Across the high frontier: a Big Gemini space TL
- Thread starter Archibald
- Start date
Archibald
Banned
Yes, butterflies will flap their wings in many areas, far beyond spaceflight.
The whole thing is an utopia centred around the space program.
I'm no Bainbrin, but I have some cool alternate movies and sci-fi in the pipeline.
James Bond will be altered (guess which one ?! hint - after 1975
)
Peter Hyams 2010 Odyssey two will be altered (2001 was before my POD)
Star Trek will be impacted.
Some politics will be changed here and there.
So far this TL extends well past 2001.
Goddam, last time I checked it had 460 000 words ! And it is still growing.
The whole thing is an utopia centred around the space program.
I'm no Bainbrin, but I have some cool alternate movies and sci-fi in the pipeline.
James Bond will be altered (guess which one ?! hint - after 1975
) Peter Hyams 2010 Odyssey two will be altered (2001 was before my POD)
Star Trek will be impacted.
Some politics will be changed here and there.
So far this TL extends well past 2001.
Goddam, last time I checked it had 460 000 words !
And it is still growing.
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Soviets in space (4)
Archibald
Banned
a bit of fun with the Soviet space program. It's only a beginning !
August 16, 1971
Moscow
Our lunar program is officially dead - but does this man realize it ?
Dmitryi Ustinov asked himself as he listened Vasily Mishin speech. Ustinov did not really hated Mishin - not as much as he scorned Chelomey.
Much like the rest of the soviet space establishment, he was very pissed-off by Mishin repeated failures - four dead astronauts, one space station and three N-1 blown up in five years.
But they were not talking about the past, not today.
No-one knew what the Americans were up to; and to the Soviets that was as much disturbing as Mishin blunders.
Since they had lost initiative in the Gemini days, the Soviets just reacted to American plans by forging similar projects.
That meant that every proposal of the now defunct Space Task Group - Moon, Mars or space station - had a soviet counterpart.
The Soviet Union had been beaten on the Moon. They had started three years late; they had only half of the funds required; and their own Saturn V, the N-1, had been a miserable failure so far. Because of bureaucratic inertia two years after the race was lost the Soviet lunar program - the L3 - was still running, although in a rather uncertain direction and much like a beheaded chicken.
Mishin continued his rambling.
"The Soviet space station effort would start off with Salyut, then move to Chelomey's military Almaz, and then finally migrate to MKBS-1 in the mid-1970s and MKBS-2 by the end of the decade - Zvezda first, then Zarya.
I already have plans to launch Zvezda first components on N1 boosters 10L and 11L, perhaps amid the initial lunar exploration phase of the L3 or L3M project."
Damn - he his still talking about the old, clunky L3. And he wants to integrate Chelomey Almaz in a line of space stations leading to the MKBS.
Should I sack this guy ?
The future of the Soviet space program ended as essentially tailored to what would NASA do; there were contingency options for Mars, the Moon, and space stations.
By contrast, Ustinov briefly thought, there had been very little work done on a soviet space shuttle; but all things considered that was NASA worst option of alls, the one that made the least sense...
August 16, 1971
Moscow
Our lunar program is officially dead - but does this man realize it ?
Dmitryi Ustinov asked himself as he listened Vasily Mishin speech. Ustinov did not really hated Mishin - not as much as he scorned Chelomey.
Much like the rest of the soviet space establishment, he was very pissed-off by Mishin repeated failures - four dead astronauts, one space station and three N-1 blown up in five years.
But they were not talking about the past, not today.
No-one knew what the Americans were up to; and to the Soviets that was as much disturbing as Mishin blunders.
Since they had lost initiative in the Gemini days, the Soviets just reacted to American plans by forging similar projects.
That meant that every proposal of the now defunct Space Task Group - Moon, Mars or space station - had a soviet counterpart.
The Soviet Union had been beaten on the Moon. They had started three years late; they had only half of the funds required; and their own Saturn V, the N-1, had been a miserable failure so far. Because of bureaucratic inertia two years after the race was lost the Soviet lunar program - the L3 - was still running, although in a rather uncertain direction and much like a beheaded chicken.
Mishin continued his rambling.
"The Soviet space station effort would start off with Salyut, then move to Chelomey's military Almaz, and then finally migrate to MKBS-1 in the mid-1970s and MKBS-2 by the end of the decade - Zvezda first, then Zarya.
