No Soviet Autoloaders...

[MerryPrankster]

Do you think the Soviets, who were known to keep the best stuff for themselves, would sell superior tanks to the country next door they might end up fighting in WWIII?

OK, so no real evidence then.

So next time there's a thread about autoloaders, let's keep the urban legends at the door, 'kay?

1. If the Finns were the ones who built the tanks in their own factories, as opposed to buying them complete from the Russians, they might well have tweaked the design.

2. This story isn't "a friend of a friend," this is a guy talking about his DAD. So you can't just wave your hand and say "urban legend."

 

[kojak]

1. If the Finns were the ones who built the tanks in their own factories, as opposed to buying them complete from the Russians, they might well have tweaked the design.

As far as I know, the Finns did not manufacture any T-72s natively. Finnish T-72s were either Soviet-made exports or East German surplus, which in turn were Czech or Polish-made exports.

 

[Stalker]

During Desert Storm Abramses usually confronted Chinese-made T-62 and T-55 and only some of the oopsing tank force were T-72s (not modified, without dynamic protection etc.). Almost all Iraqi tanks were furnished with the british laser sights, many of T-62 were refurnished with the NATO gun L7. As far as I understand Ray Manning's observations was quoted or referred to here many times.
Then it must be remembered that he explained the reasons of bad performance of Iraqi tanksagainst the Americans: absence of Abrams' silhouette in their manuals that prevented them from estimating correct distances and poor training of the Iraqi crews.
I shoul also add the Iraqiused obsolete shells (without wolframe uranium core in the warheads) and that affected greatly their penetrative ability. You may be sure that USSR had such an ammunition.

 

[Landshark]

I've never heard anything about Iraqi tanks being upgunned with L7's before?

 

[Stalker]

I've never heard anything about Iraqi tanks being upgunned with L7's before?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Ordnance_L7

 

[MacCaulay]

As far as I know, the Finns did not manufacture any T-72s natively. Finnish T-72s were either Soviet-made exports or East German surplus, which in turn were Czech or Polish-made exports.

From T-72 Main Battle Tank 1974-93:

Finland purchased 70 T-72s from the Soviet Union in 1974.

And I bet theirs worked better. Are you seriously going to tell me that you think safety standards in Finland are less rigorous or of the same level as Soviet Russia?

Heck, if you put 10 Soviet T-72s and 10 Russian T-72s together, I bet the Russian ones would run better. Mostly because they've got more time to spend keeping them running as opposed to painting them and making them look nice.
When I say this stuff, I'm not knocking the Russian people. I'm saying that the Soviet government was deliberately picking quality over quantity, and then trying to introduce mechanical devices that require quality control in their production and operation.

Good god: there's footage on the internet of these things running around with their top-hatches open so they can throw the shells out. That's how they get their arms stuck; someone's reaching down towards the breach to get a stuck shell that the extractor won't get, then the autoloader slams a charge in along with his arm.

I'm not saying it happened all the time, but even once or twice in a Western army would've been enough to have the military stop and say "What is wrong with this system?" But the Soviets didn't seem to do that. They just told the soldiers to...well..."soldier on," and keep their tanks looking shiny for the maneuvers.

 

[jotheberlock]

From T-72 Main Battle Tank 1974-93:
And I bet theirs worked better. Are you seriously going to tell me that you think safety standards in Finland are less rigorous or of the same level as Soviet Russia?

The point he's making is that these were Soviet T-72s, assembled in the Soviet Union and later sold to Finland, not Finnish ones built by Finns with notionally superior quality control. It's quite possible they were better maintained in service, for sure, but I don't see that that affects any discussion of whether the autoloader and gun was or was not poorly designed or assembled in the first place. You have a Finnish guy here telling you that T-72s built with the Soviet 'quality control in their production' which you're decrying worked just fine.

 

[MacCaulay]

The point he's making is that these were Soviet T-72s, assembled in the Soviet Union and later sold to Finland, not Finnish ones built by Finns with notionally superior quality control. It's quite possible they were better maintained in service, for sure, but I don't see that that affects any discussion of whether the autoloader and gun was or was not poorly designed or assembled in the first place. You have a Finnish guy here telling you that T-72s built with the Soviet 'quality control in their production' which you're decrying worked just fine.

Point taken.

But it's a systemic problem. When something comes out of the factory not working, then it should be isolated and fixed in the field, not ignored and swept under the rug for the sake of appearances. True?

 

[jotheberlock]

Point taken.

But it's a systemic problem. When something comes out of the factory not working, then it should be isolated and fixed in the field, not ignored and swept under the rug for the sake of appearances. True?

