...And we are back in business folks!
Many, many thanks for your patience while I got things sorted out in the real world, and hope that you enjoy the latest installment in this mess of a conflict.
Lines in the Sand: A History of the Gulf War
XVI
“People of the United States, your President Bush has placed you on the wrong side of history. It is not too late to reverse his folly. I urge you to spare your fathers and sons from needless suffering and hardship.” – Saddam Hussein
“I don’t care if Saddam has troops marching through two or twelve countries. The smug bastard is going to get his when the hammer comes down and the more he spreads his forces out the better.” - Norman Schwarzkopf
Transcript for Saturday Night Live sketch aired April 13, 1991
Season 16, Episode 17 / Host: Catherine O’Hara / Musical Guest: R.E.M.
*Scene opens on the Oval Office, with Dana Carvey portraying George H. W. Bush sitting behind the desk, a serious expression on his face*
Dana Carvey – Mah fellow Americans. I speak to you tonight on a matter of grave importance. That tyronneous villain Saddam Hussein has conquered yet another peace-loving country and in the process made me right peeved. I want you to know that myself and Danny Quayle are doing everything in our power to ensure that this never happens again. I know that we said the exact same thing the last time Saddam did this, but this time we mean it. No more monkey business, play time is over. Read my lips: no more countries conquered on my watch. No sir, not gonna happen. In fact-
*Phone on desk rings, DC picks it up*
DC – Hello? Why yes, this is the President, that’s me…he did what? Now just hold on a minute here, you’re telling me that Iraq just conquered another five countries? Maybe you don’t understand, I just did the ‘read my lips’ thing and told him not to do that. Well, that makes me quite the fool, doesn’t it? Dang nab it, I thought we were putting a stop to this nonsense. Well…okay, thank you for calling.
*Hangs up phone*
DC – Well then, doesn’t that just beat all…hello again, America. It seems I spoke just a tad too hastily earlier concerning the whole ‘stop taking over countries’ thing. Iraq seems to have just conquered the remainder of the Middle East. Sure, that’s a bit of a setback, but rest assured, the situation is under control. And to all those nay-sayers out there who are calling the war in Saudi Arabia another Vietnam, they couldn’t be further from the truth. For one thing, a desert is the complete opposite of a jungle and I’m told they don’t actually speak Vietnamese in Baghdad.
*Phone rings again*
DC – Hello? Oh, it’s you again. Yes, this is still the President. Oh dear…he did what now? Oh dear me…
Folks, I’ve just been informed that Iraqi troops have just conquered the nation of Vietnam and added it to their holdings. So, from a technical standpoint, it would appear that Saudi Arabia and Vietnam are now in fact the same thing, seeing as they’re now both part of the Greater Iraqi Empire. That’s a bit of a hum-doodle, no two ways about it. That Saddam’s really gotten my goat now, and I’m not gonna stand for it. Not gonna do it, no how, no sir. Colin? Hey Colin, what are we doing about this?
*Enter Tim Meadows dressed as General Colin Powell*
Tim Meadows – Well, Mr. President, the situation on the ground is-
DC – Colin, don’t be rude, say hello to the nice people of America.
*TM pauses, then turns to wave awkwardly at the camera*
TM – Uhm…hello…America. Listen, Mr. President, about the Iraqis-
DC – You betcha! Iraq! Buncha cattle rustlers that need to be taught a lesson! Heck, I’m a generous fellow, England and France can even take a shot at him, no need to let us have all the fun!
*Phone rings, DC answers, TM leans down to listen in*
DC – Hello? Oh it’s just you again, now what? …Oh for…of all the blasted…yes, thank you for calling.
*DC sets phone down, stares vacantly for a moment then slams his fists onto the desk*
DC – DANG NAB IT!!
*DC notices the camera again and straightens his tie*
DC – Uhmm…ah heh…hi, folks. Our little alliance with England and France has run into the teensy little itty bitty problem of Iraqtakingthemoverjustnow. Uh…hmm. Colin, who does that leave us with?
