There has been much discussion here about "what if the Soviets had conquered Poland in 1920?" but AFAIK relatively little about what would have happened if in July the Bolsheviks, having driven the Poles from Ukraine and Belarus, would have stopped at the Curzon Line (which was roughly the dividing line between Poles on the one hand and Ukrainians and Belarusans on the other) and announced that it was not their intention to spread Bolshevism into ethnic Poland through use of the Red Army.
This is an unlikely but not impossible scenario. Both Trotsky and Stalin seem to have had serious reservations about changing the hitherto defensive war into an offensive one:
"[After repulsing Pilsudski's invasion the] question arose as to what the Bolsheviks should do next, and Trotsky was reputed to have opposed making an offensive war against Poland. Certainly he had trepidations. They seem to have been military rather than political in nature. He knew how tired his Red Army had become; he doubted it had the energy and material resources for an invasion. Stalin who was afraid that Wrangel in Crimea might exploit the strategic situation, adopted the same position. Other leading Bolsheviks were even more forthright in opposing the invasion of Poland. Radek was notably sceptical that Polish workers would resist the claims of patriotism. But Lenin was insistent on pressing over the Polish border and trying to take Warsaw; and once Lenin had made this decisionTrotsky was as determined as Lenin to see it through..." Robert Service, *Trotsky: A Biography* (Harvard University Press 2009), p. 272. http://books.google.com/books?id=mbD8jRUdAjsC&pg=PA272
Some have doubted that Trotsky was opposed to carrying the war on to Polish soil, but Richard Pipes, not exactly an admirer of Trotsky, has defended him on this point: "Several historians have questioned whether Trotsky really opposed the invasion of Poland as he later claimed...But the documents cited against him date from August 1920, when the matter had long since been decided, and Trotsky, having fallen in line like a good Bolshevik, naturally desired a quick and decisive victory." *Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime*, pp. 182-3. https://books.google.com/books?id=pfNEY931UzYC&pg=PA182
FWIW, subsequently, after the invasion had failed, Trotsky still defended it at the Ninth Party Conference on September 22, on the ground that the Politburo had been duty-bound to test whether European socialist revolution could be achieved (Service, *Trotsky: A Biography,* p. 277):
"Why didn't we enter Warsaw? Because, comrades, the enterprise was not so very simple. We proceeded that way for the reason contained in the report by comrade Lenin. The reason was serious enough and now, looking back and evaluating whether it was a mistake, it's possible to answer in the form of a question: were the July Days [of 1917] or the Revolution of 1905 mistakes or were they not? What was involved was a big attempt to probe the enemy. Nobody would be able to indicate in advance where this attempt should be halted, and it can be said that this experience offers ground for a happier experience."
(I very often find a purely *incidental* remark more interesting than the main point a speaker or writer makes, and this is an excellent example. Lenin and Trotsky always denied that they meant to seize power violently in July 1917--but here, as Service notes on p. 175, Trotsky behind closed doors was admitting "that the Bolsheviks and Interdistricters had been using the trouble in Petrograd as a way of 'probing' the possibility of seizing power. Not for several decades, by when he was long dead, were his words allowed into print.")
Trotsky went on to blame Stalin: "What I have to say is that comrade Stalin undermined me and the Central Committee." According to Service, "Lenin took Trotsky's side and Stalin felt so humiliated that he demanded the right of reply the next day, when he pointed out that he had expressed doubts about the campaign even before it had started." http://books.google.com/books?id=mbD8jRUdAjsC&pg=PA277
Anyway, let's suppose that Lenin--and admittedly this is unlikely, given his desire to make contact between the Red Army and Germany to facilitate revolution in Germany--listens to the Bolshevik skeptics (whether or not Trotsky was really one of them). The Soviet government announces that theRed Army is stopping at the Curzon Line. Consequences (apart from the fact that Wrangel is presumably defeated a little earlier)?
(1) With the Curzon Line as its eastern border, Poland is going to be much smaller than it was in the interwar period in OTL and also much smaller than it is today (for while its eastern border will be about the same as it is today, [1] it will lack the western and northern territories it gained from Germany after World War II). To be sure, the exclusion of many Ukrainians, Belarusans, Jews, and Lithuanians will to some extent make Poland's minority problems less serious (though what remains of Poland will by no means be totally ethnically homogeneous) but I doubt if very many Poles will be consoled by this.
(2) There will be a common Soviet-Czechoslovak border, which could have some effect on the 1938 crisis, as discussed at https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/AiR0z92LvK0/kExGo8kkns0J
(3) Assuming that world events otherwise proceed much as they did in OTL--for example, that the existence of a common Soviet-Czechoslovak border makes no difference at Munich--in 1939 Hitler will not be able to offer Stalin much more of Poland than he already has. What difference, if any, will that make? Also, will Poles be more open to an offer by Hitler to make concessions to Germany on Danzig and the "Corridor" in return for promised territory in the East? (Poland might have more desire for eastward expansion in this ATL than in OTL but the fundamental problem with such a deal is still there--it will force Poland to join Germany in a war against the Soviet Union in which, to put it mildly, victory is not guaranteed, and where even if the USSR is defeated, the chances of Hitler keeping his promises to the Poles are negligible.)
