. Consider for example the african campaign: people tend to forget that most of the army led by Rommel was composed by italians, that was italians that covered the german retreat from el-alamein (the british had literally to destroy the folgore and the ariete divisions).
Truth is that war propaganda always warp reality (why italians were "running away", while germans were just "withdrawing to position prepareted in advance"?).
There were several cases during which the italians troops deserved their ill reputation, but were fewer than most people think.
I understand the that germans ridicule the italians: it's easier than facing truth. Ironically the italians did something similar: most of the post war propaganda tried to downplay italian partecipation to war. Everything military was associated to fascism and demonized and if it was necessary to talk about the war, the accent was on how evil the germans were, while italians were actually "good guys".

Finally allow me a minor snip: the italian navy did not performed well (unless letting the enemy sink most of your fleet is performing well...)

Edit: I'd like to clarify. I found ridicolous that ITTL Germany should be scared of Poland and consider Italy an easy prey, since both armies seemed to me pretty even
 
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Where to start?

I think you should revise better the cronology if you want this thing to work.

First: IOTL Hitler tried to annex Austria in 1934, but when Mussolini vetoed the anschluss, sendig few division near the border, Hitler withdraw his plans. This happened because italian foreign politic was still geared against Germany and friendly toward France and UK (well, more or less). But after the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 relations between them got strained, forcing the Duce to seek new alliances, id est Germany. In your timeline you should explain:

1) Why Mussolini didn't find any ally.
2) Why Italy should have a bad relations versus Germany
3) Why Italy should defend Austria. (Mussolini could have persuaded UK and France to decide the question during a summit, like Munich IOTL)
4) Why Mussolini declared war? (He was an opportunist, not an idiot. He never declared war to powerful nations, without a more powerful ally... IOTL he joined Germany, just because he was sure that war was going to be really quick and he needed only few thousand dead soldiers to sit at the peace table...)

Second: What about Dolfuss and his regime?

Third: Why UK and France didn't oppose the german rearm? IOTL Mussolini was instrumental to Hitler plans.

Four: Why use force to annex Austria when you could have used a plebiscite?

Five: What about economy? IOTL Germany had to seek war in order to avoid bankruptcy. (I don't know much on the argument, though)

Six: Why Richthofen didn't even consider the idea of regaining the lost german territories? Since your Germany seems on better terms with UK and France, he could have had a chance.

Seven: A minor annotation: many of the german tactics and equipments were tried and perfectionated during tha Spanish civil war.

But let assume for discussion sake that everything goes like you wrote. Do you really think that France and UK would have ever tolerated the creation of a similar German Empire? The whole argument of "colonial appeasement" is silly. They would never have accepted several acres of nothing (because the italian colonies amounted to nothing) in exchange for a powerful Germany. The very best you could obtain is Austria, force a goverment change in Italy and raise any kind of suspicion in UK and France, not to mention Poland...

The idea is funny, but you have piled so many PODs that is pretty ASB (well at least in my opinion :D).

Post Scriptum



Not to bad mouth the polish army, but do you really think that was so better than the italian army? Or is another POD?

It's cool, this is more of a draft of an idea than an kind of a finished work. I'm sure much of this can get straightened out.

Mussolini Does have allies, but they suck. Historically, he was allied to Austria and Hungary--the Danubian Pact. ITTL Hungary decides that discretion is the better part of Valor and backs down. Perhaps Franco (or Mola, if he didn't die) supports Mussolini. But Italy's kind of put the squeeze on itself for friends after Ethiopia and the SCW. Historically, the UK was concerned about Italian aggrandizement and made guarentees to Greece.

Why does Italy have bad relations with Germany? The Tyrol region comes to mind, as does Italian opposition to the union of Austria and Germany. Finally, there is lingering resentment about WW1. France might be too hard to take down, but Italy betrayed Germany in her time of greatest need.

Mussolini is not on good terms with the UK or France, which both want to see Mussolini toppled for Ethiopia but don't want to do the dirty work themselves. They have no interest in taking down a Germany that's pretty explicitly not interested in picking a fight with them. A summit with Italy/France and the UK in attendance will not have the background of Germany getting out of hand and needing an attitude adjustment, but one of Italy being a massive jerk and not really worth supporting.