*TM consults a clipboard for several seconds*
TM – I think that just leaves us, Mr. President. Europe’s gone, Australia’s gone, the Soviets are drunk and aren’t returning our calls…we did get a nice condolence card from China. It plays a song when you open it.
DC – We don’t need anyone or their stupid cards! Buncha losers anyway, see if I care! Fine, we’ll just have to kick Saddam’s keister all by our lonesome. It’s better this way, isn’t it? No backseat drivers mucking it all up. Okay, first things first, have we tried shooting at them? Would that work?
*Door to the Oval Office swings open, revealing Chris Farley dressed as Saddam Hussein, followed by several people dressed as construction workers*
TM – What’s the meaning of this?
Chris Farley – Bleah, you call this place fit for a ruler? I want all of this removed at once. Tariq, take notes. I want shag carpeting, statues of me in every room, a harem in the West Wing, and this paint job is unacceptable. Everything will be painted gold, you understand? Oh my, look who it is…my old friend President George.
DC – Now see here, you puffed up horny toad, you can’t just come in here and put up shag carpeting and dancing girls. I live here, you can’t just run around all willy nilly taking over things! There are rules!
CF – Oh George, you Americans and your wacky humor! I’m glad you’re here though, I need a new pool boy ever since I shot my last one. Tariq here will get you set up, won’t you Tariq? And you, dark man! I desire entertainment and hereby promote you to Head Dancing Boy. A very great honor indeed!
TM – Sir, I have absolutely no intention of performing any sort of dance-
CF – DANCE OR DIE!!
*TM begins awkwardly dancing*
CF – Much better! Now, where was I…oh yes, Tariq, can we change all of the signs from White House to ‘Saddam’s Pleasure Palace Number 347’? It has a much better ring- Pool Boy! Why are you still here? There are pools to clean! Many of them! Go now!
*DC gets escorted offstage looking dejected and holding a cleaning net, CF notices the camera*
CF – How long has that been there?! I have been on camera this entire time period? Why did no one tell me this? Now everyone has probably been looking at my bad side! Tariq! Executions for everyone, including yourself! Gather a firing squad and then report outside to be shot. Head Dancing Boy, shut off that camera at once!
*TM fumbles with lens, screen changes to the Iraqi flag overlaid with a sad face and ‘WE ARE HAVING TECHNICAL PROBLEMS THANK YOU’ with stereotypical Middle Eastern music playing*
Excerpt from Mother of All Battles: A New History of the Arabian War
By Simon Anderson Naval Institute Press 1995
Fractures
While the potential loss of Riyadh had been planned for by CENTCOM and evacuations of allied personnel and sensitive documents had been underway even before April 7, the fall of a second capital of a sovereign nation to Iraqi forces in less than two months still shocked the world community. In a matter of weeks the armies of Iraq had secured territory far exceeding that of 8 years of bloodied and grinding conflict with Iran. Economically, the price of oil shot up another $5 US on April 12 despite a recent slight decrease thanks to several new pending deals for the Soviet Union to sell oil to the West. While the United States had been less than pleased at the prospect of the Russians gaining lucrative additions to their coffers, for the moment the industrialized nations (particularly Japan) cared little for the source of their oil so long as the taps stayed on. In any case, the United States had far more reason to protest the April 12 announcement from Iraq that it had agreed to release all Soviet citizens and military advisors in exchange for Soviet promises to ‘look more closely at the Iraqi peace proposal’. Though in private Gorbachev would assure allied leaders (among them an incensed President Bush) that these promises did not constitute a shift in the USSR’s disapproval of Iraqi/Yemeni actions, the separate deal to secure their people was a significant blow to thawing Western-Soviet relations.
