JFK's Vietnam: intentions, options, & results per the historical record

[hcallega]

The literature I cite says the majority of senior national security council and DoD personnel were convinced that introducing regular troops is the necessary step by mid 1965, though McNamara, MacGeorge Bundy and George Ball all proposed having the option of capping troop levels at less than 100,000 (though obviously McNamara and Bundy let that option slip away). And these were all original Kennedy men, natch.

But even then those lot were all counter balanced by the Joint Chiefs and Westmoreland, who wanted a 'go large' policy by that point (even if interestingly Westmoreland had been more in line with the civilians during '64).

Okay, even if one speculates about Kennedy putting Bobby in as SecDef at the beginning of the second term, and rearranging a bunch of other appointments on the NSC and at the subcabinet level in both DoD and State, and, most importantly of all, giving absolute priority to the CIA's more fatalistic analysis about Rolling Thunder (they thought it wouldn't accomplish much) then there's the brickwall situation of "we are NOT going to plan on some sort of Dunkirk evacuation of our 16,000 men from a defeated RVN." That has to be taken for granted as American policy bedrock. No way round that. And no way he sees the extent of this coming in '64.

My guess is a 'mild escalation' by Kennedy involves giving Westmoreland somewhere around half of what he initially wanted (the general wanted 175,000 in the first big build-up), firing him when he complains and replacing him with a more 'optimistic' field commander (is Taylor still okay for that?), not going for comprehensive pacification across so much of the RVN, instead merely plugging one hole at a time with USMC/Air Cav/Airborne, and making Rolling Thunder into a more Operation Linebacker-ish campaign. I think this allows them to hold on for a couple years, though it means a U.S. 'surge' down the line; mid to late 1967? No doubt they label it a 'go long' policy.

The only other options are the full Johnsonian escalation, Dunkirk, or enter negotiations that allow the 1975 endgame to take place sometime shortly after mid-'65. I discount the possibility of either Dunkirk or proto-Ford taking place under President Kennedy.

Forget the specifics of of what we do or don't think about Kennedy the man. No POTUS elected in 1960 is adopting a 'go home' policy for Vietnam in 1965, not if they've got to the point where 'go home' means turnning their back on the largest peacetime combat advisory mission America has ever had.

Very interesting, and very plausible. Definetly seems like the kind of policy Kennedy would follow.

 

[Magniac]

The opening pages of PP IV C 5 has our history's debate over military strategy for the original buildup of U.S. troops; the original two competing plans were between having a relatively small American presence in a series of enclaves, versus going bigger with 'search and destroy' missions all over the country. Bigger won out in our timeline. (17 battalions versus 44, which off the top of my head is the difference between having either roughly two divisions for the limited scheme, as opposed to almost five in the larger one.)

The enclave scheme would seem to be the kind of limited approach JFK would want, and Maxwell Taylor seems the man to command it. But I think the president wouldn't be able to resist having elite units dedicated for use in heli-borne assaults outside of those zones, as that fits in with his love of special warfare doctrine; so it wouldn't be OTL's enclave plan, it'd be a hybrid with some longer range warfare thrown in. I think it can all be done without having more than 80,000-ish troops in country.

I do have to qualify my notion of them turning Rolling Thunder into Linebacker so early in the piece, as that's probably too much brinksmanship; bombing lines of communications between NVN and the PRC in an era when Mao is not considered a rational actor, that's a stretch for Kennedy.

 

[Chris S]

The opening pages of PP IV C 5 has our history's debate over military strategy for the original buildup of U.S. troops; the original two competing plans were between having a relatively small American presence in a series of enclaves, versus going bigger with 'search and destroy' missions all over the country. Bigger won out in our timeline. (17 battalions versus 44, which off the top of my head is the difference between having either roughly two divisions for the limited scheme, as opposed to almost five in the larger one.)

The enclave scheme would seem to be the kind of limited approach JFK would want, and Maxwell Taylor seems the man to command it. But I think the president wouldn't be able to resist having elite units dedicated for use in heli-borne assaults outside of those zones, as that fits in with his love of special warfare doctrine; so it wouldn't be OTL's enclave plan, it'd be a hybrid with some longer range warfare thrown in. I think it can all be done without having more than 80,000-ish troops in country.

I wonder how that would have affected the war?

I mean overall I doubt any strategy that didn't address the South Vietnamese state becoming legitimized in the eyes of the population (mainly through an end to the pro-Catholic bias and land reform) would save South Vietnam in the long-run...

I do have to qualify my notion of them turning Rolling Thunder into Linebacker so early in the piece, as that's probably too much brinksmanship; bombing lines of communications between NVN and the PRC in an era when Mao is not considered a rational actor, that's a stretch for Kennedy.

And in 1965 Kennedy would have had the 1962 missile crisis on his mind as well as the 1951-1953 fighting between the PRC and US forces under the UN aegis in Korea. I can see why he (and any other president for that matter) would (or went) to extremes to avoid involving the PRC directly.