I tend to see Mussolini as extremely moronic in his declarations of war. Perhaps the more likely development is Italian forces are sent into Austria and a shooting war begins--and Germany and Italy blame each other for the fighting, but the DoW itself might be a more confusing issue than Mussolini stupidly gesturing and getting hammered. Still, I don't see how triggering a war with Italy alone is unrealistic.

I also concede that Germany is likely to use a plebicite in Austria. But I'd point out that OTL they did essentially use force, and the west signed off on it.

Well, retaking lost German territories might be a good long term goal, but this runs into several problems. Belgium and Denmark are both relatively weak, but the West can not accept Germany simply plowing over democratic countries or attempting to cow them into handing over this territory. Belgium has the added problem of being allied to the UK and France until about 1937--and any aim against them might well force them to remain so.

Poland is probably not going to be able to take down Germany alone--but the fear is that Poland is allied to France and that combination could be lethal. Another concern is that Poland serves as a nice buffer to its Big red Neighbor, which could probably decide to make Germany really pay for Poland, if not crush ITTL's somewhat smaller German army.

I think the UK and France would accept a German grab of Italian Territory as the price of deposing Mussolini. Remember that ITTL Germany has withdrawn from the Versallies treaty, and its probably rescheduled its reparation payments to some kind of really long term and really small payments, rather than outright defaulting on them. Part of the difference is that the German military buildup isn't happening faster than Germany's ability to pay for it--so Germany enjoys a lot of the benefits of a rejuvenated economy without the desperation of needing to increase its resource base on its shoulders. ITTL, Germany makes a move for Austria for ideological reasons, not economic ones.

But even after KOing Italy, Germany has no real options for expanding its territory without either being forced onto a cold war footing with the West at a minimum or facing a shooting war it probably can't win. My thought at this point is:

Germany disarms much, although not all of its troops and sits quietly for another fifteen years. The next plausible opening for German expansion is probably led by whoever succeeds Stalin as General Secretary of the Soviet Union. Without the German attack against the Soviets, it's hard seeing their country really surviving that long. Stalin's purges and abuses of his people would not have abated due to a war against Germany--instead, I imagine, the great terror continues. The question that lingers is how long it takes the Soviets to collapse with no WW2. If Stalin has continued his horrific conditions into the 1950s through endless violence against his own people (and why wouldn't he?) then what is left of the Soviet State after he dies?

The Soviet People have no war and no territorial expansion in Europe to temper their hatred of the man of Steel. And Stalin has probably racked up millions more casualties than OTL as well. Unlike our own history, there would be no large community calling Stalin a great leader--because Stalin has probably broken the fabric of the Soviet State. It might not immediately collapse after his death, but there would be almost nothing left besides a pack of lies and a truly dark legacy of tens of millions killed by their own government.

Whoever takes over after Stalin either makes massive reforms to the Soviet state or probably watches it collapse in their hands. In the very likely case of the latter, this probably means a giant war is on the horizon as the abused Red Army and the highly skilled executioners of the NKVD face their day of reckoning in the hands of millions of survivors of the socialist hell they've suffered.

If Germany is ever out to carve out a huge chunk of Russia for itself, this would be the time to do it...
 
I have to disagree on many of your arguments.

Why does Italy have bad relations with Germany? The Tyrol region comes to mind, as does Italian opposition to the union of Austria and Germany. Finally, there is lingering resentment about WW1. France might be too hard to take down, but Italy betrayed Germany in her time of greatest need.

The question about Tyrol is hardly a reason, since IOTL it was easily resolved. The italian "betrayal" in WW1 exist only in bad fiction: the triple alliance was strictly defensive so Italy had the right to declare her neutrality.
As for the opposition to the union, why Mussolini should have picked a fight with an enemy more powerful than him while having no allies?
IOTL the strain in the relations between Italy, France and UK brought the former to ally with Germany. Why in your timeline this doesn't happen? Seems that Richthofen had planned this war ten years before with the clear intent of conquering Italy, which is ridicolous, because Germany never had any claim to italian lands.

A summit with Italy/France and the UK in attendance will not have the background of Germany getting out of hand and needing an attitude adjustment, but one of Italy being a massive jerk and not really worth supporting.

But the whole thing would have been arbitrated and if the summit had decided to resolve the problem with a plebiscite, Mussolini would have accepted the decision, under protest probably, but nothing more than a verbal protest. And why Italy should have considered a massive jerk? Mussolini would have said that France and UK had sold Austria to Germany out of fear, while he was the only defensor of freedom. Mussolini could even receive a good press in the west!
Consider OTL Munich and the its consequences.

