This is inspired by the anniversary of the Battle of Midway which is obviously post 1900. However, most cases of this pre-1900, so that's why it's here.
Here is the thread that inspired this and below is the relevant example--
So if the Akagi is hit in the Bridge at 0710 there is no way anyone will be having the AC rearmed at 0715,(What Nagumo did OTL) then between 0720 and 0730 the scout plane from the Tone reports the position of the US carriers. Now, this may be a change that doesn't make any long term difference but if nothing else the other three carriers should be able to launch their spotted anti-shipping strikes. (Maybe, since we haven't changed the scout AC he is still the incompetent that failed to completely report what he had seen...) Hard to tell if the command confusion will help the Japanese or hurt them in this battle.
My question, what are other examples of killing the commanding general early in a battle might help that side win the battle or even the war?
Likely candidates, that come to mind? Braxton Bragg and John Bell Hood, Benedict Arnold or Montcalm (earlier). Who and when would you kill someone like this?
In Antiquity killing enemy commanders was basically held to be the critical tactical objective in a large number of cases. I mean, people in India developed one of the most popular games on the planet around this concept.
EDIT: Sorry, nevermind. I had read the OP very quickly and I misunderstood the point.
William Elphinstone at any point during the British retreat from Kabul in 1842, pretty much. They would still be in serious trouble given the oncoming winter and the sheer number of civilians they had to protect, but having someone with even the slightest degree of competence making decisions instead would have helped.
If Nikias of Niceratos had died in 415 instead of Lamakos the Athenians could have probably won the siege of Syracuse, or at the very least they’d have gotten out of it without too many losses.
I would disagree with this. The moment that Joe Hooker was concussed by that shell is the moment that the Union cause at Chancellorsville truly began to dissolve. They (the Union) were able to stall out Jackson’s flank assault, and were in a great position to split the Army of Northern Virginia in two following the fall of Jackson. Once Hooker was knocked out, however, the tactical initiative fellow to his subordinates, primarily Sickles and Couch. It is the opinion of several historians, most notably Stephen W. Sears, that if Hooker had not been knocked out he would have been able to salvage the situation and win the battle. This is not even considering the consequences for Union morale should their beloved Uncle Joe be shot down by a Rebel sharpshooter right before a major battle.
I would disagree with this. The moment that Joe Hooker was concussed by that shell is the moment that the Union cause at Chancellorsville truly began to dissolve.
Hooker had screwed up the battle thoroughly well before that. His move of the main body of the AotP tio the Chancellorsville area was successful, and all he had to to was order the march eastward into the rear of the AoNV at Fredericksburg. He started the march, and then halted it, and withdrew back into the woods. Then he sat there for two days, while Lee brought the AoNV up to confront the AotP and sent Jackson's corps all the way around to the west. As he himself admitted later, he lost all confidence in himself. He became afraid to attack.
If Hooker had fallen off his horse and drowned while crossing the Rappahannock, Couch would have assumed command, and the campaign would have been a Union victory.
Hooker had screwed up the battle thoroughly well before that. His move of the main body of the AotP tio the Chancellorsville area was successful, and all he had to to was order the march eastward into the rear of the AoNV at Fredericksburg. He started the march, and then halted it, and withdrew back into the woods. Then he sat there for two days, while Lee brought the AoNV up to confront the AotP and sent Jackson's corps all the way around to the west. As he himself admitted later, he lost all confidence in himself. He became afraid to attack.
If Hooker had fallen off his horse and drowned while crossing the Rappahannock, Couch would have assumed command, and the campaign would have been a Union victory.
I think we disagree on Hooker would have done, and due to what happened in OTL and his very inconsistent character and personality it would be hard to predict exactly what he would do. I personally believe that it was that concussion that knocked the spunk out of him, and had it not occurred he would have regrouped and reorganized (as he did in the immediate aftermath of Jackson's assault). Then again, I can see what you are saying happening as well, as having a whole corps routed and your flank rolled up is a pretty traumatizing experience for an army commander I would imagine, and it certainly has the potential to break his fighting spirit.
