Robert E. Lee as a General?

[Anaxagoras]

Although half a century of historical revisionism has chipped away at the Lost Cause perception of Robert E. Lee as a martial god on earth, the prevailing opinion still seems to be that he was probably the best general of the American Civil War and certainly the best on the Confederate side. What does the board think? Is Lee overrated, underrated, or is the consensus opinion about right?

For myself, I think that Lee is overrated. I give him credit for great triumphs at Second Manassas and Chancellorsville, as well as his great tactical successes during the Overland Campaign against Grant and his clinical victory at Fredericksburg. But does this make up for his tremendous blunders at Malvern Hill or the third day at Gettysburg, for the decision to stand and fight at Sharpsburg, and for being completely fooled by Grant's move to Petersburg? Does it make up for his pestering Davis to focus almost exclusively on the Eastern Theater and leaving the Western army hanging out to dry? I think not.

Discuss.

 

[eliphas8]

How is it historical revisionism to chip away at the lost cause?

 

[Anaxagoras]

How is it historical revisionism to chip away at the lost cause?

Um. . . because it revises the historical record?

 

[High Plains Drifter]

Pete Rose, Derek Jeter, Robert E. Lee - all of them are both great and overrated.

 

[Johnrankins]

Greatly overrated, as he is not nearly the best general of all time. He wasn't even the best in the ACW, Grant was. I would rank him under Sherman and Thomas as well. Considering he did nothing but lose against Meade there is a decent argument to be made that Meade was better general. On the whole he was a pretty good general who got his rep fighting mainly losers.

 

[Anaxagoras]

I would rank him under Sherman and Thomas as well.

Agree that Lee would have been beaten by Thomas. But Lee was a much better general than Sherman, at least on a tactical level. Sherman was a master strategist, but not very good at actually fighting battles and he also made several massive operational blunders.

 

[JackExpo]

If we're trying to determine the merits of Lee, I'm not sure Gettysburg's Third Day is the best example of a failure in generalship. Though today it looks like a ridiculous charge across open ground into enemy fire, the actual plan was to have JEB Stuart's cavalry come sweeping in from the other side, catching the Union line in a pincer. If it had worked, we might be discussing it the way we talk about Cannae, both in brilliance and in the fact that the victor would probably still have lost the war.

Malvern Hill and the early campaigns in western Virginia show that Lee was not always the god he has become in Lost Cause mythology, but if you're assembling a dream team of Civil War officers, I have a tough time not including Lee. For sheer ability to inspire his troops, Marse Robert has to rank at the very top, though as McClellan has shown us, that usually isn't enough.

In the end, he was a brilliant tactician who came to a poor conclusion about loyalty, a position opposed by several other Virginians, like Winfield Scott and the often underrated George Thomas. They remained with the Union and were able to ignore the fire eating politicians in Richmond.

 

[Johnrankins]

If we're trying to determine the merits of Lee, I'm not sure Gettysburg's Third Day is the best example of a failure in generalship. Though today it looks like a ridiculous charge across open ground into enemy fire, the actual plan was to have JEB Stuart's cavalry come sweeping in from the other side, catching the Union line in a pincer. If it had worked, we might be discussing it the way we talk about Cannae, both in brilliance and in the fact that the victor would probably still have lost the war.

Malvern Hill and the early campaigns in western Virginia show that Lee was not always the god he has become in Lost Cause mythology, but if you're assembling a dream team of Civil War officers, I have a tough time not including Lee. For sheer ability to inspire his troops, Marse Robert has to rank at the very top, though as McClellan has shown us, that usually isn't enough.

In the end, he was a brilliant tactician who came to a poor conclusion about loyalty, a position opposed by several other Virginians, like Winfield Scott and the often underrated George Thomas. They remained with the Union and were able to ignore the fire eating politicians in Richmond.

Jeb Stuart wouldn't have changed much even if he got through. He didn't have enough men and cavalry wasn't worth as much as infantry in the ACW.

