Another possibility: more French troops escape the pockets at Dunkirk and Lille via land routes--ie either start out south of the Panzer corridor and stay there or pull back south of the Panzers' path before they reach the sea.
The 3rd DCR (French heavy armored division) wasn't really ready for combat on May 10th and should probably have been kept in reserve/training status rather than being tossed into battle, for example. Instead of getting wasted as scattered pillboxes--all that the commander felt it was ready to handle, it could have given the French two armored divisions rather than one after Dunkirk--not enough by itself to change the balance, but enough to help, assuming that the extra month before going into battle was enough to remedy the worst of the training deficiencies. The French might also have been able to get some of their DLMs (light armored divisions) south of the Panzer Corridor if they had (a) Not allowed local commanders to take control of the divisions' S35s (in the case of the 3rd DLM) and stall for days on giving them back and (b) Made their prime focus getting mobile troops south of the closing pocket rather than trying to cut through the Panzer Corridor when it was already too late to do so.
Weygand froze French decision-making for a crucial few days when he took over. He should have immediately started trying to get mobile forces in position to (a) Keep a corridor open as long as possible to get as much of the French army out of Belgium, and (b) Keep the channel ports (not just Dunkirk) in Allied hands as long as possible, hopefully keeping a bridgehead there that could be resupplied and sustain any forces that couldn't get south of the corridor as a fighting force to threaten the German flanks if they headed south. There were a lot of good reasons Dunkirk alone wasn't sustainable except as an evacuation port, but add in several other ports and you might be able to sustain a bridgehead. The French were hoping to do that historically, but events moved too fast for them.
That could actually make for an interesting battle, with the Brits bringing over Spitfires as aircover for the bridgehead and moving destroyers and cruisers in to hammer German forces if they got within range of the coast.
Chew up enough German forces and enough time in the north and/or force them to leave covering forces around an Allied bridgehead and it starts looking a little less impossible for the French. I would still bet on a German victory, but I wouldn't give you very long odds on it.
The 3rd DCR (French heavy armored division) wasn't really ready for combat on May 10th and should probably have been kept in reserve/training status rather than being tossed into battle, for example. Instead of getting wasted as scattered pillboxes--all that the commander felt it was ready to handle, it could have given the French two armored divisions rather than one after Dunkirk--not enough by itself to change the balance, but enough to help, assuming that the extra month before going into battle was enough to remedy the worst of the training deficiencies. The French might also have been able to get some of their DLMs (light armored divisions) south of the Panzer Corridor if they had (a) Not allowed local commanders to take control of the divisions' S35s (in the case of the 3rd DLM) and stall for days on giving them back and (b) Made their prime focus getting mobile troops south of the closing pocket rather than trying to cut through the Panzer Corridor when it was already too late to do so.
Weygand froze French decision-making for a crucial few days when he took over. He should have immediately started trying to get mobile forces in position to (a) Keep a corridor open as long as possible to get as much of the French army out of Belgium, and (b) Keep the channel ports (not just Dunkirk) in Allied hands as long as possible, hopefully keeping a bridgehead there that could be resupplied and sustain any forces that couldn't get south of the corridor as a fighting force to threaten the German flanks if they headed south. There were a lot of good reasons Dunkirk alone wasn't sustainable except as an evacuation port, but add in several other ports and you might be able to sustain a bridgehead. The French were hoping to do that historically, but events moved too fast for them.
That could actually make for an interesting battle, with the Brits bringing over Spitfires as aircover for the bridgehead and moving destroyers and cruisers in to hammer German forces if they got within range of the coast.
Chew up enough German forces and enough time in the north and/or force them to leave covering forces around an Allied bridgehead and it starts looking a little less impossible for the French. I would still bet on a German victory, but I wouldn't give you very long odds on it.