Certainly. I'd be interested to hear if the Finnish military found they did have to do much fixing-up of the tanks they got before putting them into service.

I'd still maintain that we have some evidence here that the basic design was fine, though, which is an important distinction from the general Western perception that the autoloader was a poor design that would inevitably load people's arms into the cannon on a regular basis no matter how well maintained and no matter how well trained the crew.

Actually, talking of training, the internet footage you mention is pretty interesting in that respect. I wonder if they would have done the same in battle (given that having the hatches open would generally be rather hazardous). After all, it doesn't matter a jot in terms of strategic effectiveness if crewmen were losing their arms due to laziness and carelessness in peacetime as long as they didn't do so during an actual Fulda Gap type scenario.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

To be blunt, any Fulda Gap scenario from the late-60's onwards would be nuclear from the start. The Soviet's did not want war but if it looked inevitable they would cover their ground assault with tactical and theater-level nuclear strikes. NATO retaliation and eventual escalation would be garunteed.

 

[MacCaulay]

Actually, talking of training, the internet footage you mention is pretty interesting in that respect. I wonder if they would have done the same in battle (given that having the hatches open would generally be rather hazardous). After all, it doesn't matter a jot in terms of strategic effectiveness if crewmen were losing their arms due to laziness and carelessness in peacetime as long as they didn't do so during an actual Fulda Gap type scenario.

Part of the training we recieved at Fort Hood (not sure why we were even told) was that the best thing to do was when engaging a tank like a T-72 to just keep pressing it and sending rounds at it. Sooner or later, the crew inside would get pounded either from a round from your cannon or from forgetting just how dangerous all the mechanisms around them were.

If the US and Canadian militaries were actually taking design flaws of this tank into effect, then I'd reckon it had some big ones.

Now: I'm not saying that this tank's a piece of crap. To be honest, in low intensity combat with a well trained crew, it's probably pretty good. I've said a few times that in my opinion the M-84 Yugoslav variant wasn't that bad, either, and would've been better had it been able to get the French engine they wanted.

But in trying to design the crew out of the tank (autoloader), they actually made it more dangerous to a poorly-trained crew, where a more simple tank like a T-55 is easier to operate.

Heck, the T-55 probably has a more sterling combat record against the same tanks that the T-72 has fought against precisely because of the crews that have operated them.

 

[wormyguy]

Here's some web footage of the T-80 and T-90 in trials (as well as various APCs and IFVs). My untrained eye can't see anything other than them driving around and firing their guns, but is there anything odd about how they're operating?

EDIT: It appears that they're keeping the hatch open on the BMP even when it's fording deep water.

 

[kojak]

MacCaulay, why are you being so combative? I was merely pointing out to MerryPrankster that Finnish T-72s were all export models, not natively manufactured.

 

[Linkwerk]

MacCaulay is dancing around a very good point without explicitly saying it: it's the kind of training that matters. Soviet units could deploy into combat formation from road marches at a lightning pace, manuver in radio silence, perform drill, etc very well, but failed in other areas. There was no real NCO corps in the Soviet military, and technical matters, technical familiarity, and understanding the principles behind the machines were officer's jobs. MacCaulay, I have to say, outside of the military vocabulary, your posts sound like any skilled tradesman discussing his profession, and I use the word profession deliberately.

As my totally dilettanteish reading of tank history has it, the T-72 autoloader wouldn't eat your arm. If you used it right and knew how to behave around it. But when there's a hangfire (do people even use this term for tank guns?) and the commander needs to demonstrate that his units are all up to spec, and when conscripts in their first year are only being taught to go through the motions and punished severely when they can't keep up to quota, well, dammit, the temptation to just reach into the damn thing and grab the shell out must be a great one on the inside of a rattling, smoky tank. And that's how daddy lost his hand in the wa- in the 1986 summer exercises.

Of course this ties into larger Soviet attitudes towards the military and the nature of war in general, and if I can get general, society at large. People were taught to do their jobs without a lot of rhyme or reason or explanation of the larger principles or even the end goal.

 

[Linkwerk]

I hope my point is clear enough- the problems were with institutional culture and were not logistical. It's pretty obvious the Soviets didn't really see a problem at all. I'm talking out of my ass about a lot of this, but my gut tells me small engines were not a driving factor- I mean, making large beastly machines was basically all the Soviets ever did, and they were, what, the second or third biggest economy?

But larger tanks and trained crews means an assumption that your investment in time, energy, and materials are going to last more than, like, six hours on the battlefield, and for that assumption to change, history is going to have to be pretty different.