I tend to see Mussolini as extremely moronic in his declarations of war. Perhaps the more likely development is Italian forces are sent into Austria and a shooting war begins--and Germany and Italy blame each other for the fighting, but the DoW itself might be a more confusing issue than Mussolini stupidly gesturing and getting hammered. Still, I don't see how triggering a war with Italy alone is unrealistic.

It's unrealistic because you have Mussolini to declare war. As I said before he was an opportunist, but not a moron. You don't become dictator and remain in charge if you are a moron.

I think the UK and France would accept a German grab of Italian Territory as the price of deposing Mussolini.

They disliked him, but I think that they would have preferred to mantain a balance of power, rather than handing over to Germany so much.

Germany disarms much, although not all of its troops and sits quietly for another fifteen years. The next plausible opening for German expansion is probably led by whoever succeeds Stalin as General Secretary of the Soviet Union. Without the German attack against the Soviets, it's hard seeing their country really surviving that long. Stalin's purges and abuses of his people would not have abated due to a war against Germany--instead, I imagine, the great terror continues. The question that lingers is how long it takes the Soviets to collapse with no WW2. If Stalin has continued his horrific conditions into the 1950s through endless violence against his own people (and why wouldn't he?) then what is left of the Soviet State after he dies?

This is plain ASB. You cannot have your Germany to act with the benefit of hindsight (otherwise Mussolini would have got few nukes in 1940 :D).
The main problem is that Germany has to do something about Russia. East Prussia already bordered with the Soviet Union and it was just a matter of time before Stalin tried to get a belt of "reliable allies" around him.
Demilitarize hoping that in fifteen years you could have an opportunity is suicidial.

Finally about the war between Italy and Germany: in your first post you said that Germany would have rearmed, but at a more sedate pace. What's the meaning of this, exactly? That ITTL Germany has an army similar to the Nazi's in 1936? It's important because without all the resources poured into it, and all the military equipment obtained by the Czech and France, the ITTL wehrmacht is not the engine of destruction that was OTL.
And remember if Germany is hostile to Italy, the border with Austria is going to be heavily fortified (OTL the programs were stopped after 1935, if I remember correctly). The war against Italy could not be an easy walk...
 
I find this ALT interesting. I have come to wonder however if under these circumstances the Germans could get away with invading Russia with Allied material and logistic support. Since I would still see a winter war in Finland under these circumstances and in the absence of Hitler and the Nazi party Only Stalin would be seen as the main bad guy in Europe. Then you might see a seperate war in the Pacific between the United States and Japan, but I wonder if the Us would be as well prepared for war if they weren't getting ready for a brawl with the Germans.
 
Mussolini didnt remain in charge though, so does that mean he is a moron?
I think the words, "... for any significant length of time," were missing from that sentence.

This is an interesting one, but as Cornelius has pointed out it seems to have some problems and odd assumptions.
 
Further thoughts:

A Nation that had a defensive alliance with Germany and ultimately goes all the way to DoWing Germany certainly isn't going to be a friend. I would assume that a politicization and propagandization would follow any kind of flashpoint situation.

Also, I admit I do indeed make heavy use of Mussolini Declaring War stupidly, as he has appeared to have done repeatedly in history.

I had also suggested that the Annexation of Austria, which would probably be preceded by demands for a plebiscite and heavy use of German claims for self-determination of the Austrian people. Dolfuss would probably remain Kanzler of Austria, but Anschuluss would be a later event--1942 or 1943. Germany thus has a reasonable army behind it, more than equal to Italy or Poland.

I would also concede that Germany would have less experience than OTL before embarking on a large scale military campaign. I would note, however, that Germany would probably send observers to the SCW and probably have stronger ranks of Generals owing to no nazifcation of the armed forces. Fritsch and Blomberg might have retired by this point, but if they haven't they are still at the helm.

In many ways, this Germany is stronger in the long run than OTL.

I question the UK's commitment to a balance of power in Europe, if only because of its willingness to appease Germany seems to suggest the opposite priority--that after the first world war, a peaceful and friendly Germany is more important than a defanged Germany. Now, I doubt that politics would ever really follow the same course of OTL, but even if they follow a similar route the UK and France would be at least tolerant of German expansion.

