POLL: Longer Lived Severus Alexander?

[calvin1417]

Amongst other things he drastically reformed the Army, dividing it into a local garrison army on the borders, and a mobile army which he kept under his own close supervision. He also greatly increased the number of Germans in it. He completely separated military and civil power, making it harder for would-be rebels to gather food and other supplies. He also put greater emphasis on the “cult” of the Emperor as a semi-divine being, whom it was “blasphemous” to attack.



As for why SA couldn’t do the same, probably for the same reason that Gordian III, Philip, Decius, Valerian, Gallienus, Aurelian etc couldn’t, or at any rate didn’t.. The soldiers would have murdered them had they tried.

The $64,000 Question, of course, is why Diocletian got away with it when those others would probably just have got themselves killed. I must confess to being far from sure myself as to the complete answer. About the only thing that springs to mind is the territorial losses the Empire suffered around the 270s – esp Dacia and the Rhine-Danube Angle of SW Germany. These, iirc, were the first such losses in Roman history bar some to-ing and fro-ing on the Euphrates[1], and may have given the soldiers enough of a fright that they accepted, however grudgingly, that Something Must Be Done. The greater number of Germans in the Army may also have helped, as they probably weren’t liked or trusted by native-born Roman ones (who might have been at war with them not so long ago) and might have been readier to put down mutinies.

Perhaps SA would have stood a better chance had a province or two been lost half a century earlier.


[1] No I haven’t forgotten Teutoburg, but Germany in AD9 was far less integrated into the Roman system, and its loss was more a failure to establish a province than the loss of an already established one. OTOH, the ones lost in the 270s had been Roman for well over a century (almost two centuries in the case of SW Germany) and their loss was probably a much bigger “shock to the system”.

Okay does anyone know why Diocletian reforms were successful?

 

[Mikestone8]

Okay does anyone know why Diocletian reforms were successful?

I'm not sure if anyone knows for certain.

My own guess is that the abrupt loss of provinces which had been Roman for several generations, followed over the next few years of a gradual realisation that these losses were likely to be permanent and not just a passing misfortune, had a sobering effect on the legions, causing at least a substantial number to realise that playtime was over and that if the anarchy continued there soon might be nothing left to proclaim Emperors of. Also the growing proportion of Barbarian auxiliaries gave opportunity for a bit of divide and rule. But I'll happily listen to anyone who's better informed about him.

 

[SlyDessertFox]

I think its a case of most of the work was already done by 284. Between Claudius Gothicus until 284, the Danube, eastern, and Rhine frontiers were stabilized. The army was already showing a willingness to get things together with ceding the election of the next emperor after accidentally assassinating Aurelian (which itself should not be overlooked as a watershed moment in jarring the troops, Aurelian was beloved by the legions) to the senate. Tacitus's rule was secure before his sudden death. Aside from 2 minor civil wars (which would in any case become par the course for succession in the post Diocletian era-minor civil war followed by stability), Probus was secure on his throne and tidied up the Rhine.

So aside from a few loose ends, the external crises had been largely dealt with by 284. One of the major problems of the 3rd century was the empire not able to be everywhere at once, allowing for usurper to arise at local hotspots. When you're not being pressured with overwhelming force and the empire nowhere to be found, you don't feel compelled to rebel against the emperor. It also didn't hurt that having two emperors further reduced the impetus for declaring a usurper.

 

[calvin1417]

I think its a case of most of the work was already done by 284. Between Claudius Gothicus until 284, the Danube, eastern, and Rhine frontiers were stabilized. The army was already showing a willingness to get things together with ceding the election of the next emperor after accidentally assassinating Aurelian (which itself should not be overlooked as a watershed moment in jarring the troops, Aurelian was beloved by the legions) to the senate. Tacitus's rule was secure before his sudden death. Aside from 2 minor civil wars (which would in any case become par the course for succession in the post Diocletian era-minor civil war followed by stability), Probus was secure on his throne and tidied up the Rhine.

So aside from a few loose ends, the external crises had been largely dealt with by 284. One of the major problems of the 3rd century was the empire not able to be everywhere at once, allowing for usurper to arise at local hotspots. When you're not being pressured with overwhelming force and the empire nowhere to be found, you don't feel compelled to rebel against the emperor. It also didn't hurt that having two emperors further reduced the impetus for declaring a usurper.

