Meade's Missed Opportunity

[m0585]

Instead of engaging General Lee at the Army of Northern Virginia at Gettysburg (or anywhere North of DC), would General Meade be better off using the Army of the Potomac to cut the Confederates off from Virginia?

I'm sure that Lincoln and the Union's political leadership (to say nothing of the public) would be very much disinclined to allow Confederate forces to occupy Union territory, but Meade could explain the strategy as a means to an end to trap the CSA's premier army.

 

[Arnold d.c]

Instead of engaging General Lee at the Army of Northern Virginia at Gettysburg (or anywhere North of DC), would General Meade be better off using the Army of the Potomac to cut the Confederates off from Virginia?

Right, but how does the Army of the Potomac do this and cover Washington at the same time? Covering all roads south would mean stretching the Army of the Potomac to the extent that it could be defeated in detail. To do both, Meade would have to garrison Gettysburg, the Jack Mountain passes near Fairfield, Waynesboro and Greencastle. This blocking force would take days of marching to get to each other while Lee could smash one of these forces with a concentrated Army of Northern Virginia. Added to the problem of distance is manpower constraints. At that point in time, the Army of the Potomac was at its weakest. Halleck was even convinced to send reinforcements from Washington, reducing the garrison below the limits of safety. Washington had to be covered.

I'm sure that Lincoln and the Union's political leadership (to say nothing of the public) would be very much disinclined to allow Confederate forces to occupy Union territory, but Meade could explain the strategy as a means to an end to trap the CSA's premier army.

You severely underestimate the Union’s fear of Lee marching on Washington. General Ethan Allen Hitchcock, the venerable military adviser to the War Department, warned that “possession by the enemy [even] for a short time would injure the cause of the country more than even the loss of many battles.” Halleck and Lincoln wanted Meade to between Lee and Washington & Baltimore at all times. They would never approve of such a maneuver.

 

[m0585]

Right, but how does the Army of the Potomac do this and cover Washington at the same time? Covering all roads south would mean stretching the Army of the Potomac to the extent that it could be defeated in detail. To do both, Meade would have to garrison Gettysburg, the Jack Mountain passes near Fairfield, Waynesboro and Greencastle. This blocking force would take days of marching to get to each other while Lee could smash one of these forces with a concentrated Army of Northern Virginia. Added to the problem of distance is manpower constraints. At that point in time, the Army of the Potomac was at its weakest. Halleck was even convinced to send reinforcements from Washington, reducing the garrison below the limits of safety. Washington had to be covered.

You severely underestimate the Union’s fear of Lee marching on Washington. General Ethan Allen Hitchcock, the venerable military adviser to the War Department, warned that “possession by the enemy [even] for a short time would injure the cause of the country more than even the loss of many battles.” Halleck and Lincoln wanted Meade to between Lee and Washington & Baltimore at all times. They would never approve of such a maneuver.

So you're of the opinion that OTL was the best Union strategy for Meade to execute?

 

[dmg86]

Yep. considering that he only took command on the 28th much of the army was pretty far from the areas they would need to march to.

 

[Darth_Kiryan]

Instead of engaging General Lee at the Army of Northern Virginia at Gettysburg (or anywhere North of DC), would General Meade be better off using the Army of the Potomac to cut the Confederates off from Virginia?

I'm sure that Lincoln and the Union's political leadership (to say nothing of the public) would be very much disinclined to allow Confederate forces to occupy Union territory, but Meade could explain the strategy as a means to an end to trap the CSA's premier army.

SO your plan is for Meade to, once he takes command of the AOTP, to immediately order a reverse march and head south towards Richmon, leaving Lee completely in the open and threatening Baltimore and Washigton.

Attack the Confederate Capital to leave the Union Capital undefended/defenseless? I mean, what makes you so sure that Lee will just turn around and follow Meade and not attack Washington?

 

[Arnold d.c]

So you're of the opinion that OTL was the best Union strategy for Meade to execute?

Yes, it was the right strategy between June 28 and July 3. Meade’s strategy effectively concentrated the army, protected Washington from Lee and put him in position to attack Lee in the rear if he attempted to cross the Susquehanna. What can be criticized is Meade’s use of cavalry during the pursuit of Lee.

Meade could not directly pursue Lee: Lincoln was still paranoid of Lee pouncing on Washington, requiring Meade to march indirectly. The cavalry had to buy Meade time to win. It bewilders me that Meade allowed Pleasonton to act as both commander of the cavalry corps and Meade’s Chief of Staff after Daniel Butterfield was injured. Pleasonton missed the opportunity to coordinate his cavalrymen to barricade mountain passes in Lee’s line of retreat. These mountain passes were narrow and, with artillery, the cavalry could have been a formidable blocking force that Lee must either punch through or go around them. This buys Meade more time to win the race to the Potomac.