Finally, a deeper understanding of Mussolini's decisions to go to war despite the wretched condition of the Italian armed forces and economy suggests that he was a moron--and that he became Prime Minister because he swayed the king, not the Italian people.

Questions of foriegn favoritism come to mind. And this is where I see global politics taking an odd turn in Germany's favor. Italy, by this point, has occupied Albania and conquered Ethiopia outright. By 1942, I'd probably add in some kind of war scare between Greece or Yugoslavia and Italy. It would be unfair to the situation at hand to suggest that Italy has gotten into another war, but Mussolini's actions and his targets for aggrandizement have essentially provoked a "war scare" with the United Kingdom.

Besides, Italy has supported a pro-Fascist rebellion in Spain and has outright claims on English territory. If I suggest that the UK and France reluctantly favor Germany over Italy, I think this probably a reasonable analysis of the situation at hand.

Germany's goal is to gain Austria, and it's not afraid of going to war with Italy and Hungary to do it. This achievement, not necessarily a short victorious war, is Richtofen's goal. (I'll restate Germany's objective). Does Italy DoW Germany of simply stupidly? Or is it a deception by France and the UK to see a highly threatening regime toppled at little cost to themselves? My idea, which is getting fleshed out into a scenario and de-wanked as needed, is that Germany might win PERMANENTLY from this war, rather than triggering a crisis that would cause it to get curbstomped by the rest of the world.

The crux of the scenario, obviously is Germany beating Italy and taking spoils from it while avoiding a larger war and remaining on good terms with both the west and Poland and the Soviet Union.

German Disarmament has been overstated--more to the point, Germany demobilizes and does not pursue a further increase in its military after defeating Italy. As far as Germany is concerned, there's no one left to fight.

Finally, Dan misses the point somewhat. ITTL, Mussolini is Bad Guy #2 in the history books--that he's beaten and defeated with the quiet support of France and the UK by Germany rewards their policies of leaving Europe alone.

As for Stalin, I don't think an invasion of Finland, or even the Baltic States, will be forthcoming. Stalin was not a gambler and the risk he's unwilling to take is that the extreme fragility of the Soviet Union--and its abused and tormented people--would long resist any invading army. I see Stalin as playing as a quiet supervillian with a "dark legend" of atrocities and hideous abuses whispered from the Soviet Union. After Stalin dies, these atrocities will prove to be real and the Soviet State fragile.

But the interesting point of this whole deal is that Germany, after annexing Austria and defeating Italy, has little intention of fighting another war. It would rather keep what it has and use this to increase its economic advantage. If by some disaster Germany is sorely in need of increasing its power, it now has a Southern neighbor it can turn to for added resources and territory.

I don't claim that German nationalism would come to an end. But I think that it could it could be molded into a better force for Europe instead of a simple tool for building an unjust empire.

I don't see Stalin launching a war in Europe with the grave risks it entails. Von Richtofen isn't really bloodthirsty at all, just not willing to back down to the likes of Italy. Its whatever unlucky fool that follows Stalin's lead that will have hell to pay. Its hard to say what happens to the Soviet Union in the 1950s--but something bad and dramatic is in the wings. This could be the Second World War; it could be an utter collapse of a country and the resultant devastation that follows.

Were I to write a chapter about the Europe to follow, I think the Soviet Endgame and its consequences would take center stage. The future I project for Germany is that it moves fully into the Western Democratic camp, with Austria and Italian possessions in tow. How this, and the probable disintegration of Yugoslavia in roughly the same period play out would be intriguing...
 
It's evident that we have different opinions on Mussolini ;).

Also, I admit I do indeed make heavy use of Mussolini Declaring War stupidly, as he has appeared to have done repeatedly in history.
Hardly true. Mussolini was a megalomaniac with the obsession to get a "place under the sun" for Italy. This led to the conquest of Ethiopia and Albania. But even if they were stupid and useless wars, they were wars that Italy could win. He entered WW2 only because he was sure that the war was nearly finished (and a lot of people thought that in 1940).
This is essential to understand the declaration of war. Mussolini knew that his army wasn't ready, but since the war was clearly going to be quick, he thought that he just needed "few thousand deaths" to be a winner. Pity no one told the british they weren't supposed to resist...
If he had listened to Ciano and Balbo, Italy would have never entered war and Mussolini would have probably died of old age...