Among foreign observers, opinions concerning the unexpected Iraqi successes generally fell into two camps of thought; those that felt the events since March 1 proved the might of the Iraqi war machine, and those who believed that the Iraqi victories were simply a case of waging battles against heavily outnumbered and/or undertrained opponents. While there was strong evidence pointing to the validity of the second theory, especially in the wake of the latest reverses suffered by the Republican Guard along the coastal front, the media tended to opt for the theory of Iraqi invincibility in their reports. This was in part the result of CENTCOM’s refusal to allow reporters anywhere near the battle zone and providing information only through carefully arranged press conferences. For journalists being told of allied military successes around Buqayq (an insignificant town few could even locate) when the Saudi capital was flying the Iraqi flag, there was a marked suspicion of allied claims that things would soon swing in their favor. Iraqi propaganda was quick to take advantage of this uncertainty, to the point where the Sunday April 14 edition of the
New York Times devoted a front page spread to an article covering the fall of Riyadh from a ‘trusted inside source’ and published a map depicting ‘future Iraqi military options’. The map in question was an absolute farce to anyone familiar with Iraqi military logistics, showing large red arrows representing Republican Guard columns sweeping across the entire Arabian peninsula and proposed new borders dividing up Arabia between Iraq and Yemen. The trusted insider was later shown to be an Iraqi plant who had deliberately played up the Republican Guard’s capabilities (claiming, for example, that there were no less than 5 Iraqi divisions occupying Riyadh) and an apology and retraction were printed later in the week after several allied military sources came forward to dispute the article.
This prevailing myth of Iraqi strength, while far from accurate, nonetheless found a willing audience who felt the United States was blundering its way through the conflict and had no real idea how to handle the situation. In their defense, it must be noted that CENTCOM faced an extraordinarily difficult situation on the ground during the early weeks of the conflict. With their expected base of support in a state of civil war and military threats operating along multiple axes, General Schwarzkopf was forced to make hard decisions on how to best employ his limited assets in response. Ultimately, the Iraqi force on the coast posed the greatest strategic threat to the allied position and had to be held in check, leaving the defense of Riyadh as a secondary concern to planning. It was a matter of choosing the least odious option, and while the decision to concentrate on the coastal front for the time being was the correct choice, it had lasting consequences both for the alliance and the world at large.
The actual situation within Riyadh leading up to and during its capture was chaos bordering on anarchy. While the majority of American military assets in the capital had been relocated to Qatar well before April 11 (including the precious Patriot batteries pulled in spite of protest), there was still the matter of the U.S. embassy and it staff. Even as Iraqi tanks were entering the northern outskirts of Riyadh, helicopters were frantically shuttling personnel and U.S. citizens from the embassy grounds south to Al Kharj Air Base before placing them on transports bound for Qatar and the UAE. Al Kharj was itself undergoing evacuation procedures in light of the looming threat from Republican Guard forces now 40 miles to its exposed north. Augmented by several ground convoys, the embassy officially closed its doors as the first Iraqi tanks were breaking through at Al Qirawan shortly before nightfall. The evacuation itself proceeded in an acceptable manner despite several instances of transport helicopters taking small arms fire and in one extreme case was targeted by an RPG that thankfully missed. The ground convoys, comprised of groups of buses escorted by Humvees, were subjected to hurled debris from gathered crowds as they left the city, most of which were scattered with tear gas and warning shots. Some hours later, a small Iraqi force would storm the abandoned embassy grounds and hang their flag from the main compound’s roof, leading to more propaganda photographs that were seized on by Saddam as further proof of Iraqi invincibility against the hapless Americans.