Another POD to supplement this is Brig. Gen. Benjamin F. Kelley’s decision to attack the wagon trains resupplying Lee’s depleted supply of ammunition. Or having Meade order William H. French’s command (the Harpers Ferry garrison) capture Williamsport before Imboden’s Rebel cavalrymen could occupy it for Lee. These infantrymen were wasted occupying the South Mountain passes which Lee did not intend to use.

 

[Mikestone8]

Do about the same as he did anyway, but more slowly, so that Lee is in the neighborhood of Harrisburg when they meet up. Lee is then probably fighting with his back to the Susquehanna, and has to fight his way past Meade in order to get home. There's a good chance he won't manage it.

 

[History Learner]

Instead of engaging General Lee at the Army of Northern Virginia at Gettysburg (or anywhere North of DC), would General Meade be better off using the Army of the Potomac to cut the Confederates off from Virginia?

I'm sure that Lincoln and the Union's political leadership (to say nothing of the public) would be very much disinclined to allow Confederate forces to occupy Union territory, but Meade could explain the strategy as a means to an end to trap the CSA's premier army.

He couldn't:
1. Lincoln was adamant that the Army of the the Potomac be kept between Lee and Washington; no ifs ands or buts in this regard.
2. Moving to cut Lee's line of retreat exposed himself in return to the same.

 

[dmg86]

Not to mention he only took command on the 28th of June by this time most of his army was several days from the areas you mention. As to the cavalry commander he was more or less a mediocre commander whose only reason he had command was rank and not talent.

 

[Galba Otho Vitelius]

"your plan is for Meade to, once he takes command of the AOTP, to immediately order a reverse march and head south towards Richmon, leaving Lee completely in the open and threatening Baltimore and Washigton."

I remember reading that Hooker proposed something like this. Lincoln didn't approve, and it was one of the reasons he removed Hooker. This is an interesting alternative scenario itself, but by the time Meade took command it was too late to do it anyway.

 

[Scott Washburn]

Meade's strategy was the correct one: pursue Lee but keep the Army of the Potomac between Lee and Washington. One thing that needs to be kept in mind is that Lee was supplying his army through foraging, there was no supply line for Meade to cut.

 

[Arnold d.c]

"your plan is for Meade to, once he takes command of the AOTP, to immediately order a reverse march and head south towards Richmon, leaving Lee completely in the open and threatening Baltimore and Washigton."

I remember reading that Hooker proposed something like this. Lincoln didn't approve, and it was one of the reasons he removed Hooker. This is an interesting alternative scenario itself, but by the time Meade took command it was too late to do it anyway.

That wasn't really what Hooker was planning. He had intended to raid Lee's LOC with the Harper's Ferry Garrison and Twelfth Corps, in hopes of drawing Lee south for battle. According to Hooker and Butterfield, when Lee goes south to attack this force, a force of three corps under Reynolds would march from Middletown and strike Lee's flank. The plan was problematic:

1. Hooker was planning to send 25,000 troops, but the Harper's Ferry Garrison and XII Corps only numbered 17,000.
   
2. Hooker was asking the strike force to march 40 miles for the raid on Lee's supply lines.
   
3. Of this force, only half were veteran troops.

Hooker made two assumptions: Lee had a supply line in the strictest sense; and that he would react the same way Hooker expected him to. Hooker was hoping for Lee to go back to the Potomac and was hoping not to pursue Lee into Pennsylvania. Halleck got his opportunity to get rid of Hooker when the latter argued against Halleck's restriction that the Harper's Ferry Garrison had to hold the town.

 

[m0585]

I agree the plan wouldn't be popular with Lincoln, but if it was explained that the primary goal was to trap Lee's army in the North then perhaps Lincoln would have been more amendable? Meade still could have kept the AotP between DC and Lee while cutting off avenues of escape. And, unlike the end of Gettysburg, the AotP wouldn't have been exhausted by three days of horrific battle.

I agree with @Scott Washburn that Lee was keeping his army fed by foraging, but eventually that source would dry up. Lee would be in hostile territory trying to keep his army fed and supplied and now he's cut off from Virginia. It's a politically risky strategy, but not the first one of the war.

 

[Darth_Kiryan]

How strong are the Washinngton defences in 1863?

 

[Arnold d.c]

I agree the plan wouldn't be popular with Lincoln, but if it was explained that the primary goal was to trap Lee's army in the North then perhaps Lincoln would have been more amendable? Meade still could have kept the AotP between DC and Lee while cutting off avenues of escape. And, unlike the end of Gettysburg, the AotP wouldn't have been exhausted by three days of horrific battle.