In other words, if you want Italy to declare war to Germany over the independence of Austria, you have to give a huge boost to Mussolini ego on the Italian army capabilities, something that would let Mussolini to think that he can take down anyone. Id est letting Italy win a war against another regional power, but that would mean to let Italy beat France or UK, because they are the only nations that fit the bill. In truth I really don't see that happening.

Besides if you move the war to 1943/1944 the italian army will have recoveredfrom the loss sustained and the fortifications in the Alps will have been further enhanced.

Now, about Austria. Dolfuss was killed during an attemped coup in 1934. If ITTL he survives you must decide what he has done in the meanwhile and what are his relations with the rest of the world.

that he's beaten and defeated with the quiet support of France and the UK by Germany rewards their policies of leaving Europe alone.
I'm afraid you are too optimistic in your assumptions: IOTL UK and France accepted to appease Germany land requests when they involved territories that belonged to Germany before WW1, or were populated by germans.
Letting Germany annex territories that were never part of Germany in exchange for useless colonies is really far fetched.

As for Stalin, I don't think an invasion of Finland, or even the Baltic States, will be forthcoming. Stalin was not a gambler and the risk he's unwilling to take is that the extreme fragility of the Soviet Union--and its abused and tormented people--would long resist any invading army. I see Stalin as playing as a quiet supervillian with a "dark legend" of atrocities and hideous abuses whispered from the Soviet Union. After Stalin dies, these atrocities will prove to be real and the Soviet State fragile.
You understimeate him. Stalin would for sure annex the baltic republics at the very first opportunity (maybe while Germany and Italy are at war?). Then he will start to finance and support communist parties abroad, undermining the current regimes. Sooner or later the republics bordering with Soviet Union are going to fall, through coups, elections or even military interventions after failed coups.

Anyway, what I really don't understand is why Germany has to go to war with Italy? Richthofen bends over himself to plan the war from 1932, disregarding completely any other line of action. And he seems to train the army just for that and nothing else... Given the preparation, both military and diplomatic, he could have easily obtained the Sudet and the Danzig corridor...Really, I'm flabbergasted
 
For a suggestion:

Von Richtofen is not planning to carry out major conflicts to rebuild Germany, but he does build the Wehrmacht up to the limits of the Treaty of Versailles, brings the general quality up high and lays the groundwork to rapidly expand and strengthen it, using the excuses mentioned already. By 1938 he's in good shape and has not tried to grab the Sudetenland.

Then he goes to France, Poland and the United Kingdom and hammers out a 'fairer treaty'. This new Treaty confirms the various border changes of the original treaty, agrees to keep the Rhineland demilitarised, scales back the German navy even further (no battleships or aircraft carriers) and renegotiates the payments of the indemnities on the basis of 'value' for some very generous trading agreements with all three nations. The treaty does not forbid unification with Austria, or the possession of military aircraft, tanks and artillery by Germany. Germany enters a mutual defense pact with Poland against Russia.

Shortly afterwards, Von Richtofen condemns Mussolini for the policies in Ethiopia. Relations between Italy and Germany are rather sour, particularly since Italy is not getting the favored trade arrangements that France, Poland and the UK are getting. When Mussolini invades Albania, von Richthofen tells him to stop or else Germany will help Albania.

At this point, the Italian Army is roughly twice as large as that of Germany. Mussolini decides that this is acceptable, since no one else is making noises to do anything and maybe he can get concessions out of Germany. The war is not quick and easy for either side, but the rearming Germany holds its own, winning back martial pride, and Austria steps in as an ally (possibly with a 'foreign legion of German Czechs). After a war lasting a year or two, there is a negotiated conclusion that leaves Albania independent, Italy making concessions (I don't know who gets the reparations from the Treaty of Versailles, but if Italy was getting some then their share is cancelled) and Austria quietly becomes part of Germany.

The Wehrmacht absorbs the Austrian army, and scales back to a peacetime level a little larger than the pre-war combined numbers of both forces but significantly better equipped. Germany starts 'courting' Czechoslovakia and otherwise plays the protector to the various balkan states, using the factories built up for the war with italy to sell arms to their allies there. Italy, probably not under Mussolini, also starts a competition for influence there.
 
I'd point out that the Italian DoW of Greece also supports my view that Italy was messing with nations too large for it to handle. Supporting Croatian Terrorists with the whole Ustache deal would surely convince Yugoslavia that a change in Italian Leadership is a good goal, and might even join the war in exchange for Trieste and perhaps some kind of arrangement in Albania.