For the Sultan government, the evacuation from Riyadh was much more haphazard than the pullout of the Western embassies. Prince Sultan and most of his advisors had secretly fled the capital after the Republican Guard captured Al Maajmah but continued to release televised statements in the following days to give the illusion of still being in the city. In trying to keep the already embattled capital from falling apart completely, Sultan government statements made no mention of the Iraqi advance on Riyadh, though unofficially word had already reached many of the reverses in the north. While provisions were taken to ensure that other (pro-Sultan) high ranking members of the Al Saud family were able to escape Saddam’s grasp, lesser members of the royal family were forced to flee by any means they could secure, paying exorbitant prices for a chance to fly out on the last few flights from Abdul Aziz Airport. Sadly, the Al Sauds placed much higher importance on securing the contents of their palaces than destroying military supplies and government documents, allowing many of these to fall into the Republican Guard’s possession when their tanks rolled in. It was a huge intelligence coup for the Iraqis, giving them the names and locations of thousands of Saudi government officials and, more importantly, Saudi secret police and operatives. Those unfortunate enough to be trapped in Riyadh after April 11 were swiftly tracked down and rounded up by the Republican Guard, with most getting shipped back to Iraq for further interrogation.
After reaching a fever pitch of activity on April 11 as citizens fled south from Riyadh, the situation after the Iraqis took over become one of Republican guard units standing idly by while pro-Nayef forces in the city attacked pro-Sultan areas. The cease-fire between Iraq and the Nayef regime thus far hadn’t translated to open support and assistance in military operations, but the Iraqi military seemed content to let the Saudi factions fight amongst themselves while they tended to their own pressing concerns. Foremost among these were the pointed directives from Baghdad for the 2nd Armored and 4th Mechanized Divisions to continue their advance against Sultan and American positions at the earliest opportunity. The simple truth of the matter was that the advance on Riyadh had badly overextended Iraqi supply lines and it had been a minor miracle that they had been able to push this far south to begin with. With an exposed logistics train running north along the single highway through Hafar al Batin and into occupied Kuwait, even a move against Al Kharj was only somewhat less impossible than a drive along Highway 40 to assist the coastal offensive. Whatever the urgings of their political officers, the 2nd and 4th Divisions were fully committed to maintaining control over their sectors of a rapidly disintegrating city. While pro-Nayef forces were generally consistent in steering clear of confrontations with the Republican Guard within the city, an atmosphere of lawlessness was descending over the Saudi capital as clashes between mobs and street gangs armed from looted government stores increased in both frequency and intensity. By April 15, the Iraqi occupation of Riyadh extended only to certain government structures (centered on the royal palace), the airport, and the main avenues within the city. Eager to avoid getting caught in the crossfire, most of the Iraqis had fortified themselves in the local Army and National Guard bases.
Realizing that their situation was untenable beyond the short term and after prolonged discussion with Baghdad, on April 17 the commander of the 2nd Armored sent out overtures to the head of the Nayef government’s Riyadh branch for a potential turnover of the capital to their forces as a goodwill gesture from Saddam Hussein to Prince Nayef. Not only would the turnover free up the 2nd and 4th for operations elsewhere, but it would strengthen ties between Iraq and a dominant faction of the warring Saudi princes that was becoming increasingly dependent upon Saddam as its primary backer. More importantly, it would be one further nail in the coffins of Prince Sultan and Prince Mansour as the Nayef regime gained one further measure of legitimacy as the rightful King of Saudi Arabia. Understandably, the Nayef government readily accepted the proposal and by April 19 the first column of New Ihkwan vehicles was entering Riyadh to assume control. In a formal ceremony on the antechamber of the royal palace (the very same room that King Fahd had approved the deployment of American soldiers into the country some weeks before), the Republican Guard officially turned over control of the city to Prince Nayef and the New Ihkwan. Though the Iraqis would continue to base two brigades in the area to ostensibly support the Nayef government and protect it from ‘terrorist and pro-imperialist elements’, Riyadh saw its third government within the span of a month take control. Prince Nayef himself would not move into the royal palace until April 22, well after the New Ihkwan had finished securing control of the local facilities and driven the remaining pro-Sultan opposition to ground.