(4) What happens to internal politics in Poland, given that Pilsudski's military leadership will presumably be less respected than in OTL?
(5) Almost all Ukrainians and Belarusans [2] will come under Soviet rule. This gives Ukrainian nationalism less chance to develop (in OTL it took root in eastern Poland both in spite of and because of Polish repression, and caused the Soviets considerable difficulties in Western Ukraine during and after World War II). And the Uniate Church is crushed sooner than in OTL. Also, still more Ukrainians than in OTL will die in the 1933 famine.
OTOH, it can be argued that the existence of a large Ukrainian community in Poland helped the Soviet Ukrainians during the 1920's because one of the justifications of "Ukrainization" was that it was necessary to give the Ukrainians of Poland a positive image of the Soviet Ukraine:
"It is interesting to note that even during the debates on Ukrainization in the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, Ienukidze, the secretary of the Committee, expressed the sincere hope that other non-Russian peoples would not be as impatient as the Ukraine to introduce their native languages into official use, and was persuaded in favor of Ukrainization by the argument that such a policy was good not intrinsically but for the purposes of propaganda aimed primarily at Ukrainians living in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania." George Luckyj, *Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, 1917-1934,* p. 45 http://books.google.com/books?id=CuLpivm5lDsC&pg=PA45
But I am not sure how much weight to assign this, since Ukrainization was part of a general policy of indigenization (Korenizatsiya) applied to many other peoples of the USSR in the 1920s (and abandoned by Stalin in the next decade).
(6) The experience of loss in the battle for Warsaw did have some sobering effect on the Bolsheviks. Is it conceivable that without this experience they might be more aggressive elsewhere (e.g., with respect to the Baltic states)?
Any other thoughts?
[1] Assuming that the Curzon Line of which we are speaking is "Line A." "Line B" would at least have let Poland keep Lwow and the nearby oil fields. Unfortunately, the Curzon note of July 11, 1920 created confusion because "the line of actual hostilities, to which Grabski had consented, and Line A...were simultaneously indicated as the cease-fire line. The second would place all of eastern Galicia outside of Poland. Whether it was a mistake or an underhanded move by the Foreign Office may never be known, but the December 8 line extended to Eastern Galicia entered history under the name of the Curzon Line. More would be heard about it in the years to come..." http://books.google.com/books?id=_XaFaNshCrkC&pg=PA152
[2] Yes, there will be some Ukrainians in Romania (Bukovina and parts of Bessarabia) and Czechoslovakia (Subcarpathian Rus) and in the Lemko territory of Poland, and some Belarusans in even this truncated Poland and in Lithuania. But on the whole, Ukrainian and Belarusan ethnolinguistic territory will be overwhelmingly in the USSR.
This is an unlikely but not impossible scenario. Both Trotsky and Stalin seem to have had serious reservations about changing the hitherto defensive war into an offensive one:
"[After repulsing Pilsudski's invasion the] question arose as to what the Bolsheviks should do next, and Trotsky was reputed to have opposed making an offensive war against Poland. Certainly he had trepidations. They seem to have been military rather than political in nature. He knew how tired his Red Army had become; he doubted it had the energy and material resources for an invasion. Stalin who was afraid that Wrangel in Crimea might exploit the strategic situation, adopted the same position. Other leading Bolsheviks were even more forthright in opposing the invasion of Poland. Radek was notably sceptical that Polish workers would resist the claims of patriotism. But Lenin was insistent on pressing over the Polish border and trying to take Warsaw; and once Lenin had made this decisionTrotsky was as determined as Lenin to see it through..." Robert Service, *Trotsky: A Biography* (Harvard University Press 2009), p. 272. http://books.google.com/books?id=mbD8jRUdAjsC&pg=PA272
Some have doubted that Trotsky was opposed to carrying the war on to Polish soil, but Richard Pipes, not exactly an admirer of Trotsky, has defended him on this point: "Several historians have questioned whether Trotsky really opposed the invasion of Poland as he later claimed...But the documents cited against him date from August 1920, when the matter had long since been decided, and Trotsky, having fallen in line like a good Bolshevik, naturally desired a quick and decisive victory." *Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime*, pp. 182-3. https://books.google.com/books?id=pfNEY931UzYC&pg=PA182
FWIW, subsequently, after the invasion had failed, Trotsky still defended it at the Ninth Party Conference on September 22, on the ground that the Politburo had been duty-bound to test whether European socialist revolution could be achieved (Service, *Trotsky: A Biography,* p. 277):
"Why didn't we enter Warsaw? Because, comrades, the enterprise was not so very simple. We proceeded that way for the reason contained in the report by comrade Lenin. The reason was serious enough and now, looking back and evaluating whether it was a mistake, it's possible to answer in the form of a question: were the July Days [of 1917] or the Revolution of 1905 mistakes or were they not? What was involved was a big attempt to probe the enemy. Nobody would be able to indicate in advance where this attempt should be halted, and it can be said that this experience offers ground for a happier experience."