 

[Neala]

Agree that Lee would have been beaten by Thomas. But Lee was a much better general than Sherman, at least on a tactical level. Sherman was a master strategist, but not very good at actually fighting battles and he also made several massive operational blunders.

generally a master strategist will ace a master tactician every time. Grant and Sherman are definitely two of the best generals in the ACW. Lee was...one of the best Confederate generals. Actually one of the things he was best at was choosing exceptional subordinates (Jackson, Longstreet) and managing them well

Lee's big failing was logistics. And given the Confederates generally disastrous logistics all their Generals needed to be master logisticians. Basically for this reason I consider Grant a far better general than Lee (much as I consider Montgomery to be far better than Rommel in fact)

 

[Snake Featherston]

Very, very overrated. He only worked well if he had subordinates covering all his weaknesses. Losing just one of them permanently wrecked his ability to do anything at a tactical level. As a strategist he had no ability whatsoever, what strategies he had came from Stonewall Jackson, who was the brains of the ANV. As a tactician he had the major limitation of behaving with the resources of a manpower and resource-poor side as though he was Georgi Zhukov. Lee benefited immensely from being the guy that changed the Confederate view of the war from imminent disaster to the dim possibility of success, but the CSA never acknowledged how much of this was really Henry Halleck and George McClellan, not them. Zhukov could throw men's lives away in overpowering mass attacks because he had the reserves and logistics to make this feasible (and he had even then quite a few epic failures all the same).

Lee, however, had the resources of Romania and was acting like he had the RKKA. He took more casualties than any other general of the war, on the side least able to afford them, and none of his victories saw a greater proportion of casualties in terms of the Union army than his own. Tactically that's not brilliance, that's Leeroy Jenkinsism.

Lee's primary skills were on the defensive, and even then he was completely bamboozled by the move to Petersburg, and every time he did something to Grant it was a complete failure, where with regard to Grant, even if he didn't have his ideas work as well as he should like, it was actually still beneficial to the Union.

At Second Bull Run, Lee's triumph was a matter of Pope's poor tactical handling opening an opportunity to James Longstreet on the second day. At Chancellorsville, Hooker's very plan ensured that Lee never had the chance to totally destroy his army regardless of what happened. In the Seven Days', McClellan actually won all but one of the battles, and in Gettysburg, Malvern Hill, and the second day of the Wilderness Lee displayed an appalling wilderness to piss away lives in stupid frontal assaults that didn't even offer actual gains, like say, the Bloody Angle did.

Lee is the true prototype of Rommel: aggressive in a stupid, glory-hogging fashion, a man to win a brilliant battle but never a choice to win a war. All his victories were from the failure of his opponents, not a one was from anything Lee himself did. Give Lee the Union army, and you get a Georgi Zhukov figure, his aggression and disregard for human life would be appalling and would see him reassigned to New Mexico.

 

[JackExpo]

Jeb Stuart wouldn't have changed much even if he got through. He didn't have enough men and cavalry wasn't worth as much as infantry in the ACW.

I disagree. If any sizeable percentage of Stuart's men had made it to the rear of the Union line and that had coincided with Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble's men reaching the high-water mark, it would have made a huge difference. Granted, whether the battle's outcome would change is debatable as the Union was successfully defending Culp's Hill and Little Round Top and may have been able to continue doing so, but a shattered center would not have been good for Meade.

I agree though, that there is a tendency to overestimate cavalry forces when talking about the early modern wars (American Civil, Crimean, etc.). Maybe there should be a thread just for that topic.

 

[Snake Featherston]

generally a master strategist will ace a master tactician every time. Grant and Sherman are definitely two of the best generals in the ACW. Lee was...one of the best Confederate generals. Actually one of the things he was best at was choosing exceptional subordinates (Jackson, Longstreet) and managing them well

Lee's big failing was logistics. And given the Confederates generally disastrous logistics all their Generals needed to be master logisticians. Basically for this reason I consider Grant a far better general than Lee (much as I consider Montgomery to be far better than Rommel in fact)

Grant was a good tactician and strategist, also. At Fort Donelson, he was the only guy to grasp the obvious that if the CSA massed all its power to attack McClernand that it must have denuded the fort in the process and to use this to capture the fort. At Vicksburg he won five battles in five days against superior forces and quickly massed an overwhelmingly large force for a siege that ensured he'd capture the army (very important) and the city (symbolically important). At Chattanooga his plans were flexible enough to produce a victory even when the actual circumstances inverted what he originally intended (which depressing as it sounds is Tactics 101, and yet it is rare on both sides in this war), in the Overland Campaign Grant actually gave better than he got, to the degree of capturing an entire CS division, holding the initiative the whole way through, and strategically reducing Robert E. Lee to a non-entity in a process that lasted only six weeks.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Agree that Lee would have been beaten by Thomas. But Lee was a much better general than Sherman, at least on a tactical level. Sherman was a master strategist, but not very good at actually fighting battles and he also made several massive operational blunders.