I'm now leaning to the UK and France duping Italy into a word by quietly goading Italy into to fighting a country that will completely pound it.

I disagree with the whole acquisition of the Sudentenland and Danzig Corridor. For starters, a slower German rearmament and more honorable leadership means that bullying the Czechs looks like a losing move. Besides, screwing with the Czechs will sharely risk any kind of reapproachment between Germany and the Allies. It's a strong OTL bias that Sudentenland could be earned without a war--in reality, it was by the closest of margins and only because Hitler's charisma was able to sway Neville Chamberlain.

Yes, Germany can attempt to launch Case Green against the Czechs--but then they'll be storming right into massive fortifications, even heavier ones than OTL. Is the loss of a quarter of a million men dying worth taking a region with three million Germans but nine million Czechs really worth this price, considering that this would likely lead to France and therefore the UK DoWing Germany? Not at all.

If Stalin is an opportunistic leader who strikes at times of weakness, he'd be hard pressed to find a better opportunity than a Polish-German war. Unlike OTL, Stalin would probably pursue a deal with the Allies, as he attempted to do in 1938. This would rule out gaining the Polish Corridor lightly.

But if Poland remains stable and strong, Romania safe in its strong treaties to the UK and France, and Finland supported by other Scandinavian states and Germany, it's hard to see Stalin marching west. And WITHOUT an invasion with the deliberate aim of killing or enslaving the Soviet People, I do question whether the Soviet Union would survive a major war. Going for the Baltics is possible--although Poland is likely to see Lithuania as its oyster.

OTL, Stalin only went for Finland, Poland and Bessarabia because Hitler had signed off on all of it, and there would be no way for the Allies to reinforce these countries. Without that kind of outright guarentee that the Soviets will face no major outside help, I don't see Stalin moving in Europe.

Stalin is more likely to see Japan as the likely target...

I have to admit, this strategy was developed from a computer game (Hearts of Iron II) and I found it a rather gamey approach to WW2. But I think it does stand up better than a scenario of Germany somehow overtaking the Soviet Union militarily and invading the UK--both of which strike me as nearly ASB.
 
sl

Ok in reality Germany got Austria and the Sunderland without firing a shot and Italy did help so all this doesn’t make any sense.
Germany gets involved in a war for no reason and loses an ally (Italy). How is this the smart stategy?
 
Ok in reality Germany got Austria and the Sunderland without firing a shot and Italy did help so all this doesn’t make any sense.
Germany gets involved in a war for no reason and loses an ally (Italy). How is this the smart stategy?


Well, there are several problems with OTL's strategy:

1. The Acqusition of the Sudentenland, while successful OTL, was an extremely close call--and only worked for Germany because Neville caved twice to German demands for Sudentenland and the Czechs were somehow not consulted in the entire affair. Treating OTL like a given is simply wrong--indeed, it's entirely possible that OTL WAS the corner case that got Germany the Sudentenland instead of a war an a curbstomping.

2. Actions taken by Hitler economically have left the country with little choice but to grab more territory, as the country was bound to feel the effects of a massively imbalanced budget due to extreme military spending. If ANYTHING goes wrong the whole economy crashes--and Germany has one hell of a mess on its hands.

3. Its simply not possible to defeat the Western Allies militarily. The UK's got a pretty nifty moat around it that's going to be impossible to defeat without a massive navy, which coincidentally preclude the creation of a massive army needed to defeat Poland and France.

Italy as an ally is worth far less than NOT having a war with France or the UK, and that is by deliberate design. Even if Germany somehow kept its borders as of Sept 1st, 1939 without taking another Step in Europe, they are now ruined because they have forced themselves into at least a cold war with the Western Allies-- a cold war they can not possibly win, because their economy is on its last legs.

Germany in this scenario has made several different calls than OTL:

It hasn't resorted to economic brinksmanship to gain a military advantage over its neighbors

It has no real intention in getting involved in a war against a major power (Italy is NOT a major power)

Germany has learned from WW1 that it can not beat France and the UK in a long war because the US will get involved. And its learned that France can't get taken down quickly (which isn't true, but a likely consequence of its history)

Therefore, antagonizing the UK and France would be unwise--but they don't have a leg to stand on in denying "German Nationalism" in Austria.