 

[BlairWitch749]

MacCaulay is dancing around a very good point without explicitly saying it: it's the kind of training that matters. Soviet units could deploy into combat formation from road marches at a lightning pace, manuver in radio silence, perform drill, etc very well, but failed in other areas. There was no real NCO corps in the Soviet military, and technical matters, technical familiarity, and understanding the principles behind the machines were officer's jobs. MacCaulay, I have to say, outside of the military vocabulary, your posts sound like any skilled tradesman discussing his profession, and I use the word profession deliberately.

As my totally dilettanteish reading of tank history has it, the T-72 autoloader wouldn't eat your arm. If you used it right and knew how to behave around it. But when there's a hangfire (do people even use this term for tank guns?) and the commander needs to demonstrate that his units are all up to spec, and when conscripts in their first year are only being taught to go through the motions and punished severely when they can't keep up to quota, well, dammit, the temptation to just reach into the damn thing and grab the shell out must be a great one on the inside of a rattling, smoky tank. And that's how daddy lost his hand in the wa- in the 1986 summer exercises.

Of course this ties into larger Soviet attitudes towards the military and the nature of war in general, and if I can get general, society at large. People were taught to do their jobs without a lot of rhyme or reason or explanation of the larger principles or even the end goal.

It's not a uniquely Soviet problem either. Every armored vehicle has its issues and tradeoffs. Look at how much freaking fuel an M1 burns... and there is nothing so vulnerable on the battlefield as a fuel truck. The Bradley suffered from being designed to do too many things. Portholes were put on bmp's even though the soldier inside didn't have the necessary visability to orient his sighting. there is no perfectly constructed tank

 

[Linkwerk]

It's not a uniquely Soviet problem either. Every armored vehicle has its issues and tradeoffs. Look at how much freaking fuel an M1 burns... and there is nothing so vulnerable on the battlefield as a fuel truck. The Bradley suffered from being designed to do too many things. Portholes were put on bmp's even though the soldier inside didn't have the necessary visability to orient his sighting. there is no perfectly constructed tank

Well, yes, exactly. Mechanical designs are built around a purpose. The Soviets doctrinally and systemically didn't see the need for tight tolerances or totally optimal crew layouts, or better engines, because for one they viewed AFV's as a couple of steps above expendable ordinance, and two, they were used to thinking of production and design as a zero-sum game full of tradeoffs because their system by and large demanded it (although in retrospect, maybe not to the extent they thought it did).

 

[BlairWitch749]

Well, yes, exactly. Mechanical designs are built around a purpose. The Soviets doctrinally and systemically didn't see the need for tight tolerances or totally optimal crew layouts, or better engines, because for one they viewed AFV's as a couple of steps above expendable ordinance, and two, they were used to thinking of production and design as a zero-sum game full of tradeoffs because their system by and large demanded it (although in retrospect, maybe not to the extent they thought it did).

I look at the T-34 and say this is how the Russians should make tanks, crude, simple, flexible and effective in numbers just like the AK47 or RPG-7. They designed so their average peasant soldier could use those systems... it was when they got away from that idea and tried to overengineer their systems that they stopped being the best

 

[Linkwerk]

It's worthy of noting that the Soviets were way, way into military academia and doctrine. I love studying Soviet academia for this reason- they always were going off and making up whole fields and then exploring them with a good amount of intellectual vigor for such a stagnant society. Doctrine shaped the Soviet army to a huge extent, much more so than any western army. When everything is by the book, and the book says "tanks work like this" well....

 

[Linkwerk]

I look at the T-34 and say this is how the Russians should make tanks, crude, simple, flexible and effective in numbers just like the AK47. They designed so their average peasant soldier could use those systems... it was when they got away from that idea and tried to overengineer their systems that they stopped being the best

I disagree. The idea of "crude, simple, replaceable" tanks to be used in a war involving full industrial mobilization was what drove the Soviets to keep building T-55 variants into the 1970's. It was predicated on basically re-fighting Operation Bagration in Western Europe. An industrialized nation was building tanks to be run by farmers and built by collective farm girls- which is absurd in the 1970's. Look at Soviet education. For all their faults, Soviet schools turned out great math and science students. They had good talent and a fair industrial base. Sure, they would have had to make shortcuts, and they were used to doing so, but if they saw "The Threat" differently, they could have fielded a force of better than OTL quality.


As time went on, they did plan for more of a "come-as-you-are" war, but equipment production was inflexible, mandated by the Soviet military-industrial complex, and tied to a doctrine which was deep-set in the military.
When they finally realized very very late in the game that quality does beat quantity they produced some pretty impressive pieces of kit, but even then their system had the final word, and promptly collapsed.