Nevertheless, I do not think Hooker belongs in this category. Regardless of whether Hooker or Couch commanded, I think both could lead to the Union to victory. It was a simply several strokes of terrible misfortune, most of which was completely out of Hooker's control, that the battle ended up as it did. Had any of those misfortunes not occurred, be it Jackson is more surely detected, Howard obeys orders to fortify his flank, Reynolds arrives in time to sure up the line, Sickles not influencing the mentally exhausted Hooker to pull back from Hazel Grove, or Hooker is not concussed, then I think the Union would have crushed the outnumbered rebels.
I think we disagree on Hooker would have done, and due to what happened in OTL and his very inconsistent character and personality it would be hard to predict exactly what he would do. I personally believe that it was that concussion that knocked the spunk out of him, and had it not occurred he would have regrouped and reorganized (as he did in the immediate aftermath of Jackson's assault). Then again, I can see what you are saying happening as well, as having a whole corps routed and your flank rolled up is a pretty traumatizing experience for an army commander I would imagine, and it certainly has the potential to break his fighting spirit.
You misunderstand. Hooker's confidence failed on the second day of the campaign, when he cancelled the advance to the east and withdrew to Chancellorsville. At that time, nearly all of the AoNV was still at Fredericksburg.
It would probably be best that Marshall François Achille Bazaine (commander of the French Army of the Rhine in the Franco-Prussian war) goes down as soon as hostilities begin. Frankly speaking, Bazaine's conduct is what you'd expect from putting the average Joe in command of an army. Bazaine's generalship was characterised by missed opportunities (Vionville), a preoccupation with defence at the expense of attack, indecisiveness, a lack of understanding of the ‘big picture', inept handling of logistics and administration and a tendency to make suggestions rather than give orders.
The Germans seriously could not have asked for a better opponent than Marshall Bazaine, because the Germans had seriously blundered several times during this offensive. The Germans had overestimated the speed of the French withdrawal and thus the Prussian 2nd Army was vulnerable to a defeat-in-detail. Yet at Mars-lat-Tour, the entire French Army of the Rhine sat virtually immobile for most of the battle when they faced two German corps. Later in the campaign, Bazaine failed to take another opportunity to punish the error of the German commanders when they had made suicidal charges at Gravelotte-St. Privat that made Pickett's Charge look like a minor skirmish.
I'd actually have to disagree on this one. My issue here is that I don't think that Longstreet has the talent for army command. He's a brilliant corps commander and an excellent defensive and offensive tactician. However, his record as an independent commander is very mixed. The most concerning is Longstreet's operational ideas. For all the flack Beauregard gets for impractical strategic ideas, Longstreet's ideas were almost just as bad. Longstreet often ignored logistics considerations in his planning. To offer a few examples:
A good idea in abstract, but utterly impractical to execute. Longstreet ignored the fact that the one with the roads leading south of Gettysburg was in Meade's hands. More likely than not, Meade would have beaten Longstreet in any race to get between the Army of the Potomac and Washington, especially since this is what Meade was watching for. More seriously, Longstreet would have to address his supply lines and reroute his supplies. Planning for such a matter would take an entire day, let alone actually executing the task. OTL it took 24 hours for the first wagon to get out of Gettysburg after Pickett’s charge on July 3rd.
After Chickamauga, Longstreet proposed to get Rosecrans out of Chattanooga via a flank maneuver across the river. This would be followed by the destruction of Burnside in East Tennessee and a campaign into Middle Tennessee. Dave Powell points out that the strategy "foundered, however, on the shoals of logistical reality." Braxton Bragg did not have enough wagons to supply Longstreet's proposals and the Western & Atlantic Railroad was reaching breaking point. Longstreet did not seem to have understood the problem even as he and his men complained about hunger.