I already have plans to launch Zvezda first components on N1 boosters 10L and 11L, perhaps amid the initial lunar exploration phase of the L3 or L3M project."
Damn - he his still talking about the old, clunky L3. And he wants to integrate Chelomey Almaz in a line of space stations leading to the MKBS.
Should I sack this guy ?
The future of the Soviet space program ended as essentially tailored to what would NASA do; there were contingency options for Mars, the Moon, and space stations.
By contrast, Ustinov briefly thought, there had been very little work done on a soviet space shuttle; but all things considered that was NASA worst option of alls, the one that made the least sense...
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Battle for the space shuttle (5)
Archibald
Banned
August 25, 1971
OMB deputy director Caspar Weinberger red again Nixon answer. Three weeks before, he had tentatively proposed the NASA administrator a FY73 budget well below $3 billion. There was no space shuttle, of course; it was way too expensive to fit into that budget envelope.
James Fletcher answer had been blunt.
Then manned spaceflight will die, since NASA has no option outside the Space Shuttle.
Weinberger had not realized that; would his name be forever associated with the end of US manned spaceflight ?
Not that NASA expansive stunts really mattered to him; what mattered was the predictable loss of prestige against the Soviet Union that would inevitably follow closure of Apollo, Skylab and the shuttle.
He had thus changed his mind, and wrote to Nixon, defending a higher budget for NASA.
“Present tentative plans call for major reductions or change in NASA, by eliminating the last two Apollo flights (16 and 17), and eliminating or sharply reducing the balance of the Manned Space Program (Skylab and Space Shuttle) and many remaining NASA programs.
I believe this would be a mistake.
1) The real reason for sharp reductions in the NASA budget is that NASA is entirely in the 28% of the budget that is controllable. In short we cut it because it is cuttable, not because it is doing a bad job or an unnecessary one.
2) We are being driven, by the uncontrollable items, to spend more and more on programs that offer no real hope for the future: Model Cities, OEO, Welfare, interest on the National Debt, unemployment compensation, Medicare, etc. Of course, some of these have to be continued, in one form or another, but essentially they are programs, not of our choice, designed to repair mistakes of the past, not of our making.
3) We do need to reduce the budget, in my opinion, but we should not make all our reduction decisions on the basis of what is reducible, rather than on the merits of individual programs.
4) There is real merit to the future of NASA, and its proposed programs. The Space Shuttle and NERVA particularly offer the opportunity, among other things, to secure substantial scientific fall-out for the civilian economy at the same time that large numbers of valuable (and hard-to-employ-elsewhere) scientists and engineers are kept at work on projects that increase our knowledge of space, our ability to develop for lower cost space exploration, travel, and to secure, through NERVA, twice the existing propulsion efficiency for our rockets.
(…)
Cancellation of Apollo 16 and Apollo 17 would have a very bad effect, coming so soon after Apollo 15's triumph. It would be confirming, in some respects, a belief that I fear is gaining credence at home and abroad: That our best years are behind us, that we are turning inward, reducing our defence commitments, and voluntarily starting to give up our super-power status, and our desire to maintain our world superiority.
America should be able to afford something besides increased welfare, programs to repair our cities, or Appalachian relief and the like....
7) I believe I can find enough reductions in other programs to pay for continuing NASA at generally the $3.3 - $3.4 billion level I propose here. This figure is about $400 - $500 million more than the present planning targets.
The answer to his pledge was kind of a milestone. Weinberger's memo featured a handwritten annotation by the president.
"I agree with Cap."
Manned spaceflight would not die with Skylab or Apollo. Astronauts would continue flying in space, in a ship that remained to be defined, probably a space shuttle - depending from the development costs, however.
The fight for the space shuttle has started Weinberger thought.
Powerful political forces were already moving; Mathematica and NASA faced Nixon Bureau of budget and Science Advisory Committee.
The battle would be of epic proportions.
OMB deputy director Caspar Weinberger red again Nixon answer. Three weeks before, he had tentatively proposed the NASA administrator a FY73 budget well below $3 billion. There was no space shuttle, of course; it was way too expensive to fit into that budget envelope.
James Fletcher answer had been blunt.
Then manned spaceflight will die, since NASA has no option outside the Space Shuttle.
Weinberger had not realized that; would his name be forever associated with the end of US manned spaceflight ?
