Japan does not attack Pearl Harbor or the Philippines

[ric350]

What ifJapan attacked the Philippines as OTL, but did not attack PH? After all fuel was a precious commodity to the Japanese, so why waste it going to the Americans? Let the Americans come to them. How would the US ‘41 pacific fleet do against the Japanese navy (and island based bombers) if battle was joined in the western pacific? Now it’s the US whose supply lines are stretched and they are over,atched in number of carriers/experienced air crew. Or would the US not take the bait, and let the Philippines fall?

ric350

 

[prester.john208]

Great list - all of that was tolerable in London given the fact the Americans were in the war. But add a low down backstab by Washington in the form of hiding behind neutrality after Britain gets attacked for doing Washington's bidding, and I wonder if the British will deliver their own ultimatum to Washington - either you make war or we make peace.

Losing the rubber from Malaya hurts Britain. Moving Naval, Australian and Indian forces from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific weakens the position in Europe. It seems the US is willing to fight to the last Soviet or British soldier, on credit.

Given this outcome, FDR's cheerleading for standing up to Germany in the late 1930's, along with the cash and carry policy until Britain was essentially bankrupt and then "Lend-lease" take on a new slant.

 

[prester.john208]

I think that China lobbyists were able to prevent a deal because FDR wanted a deal to be prevented. Generally speaking, if you want a settlement you shut all the special interest groups out. If you don't want a settlement, you widen the discussion as much as possible and give everyone veto power. That's what FDR did, and I don't think it was an error, it was deliberate. I think the Americans simply underestimated the Japanese and had no idea how powerful their initial offensive was going to be.

So Mr "I known war, I hate war." was hoping for a weak attack by Japan? To what purpose?

 

[prester.john208]

have read the German KM (at least) thought a Japanese capture of Singapore would greatly change the war scenario, this being earlier than historical and not involving the US.

That's interesting. What were the comparative timelines? Depending on dates the IJN might have 2 less carriers and fewer Zeros. Britain would have less forces in Malaya and Singapore.

my understanding the idea was the US would be presented with a fait accompli? I'm not convinced it would be so important but what if they did risk an early war, if they attack the British positions would it eclipse the RN raid on Taranto? any other butterflies?

The US has less ability to project power. The Philippines garrison would have fewer resources. Midway, Wake, Hawaii and Guam have weaker defenses and in some cases no airstrips. The Pacific fleets on the West Coast.

No RN Raid on Taranto makes a difference to the Mediterranean balance of power. The inspiration for the torpedo attacks at Pearl Harbor gets removed. Britain might have less ships for the Eastern Fleet.

 

[prester.john208]

What ifJapan attacked the Philippines as OTL, but did not attack PH? After all fuel was a precious commodity to the Japanese, so why waste it going to the Americans? Let the Americans come to them. How would the US ‘41 pacific fleet do against the Japanese navy (and island based bombers) if battle was joined in the western pacific? Now it’s the US whose supply lines are stretched and they are over,atched in number of carriers/experienced air crew. Or would the US not take the bait, and let the Philippines fall?

ric350

There's a good short thread on that from 2017.

WI Japan does not attack Pearl Harbor but still invades the Philippines.

From the thread an interesting US Naval analysis
"""
Carl Schwamberger
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/wi-japan-does-not-attack-pearl-harbor-but-still-invades-the-philippines.430666/page-2#post-16034271

There has been some discussion of the US battle fleet vs the Japanese here. This document discusses how the US naval leaders worked out their doctrines in the 1920s & 30s, and how they perceived their strengths. American Calculations of Battleline Strength, 1941-2 - Alan D. Zimm​

"""

 

[thaddeus]

have read the German KM (at least) thought a Japanese capture of Singapore would greatly change the war scenario, this being earlier than historical and not involving the US.

my understanding the idea was the US would be presented with a fait accompli? I'm not convinced it would be so important but what if they did risk an early war, if they attack the British positions would it eclipse the RN raid on Taranto? any other butterflies?

That's interesting. What were the comparative timelines? Depending on dates the IJN might have 2 less carriers and fewer Zeros. Britain would have less forces in Malaya and Singapore.

The US has less ability to project power. The Philippines garrison would have fewer resources. Midway, Wake, Hawaii and Guam have weaker defenses and in some cases no airstrips. The Pacific fleets on the West Coast.

No RN Raid on Taranto makes a difference to the Mediterranean balance of power. The inspiration for the torpedo attacks at Pearl Harbor gets removed. Britain might have less ships for the Eastern Fleet.

IDK what the timeframe the KM was desirous of a Japanese attack on Singapore, the Germans also wanted to "lease" some ocean going submarines to allow operations in either the Indian Ocean or the Pacific to aid their commerce war against the British & Commonwealth. (they got declined on the subs)

think the KM concept was what @HJ Tulp posted earlier

Do the Japanese launch their offensive at the same point as OTL? As at that point the US government had clearly chosen to stand up to new Japanese aggression. Now this is a lot less clear cut in the Japanese launch an attack on the DEI (or even the DEI+the British possessions) in 1940.

also IDK what if any leverage the Nazi regime had over Japan occupying (Vichy) French Indochina, though putative allies they really did not discuss strategy except in broad strokes? whether they could have prompted an earlier Japanese attack and one that excluded the US seems doubtful but maybe not impossible?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

also IDK what if any leverage the Nazi regime had over Japan occupying (Vichy) French Indochina, though putative allies they really did not discuss strategy except in broad strokes? whether they could have prompted an earlier Japanese attack and one that excluded the US seems doubtful but maybe not impossible?

