And thousands dead and many more left permanently disfigured. And if we are just going to look at economics, even by late 1862, prices on basic commodities had gone up considerably. By spring 1863, you had a bread riot in Richmond. And even if the war ends before that, the South is going to be struggling quite a bit economically.
Sure, some morons will see Southerners as invincible, but many will recognize that war shouldn't be something taken up lightly.
Prices on basic commodities going up is because of war problems, not something that will necessarily last beyond the war.
Your argument for a new war being likely is almost exclusively dependent on the stereotype that Southerners are a bunch of trigger-happy yahoos.
No. Its dependent on the reality that Southern leadership up to and through the ACW was a bunch of irresponsible twits. Whether One Armed Johnny swears to eternal pacifism or not is going to influence them not at all.
The average Southerner's personal cool headedness doesn't matter if President Insert Name Here is in the mold of a generation of southern politicians before him.
This is essentially the problem with arguing this way. I provide a list of reasons that, collectively, would work towards maintaining peace, and you address them individually failing to be a silver bullet. Also, I don't know if by "prevent" you mean "guarantee against" or "discourage". If it's the former, I totally agree. If it's the latter, I completely disagree.
I'm addressing them individually for two reasons:
1) Its easier to post why a given thing has or has not influence piece by piece - purely organizational.
2) Because they have to have some weight and validity in order for the cumulative effect to be a hill of beans.
It's not about - for example - commerce not being a silver bullet. It's about it not even being a silver painted bullet.
It's not irrelevant at all. People who opposed the war (or secession in the case of the Confederates) would have very different attitudes towards their family members on the other side of the border than people who whole-heartedly supported it.
Looking at the Terrills (If you have another family we can study the individuals in without exhaustive geneology work and mind this example, please share) - its not that William is living outside Virginia that's the problem.
Except that very statement is treating them as monolithic groups. Some families were shattered. Some love turned to hate and animosity. You're painting with a very broad brush.
I'm painting with no wider a brush than you are in speaking of "family ties" as a positive force for peace.
Who ever said that separating the US was going to bring families together? That's absurd. I said that family connections would do more to maintain peace than the lack of family connections.
And given examples like the Terrills, where family members are going to have seen each other as on the side of the enemy, family "connections" are not going to be what they were in 1860.
Where do I even begin with this?...
Ok, let me just clarify something before I pounce: Are you saying that the Napoleonic Wars were just another European war in which Britain did not see the stakes as being especially high?
I never used the phrase "just another European war". But its not some extraordinary event that represented unique circumstances - Louis XIV a century and change earlier was probably more of a threat to Britain than Napoleon was. Britain had been in a pretty intense conflict only half a century earlier (Seven Years War), and that's not even counting the part of the American Revolution that was a world war as far as Britain is concerned.
"Britain is fighting France in a major war with far reaching effects as Britain tries to stop France with every means available" has happened too many times to treat Napoleon as more than the last and bloodiest.
Actually, it's extremely important. There's been lots of "flash points" for Britain and the United States to go to war since 1815. It hasn't happened.
Britain and the United States have generally had an interest in peaceful relations, and the latter (as the weaker country) generally has had leadership that isn't convinced that war would be easy. That is going to be considerably harder to find in the gung-ho leadership of the Confederacy.
So why did 1812 happen? Because Britain was in an extraordinary situation where it saw its repeated violations as being vitally necessary. It had to be in a situation where all of the disincentives for angering the USA to the point of war were superseded.
Which is not some freakish occurrence, as neutrals from earlier conflicts (above) would testify.
So the point is that war between the two has been extremely rare in spite of all the times it could have started. Could war have broken out? Sure. But it was improbable because of the connections between Britain and the USA. So could war have broken out between the USA and CSA? Sure. I never denied that. But it is also improbable given the bonds between them.
The bonds between the mid-19th century UK and the mid 19th century US are considerably stronger than anything that exists between the CSA and the USA.
Is the CSA one of the most important trade partners to the USA?
Are ambitions in regards to expansion things that can slide smoothly past each other?
Not even about the CSA attacking or the USA attacking, #2 is how much the same territories are desired by both sides. Since that list of territories includes, for example, Kentucky - that's definitely out.
Again, I'm not sure what you mean by "prevent". As I said in my first post, I'm not saying a war was impossible merely improbable.
Answering here to avoid answering twice:
Prevent as in, when war tensions arise, these factors will be larger than the factors aggravating the problem. Not necessarily render outright impossible, but be bigger forces than things making relations less likely to go well (the idea of one side as "traitors", for example).
The Midwest is shipping a lot by rail. Not exclusively by rail. Disrupting existing commercial transport is a disincentive... like all of the other things that I've mentioned. Senators and Congressmen from the Midwestern states will be taking that into account. The relationship with the railroads will make a difference as well because the increased rail traffic will mean a rise in rates. That will likely be viewed with suspicion given the existing mistrust of the rail companies.
An increasing lot by rail. Business down the Mississippi being important enough to be a big influence on Midwestern attitudes on fighting the CSA raises the question of how much the Midwest states would, to the extent this commerce is a thing, be more interested in war so as to not pay tariffs on shipping down the Mississippi.
Never mind the fact that you've almost exclusively been portraying the Confederates as the aggressors in a future war. The US has enough reason to be hesitant having lost the last war.
As stated above, because the Confederacy is lead by irresponsible twits. A lot of the "caused by friction" scenarios require someone who would - to use something that didn't turn into a war between the US and UK - actually follow up on "54-40 or fight", which is a lot more like the secessionist leadership than 19th century US national leadership was OTL.
The issue of there being another war because the US wants to retake what it considers to have lost is another issue in regards to the likelihood of war than the issue of something, at some point, leading to war.
About as likely as the US and Britain forming standing alliances with each other's enemies because a war could break out across the Canadian border.
I'm fairly sure that if the US of the first decade or two of the 19th century felt it had a good ally in X it being an enemy of Britain would be a bonus. As for the US, it up until around the ACW isn't significant enough to have enemies outside North American enemies (besides potentially Britain).
This is an ASB example. Alliances almost always come with conditions. It is ludicrous to think that the CSA would sign an alliance to declare war every single time France (of all people!) gets into a scrape with somebody.
"Hi, we want to be your ally, but we don't actually want to take part in any conflicts of yours. Is that okay?"
If the CSA allies with France, that's going beyond an agreement to be benevolently neutral into an agreement to actually be a partner.
There's no reason for France to accept an alliance with the CSA where the CSA can avoid any involvement in any wars outside North America - what good is that for France?
As for "France of all people", I'm going to clarify here I'm picking France because of the UK's policy against long term alliances in this period. A CSA-Prussia alliance would be interesting if some conditions happened to make either side want it.
Or CSA-Japan.
Trying to think of other Great Powers who are interesting enough that their polices matter (sorry Italy, you're not a Great Power).