Outside of Riyadh, the loss of the capital had greatly damaged Prince Sultan’s remaining prestige as multiple units and areas abruptly switched allegiances following April 11. In the Asir, the large pro-Sultan area based around Bishah threw their support behind Prince Mansour after fearing for their fates at the hands of Nayef’s New Ihkwan. Elsewhere, the northern town of Arar surrendered to besieging New Ihkwan units in exchange for promises of leniency for the local populace. While the New Ihkwan would initially respect these promises, the defending militia were rounded up and sent into the interior to join other captured Saudis in several camps sprouting up across the central provinces. Cut off after the fall of Riyadh, the towns of Al Duwadimi and Shaqra fell to New Ihkwan assaults on April 16 and by the time of the turnover on April 19 the whole of the Ar Riyad province (with the exception of Al Kharj) had fallen under Prince Nayef’s control.
By April 20 the only area of Saudi Arabia that Prince Sultan could still claim ownership of was that controlled by the United States military, constituting a narrow strip of land stretching from holdouts at Al Kharj east along Highway 10 to the border with Qatar and bulging to the north as far as Judah and Buqayq. With his few remaining loyal commanders operating from new facilities in Al Hofuf, Prince Sultan found himself in much the same position as the Al-Sabahs of Kuwait; completely dependent upon the actions of the West to restore him to the throne. There was one increasingly glaring difference between the two in that while Arab leaders were in agreement over placing the Emir back in control of Kuwait, there was a growing split among Middle Eastern leaders over who to back in the Saudi civil war. Though officially the alliance was still united and dedicated to seeing Saudi Arabia and Kuwait liberated, away from the cameras things were far from ideal. What began more as a matter of location and convenience in helping Prince Mansour secure the western provinces of Saudi Arabia had steadily grown into an Arabian Faction of the alliance spearheaded by Egypt and Syria. Recent weeks had shown the Sultan government to be little more than a proxy of the West and requiring extensive American military support to keep what small bit of territory it had left. With Prince Nayef’s territory serving as a border through central Saudi Arabia, to the east the Gulf states were aligning themselves with the United States’ Western Faction as it was the only thing currently holding the Iraqis at bay, while to the west the Arabian Faction was gaining support among the African states, particularly Morocco and Niger. This division within the alliance over who should become the next ruler of Saudi Arabia was kept secret from the general public and it would be some time before it would begin to interfere directly with allied military activities.
Difficulties and disputes were hardly confined to the allies, as the Iraqis found themselves hopelessly stalled in the advance and unable to make any further progress in the face of American firepower around Buqayq. Making matters worse, April 14 saw the arrival of the first units of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment after its speedy activation and transfer from Germany, bringing CENTCOM one step closer to its desired defensive levels. Though the coastal supply lines were somewhat better protected against air interdiction (despite increasing occurrences of strikes against supply depots by American F-117 stealth fighters), there was only so much that Iraqi logistics could do and by April 15 Saddam had grudgingly approved another halt to allow the exhausted Republican Guard to dig in. Excused as ‘temporary consolidation before the final campaign against the imperialists’, the order gave local Republican Guard commanders some measure of cover for a push had been effectively halted well before that point. Needing a handy scapegoat to explain the recent lack of progress along the coast and the failure to destroy the American enclave, the Republican Guard declared that it had been the victim of Shiite saboteurs and Western agents operating in the Dhahran area. It was an idea that readily appealed to Saddam, who by this stage in the conflict was buying more and more into his own propaganda of Iraqi invincibility against the West. By April 20 hundreds of Shiites had been rounded up in Dhahran on fabricated charges of sabotage against the Iraqi state; most were executed by firing squad in back alleys or simply disappeared. These saboteur sweeps backfired badly on the Iraqis as it led to the formation of an actual Shiite-dominated underground network in Dhahran sympathetic to the allies. For a religious group that had seen decades of persecution and repression from the Saud regime, it realized that its chances under Prince Sultan and the Americans were far more enviable to life under Saddam Hussein’s regime. In an even more interesting development, the Iraqi crackdown on Shiites in Dhahran received criticism from an unexpected corner; that of its ally Yemen. While Yemeni protest was limited to a strongly worded statement from President Saleh, it was the first crack in the Iraqi/Yemeni alliance.