I think we all suffer some degree of "replay bias" in situations that it would be entirely inappropriate. I suspect that small differences, like Mr. Chamberlain having a bad day and refusing to cave in on Hitler's sudden increase in demands, could easily have butterflied the whole outcome of the Munich conference to "Hitler can go F*** himself"

So, pursuit of any claim against the Czechs (who weren't abusing the Germans anyhow) would run into a high chance of getting crushed in a hopeless war. Replay Bias would indicate that this is the best move to make, but can we really expect the same outcome to happen in 1942 with a slower German rearmament and with no occupation of the Rhineland? I doubt it.

The risks of a premature war and the likely hostility this will create in the West are not worth the gains of a slightly increased tax base and another three milion Germans added to German territory. Only a stupid army corporal with a warped view of the world and a willingness to shoot for boxcars in world politics would ever attempt Sudentenland.

And if France and the UK are Friendly, this more than compensates for the loss of Italy (and subsequent occupation and annexation of highly industrialized areas.)

Now, Hitler would never have done this and it strikes me as somewhat gamey, but I think this alternative route offers Germany a chance at keeping what its gained, rather than being ground down or nuked.
 
sl

After Munich Germany has 2 choices go to war or continue to regain its lost territories through negotiations. At this point Hitler could have picked the second choice and GB would have gone along, and there would be a precedent that he could have used in the case of Poland.
As far as Czechoslovakia that is a artificial creation (less then half the population is Czech and even the Slovaks didn’t want to be a part of that state because them felt mistreated).
 
After Munich Germany has 2 choices go to war or continue to regain its lost territories through negotiations. At this point Hitler could have picked the second choice and GB would have gone along, and there would be a precedent that he could have used in the case of Poland.
As far as Czechoslovakia that is a artificial creation (less then half the population is Czech and even the Slovaks didn’t want to be a part of that state because them felt mistreated).

What do you mean, after Munich?

You can't guarantee that you'll even GET to Munich. That's part of my argument--that the benefits aren't with the risks taken. The Czechs were close to fighting on their own and Germany was close to getting humiliated on the battlefield, if the UK honored its arrangments with the Czechs.

Without the massive buildup in 1933-38, all bets are off that the Czechs can be pushed around in this way--and this smarter Germany DOESN'T bet the farm on war. So this point is invalid.

If this decision is made in 1938, it was surely voided in 1939 where Hitler invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia against his own promises. So, the UK gives Germany the finger over negotiations with Poland.

Again, I refer you to this "Replay Bias" that events that happen OTL have any guarantee of working with Butterflies on the table. Munich is probably one case where the longshot won. If nothing else, the PoD is the Red Baron survivng WW1 and becoming Kanzler of Germany. This kind of massive PoD for German Politics would obviously shift international relationships beyond the limits needed for Munich to be a very bad idea.

Finally, if Czechloslovkia has no right to exist on the basis of being an "artifical state" I would remind you that Germany itself is a recent development only a generation old at the time of the first world war. You can't have it both ways.

I am finding myself attracted to Drakensis' retelling of the story, although I suspect that the timing is rather tight. Perhaps rolling the TL back a couple of years and Italy now backing a Croatian uprising in Yugoslavia as the critical issue. This arrangment would also mean that the UK and France would largely have pulled themselves out of the Depression and have a little better ties to Germany. If nothing else, it would kind of show a less hurried logical development in German politics.

That said, given that TTL would not have a "replay bias" I doubt we can assume that Munich would have worked...
 
I'm afraid I don't find this really realistic.

Let's start with the military side of things. You seem to take the German armed forces' show of OTL 1939-40 and apply it to the war against Italy. You also seem to take the Italian armed forces' show in the whole war and apply it here.

The Heer in 1939 counted 103 divisions. Of these, 52 were active, the rest were reserve, and of the reserve, 36 can be counted as not trained save for the cadres. Within this force, the Heer had five Paznerdivisionen. The Leichte, partially armored divisions were four. We can add the equivalent of two armored divisional-sized units (taking together the ad hoc Kempf Division and assorted non-divisional armored regiments/battalions).
However, where your plans falls through is in the fact that the Austrian, Czech and Sudeten contribution to this force was essential. Of the 52 active divisions, 6 were Austrian. The manpower basis from which the Heer was recruited of course included Sudetenland and Austrian men.
In OTL, Austrian-built AGDZ armored cars were used in Danzig, and during the Polish campaign, 6% of the tanks used by the Germans were Czech models. If we exclude the MG-only Pz I and command tanks, and consider the Pz 35(t) and Pz 38(t) as comparable only with the cannon-armed German models, then the percentage goes up to 13%. In the Polish campaign, the German army had in the field more Czech models than its main battle tanks, the Pz III.
Many of the reserve divisions were equipped with Czech-built artillery.
Even if we assume that the Austrian army in your ATL immediately and wholeheartedly sides with Germany – which is not necessarily the case – it is one thing to have one army where the newcomers have had several years to learn the policies and doctrines, and to practice with standardized equipment, and quite another to have an ally, albeit speaking the same language. And even so, still no Czech tanks and artillery.

