Sealion Naval Forces

[Saphroneth]

The 1934 and all 1936 classes of destroyer were all above 3000 t and with 5in guns - but were also poor sea boats, with the 1934s being worse. As you rightly point out, size isn't everything!

2600 T standard displacement for the 1936A, but 3600 max. This is why displacement is annoying.

 

[TFSmith121]

Are those full load displacements?

The 1934 and all 1936 classes of destroyer were all above 3000 t and with 5in guns - but were also poor sea boats, with the 1934s being worse. As you rightly point out, size isn't everything!

Are those full load displacements?

Pretty heavy for standard; even a Fletcher at standard in 1942 was ~2,100, and full load about ~2,500 when new; obviously, radar and heavy AA increased that, but ~3,000 tons standard is really hefty for an interwar destroyer, even in 1940, that (ostensibly) was supposed to function as a semi-expendable unit...

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Yeah, standard seems much more reasonable;

2600 T standard displacement for the 1936A, but 3600 max. This is why displacement is annoying.

Yeah, standard seems much more reasonable; a Tribal was about ~1,900 standard and ~2,500 full; a Fantasque was about ~2,600 tons standard and ~3,300 full load.

My take on ZEELOWE is essentially that the available KM warships would have been barely a quarter of what they used for Noway, for an operation much larger in size and against an RN in its home waters and massive air support...

Best,

 

[sitalkes]

Here is Walter Ansel's view, from P 314 "Hitler Confronts England" - a one hour wait:



Eventually even the Germans accepted that surprise was impossible other than a small level of tactical surprise (since the exact location of the landings was unknown to the British). However any landing before the first week of September would have had strategic surprise as the British high command and intelligence services persisted in believing that the invasion would be on the east coast right into the first week of September - and might have thought that a landing on the south coast was a diversion from the real invasion. They kept significant forces in, or close to, East Anglia anyway. It was actually illogical for the Germans to cross at night given the need to counter the RN with aircraft and to keep the convoys properly organised, but the Kriegsmarine seems to have lost that argument.

In the first week of September reconnaissance of the Channel ports -Ostend, Le Havre, Flushing, Ostend, Dunkirk and Calais- had shown a substantial build-up of barges. At Ostend alone 280 had arrived during the previous week. Substantial numbers of motor-boats and larger vessels had also moved down the coast to the same area. Considerable numbers of bombers had just moved to airfields in the Low Countries and dive-bombers appeared to be assembling near the Straits of Dover. The moon and tide favoured a landing between September 8th and 10th. Everything pointed to an invasion. At 5.20 p.m on 7th September the Chiefs of Staff met. At 8.07 p.m. they decided to bring Home Forces to a state of "immediate readiness" and issued the word “Cromwell” meaning invasion imminent.

What was the RN's response to an "Invasion Immanent" alert? They sent out two submarines and (from the pink list http://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4009-22SEP01.htm) :

Friday 6 September

German minelayers TOGO, KAISER and torpedo boats GREIF, FALKE, ILTIS, and JAGUAR of the 5th Flotilla, escorted by torpedo boats T.1, T.2, and T.3 of the 1st Torpedo Boat Flotilla, laid minefield SW 0 in the southwest North Sea. Escort was provided by destroyer GALSTER and torpedo boat KONDOR, and the force arrived at Rotterdam on the 8th.

[11 German warships sailed into the North Sea, laid a minefield, and returned unmolested???]


Australian heavy cruiser AUSTRALIA departed the Clyde for Freetown to replace light cruiser FIJI in the MENACE operation. On 8 September, U.56 unsuccessfully attacked AUSTRALIA, which arrived at Freetown on the 14th.

Force H units, aircraft carrier ARK ROYAL, battleships BARHAM and RESOLUTION, with destroyers FAULKNOR, FORESIGHT, FORESTER, FORTUNE, FURY, GREYHOUND, ECLIPSE, ESCAPADE, and INGLEFIELD, departed Gibraltar on MENACE. Destroyer ECHO with defects was able to depart the next day and joined the force at sea.

Force H joined the MENACE "MP" convoy at sea on the 13th. In addition, Heavy cruisers DEVONSHIRE, with the convoy, and heavy cruiser CUMBERLAND, which joined at sea, travelled in company with Force H and the convoy.

[Operation MENACE was the failed attack on Dakar, this diverted several important fleet units to West Africa at the height of the invasion scare - invading Dakar was more important than defending England ????]