Which is a weird parallel with Stonewall Jackson, who never fought one battle without a major tactical blunder, even at Chancellorsville, and who owes his reputation to his strategic mind, not his tactical abilities. He used the Valley Campaign for a diversion on a larger scale than was originally intended, but his tactical skills can be gauged by the fact that his was the only CS force at Fredericksburg to take any dents in its line whatsoever. With a gape in his line he knew was there and didn't even bother to correct. So.....Jackson was to the Confederacy what Sherman was to the USA.

 

[67th Tigers]

Very, very overrated. He only worked well if he had subordinates covering all his weaknesses. Losing just one of them permanently wrecked his ability to do anything at a tactical level. As a strategist he had no ability whatsoever, what strategies he had came from Stonewall Jackson, who was the brains of the ANV.

This claim I find extremely bizarre. Jackson was probably the worst Corps commander Lee ever had under him. Lee certainly did not consult much with Jackson who had a fairly consistent record of failure.

If looking for a reason Lee lost at Gettysburg one must look elsewhere.

As a tactician he had the major limitation of behaving with the resources of a manpower and resource-poor side as though he was Georgi Zhukov. Lee benefited immensely from being the guy that changed the Confederate view of the war from imminent disaster to the dim possibility of success, but the CSA never acknowledged how much of this was really Henry Halleck and George McClellan, not them. Zhukov could throw men's lives away in overpowering mass attacks because he had the reserves and logistics to make this feasible (and he had even then quite a few epic failures all the same).

Lee, however, had the resources of Romania and was acting like he had the RKKA. He took more casualties than any other general of the war, on the side least able to afford them, and none of his victories saw a greater proportion of casualties in terms of the Union army than his own. Tactically that's not brilliance, that's Leeroy Jenkinsism.

Silly statement. Tactics are the province of minor commanders. His conduct of operations was as good as any on either side.

Lee is the true prototype of Rommel: aggressive in a stupid, glory-hogging fashion, a man to win a brilliant battle but never a choice to win a war. All his victories were from the failure of his opponents, not a one was from anything Lee himself did. Give Lee the Union army, and you get a Georgi Zhukov figure, his aggression and disregard for human life would be appalling and would see him reassigned to New Mexico.

Absolute balls. Lee fully understood the cost in human life of battles, and indeed was quite careful in husbanding his human resources. To suggest that a general is a bad one for actually fighting the enemy....

 

[Elfwine]

A lesser version of Snake's argument. Lee was severely handicapped when he had to adjust to dealing with subordinates who couldn't pick up the slack of his loose management style, and aggressive to the point that certain generals should have been able to beat him if they had the balls.

If Lee's traditional rating is a 10, and Snake's is a 6-7, I'm giving him a 8-9.

Best Confederate general, top five in the war (Grant, Thomas, Lee, Sherman, Longstreet IMO).

 

[dduff442]

Lets bear in mind that many of Lee's opponents were nothing short of dire. They had an excellent education at West Point but that was where it ended: they were all top class 2nd Lieutenants. Lee was one of only a handful with staff experience dating to the Mexican War, so he could at least issue march and manoeuvre orders to large bodies.

"Military genius" is something of an overrated quality anyway. What's required is patience, technical skill, a level head and above all a strong combination of nerve and stamina. My feeling is that several Prussian commanders of the 1870 war (if you took out the numerous insubordinate ones) could have led the Confederates to decisive victories in the 1861-2 period. OTOH, Grant, Sherman and Co could likely have led Union forces to crushing wins over the Prussians by 1864.

That said, Gettysburg and Cold Harbour showed that whoever was attacking was going to be involved in a horrible mess -- Leuthens were barely feasible. The one campaign that does fit that bill, though, -- Appomatox -- gets written out of the equation as being invalid somehow. But it was no pushover. Lee's exhausted forces were only cornered after a protracted and brutal pursuit lasting almost 2 weeks. That was the decisive campaign. Like Vicksburg and Fts Henry & Donelson the result was the total destruction of the enemy forces.

 

[dduff442]

I should have mentioned that Lee did have the nerve and stamina -- most important qualities IMO.

 

[Snake Featherston]

This claim I find extremely bizarre. Jackson was probably the worst Corps commander Lee ever had under him. Lee certainly did not consult much with Jackson who had a fairly consistent record of failure.

So, tactically speaking, did Sherman. Your analysis here is a deeply flawed one.

