What if Hitler didn't declare war on the US after Pearl Harbor? The Axis was strictly defensive so Hitler really didn't have to declare war. In his declaration of speech he didn't even site Pearl Harbor as his main reason for declaring war, he said it was the US kept sending aid to Britain.
PE: Hitler does not Declare War on US
- Thread starter ThatOneGuy
- Start date
Delta Force
Banned
The USS Reuben James (DD-225) was sunk by a German submarine on October 31, 1941, and became the first American warship sunk in World War II. Germany and the United States were in a shooting war well before the official declaration of war.
Redbeard
Banned
It will be significantly more difficult to have the US give 1st priority to wareffort in Europe.
Without explicit priority to Europe anything resembling the OTL D-day can't happen.
The worst alternative is if the British cave in to the original US "plans" - i.e. "let's just land a huge bunch of recruits in France and then roll on all the way to Berlin - in 1943!"
That will likely mean a humiliating allied defeat and further postponement of US focus on Europe.
Alternatively the effort in Eupre is focussed on keeping GB safe and probably liberate N.Africa. That will at least save the allies on a humiliating defeat but the really interesting question now is what happens on the eastern front.
The Germans have more resources to allocate to the east. If this makes no difference the Soviets will end up in control of the entire European continent.
I doubt this PoD can have the Germans actually win the east, but they may very well be able to stop the Red Army and make a separate peace. Important will be how much aid the w.allies can and will send to the Soviets. Initially (41-42) only limited resources are available and without 1st priority to Europe I take less US materiel will be given. Later much more will be available, but without any near prospect of an invasion in W.Europe the W.allies really don't have an interest in the Soviets rolling all the way to the Channel - just enough to keep them occupied with the Germans.
Stalin will probably sense that even before the W.allies has even had the thought and my guess is that he will be seriously tempted to make peace with Germany on a June 1941 status. After all it wasn't him who attacked, he can just say: "I have now repulsed the evil enemy and go back into my old peaceful mode (preparing the big offensive - silent evil laughter...)!"
Hitler might not survive, but some sort of Nazi control will probably remain over all of continental Europe from the Channel to Brest and from North Cape to Sicily.
That German DoW in December 1941 remains a mystery to me, but OTOH Hitler made so many other strategic blunders...
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
NB: No, US can't nuke an otherwise intact Germany into submission. Very few nukes will be available in the first many years and you will just give the Germans time to develop their own (incl. ICBMs).
Without explicit priority to Europe anything resembling the OTL D-day can't happen.
The worst alternative is if the British cave in to the original US "plans" - i.e. "let's just land a huge bunch of recruits in France and then roll on all the way to Berlin - in 1943!"
That will likely mean a humiliating allied defeat and further postponement of US focus on Europe.
Alternatively the effort in Eupre is focussed on keeping GB safe and probably liberate N.Africa. That will at least save the allies on a humiliating defeat but the really interesting question now is what happens on the eastern front.
The Germans have more resources to allocate to the east. If this makes no difference the Soviets will end up in control of the entire European continent.
I doubt this PoD can have the Germans actually win the east, but they may very well be able to stop the Red Army and make a separate peace. Important will be how much aid the w.allies can and will send to the Soviets. Initially (41-42) only limited resources are available and without 1st priority to Europe I take less US materiel will be given. Later much more will be available, but without any near prospect of an invasion in W.Europe the W.allies really don't have an interest in the Soviets rolling all the way to the Channel - just enough to keep them occupied with the Germans.
Stalin will probably sense that even before the W.allies has even had the thought and my guess is that he will be seriously tempted to make peace with Germany on a June 1941 status. After all it wasn't him who attacked, he can just say: "I have now repulsed the evil enemy and go back into my old peaceful mode (preparing the big offensive - silent evil laughter...)!"
Hitler might not survive, but some sort of Nazi control will probably remain over all of continental Europe from the Channel to Brest and from North Cape to Sicily.
That German DoW in December 1941 remains a mystery to me, but OTOH Hitler made so many other strategic blunders...
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
NB: No, US can't nuke an otherwise intact Germany into submission. Very few nukes will be available in the first many years and you will just give the Germans time to develop their own (incl. ICBMs).
The Japanese attack was a major turning point in the war and although many see the German declaration as a major blunder, many will argue that from this time on, the US find an excuse sooner or later to start a war.
Hitler did declare that "a great nation declares its own wars".
Thus, the OTL was the most realistic option, and not declaring war might not have made much difference.
A more clever and cynical decision - that would make a major difference - would be to declare war against the Japanese. The excuse would be because they failed the fight against communism.
Of note, on the day of the attack, German began their first retreats from Moscow, driven back by Siberian forces.
Hitler did declare that "a great nation declares its own wars".
Thus, the OTL was the most realistic option, and not declaring war might not have made much difference.
A more clever and cynical decision - that would make a major difference - would be to declare war against the Japanese. The excuse would be because they failed the fight against communism.