Saturday 7 September

At 0048, cruisers and destroyers at Scapa Flow were brought to one hour's notice. The destroyers were kept at one half hour's notice during dark hours.

_____​

Battlecruiser REPULSE, heavy cruisers NORFOLK and BERWICK, with destroyers ZULU, SIKH, KASHMIR, and KIPLING departed Scapa Flow at 1300 to sweep off the east coast of Iceland. They arrived back after an uneventful patrol at 2130/10th

[They went to Iceland to look for the invasion???]

Destroyer DOUGLAS departed Portsmouth at 1900 to join the 12th Destroyer Flotilla operating at Scapa Flow. She arrived at 1730/9th, but was found to have faulty boiler tubes and secured alongside depot ship GREENWICH for repairs.

​

[they sent a destroyer away from the invasion area!!!!]​

​

Destroyers ATHERSTONE, BEAGLE, BULLDOG, and SALADIN at sea on patrol were ordered to attack German motor torpedo boats off Calais. They were ordered to be west of Dungeness by dawn and no contact was made.

Sunday 8 September

During the night of 8/9 September, light cruiser GALATEA with destroyers CAMPBELL, GARTH, and VESPER plus light cruiser AURORA with destroyers HAMBLEDON, HOLDERNESS, and VENETIA were to shell German shipping concentrations off Calais and Boulogne. From 0225 to 0245, British Anson aircraft dropped flares over both ports. No shipping was found in Calais Roads, and GALATEA did not conduct a bombardment. However, AURORA did bombarded the Boulogne harbour area. Destroyers ATHERSTONE, BERKELEY, BULLDOG, BEAGLE, and FERNIE swept along the French coast in a broad sweep from Le Tonquet to the southwest up to five miles north of Cape Antifer. The cruisers arrived back at Sheerness on the 9th. On her return, GALATEA struck a mine at 0525 off Sheerness and repaired at Chatham until 8 January 1941.

[and the Germans hadn't even begun the major part of their mining operation]

 

[MattII]

Of course, this supposes no mine-clearance operation or counter-mining by the British, both of which would screw the Germans over.

 

[alfredtuomi]

[Operation MENACE was the failed attack on Dakar, this diverted several important fleet units to West Africa at the height of the invasion scare - invading Dakar was more important than defending England ????]

​

[/QUOTE]
​

would appear that nobody was scared....wonder why.​

​

oh....and you left out the tanks being sent to Egypt.​

​

 

[TFSmith121]

Suggests how confident the British were in the RN and RAF;

Suggests how confident the British were in the RN and RAF; considering that the entire "invasion army" (according to the attached map) appears to amount to six infantry divisions, aboard a grand total of 114 cross-channel steamers and 800 converted barges, the vast majority being unpowered, I can see why...

It makes Gallipolli look well organized...

Best,

 

[Saphroneth]

I find most hilarious here that the Brits are considered to have been "unprepared" when they actually changed their threat assessment based on the movement of barges. Does it not suggest that... er... if the barges moved earlier, they'd have changed their threat assessment earlier?

And since there's one school of thought that says the whole sealion plan was a massive bluff to attempt to induce Britain to surrender, then it makes perfect sense that the normal actions of preventing German breakout into the atlantic continued. As for Operation Menace - YES, that was important; if they'd secured Dakar, they'd have the French, Polish and Belgian gold reserves to draw upon!

Why, exactly, is it surprising that the Brits were still thinking in terms of a long war in 1940? I mean, shades here of 1805 - a parallel being consciously made in Britain at the time!

 

[sharlin]

Are we also going to assume the RN/RAF and Army sit on the lawns of their various HQ's drinking Pimms and orange, whilst screaming TALLY HO!! WHAT WHAT GOOD CHAP! whilst beaning themselves in the head with a cricket bat for a hour before downing a liter of lead based paint (or just liquid lead). Because thats whats going to be needed if they somehow ignore the invasion fleet thats just spent the past 3 days trying to form up outside French/Dutch ports before sailing.

Can we also assume that the RAF's photo-recon are all on holiday at bognor, that the utterly infiltrated Abewher suddenly goes full on Uber-nazi and does not leak anything and that the German spies in england (all of them who had been captured/turned into double agents etc) suddenly change sides again and the Brits don't notice this.

Wehra's gonna boo, ride you magnificent Sealionista, ride!


*edit*

*waits for comment about how barges with guns performed against Soviet destroyers in an as yet unnammed incident somewhere on the coast/russian lakes/Hathaway's bath and or mind.*

 

[Ian Hathaway]

I'd also like to say that that list only gives ship classes, it doesn't split them between British and German types.