(I very often find a purely *incidental* remark more interesting than the main point a speaker or writer makes, and this is an excellent example. Lenin and Trotsky always denied that they meant to seize power violently in July 1917--but here, as Service notes on p. 175, Trotsky behind closed doors was admitting "that the Bolsheviks and Interdistricters had been using the trouble in Petrograd as a way of 'probing' the possibility of seizing power. Not for several decades, by when he was long dead, were his words allowed into print.")
Trotsky went on to blame Stalin: "What I have to say is that comrade Stalin undermined me and the Central Committee." According to Service, "Lenin took Trotsky's side and Stalin felt so humiliated that he demanded the right of reply the next day, when he pointed out that he had expressed doubts about the campaign even before it had started." http://books.google.com/books?id=mbD8jRUdAjsC&pg=PA277
Anyway, let's suppose that Lenin--and admittedly this is unlikely, given his desire to make contact between the Red Army and Germany to facilitate revolution in Germany--listens to the Bolshevik skeptics (whether or not Trotsky was really one of them). The Soviet government announces that theRed Army is stopping at the Curzon Line. Consequences (apart from the fact that Wrangel is presumably defeated a little earlier)?
(1) With the Curzon Line as its eastern border, Poland is going to be much smaller than it was in the interwar period in OTL and also much smaller than it is today (for while its eastern border will be about the same as it is today, [1] it will lack the western and northern territories it gained from Germany after World War II). To be sure, the exclusion of many Ukrainians, Belarusans, Jews, and Lithuanians will to some extent make Poland's minority problems less serious (though what remains of Poland will by no means be totally ethnically homogeneous) but I doubt if very many Poles will be consoled by this.
(2) There will be a common Soviet-Czechoslovak border, which could have some effect on the 1938 crisis, as discussed at https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/AiR0z92LvK0/kExGo8kkns0J
(3) Assuming that world events otherwise proceed much as they did in OTL--for example, that the existence of a common Soviet-Czechoslovak border makes no difference at Munich--in 1939 Hitler will not be able to offer Stalin much more of Poland than he already has. What difference, if any, will that make? Also, will Poles be more open to an offer by Hitler to make concessions to Germany on Danzig and the "Corridor" in return for promised territory in the East? (Poland might have more desire for eastward expansion in this ATL than in OTL but the fundamental problem with such a deal is still there--it will force Poland to join Germany in a war against the Soviet Union in which, to put it mildly, victory is not guaranteed, and where even if the USSR is defeated, the chances of Hitler keeping his promises to the Poles are negligible.)
(4) What happens to internal politics in Poland, given that Pilsudski's military leadership will presumably be less respected than in OTL?
(5) Almost all Ukrainians and Belarusans [2] will come under Soviet rule. This gives Ukrainian nationalism less chance to develop (in OTL it took root in eastern Poland both in spite of and because of Polish repression, and caused the Soviets considerable difficulties in Western Ukraine during and after World War II). And the Uniate Church is crushed sooner than in OTL. Also, still more Ukrainians than in OTL will die in the 1933 famine.
OTOH, it can be argued that the existence of a large Ukrainian community in Poland helped the Soviet Ukrainians during the 1920's because one of the justifications of "Ukrainization" was that it was necessary to give the Ukrainians of Poland a positive image of the Soviet Ukraine:
"It is interesting to note that even during the debates on Ukrainization in the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, Ienukidze, the secretary of the Committee, expressed the sincere hope that other non-Russian peoples would not be as impatient as the Ukraine to introduce their native languages into official use, and was persuaded in favor of Ukrainization by the argument that such a policy was good not intrinsically but for the purposes of propaganda aimed primarily at Ukrainians living in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania." George Luckyj, *Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, 1917-1934,* p. 45 http://books.google.com/books?id=CuLpivm5lDsC&pg=PA45
But I am not sure how much weight to assign this, since Ukrainization was part of a general policy of indigenization (Korenizatsiya) applied to many other peoples of the USSR in the 1920s (and abandoned by Stalin in the next decade).
(6) The experience of loss in the battle for Warsaw did have some sobering effect on the Bolsheviks. Is it conceivable that without this experience they might be more aggressive elsewhere (e.g., with respect to the Baltic states)?
Any other thoughts?
[1] Assuming that the Curzon Line of which we are speaking is "Line A." "Line B" would at least have let Poland keep Lwow and the nearby oil fields. Unfortunately, the Curzon note of July 11, 1920 created confusion because "the line of actual hostilities, to which Grabski had consented, and Line A...were simultaneously indicated as the cease-fire line. The second would place all of eastern Galicia outside of Poland. Whether it was a mistake or an underhanded move by the Foreign Office may never be known, but the December 8 line extended to Eastern Galicia entered history under the name of the Curzon Line. More would be heard about it in the years to come..." http://books.google.com/books?id=_XaFaNshCrkC&pg=PA152
[2] Yes, there will be some Ukrainians in Romania (Bukovina and parts of Bessarabia) and Czechoslovakia (Subcarpathian Rus) and in the Lemko territory of Poland, and some Belarusans in even this truncated Poland and in Lithuania. But on the whole, Ukrainian and Belarusan ethnolinguistic territory will be overwhelmingly in the USSR.