In my opinion, this is probably the most egregious example of Longstreet ignoring logistics. During January-March, Longstreet repeatedly proposed an offensive in the Western Theater to preempt the coming offensive to Atlanta. Longstreet's first proposal was an invasion of Kentucky from East Tennessee. Lee brought up the plan with Davis, but the Confederate President rejected the proposal. Weeks later, Longstreet fleshed out the proposal.
This time, Longstreet would mount his entire command on horses and mules, move across the Cumberland Mountains and into Kentucky, then sever the railroad between Louisville and Nashville to compel the Federals to fall back and open the path for the Army of Tennessee to re-enter their namesake state. A few days later, Longstreet amended his plan to have Lee join him with a few reinforcements, while Johnston took command of the Army of Northern Virginia.
Lee promptly pointed out the obvious - there weren’t enough horses for the entirety of the I Corps.
Undeterred, Longstreet proposed another plan in March. This time, the plan was discussed by several major players in Confederate strategy making. Davis, Lee, Longstreet Seddon and Bragg discussed the plan, but changed the plan considerably. The campaign’s objective was shifted from Kentucky to Middle Tennessee; Beauregard was to join Longstreet in East Tennessee with spare troops from the coastal defenses; and the Army of Tennessee plus spare troops from Mississippi would go around Chattanooga and into Middle Tennessee. Davis and Bragg thought the plan was feasible, but Johnston’s refusal to cooperate ended all talk of an offensive. In historian Earl J. Hess’ opinion, Longstreet should be “credited for a far-sighted evaluation of Confederate strategy” but notes that Longstreet’s refusal to acknowledge the practical problems with his plan mark him as unrealistic.
First, Confederate logistics in East Tennessee was practically non-existent. Longstreet’s troops were literally starving when he got back from Richmond. Since there really was no way to mount all of his troops or feed the horses even if they were available, Longstreet would have to successfully assault the fortified city of Knoxville if he wants to enter Middle Tennessee. Second, the country that the columns would have to move through had been “exhausted by the enemy”. Even Longstreet acknowledged that the operation would have to be a total success or the armies involved would “be obliged to disperse in the mountains and many would perish or surrender.” Even Grant, with his ample resources, could not live off that land. Third, Grant and Sherman were already prepared for such an offensive. Southern newspapers had discussed about the proposal openly and Grant and Halleck took notice.
In light of Longstreet's shortcomings in the operational and strategic level, I think that Longstreet was more likely to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia by the end of the summer in 1864. As much as Lee could be criticized for over-aggression, Lee was still a very capable general in the operational arts, capable of matching some of Grant's best maneuvers during the war. I don't think Longstreet had the talent to match Grant's maneuvers.
Another 20th century example would be Oskar Potiorek. It would've been a net positive for Austria-Hungary if Gavrilo Princip had shot him in addition to or instead of Franz Ferdinand and Sophie Chotek. Or as one German military observer put it: "He was the man most eager for war against Serbia and least capable of prosecuting it with any modicum of success."
In neither of these situations would the second in command due better. This is especially true at Chancellorsville, where Hooker was concussed and temporarily lost command.
You misunderstand. Hooker's confidence failed on the second day of the campaign, when he cancelled the advance to the east and withdrew to Chancellorsville. At that time, nearly all of the AoNV was still at Fredericksburg.
William Howe at the Battle of Long Island during the American Revolution.
Henry Clinton and Cornwallis would have finished the Rebels on Brooklyn Heights off right then and there instead of letting them escape.
Taking out the continental army allows the Middle colonies to easily be taken and occupied and allow loyalist militias the ability to mobilize without the threat of losing their property.
In neither of these situations would the second in command due better. This is especially true at Chancellorsville, where Hooker was concussed and temporarily lost command.
1) Hooker never gave up command at Chancellorsville.
2) There was no "second in command" at either battle. Command would pass to the senior corps commander; at Chancellorsville, II Corps commander Darius Couch.
3) Hooker made critical mistakes at Chancellorsville well before he was stunned; mistakes that Couch would not have made. In fact Couch protested against the mistaken orders issued by Hooker.