Sorry, this strategy is still problematic. You talk about cutting Lee off in the North while defending Washington. Great idea, but how does Meade execute it? The only feasible solution to block Washington AND cut Lee’s escape route is to divide the army. By the end of June 28, Meade knew Lee was north of Hagerstown and marching in the direction of Pennsylvania. Meade chose the most sensible option: concentrating the army between Emmitsburg and Westminster on June 29. Meade’s greatest fear was that Lee had already or was in the process of crossing the Susquehanna. Meade’s thought process is focused on catching up with Lee, not cutting him off.

Suppose that Meade decided to do your strategy. He can’t use the main army because it would disobey the instructions to screen Washington. So what options does Meade have for a strike force? Meade's total strength is 112,735 men, Lee has about 75,000. However, Northern intelligence, the Bureau of Military Information, overcounted Lee's strength (a rare mistake for this new bureau) and so Meade would be concerned that Southerners would outnumber him if he divided his command. But suppose that he does so anyway. Given Meade's knowledge of Lee's dispositions, his best bet to block him would be Gettysburg, (the mountain passes at Fairfield if Meade wants to use the ridges behind Gettysburg), Waynesboro and Greencastle. The distances between Gettysburg and Waynesboro and Greencastle are 35km (21.7 miles) and 49km (30.4 miles). That's about two or three days of marching for the Army of the Potomac and on June 28 the Army of the Potomac is still far away from those points.

If Meade sends a strike force of, say, the V and VI Corps, (24,914 men) off to block those roads, Meade will find himself incapable of actually covering the line from Culp's Hill to Little Round Top. There will be no reserve whatsoever. If Sickles still obliterates himself by moving to the Peach Orchard, there will be no V Corps to plug the gap and there will be no VI Corps to plug up all the gaps in Meade's line and act as a reserve. And we haven't even considered what Lee is going to do.

By the night of June 28, Lee knew that the Union army had crossed the Potomac from Harrison (a spy) and sought to concentrate his army at Cashtown, near Gettysburg. Lee is bound to discover Meade's position near Gettysburg if Buford and Pettigrew still engage each other at Gettysburg on June 30 IOTL and he will eventually discover the blocking force at his rear. By waiting, Meade has ceded the initiative to Lee. Lee could strike a heavy blow on Meade at Gettysburg or turn around and defeat the blocking force before Meade can react. Cashtown is 13km (8 miles) from Gettysburg and 32-40km (19.8-24 miles) from Waynesboro and Greencastle respectively. You treat it as though Lee will just sit still while Meade traps him to the north. This would be a very deadly assumption. Lee is one of the most aggressive generals of the ACW, why wouldn't he decide to attack and defeat Meade in detail? A battle would be fought on Northern soil, whether Meade desired it or not. Halleck would see the risk of a defeat in detail and surely Lincoln would not have approved of such a dangerous strategy.

 

[Arnold d.c]

How strong are the Washinngton defences in 1863?

Based on the report of Brigadier General J.G. Barnard on March 31, 1863, the garrison "of the forts constituting the Defenses of Washington" was 10,305 artillerymen and 16,420 Infantry for a total of "full garrisons for all the forts" as 26,725 men.
He also included an interesting statement:
It will be seen, therefore, that a force of this magnitude would not furnish a satisfactory defense against a powerful and prolonged attack.It would be necessary to sustain it by arming all the able-bodied men in the District, and putting them upon the lines and in garrisons in the northern forts, and even then the defense would be weak.
The report shows that the Washington Defenses were felt to be undermanned than overstrength. The report also stated that 25,000 infantrymen and 9,000 artillerymen were required to properly man the defense. Given how Grant was repulsed by the Vicksburg garrison, I think Barnard might be underestimating the forts. However, his worry that it might be break under prolonged attack might be valid. This explains a lot as to why Lincoln and Halleck were frightened about Washington's safety.

 

[m0585]

Sorry, this strategy is still problematic. You talk about cutting Lee off in the North while defending Washington. Great idea, but how does Meade execute it? The only feasible solution to block Washington AND cut Lee’s escape route is to divide the army. By the end of June 28, Meade knew Lee was north of Hagerstown and marching in the direction of Pennsylvania. Meade chose the most sensible option: concentrating the army between Emmitsburg and Westminster on June 29. Meade’s greatest fear was that Lee had already or was in the process of crossing the Susquehanna. Meade’s thought process is focused on catching up with Lee, not cutting him off.