Of note, on the day of the attack, German began their first retreats from Moscow, driven back by Siberian forces.
Not really. The US by 1944 will have more then enough resources to conduct major offensives in both theaters continuously. It does not matter where the US prioritizes: it has so many resources and industry that it can bury both sides under arms.
Germany does not have the industrial infrastructure to develop nuclear weapons before the US is able to destroy Germany. Each nuclear weapon is also guaranteed to destroy (and I mean destroy, as in wipe out completely so it has to be rebuilt from scratch) at least one German industrial complex when it is dropped. How are the Germans going to develop nuclear weapons when they can't even make any petroleum products or steel because all of their refineries were reduced to radioactive scrap in less then a year?
Redbeard
Banned
Landing craft as well as tonnage to keep the theatres supplied were very scarce all through the war.
This has been flogged to death already.
1) Hitler had explicitly promised Japan that Germany would join her if Japan attacked the U.S. and Britain.
2) The day after Pearl Harbor, a Gallup poll found that 80% of Americans thought the U.S. should declare war on Germany as well as Japan; a very substantial portion of Americans thought Germany had incited, or assisted, or even participated in the Pearl Harbor attack.
3) The U.S. was already providing lavish aid to Germany's enemies through Lend-Lease. Britain was now also the U.S.'s ally against Japan. So the U.S. will continue and expand aid to Britain, including delivering aid to the British Isles, and escorting the ships carrying that aid. That means expanded U.S. patrols and actions against U-boats, and additional attacks by U-boats on U.S. warships. Any such action could be used by Roosevelt as casus belli for a declaration of war on Germany. This would happen within a few months.
4) If Germany does not declare war on the U.S., the western Atlantic will remain off-limits to U-boats. This will seriously hamper their operations compared to OTL, where the U-boats ran wild in the western Atlantic in 1942.
5) The U.S. has no capacity for immediate military attack on Germany, but is already working very hard to develop that capacity, and will continue to do so regardless of whether Germany declares war. It will six months to a year to achieve it, and by that time the U.S. will declare war anyway.
Redbeard
Banned
Judging from OTL "negotiations" between US and UK about where and how to give priority it does in no way appear that "Germany first" from the start was a given outcome. In that context Germany not declaring war could very well be the straw that breaks the camel's back.
I'm not in doubt that a US declaration of war will come soon (I.e. British Isles are safe) but I'm even less in doubt that the OTL d-day would require a "Germany first" priority from the start.
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
I'm not in doubt that a US declaration of war will come soon (I.e. British Isles are safe) but I'm even less in doubt that the OTL d-day would require a "Germany first" priority from the start.
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
Huh???
During the big debate between the US and UK in 1942-1943, it was the US commanders who were red-hot to strike at Germany with full force. They wanted to invade France and march on Germany ASAP. It was the British who held out for North Africa first and then Italy.
Redbeard
Banned
Yes, when 1st priority had been given to Europe. But before that strong interests centered on especially Adm King wanted to focus on the Pacific. Anyway landing craft and tonnage in general all ways was in shortage and limited operations very much.
Allied grand operations also was influenced by the Germans being able to shift masses of troops by railway faster than the allies could move them by ship. At least until allied fighterbombers from bases in France could routinely sweep the railway lines. But even then the Germans unseen (by night) could move some 25 Divisions in place for the Ardennes offensive.
Alanbrookes uncut diaries give a good impression of the considerations, troubles and negotiations.
IMO the difference is more likely to be days than weeks. As I have noted before, FDR's December 9 radio address to the nation certainly sounds like a rehearsal for a proposal to declare war on Germany [1]--and it is possible that if FDR did not yet ask for a declaration at that time, it may have been because he was convinced from intelligence sources and decrypts that Germany would soon declare war on the US.
And as I have also noted, with regard to how hard a time FDR have had in getting a declaration of war through Congress, I think a Gallup poll from December 10, 1941 should settle that: " The December 10, 1941, Gallup/AIPO (American Institute of Public Opinion) poll asked. "Should President Roosevelt have asked Congress to declare war on Germany, as well as on Japan?": yes — 90%, no — 7%." http://books.google.com/books?id=61WMf6XRVT8C&pg=PA209
The general reaction in the US press--including the former isolationist press--to the German DoW was incidentaly one of indifference. It was a mere formality, they said; the US and Germany were already really at war, Japan could not have pulled off Pearl Harbor without German inspiration, etc.
There is also incidentally no reason to think that if the US rather than Germany had declared war first it would have made any difference to the "Germany first" strategy which US planners had agreed on well before Pearl Harbor. As Louis Morton writes, by the summer of 1941,
"...the decision on the course the United States would follow in the event it was "compelled to resort to war" had, in effect, been made. The United States would make the main effort in the Atlantic and European area where the major enemy, Germany, was located, Just how the final blow would be delivered was not yet known, but the Americans expected it would require a large-scale ground offensive. In the Pacific and Far East, United States strategy would be defensive, with greatest emphasis on the area encompassed by the strategic triangle, Alaska-Hawaii-Panama. Implicit in this concept was acceptance of the loss of the Philippines, Wake, and Guam, Thus, in a period of less than three years, the Pacific orientation of U.S. strategy, developed over a period of many years, was completely reversed. By mid-1941, in response to the threat from Europe, the eyes of American strategists were focused on the Atlantic. It was there, they believed, that the war in which the United States was certain to be involved would be decided.