Not that NASA expansive stunts really mattered to him; what mattered was the predictable loss of prestige against the Soviet Union that would inevitably follow closure of Apollo, Skylab and the shuttle.
He had thus changed his mind, and wrote to Nixon, defending a higher budget for NASA.
“Present tentative plans call for major reductions or change in NASA, by eliminating the last two Apollo flights (16 and 17), and eliminating or sharply reducing the balance of the Manned Space Program (Skylab and Space Shuttle) and many remaining NASA programs.
I believe this would be a mistake.
1) The real reason for sharp reductions in the NASA budget is that NASA is entirely in the 28% of the budget that is controllable. In short we cut it because it is cuttable, not because it is doing a bad job or an unnecessary one.
2) We are being driven, by the uncontrollable items, to spend more and more on programs that offer no real hope for the future: Model Cities, OEO, Welfare, interest on the National Debt, unemployment compensation, Medicare, etc. Of course, some of these have to be continued, in one form or another, but essentially they are programs, not of our choice, designed to repair mistakes of the past, not of our making.
3) We do need to reduce the budget, in my opinion, but we should not make all our reduction decisions on the basis of what is reducible, rather than on the merits of individual programs.
4) There is real merit to the future of NASA, and its proposed programs. The Space Shuttle and NERVA particularly offer the opportunity, among other things, to secure substantial scientific fall-out for the civilian economy at the same time that large numbers of valuable (and hard-to-employ-elsewhere) scientists and engineers are kept at work on projects that increase our knowledge of space, our ability to develop for lower cost space exploration, travel, and to secure, through NERVA, twice the existing propulsion efficiency for our rockets.
(…)
Cancellation of Apollo 16 and Apollo 17 would have a very bad effect, coming so soon after Apollo 15's triumph. It would be confirming, in some respects, a belief that I fear is gaining credence at home and abroad: That our best years are behind us, that we are turning inward, reducing our defence commitments, and voluntarily starting to give up our super-power status, and our desire to maintain our world superiority.
America should be able to afford something besides increased welfare, programs to repair our cities, or Appalachian relief and the like....
7) I believe I can find enough reductions in other programs to pay for continuing NASA at generally the $3.3 - $3.4 billion level I propose here. This figure is about $400 - $500 million more than the present planning targets.
The answer to his pledge was kind of a milestone. Weinberger's memo featured a handwritten annotation by the president.
"I agree with Cap."
Manned spaceflight would not die with Skylab or Apollo. Astronauts would continue flying in space, in a ship that remained to be defined, probably a space shuttle - depending from the development costs, however.
The fight for the space shuttle has started Weinberger thought.
Powerful political forces were already moving; Mathematica and NASA faced Nixon Bureau of budget and Science Advisory Committee.
The battle would be of epic proportions.
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Battle for the space shuttle (6) - POD
Archibald
Banned
here come the POD !
September 19, 1971
NASA Headquarters, Washington DC
Nixon answer to Weinberger gave George Low reasons to believe that piloted flight might survive, if only at a bare-bones level. That meeting was to be the last before administrator Fletcher send its budget request to the Bureau of the Budget.
Around the table were NASA new boss James Fletcher; and two shuttle program managers, Dale Myers and Leroy Day.
James Fletcher was, above all, an honest man.
"Gentlemen, I will be direct: the situation of the shuttle program is bad enough that I and George discussed of alternatives. As you can see, we have now a half-baked supporter at the Office of Management and budget.
Caspar Weinberger warned President Nixon about how our budget was being cut to alarming levels. Nixon answer has been mixed. It amounts to a blessing of manned spaceflight, but not of the space shuttle itself ! George ?"
"Well, bluntly, the reason why Weinberger and Nixon wants manned spaceflight to continue its because it is already there. Negative symbolism - that what would be felt by the American people if men stopped flying in space only three years having set a foot on the Moon. The Soviets would laugh at us. Our boys that fight in Vietnam - further loss of an already low morale. So we have to hang on, perhaps according to the message that Weinberger and the President passed us in August."
"What do you mean ?" Low could felt the anguish in Dale Myers voice.
"I mean – for a minute, let's dissociate manned spaceflight and the space shuttle."
It was as if a mortar shell had exploded in the room. Low continued, undisturbed.
