Hitler resumes the Phoney War after the Fall of France.

[ObssesedNuker]

You're aware that is a huge disparity, right?

Quite. And why I pretty much rule out any successful major Soviet offensive until it gets fixed. IOTL it was fixed by pretty much the wholesale disbanding of the mechanized corps and reducing all the tank divisions into brigades (the motor-rifle divisions were converted into regular rifle divisions) as the Soviets realized that between being caught in the middle of their build-up and reform program on the one hand and taking huge losses on the other, they lacked the trained personnel, officers, and equipment to operate any kind of large mechanized formations. ITTL, either they will notice it during the major exercises in autumn-winter 1941 (which I think is more possible then you might give it credit for: the discrepancy is much bigger then the one between the 1939-1940 panzer divisions and the 1941 panzer divisions) and fix it or they figure it out when their first major counter-offensive founders because of it. The response will probably re-organization of the mechanized corps instead of disbandment.

I should note as an aside that it is possible that the Soviets might have held additional support vehicles ready in independent units directly under corps command. While this would fit with the Soviet's mania for centralization of command and control, I have not seen much evidence for it.

I was watching a history documentary and a Panzer commander said that what really gave them an edge was their radios

Soviet industry was just beginning mass-production of indigenously developed portable military radios in June 1941.

and tactics where at a whim they can all change direction at once and essentially choose their battles.

The entire nature of Soviet-style fortifications inhibits this, whether at the Stalin line, the Molotov-Voroshilov line, or at Kursk. The bunkers and fortified positions do not simply try to form a solid line, instead they are a series of interconnected fortified points that are designed to break-up attacks and channel the enemy formations onto prepared kill-zones. And both the fortifications and Soviet forces are arranged in-depth. And the Soviets are using their tactical and operational reserves to launch counter-attacks against the German spearhead's flanks every opportunity they get. And while the Germans are busy attempting to fight through the first strategic line of defenses, the Soviet strategic reserves not-yet-committed-to-the-battle (probably those freshly raised 13 reserve armies, as the rest of the 2nd echelon will be moving to reinforce the first) are busy working at throwing up new lines of defense on the Pskov-Denieper line.

In other words, if the Germans attack a completed and fully-manned Voroshilov-Molotov line they are going to find their only options for maneuver to by pass these bunker positions will be where the Soviets want them to go. In order to bring this advantage back into play the Germans have to breakthrough first and (a) do so rapidly enough before the Soviets can reinforce and murder whatever chance they have for a breakthrough and (b) make sure they don't take so many losses and suffer so much combat-strain that they find themselves too exhausted to exploit a breakthrough, thereby allowing the Soviets the opportunity to either bottle them back up or withdraw from their exposed positions.

As for the other points, all I can say is that I beleive the USSR had a 5.5 million man army max on all fronts.

In June 1941 IOTL. Not on June 1942 ITTL. Which you know, is what the discussion is about.

And note the specifics of my post:

Just bringing the Soviet formations that existed in June 1941 west of the Urals up to full manpower strength gives them 5,568,873 men west of the Urals

(Emphasis added)
From what I recall, there were only 20 Soviet rifle divisions in the European USSR on June 22nd which were in the 90+% range of their full manpower strength. Everyone else was radically understrength because the Soviets were still steadily building up and training those formations. Even when that is completed, a number of the formations in the second echelon would probably be kept understrength with the intent to fill them out with reservists in the event of mobilization and therefore war.

Which, you know, would be the case for a minimum of a month (likely longer) before the German attack ITTL.

If you can provide data that shows exactly what they were East of the Urals too, I'd take those numbers more seriously.

On June 22nd 1941 IOTL? Roughly 1.3-1.4 million. The Soviets transferred 200,000 of that westward by the end of July. Beyond that date it becomes harder to tell, since the Soviets were constantly raising and training fresh formations out there only to then ship them to the European side of the Urals as soon as they were ready. I do know that the Far Eastern Military Districts never dropped below 500,000 and never went past ~1 million (until the war with Germany ended and the Soviets shipped a whole bunch of guys over to smash into Manchuria of course). But as for the Siberian and Central Asian military district's? After July 1941... I'm not sure until 1943, after which I can guess.

 

[Devolved]

I recently read a book by Peter Fleming about Operation Sealion. He suggests that one possible course of action for Hitler after the Fall of France, in dealing with Britain, would have been to resume the Phoney War. The point seems to be that the German air-offensive and preparations served only to galvanise British resistance, and created a heroic myth which strengthened the will to go on fighting in Britain, and created sympathy and admiration in America. If the Germans had adopted a defensive posture, then over the course of time, the British would have wearied of the endless privations and economic hardship while questioning the futility of it all. The inability of the British to carry the war to the Germans in any materially significant way would have been highlighted, and a strong peace-lobby may have developed.

I personally do not know if this view has any merit, but what do other people think?

The problem with that strategy is how long do you wait for that to happen?

The one thing that worried Hitler was time. Waiting wasn't really his style and if he takes no military action then the British simply replace their Battle of France losses much more quickly and if they feel like there's going to be no invasion then they would save a lot of resources that OTL went on anti-invasion preparations well into 1942.

The British government would simply say that Hitler wasn't attacking because he was scared. Invading Denmark, Norway, Belgium was something he could handle but not the home of the Empire etc.

British morale would actually rise and the peace movement would be accused of wanting to save the Nazis rather than save Britain from bombing and terror.