The German French Armistice required the French not allow other nations into their colonies. In this case the Germans pressured the French into not resisting the Japanese occupation. I am guessing they thought it better the Japanese occupy them vs the British, as the Brits were busy doing elsewhere.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

This doesn’t explain though why there was no long distance reconnaissance, ammunition for anti-aircraft weapons were kept in storage lockers, and there were no alerts issued. The only preparations taken by General Short were to prepare for an internal attack or sabotage. General Short explicitly stated in testimony that he did not take preparations to repel attack because he believed it would compromise his orders not to alarm the public or incite Japan

There were a few LD reconnaissance flight launched the previous days. One of the problems in the 'Surge of preparation on the days after the 27 November War Warning was the PBY squadrons were run down. Inadequate stock of spare parts, to few aircraft to run a proper search program, and overuse on the 28th thru 3rd or 4th December. To many aircraft were on the deadline after a frantic week. A second problem is the USN expected the enemy fleet to come from True to the SW. Much closer and the bulk of the IJN battle fleet was based there. Without enough aircraft to search everywhere the priority was in the wrong direction.

and there were no alerts issued.

The "consider hostile" part of the War Warning was in effect. That produced the standing order the Ward was operating under when it attacked the suspect submarine that morning. The pursuit planes of the ready squadrons were staged with guns installed, maintenance checks done the previous day, and ammunition in easy reach. Unfortunately no one had ordered any pilots to be on stand by that morning.

Ironically had the Japanese not been delayed a week by their preparations the defenses would have been much more active the previous Sunday. Originally the nominal or target date of the Japanese was Thanksgiving Holiday, but that was set back early in the preparations.

 

[HJ Tulp]

The German French Armistice required the French not allow other nations into their colonies. In this case the Germans pressured the French into not resisting the Japanese occupation. I am guessing they thought it better the Japanese occupy them vs the British, as the Brits were busy doing elsewhere.

The French capitulation is less straightforward than that though.

- June 1940: FIC officials request help from the US but are turned down.
- September 1940: US blocks arms shipments to FIC.
- June 1940: GG Catroux signals to the UK that he is willing to go over to the British, if they support him against the Japanese. The Britons signal back that they have nothing to spare and are unwilling to offer any guarentees.
- Afterwards the Royal Navy enforced a worldwide shipping blockade which stopped an attempt to reinforce the FIC with 4 Senegalese battalions. The same happened with the carrier Bearn, which was planned to reinforce the FIC with 90 modern planes.
- The US government refused any more arms deliveries to the FIC.

Only after this period did the Germans use the terms of the Armistice to stop any French reinforcement of the FIC.


EDIT: All this per Paradise in Peril by Bussemaker.

 

[thevaliant]

Yamamoto gets overruled and Japan only goes after the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, New Guinea, the Solomans and Vietnam to get strategic materials, oil and cut off China from the west. The Kidō Butai vs Force Z and the Far East fleet.

No war with the US.

Has this scenario been discussed?

We're seven pages in, so I'm not reading them all, but page 1 is mostly a fantasy scenario.

Here's how it really goes:

Japan attacks Dutch/UK holdings, steaming past the Philippines in doing so.
The US (especially Roosevelt) goes ape, but can't openly declare war; so don't.
The US sends lots of ships to the Philippines to protect her, just in case.

About two months into the war, a Japanese task force, or other convoy is steaming past a US equivalent.
The Japanese identify the ships as British and attack them (or if that absolutely does not work, the US ships 'see them attacking' some Philippino fishing boats and strike back).

Cue World War II, just a little bit later.

 

[Sekhmet_D]

About two months into the war, a Japanese task force, or other convoy is steaming past a US equivalent.
The Japanese identify the ships as British and attack them (or if that absolutely does not work, the US ships 'see them attacking' some Philippino fishing boats and strike back).

Cue World War II, just a little bit later.

That's the Army. This is the Navy.

The IJA mid level management was prone to swanning off on their own and starting wars. I cannot think of any instance where someone from the IJN did something similar.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Well at best they were guilty of misidentification. The misidentification scenario is the most likely. Another is The 'Neutral or Exclusion Zone' the US places around the Philippines is so large and constrictive the Japanese leaders back in Tokyo, and the admirals herding cargo and warships past lose patience with US arrogance and violations ramp up as ships or convoys cut through the Neutral Zone. Both US surface ship patrols, and air patrols would be Incident material. A US destroyer or gun boat showing the flag in the path of a Japanese cruiser commander gets run down. A Japanese carrier transiting inside or outside the Neutral Zone takes affront at a US PBY or B18 and the admiral pics the CAP on the patrol. One incident won't start a war, but as in the Atlantic multiple incidents bring things right up to the tipping point.

 

[Glenn239]

So Mr "I known war, I hate war." was hoping for a weak attack by Japan? To what purpose?

To defeat the Axis, obviously.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The IJA mid level management was prone to swanning off on their own and starting wars. I cannot think of any instance where someone from the IJN did something similar.

I've often wondered if there is any claim the mid level management were connected by family to the those upper management who ran the Zaibatsu? Ordinarily I didn't pay much attention to shadow government theories. But after living in Japan two years and studying some of the history I am aware of how in that culture these deep rooted traditions and opaque lines of power are important. Probably take someone much smarter than me to sort that one out one way or the other.