"These expectations were more than fulfilled. Though the war when it came opened with an attack in the Pacific, the President and his military advisers made it clear at the outset in the first of the wartime conferences with the British held at Washington in December 1941-January 1942 (ARCADIA) that they would stand by their decision to defeat Germany first. Not once during the course of the war was this decision successfully challenged."
http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_01.htm
***
[1] The course that Japan has followed for the past 10 years in Asia has paralleled the course of Hitler and Mussolini in Europe and Africa. Today, it has become far more than a parallel. It is collaboration so well calculated that all the continents of the world, and all the oceans, are now considered by the Axis strategists as one gigantic battlefield.
In 1931, Japan invaded Manchukuo without warning.
In 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia without warning.
In 1938, Hitler occupied Austria without warning.
In 1939, Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia without warning.
Later in 1939, Hitler invaded Poland without warning.
In 1940, Hitler invaded Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg without warning.
In 1940, Italy attacked France and later Greece without warning.
In 1941, the Axis Powers attacked Jugoslavia and Greece and they dominated the Balkans without warning.
In 1941, Hitler invaded Russia without warning.
And now Japan has attacked Malaya and Thailand and the United States without warning.
It is all of one pattern...
Your Government knows that for weeks Germany has been telling Japan that if Japan did not attack the United States, Japan would not share in dividing the spoils with Germany when peace came. She was promised by Germany that if she came in she would receive the complete and perpetual control of the whole of the Pacific area and that means not only the Far East, not only all of the islands in the Pacific, but also a stranglehold on the west coast of North, Central, and South America.
We also know that Germany and Japan are conducting their military and naval operations in accordance with a joint plan. That plan considers all peoples and nations which are not helping the Axis Powers as common enemies of each and every one of the Axis Powers.
That is their simple and obvious grand strategy. That is why the American people must realize that it can be matched only with similar grand strategy. We must realize, for example, that Japanese successes against the United States in the Pacific are helpful to German operations in Libya; that any German success against the Caucasus is inevitably an assistance to Japan in her operations against the Dutch East Indies; that a German attack against Algiers or Morocco opens the way to a German attack against South America.
On the other side of the picture we must learn to know that guerrilla warfare against the Germans in Serbia helps us; that a successful Russian offensive against the Germans helps us; and that British successes on land or sea in any part of the world strengthen our hands.
Remember always that Germany and Italy, regardless of any formal declaration of war, consider themselves at war with the United States at this moment just as much as they consider themselves at war with Britain and Russia. And Germany puts all the other republics of the Americas into the category of enemies. The people of the hemisphere can be honored by that.
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/dec06.asp
Admiral King was very much a latecomer to this debate, which had been settled long before DoW by or against the US. Both the military and civilian leaders from around 1938 saw Germany as the more important potential enemy. That was reflected in War Plan Orange which had the US on the strategic defense in a Pacific war with Japan for 18-24 months, in the "Plan Dog" memo from Adm Stark to President Roosevelt of 12 November 1940
http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box4/a48b01.html
This memo from Stark summarized the views of many other senior civilian and military leaders then & serves as the basis for focus on the Rainbow 5 plan for mobilization planning and execution during 1941. By the end of 1941 it was a given inherent in the US mobilization already underway that preparations were well underway for war in Europe first.
"Alanbrooke" was also a late comer to the question. He did not become CIGS until mid 1942, even later than Admiral King becoming CNO. His view of the strategy discussions between the US and UK in 1940-41 were from something of a distance.
Which is why the United States was able to conduct it central Pacific offensive simultaneously with both Operations Overlord and Dragoon-Anvil.
Hey! Dont forget the South Pacific offensive starting with Op Cartwheel in early 1943 & running up to the Phillipines.
'Shortage' in that we could only conduct near simultaneous large scale amphibious in four different oceans vs five or six. Sometimes one gets a impression there was a lack of focus in Allied ambitions.
'Shortage' in that we could only conduct near simultaneous large scale amphibious in four different oceans vs five or six. Sometimes one gets a impression there was a lack of focus in Allied ambitions.
Which is why the United States was able to conduct it central Pacific offensive simultaneously with both Operations Overlord and Dragoon-Anvil.
The major difference between the American and Soviet ways of war in WWII is the US drowned their enemies in massive amounts of stuff instead of people.
Redbeard
Banned
Brooke was CIGS from December 1941. King was chief of USN also from december 1941.
Both had major influence on the strategy layout from that time.
A missing German DoW is difficult exclude as having an inluence on the strategy layout.