And how can Severus succefully handle the crises so he can make reforms? Does he need crushing victorys on all fronts?

 

[calvin1417]

I'm not sure if anyone knows for certain.

My own guess is that the abrupt loss of provinces which had been Roman for several generations, followed over the next few years of a gradual realisation that these losses were likely to be permanent and not just a passing misfortune, had a sobering effect on the legions, causing at least a substantial number to realise that playtime was over and that if the anarchy continued there soon might be nothing left to proclaim Emperors of. Also the growing proportion of Barbarian auxiliaries gave opportunity for a bit of divide and rule. But I'll happily listen to anyone who's better informed about him.

This makes the Roman army seem less like a paycheck to the soldiers and more nationalistic. Is this accurate?

 

[DominusNovus]

This makes the Roman army seem less like a paycheck to the soldiers and more nationalistic. Is this accurate?

Pride and honor are important to a military. Consider that one of the complaints against SA was that he was too willing to negotiate.

 

[Mikestone8]

This makes the Roman army seem less like a paycheck to the soldiers and more nationalistic. Is this accurate?

It's what I suspect. As SlyDesertFox has already observed, things were starting to turn round even before Diocletian, and the territorial losses could well have been a factor.

 

[calvin1417]

Pride and honor are important to a military. Consider that one of the complaints against SA was that he was too willing to negotiate.

True.

 

[SlyDessertFox]

Pride and honor are important to a military. Consider that one of the complaints against SA was that he was too willing to negotiate.

Though this complaint was only a complaint because he had already failed militarily. It's not that big of a problem that he might be willing to easily negotiate with the Germans if he just smashed the Sassanians, or vice versa. But the fact that his military record had no major successes and only blunders, meant that his easily willing to negotiate was just the catalyst for a long line of gripes.

 

[SlyDessertFox]

It's what I suspect. As SlyDesertFox has already observed, things were starting to turn round even before Diocletian, and the territorial losses could well have been a factor.

I'm not really sure the territorial losses are as big a factor as you suggest. Viewing the Gallic and Palmyrene Empires as territorial losses wouldn't be accurate. Odaenathus was officially invested in his power by Gallienus, and his successful maintanaince of the east against the Sassanians would not have been possible without the cooperation of the Roman legions still left in the east. The Palmyrene Empire was of course a series of usurpers who's main goal was stabilizing the Rhine frontier. The loss of Dacia was not official until Aurelian, and even then there was already proving to be some form of stability leadership. Gallienus managed to hold things together for 15 years (the first 7 being with Valerian), and Claudius Gothicus had a promising career as emperor ahead of him until plague took his life.

 

[Mikestone8]

I'm not really sure the territorial losses are as big a factor as you suggest. Viewing the Gallic and Palmyrene Empires as territory losses wouldn't be accurate..

I wasn't counting them. Indeed, just offhand I can't even remember mentioning them.

I referred only to those long-established provinces, Roman for the past century or more, which had to be abandoned to the "Barbarians" and never retrieved - an unprecedented event.

 

[calvin1417]

I wasn't counting them. Indeed, just offhand I can't even remember mentioning them.

I referred only to those long-established provinces, Roman for the past century or more, which had to be abandoned to the "Barbarians" and never retrieved - an unprecedented event.

How did the army know that they'll never be retrieved?

 

[SlyDessertFox]

I wasn't counting them. Indeed, just offhand I can't even remember mentioning them.

I referred only to those long-established provinces, Roman for the past century or more, which had to be abandoned to the "Barbarians" and never retrieved - an unprecedented event.

I know you weren't referring to them, I was just rattling off what losses Rome might have had. But like I said, Dacia wasn't officially abandoned until Aurelian, and the Agri Decumates weren't completely abandoned until Probus.

 

[calvin1417]

I know you weren't referring to them, I was just rattling off what losses Rome might have had. But like I said, Dacia wasn't officially abandoned until Aurelian, and the Agri Decumates weren't completely abandoned until Probus.

And the army can't see the future so how would they know it would be lost forever.