I will include a note to say which country but as this is a comparison document I thought it wise to keep them together.

 

[MattII]

*waits for comment about how barges with guns performed against Soviet destroyers in an as yet unnammed incident somewhere on the coast/russian lakes/Hathaway's bath and or mind.*

That was Glenn's posit wasn't it?

 

[Ian Hathaway]

Tenders and mine warfare vessels (with the limited exception of the built for the purpose ocean-going minelayers like HMS Abdiel or USS Terror) were generally not regarded as warships, since they tended to be converted merchant ships, or based on merchantile designs. They were generally regarded as auxiliaries, along with oilers, transports, and the like...hence the "AM" hull designations in the USN, for example, for minesweepers.

Where possible I'll include the origins of each ship to reflect whether they are purpose built or converted.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

Yeah, standard seems much more reasonable; a Tribal was about ~1,900 standard and ~2,500 full; a Fantasque was about ~2,600 tons standard and ~3,300 full load.

Best,

On your suggestion I will try to include standard displacement and where this is not possible I will add a note.

 

[King Augeas]

What was the RN's response to an "Invasion Immanent" alert? They sent out two submarines and (from the pink list http://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4009-22SEP01.htm) :

Friday 6 September

German minelayers TOGO, KAISER and torpedo boats GREIF, FALKE, ILTIS, and JAGUAR of the 5th Flotilla, escorted by torpedo boats T.1, T.2, and T.3 of the 1st Torpedo Boat Flotilla, laid minefield SW 0 in the southwest North Sea. Escort was provided by destroyer GALSTER and torpedo boat KONDOR, and the force arrived at Rotterdam on the 8th.

[11 German warships sailed into the North Sea, laid a minefield, and returned unmolested???]

[Operation MENACE was the failed attack on Dakar, this diverted several important fleet units to West Africa at the height of the invasion scare - invading Dakar was more important than defending England ????]

Battlecruiser REPULSE, heavy cruisers NORFOLK and BERWICK, with destroyers ZULU, SIKH, KASHMIR, and KIPLING departed Scapa Flow at 1300 to sweep off the east coast of Iceland. They arrived back after an uneventful patrol at 2130/10th

[They went to Iceland to look for the invasion???]

It's not clear what the point of your post is or what argument you are making, unfortunately.

The North Sea is a big, dark place at night. It shouldn't surprise anyone that minelaying operations are feasible.

Major fleet units are not well suited to interdicting barge convoys. You want light craft really.

I don't think they were looking for barge convoys off Iceland. Raiders or decoys, more likely.

 

[Gunnarnz]

*waits for comment about how barges with guns performed against Soviet destroyers in an as yet unnammed incident somewhere on the coast/russian lakes/Hathaway's bath and or mind.*

That was uncalled for. You might disagree with what Ian says, and that's fine - it's one of the things this board is for. And I get that these topics can be frustrating. But I don't think we need to descend to making snide personal comments like that.

 

[Derek Pullem]

Here is Walter Ansel's view, from P 314 "Hitler Confronts England" - a one hour wait:

View attachment 236302

You are confusing a one hour wait offshore the landing beaches for forming up (surely a gross underestimate!) with the time taken for the various invasion streams to load and leave port, form up outside the port and move off in convoy.

The latter period is several hours if not a day or so for the larger convoys and it is this activity which would be spotted by the British and would result in naval units being redeployed South.

 

[sharlin]

That was uncalled for. You might disagree with what Ian says, and that's fine - it's one of the things this board is for. And I get that these topics can be frustrating. But I don't think we need to descend to making snide personal comments like that.

Oh come off it, its not like you never ever played with toy boats as a kid This is just re-hashing old debates, where a select few will try and defend the indefensable. its this

http://1d4chan.org/images/7/7e/Lolcrontroll.jpg

in a nutshell.

And it never changes, its almost always the same suspects, trying to re-tread well trodden (both by booted feet and trucks/tanks) ground.

Sealion could not have worked, unless the RN, Army and RAF all were struck so dumb that even a mental ward would suggest just taking them out back and putting a 12 gauge between their eyes. You can wank it as much as you want. On the ASB part of the forum. Or you can read the scapa flow story by Ovaron which is pure unadulterated comedy. Rehashing the same points again and trying to argue the most minute point still won't make the Sealionista's wehraboo dreams come true.