If looking for a reason Lee lost at Gettysburg one must look elsewhere.

Knowing you the answer relies in a combination of badly sourced quotes out of context and monkeying with numbers, in your view, instead of crediting Meade and the problems Lee had with a meeting engagement in enemy territory.

Silly statement. Tactics are the province of minor commanders. His conduct of operations was as good as any on either side.

On the contrary, he never delivered an unambiguous victory.

Absolute balls. Lee fully understood the cost in human life of battles, and indeed was quite careful in husbanding his human resources. To suggest that a general is a bad one for actually fighting the enemy....

No, it's perfect bullshit to claim he did. Lee took more casualties per proportion and sometimes in actual simple quantity than an enemy who always outnumbered him. Even when he was on the defensive, I might add, with the singular exception of Fredericksburg. Lee pissed away human life like he was Zhukov, but he had the means of a Pavelic. A full quarter of CS casualties belong to Lee, and of all generals in the war he had the biggest death toll in terms of men who served under him than any other: on the part of the side least able to afford such lavishness with blood and such murder in place of warfare.

If Lee had Grant's resources, his battles would have been still more horribly worse, probably rivaling Samsonov for mismanagement and casualties involved.

 

[Elfwine]

Lets bear in mind that many of Lee's opponents were nothing short of dire. They had an excellent education at West Point but that was where it ended: they were all top class 2nd Lieutenants. Lee was one of only a handful with staff experience dating to the Mexican War, so he could at least issue march and manoeuvre orders to large bodies.

In order (quotes taken from Generals in Blue):

McClellan: "During the Mexican War, while attached to General Winfield Scott's forces, he excited much favorable mention in reports for his zeal, gallantry, and ability for constructing roads and bridges along the route over which the army made its way, and won the brevets of first lieutenant and captain. In the course of the next decade his duties were varied and his accomplishments many. For three years he was an instruction at West Point . . . he then served on engineering duty at Fort Delaware in the expedition under Captain Randolph Marcy (his future father in law) to explore the source of the Red River . . . and as a member of a board of officers sent abroad to study the armies of Europe and the Crimean war."

Pope: "After four years of survey duty, Pope won the brevets of lieutenant and captain for gallantry in the Mexican War. Following the war he discharged various assignments in the Topographical Engineers and was regularly promoted captain in 1856."

Burnside: "In the Mexican War he was confined mainly to garrison duty in Mexico City. He afterward served in garrison duty and on the southwestern frontier, where he was slightly wounded in a skirmish Apaches in 1849. He resigned his commission in 1853 . . . (and) his genial personality won him, during the antebellum years, appointment as major general of the state militia (for Rhode Island)."

Hooker: "His army career prior to the outbreak of the Mexican War was highly commendable; he demonstrated qualities of leadership and executive ability. As a staff officer in Mexico under P.F. Smith, Benjamin F. Butler, and Gideon J. Pillow, he took part in both Zachary Taylor's and Winfield Scott's campaigns and won the brevets all the grades through lieutenant colonel for gallant and meritorious conduct, a record not surpassed by any first lieutenant in the service. Hooker was appointed captain of the 1st Artillery on October 29, 1848, but for some reason vacated the appointment the same day. From then until June 9, 1849, when he became assistant adjutant general of the Pacific Division, his service record does not disclose his activities. He was on leave of absence during 1851-1853 during 1851-1853 and resigned his commission on February 21, 1u853, to engage in farming near Sonoma."

So: No, that's not where it ended, except arguably for Burnside, but for Hooker and McClellan? They are as well prepared as Lee if not better. Pope is somewhere in between, certainly not "ended after West Point".


Snake: In the context of the ACW - as in, with the armies of at work there - isn't Second Bull Run pretty unambiguous?

Still costly, but it was pretty crushing.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Snake: In the context of the ACW - as in, with the armies of at work there - isn't Second Bull Run pretty unambiguous?

Still costly, but it was pretty crushing.

Actually no, given that Pope's mistake wasn't even his fighting Jackson but his shifting forces on the second in order to allow Lee's army to link up (which he didn't realize, and that he didn't realize is where the mistake comes in). And even when he did this and Longstreet was finally able to attack, Pope withdrew in good order and the CS attack on his rear guard didn't exactly deliver much for the CSA beyond bloating the death toll on both sides.

It was his best campaign and the only example of the classic Lee way of war that really measures up to the idea of Lost Cause mythology, but even here the Union lost the battle, Lee did not win it.