Suppose that Meade decided to do your strategy. He can’t use the main army because it would disobey the instructions to screen Washington. So what options does Meade have for a strike force? Meade's total strength is 112,735 men, Lee has about 75,000. However, Northern intelligence, the Bureau of Military Information, overcounted Lee's strength (a rare mistake for this new bureau) and so Meade would be concerned that Southerners would outnumber him if he divided his command. But suppose that he does so anyway. Given Meade's knowledge of Lee's dispositions, his best bet to block him would be Gettysburg, (the mountain passes at Fairfield if Meade wants to use the ridges behind Gettysburg), Waynesboro and Greencastle. The distances between Gettysburg and Waynesboro and Greencastle are 35km (21.7 miles) and 49km (30.4 miles). That's about two or three days of marching for the Army of the Potomac and on June 28 the Army of the Potomac is still far away from those points.

If Meade sends a strike force of, say, the V and VI Corps, (24,914 men) off to block those roads, Meade will find himself incapable of actually covering the line from Culp's Hill to Little Round Top. There will be no reserve whatsoever. If Sickles still obliterates himself by moving to the Peach Orchard, there will be no V Corps to plug the gap and there will be no VI Corps to plug up all the gaps in Meade's line and act as a reserve. And we haven't even considered what Lee is going to do.

By the night of June 28, Lee knew that the Union army had crossed the Potomac from Harrison (a spy) and sought to concentrate his army at Cashtown, near Gettysburg. Lee is bound to discover Meade's position near Gettysburg if Buford and Pettigrew still engage each other at Gettysburg on June 30 IOTL and he will eventually discover the blocking force at his rear. By waiting, Meade has ceded the initiative to Lee. Lee could strike a heavy blow on Meade at Gettysburg or turn around and defeat the blocking force before Meade can react. Cashtown is 13km (8 miles) from Gettysburg and 32-40km (19.8-24 miles) from Waynesboro and Greencastle respectively. You treat it as though Lee will just sit still while Meade traps him to the north. This would be a very deadly assumption. Lee is one of the most aggressive generals of the ACW, why wouldn't he decide to attack and defeat Meade in detail? A battle would be fought on Northern soil, whether Meade desired it or not. Halleck would see the risk of a defeat in detail and surely Lincoln would not have approved of such a dangerous strategy.

But wasn't Washington already heavily garrisoned/defended?

Edit: Just saw your response to @Darth_Kiryan. Still, I Lee was in the North and having to deal with a hostile force to his South, how much of Meade's army would be required to block/hold Lee in place in Pennsylvania?

 

[Arnold d.c]

Still, I Lee was in the North and having to deal with a hostile force to his South, how much of Meade's army would be required to block/hold Lee in place in Pennsylvania?

All of it. The only thing Lee has to be worried about is the Army of the Potomac. Couch’s Department of Susquehanna to the north is worthless as an attacking force; French’s Harper’s Ferry Garrison is stuck to its post and regarded by its own commander to be of questionable quality; and the Washington Garrison was not leaving their forts. As soon as news comes of the approach of the Army of the Potomac, Lee would concentrate and come to blows with it. Defeating a Northern army on Northern soil is one of the key objectives of Lee’s Pennsylvania Raid. If Meade splits his command up, that just makes it easy on Lee to defeat him. If the main army is badly beaten, what stops Lee from then turning on the blocking force? The time to block Lee comes when Lee is retreating. You talk about the advantage of not being bloodied at Gettysburg for the Army of the Potomac, but you don’t consider the advantage of not being bloodied for the Army of Northern Virginia. This was the aggressive premier Southern army confident of victory, not the bloodied retreating force disappointed after Gettysburg.

 

[Mikestone8]

Meade’s greatest fear was that Lee had already or was in the process of crossing the Susquehanna.

Would that have been such a bad thing?

Wherever Lee went, the AoP was going to find him eventually, and the deeper he had gone into northern soil, the less chance he would have of getting home. And putting that river between Lee and Washington would have greatly reduced the danger to the capital.

 

[Arnold d.c]

Would that have been such a bad thing?

Wherever Lee went, the AoP was going to find him eventually, and the deeper he had gone into northern soil, the less chance he would have of getting home. And putting that river between Lee and Washington would have greatly reduced the danger to the capital.

I think Meade's fear was more about the distance he would need to cover to reach Lee. If he was already in the process of crossing the river by the time Meade had taken command, the distance Meade would have to cover was significant. Meade's hope was that Couch's Department of Susquehanna would delay Lee long enough for Meade to catch Lee in the act of crossing. If Lee was across the river then Meade would also have to cross the river and river crossings are universally a fairly risky operation. In reality, Lee wasn't too interested in crossing the Susquehanna, his orders to Ewell emphasized capturing foodstuffs and gave authorization to seize Harrisburg if it came within his "means".