As to the Regio Esercito. Sure it performed badly on the whole in the second world war. With one exception: mountain operations. In Albania, the Greeks managed to advance through mountainous terrain – as long as they had numerical superiority, when they lost it, their offensive stopped. The Italian offensive against France was botched; but for all its shortcomings, people tend to forget that the Italians did gain ground there over the few days of combat. In Keren, the outnumbered Italian defenders kept the British attackers at bay for two months. In the sad days after the armistice, the Germans managed to disarm the Italian army units everywhere, but not in the mountains, including the Balkan ones where a full division survived and went to fight alongside the Yugoslavian partisans. And the last victory of the RSI was a winter mountain offensive that pushed back nobody less than US troops in 1944.
The Italian army was unprepared to fight highly motorized campaigns like in the desert or the Russian plains. It was prepared to fight colonial wars – and mountain warfare. It was what it had been preparing like forever.
Now, in order to invade Italy, the Germans have to pry open the Alpine passes. It's a situation where tanks have little importance; even air power is less useful here than elsewhere. It's infantry against fortifications.

Which brings us to the sheer manpower issue. The Heer in OTL 1939 employed against Poland some 1,520,000 men. Assuming the French had not declared war and that the Germans managed to redeploy East some of the garrisons of the Westwall, this number can hardly go over 1,600,000. This is, I'll point it out again, including Austrian and Sudeten manpower.
In OTL 1940, the Regio Esercito mobilized 955,000 men – in Italy only; considering that a war with the French and the British would have obviously had an important colonial side, and that this had been known for several months, there some other 630,000 men in the colonies, all told. But if there had been no such an outlook, the troops in Libya could have been fewer, for instance.
I reckon that in your timeline, the Heer can't employ more than 1,300,000 men for annexing Austria first and then advancing into Italy, while Italy can field some 1,150,000 men – to start with – in Italy only. That's an insignificant margin of numerical superiority to attack into the Alps.

Now on to the economics. What I mentioned with regard to the German armed forces of course applies to production for the same. If the Germans could mobilize that manpower in 1939, it was also be because they could afford to keep plenty of workers churning out tanks and artillery and ammo – Czech workers in Czech factories. None of that here. If Hitler could afford, in OTL 1939, to fire Schacht for recommending a severe cut to armament expenses, it was because he grabbed the Prague gold reserves. None of that here. And so on.

I could now go on with the diplomatic side of things, but others have already written a lot. I'll only point out this. To France, it doesn't matter if the German boss is Richtofen, nor if Germany has not seized the Sudetenland or anything else before this. France still has Alsace-Lorraine; a rearmed Germany is already enemy #1, regardless of anything else. France is not going to let Germany gain the whole of Northern Italy, and with it, not only its industries, but also another border with France South of Switzerland.
Note how Italy's colonial war caused the LoN sanctions; but no embargo on oil, which would have stopped the Italians cold in their tracks. France and Britain could have done more to stop Italy. Why didn't they? Why did Mussolini think that he basically had an under-the-counter green light to Ethiopia? Because the Western powers already hoped to use Italy as another counterweight to Germany.
Note the Mussolini-Laval agreement of January 1935 of OTL. It states (clearly) joint French-Italian action in case of threats to Austrian independence and (in veiled diplospeak) that France has no objection to the Italian conquest of Ethiopia. Note the date: January 1935. For this to take place in OTL, Germany did not need to remilitarize the Rhineland, or annex Austria, or the Sudetenland, or to turn what remained of Czechoslovakia in a protectorate.

To sum up: the German generals in 1938 were really afraid of what could happen if the _Austrians_ had fired back. This, rather than the Heer achievements of 1941, when it had become quite another, larger thing, should be the touchstone here.
 
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