Within a few months you are into 1941. British cities are intact, no losses from the Blitz or BoB and a population wondering when they were going to liberate the conquered peoples. The RAF would still raid targets in Europe although more focus on purely military targets. At sea the Royal Navy is still going to fire on anything that belongs to the Axis, the Commandos are still going to mount raids in increasing strength. I don't see the Germans turning the other cheek forever. If a peace movement develops then I can see Churchill delberately provoking Hitler into doing something stupid so as to unite the country.

 

[MattII]

Britain in N.Africa and supply lines- Britain has much more sea going resupply capacity than the axis did. The only way this could become an issue is if the retreating Italians make a special effort to ruin ports as they go.

What ports? They stood no chance of doing that with Tobruk, and I don't think the British ever did much with Benghazi (what they could do anyway was limited given it was pretty poor to begin with). The thing about another 'Phoney War' is that both sides get the time to rearms, so when they do eventually clash again, Britain is that much further ahead of OTL, given that no invasion scare means no shelving of projects like the Valentine Tank and 6 Pounder.

 

[Devolved]

What ports? They stood no chance of doing that with Tobruk, and I don't think the British ever did much with Benghazi (what they could do anyway was limited given it was pretty poor to begin with). The thing about another 'Phoney War' is that both sides get the time to rearms, so when they do eventually clash again, Britain is that much further ahead of OTL, given that no invasion scare means no shelving of projects like the Valentine Tank and 6 Pounder.

The invasion scare probably set the British army back two years in terms of equipment.

Benghazi was a useful port but the British never got much of a chance to exploit it as OTL early 1941 almost everything was being sent to Greece and in early 1942 stuff was being diverted to the Far East before Rommel took it back.

 

[rubix]

Hitler lost the war as soon as he started it. Britain had him in checkmate from day one and would eventually defeat him with or without help from the U.S. or USSR

The best thing he could have done is surrender after the fall of France and pray Britain would be generous.

 

[MattII]

Going to disagree with that, it was his own policies that put him in an untenable position, and the best Britain could have done would be to hold on.

 

[Devolved]

Going to disagree with that, it was his own policies that put him in an untenable position, and the best Britain could have done would be to hold on.

I think he was joking. He certainly couldn't be serious.

 

[rubix]

Britain gets nuclear weapons 1946-1949. Berlin along with Hitler is gone in the first blast. Germany surrenders or gets nuked more.

 

[pattersonautobody]

Britain gets nuclear weapons 1946-1949. Berlin along with Hitler is gone in the first blast. Germany surrenders or gets nuked more.

46? Nah, by 1943. And then after Germany is nuked into surrender, they'll Anthrax them to death just to show how tough they are.

 

[pattersonautobody]

In June 1941 IOTL. Not on June 1942 ITTL. Which you know, is what the discussion is about.

Understood. So, in 1941 to have numbers as large as 5.6 million takes into account the calling up of reserves and raising or armies that already occurred OTL.

IN 1942, the issue more is whether Stalin really sought having much more than another million men total in his standing army. As we already discussed, it also begs the question whether Hitler would have been smart and continued growing his army instead of leaving it around the same. Being that war is health of the state, I imagine he keeps growing it anyway.

 

[rubix]

Understood. So, in 1941 to have numbers as large as 5.6 million takes into account the calling up of reserves and raising or armies that already occurred OTL.

IN 1942, the issue more is whether Stalin really sought having much more than another million men total in his standing army. As we already discussed, it also begs the question whether Hitler would have been smart and continued growing his army instead of leaving it around the same. Being that war is health of the state, I imagine he keeps growing it anyway.

Why can't you accept that Germany would NOT win an attrition war with the USSR, especially with lend-lease? The USSR has a far greater manpower pool than Germany. Sorry, but it is the truth.

 

[pattersonautobody]

Why can't you accept that Germany would NOT win an attrition war with the USSR, especially with lend-lease? The USSR has a far greater manpower pool than Germany. Sorry, but it is the truth.

I think I agree with you and Obsessed on this one, I just wanted to tease out the German's chances of cracking the Molotov Line and what the realistic build ups would be. Indeed, any delay in the German time table and any increased losses puts the Germans farther west than OTL, denying the USSR less of their manpower and natural resources, and begins a downward spiral for Germany as long as the USSR has Lend Lease from some source.

However, the position I have taken here, and will cease because it is OT, is the effects of the British dropping out of the war from the continuation of the Phony War. This means, the soonest the Germans could attack is 1942 in such a scenerio, presuming the gambit works.

I have argued, I believe convincingly, elsewhere that Axis demographics were close to equivalent to the USSR (160 million to 180 million). They had a greater GDP, but less vital resources such as oil. If a war became a fight to the death attrtional battle, barring US entry, the Axis would eventually win as the kill ratios were in their favor and barring Wallies bombing out German industry, German superiority in aircraft and weaponry would ensure that the favorable kill ratios would continue. If someone chooses to pick a bone with this point, I would rather cover that in another thread than here and give you the last word on it.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Understood. So, in 1941 to have numbers as large as 5.6 million takes into account the calling up of reserves

Only west of the Urals, yes. In it's total the entire Soviet army (both west and east of the Urals) was already 5.5 million on June 22nd 1941.

and raising or armies that already occurred OTL.

Pre-June 22nd, yeah. The armies raised after June 22nd 1941 OTL are a different matter.

I should observe that had the Soviet formations in the European USSR in June 1942 IOTL been at full manpower strength, the Soviets would have ~7.5 million men on the western side of the Urals. Had their formations IOTL 1943-1944 been at full manpower strength, the number would have been between 9 and 10 million.

If not for the losses (both manpower and industrial) of their first year in the war, the Red Army had the potential to become even more of a monster then it did IOTL.