 

[sitalkes]

*edit*

*waits for comment about how barges with guns performed against Soviet destroyers in an as yet unnammed incident somewhere on the coast/russian lakes/Hathaway's bath and or mind.*

*Waits for Sharlin to bother reading anything other than the sacred Sealaam texts....zzzzzz ...... nobody said anything about BARGES performing well against Soviet destroyers, but then some people just can't adjust to the idea that the invasion fleet contained vessels other than barges...

Auxiliary Gunboats (Schenk pp 129-132)
The topic of fire support for a seaborne assault was brought up at a meeting with the Chief of Staff of Naval Operations Admiral Schniewind, on 17 August. Although the Luftwaffe would bear the brunt of suppressing enemy defences, ships of the invasion fleet would have to engage point targets. To this end, single 15cm guns were to be installed on twenty barges to cover the landing zones against enemy naval forces once a bridgehead had been established. However, it proved impossible
to procure barges that were stable enough, and they were also difficult to integrate into the landing fleet due to the shortage of tugs. The more sensible approach was to use the fifty coasters already designated for the transport of the submersible tanks. These were able to operate without tugs and were large enough to carry guns up to 15cm. Initial planning called for 20 heavy fire support ships each capable of carrying two medium guns and 27 light fire support ships each with three small calibre guns.

However, only five coasters were converted into heavy fire support vessels. The conversion of these craft at Wilhelmshaven entailed the fitting of 15cm gun on the Helene, August, Ost and West; and two 10.5 cm guns on the Robert Muller 6. Two 2cm Oerlikons provided air defence. The 120 tons of sand ballast needed to compensate for the gun on deck was usually stored in outboard quarters compartments where it protected crew and munitions stores. Both the gun mounts and the ship's waterline were lightly armoured and concrete blocks or sandbags protected the wheelhouse; degaussing systems as well as bow protection gear were fitted.

The heavy auxiliary gunboats proved satisfactory, and they later acquitted themselves well against Soviet destroyers in the Baltic. The light auxiliary gunboats, however, of which 27 were converted at the Naval Yard at Wilhelmshaven in autumn 1940, were much more makeshift. In this case the
forward derrick was re placed by a mount for a captured 7 .5cm land gun. The crew were squeezed into temporary quarters in the hold a long with 40 to 60 ton s of sand for ballast. The 7.5cm gun and 350 rounds of ammunition were intended to engage coastal targets after landing as well as naval targets, though the latter only in a pinch. Two 3.7cm Luftwaffe anti-aircraft and two machine guns were fitted on the hatches for air defence and against fast attack craft. Once the landings had been accomplished, the Luftwaffe anti-aircraft guns, and their mounts stored in the hold were to be landed.

After a training period - transfer to the embarkation ports was not scheduled until two days before the operation – the fire support vessels were taken out of service in November. The former light gun vessels were mostly assigned to harbour defence flotillas, while those with medium artillery, some of which had to be rearmed, were taken back into service with the Baltic Trials Unit, and were used for the assault on the Soviet Baltic Islands. They performed so well during this operation that twenty additional motor coasters were subsequently converted into heavy and light auxiliary gunboats.

Later both the US Navy and the Royal Navy produced dedicated landing support ships with provided fire support for the assault forces. [these included landing craft with turrets, 25 pdr guns or Priests on them]

 

[sitalkes]

According to naval-history.net and the relevent War Cabinet minutes for the period on the night of 23/24 September there were 94 Destroyers, 10 Light Cruisers and 2 Heavy Cruisers in British waters. Once you remove those that were on active convoy duties the number of Destroyers falls to 74. These figures do not include ships that were undertaking refit or repairs. Of those 74, 10 were on patrol and 1 was escorting minelaying operations.

Nice pictures of those ships!
The 1938 class of German destroyers had four or five 5.9" guns, though only Z26 and Z23 might have been available.

For 16 September there were 43 destroyers (18 from the east and 25 from the west), 7 cruisers, and one battleship available within six hours of the invasion beaches
(See pp143-44 and 163, Hitler’s Armada and pp 110-114 River Wide, Ocean Deep )

 

[MattII]

Coasters may be more seaworthy, but they're probably not much more heavily armoured, and unless they're using naval gun crews and stabilised guns, they're unlikely to hit anything, and more likely to hit friendly vessels than enemy ones. Also, we're still waiting on proof (ie, more than a brief mention, an actual named battle would be nice) of auxiliary gunboats in operation against Soviet destroyers.