"My own view of all this that we might be able to bring the 1973 budget back to the 1972 level, but that our chances of bringing it above that level are essentially non-existent. You all know that the 1972 budget had been too small to launch the Shuttle as a new start. If future budgets continue at that level, a shuttle will be out of the question. Like it or not, but in my opinion, we face no other choice than to kill the space shuttle. Right now."
Low took a deep breath and continued, facing outraged faces.
"Yes, we should come up with a new manned space flight program. I’ve struggled to detail such option since last May. In my view, this program should be based on an evolutionary space station development, leading from Skylab through a series of research and applications modules – RAMs - to a distant goal of a permanent space station.
"The transportation system for this manned space flightprogram would consist of first, Apollo or Gemini capsules to Skylab.
"Then, a glider - a shuttle without rocket engines - launched on an expendable booster for the research and applications modules; and finally, the shuttle but delayed 5 to 10 years beyond our present thinking.
The new element in this plan is the glider. The whole program ties together in that none of it is dead-ended. The glider would be both an up and down logistics system for the research and applications modules, and, at the same time, lead toward the development of a shuttle in the future..."
Low ended its speech. Faces around the table were not exactly encouraging. Dale Myers notably looked appalled. That old bald head and glasses, a foot in both worlds of contractors - North American and NASA.
Myers was evidently outraged.
“That is not acceptable. Neither economically nor technically. This glider would be a typical bureaucratic compromise. You know, a camel is nothing more than a horse designed by a committee… It would be a combination of uneconomic expendables with expensive and risky spaceplane, satisfying neither NASA nor the Bureau of Budget in the end. James ?” Myers called out Fletcher.
"Yes, we talked about alternate space programs recently. But in my opinion we can't drop the shuttle, not now. We recently dropped the fully reusable shuttle in favour of a partially reusable concept. Mathematica told us that this is less expensive to built, but more expensive to fly. Now this glider is something like one third of a reusable shuttle; is such reusability level still worth the price? I don’t think so.”
Leroy Day gave the final blow
"Lacking its own propulsion, a glider would require its own enormous booster; a two-stage rocket which you throw away each time which and would drive the cost per flight as high as $35 million. And so you have an operating cost that is getting to be kind of ridiculous. The vehicle size and everything- it doesn't have much utility. It will certainly be a nice research vehicle that you could have studied re-entry with – but not a good space station logistic vehicle. The Office of Management and Budget and Congress will never support it.
“So we all agreed that the glider is unacceptable.” Fletcher said “sorry George, but we just can’t accept such concept. "Now I want to discuss another subject with you. George Schultz, director of the Budget, send me a staff memo.
Look at this:
“ The President read with interest and agreed with Mr. Weinberger's memorandum of August 12, 1971 on the subject of the future of NASA. Further, the President approved Mr. Weinberger's plan to find enough reductions in other programs to pay for continuing NASA at generally the 3.3 - 3.4 billion dollar level, or about 400 to 500 million more than the present planning targets. “
“As you can see, this approval does not embrace the Shuttle itself, only manned spaceflight.” Fletcher noted. He eyed an agitated Low. “George ?”
“We should debate further on alternate plans.” Low tried again. “Maybe not forego the Shuttle entirely and develop instead some alternative manned space flight program. I recognize that the glider I have described can’t be substitute for a true Shuttle.
"Even cheaper than this reusable spaceplane are capsules, either a block III Apollo or Big Gemini. I was present in September 1969 when Mayo killed the Space Task Group report. I remember Mayo shown Paine and I a report from its Bureau of Budget.
"They mentioned a possible $2.5 billion annual budget [...] adding that even at such level there could be a space station in 1980. However, there would be no space shuttle, rather Titan III-Gemini for logistics. Maybe we should go this way; it would result in a more balanced space program, a logistic vehicle plus a space station.
"Truth is, with such tight budget we have to cut down the logistic vehicle to the glider or Big Gemini or Apollo level if we want to run a space station program in parallel. Anything bigger and more expensive than the glider push the space station far into the 80’s, after the logistic vehicle development is complete. What’s the usefulness of a space station logistic vehicle if it has no space station to go, at least in the first ten years ? will we build a shuttle to nowhere ?"
Myers was boiling. So was Leroy Day, a leading manager in shuttle development.
“George, you know we just can’t accept such options. We can’t return to expendable capsules and rockets. Don’t forget our mantra and the shuttle raison d’etre is lower costs to orbit before space station logistics.”
“But you don’t realise that the Saturn Shuttle is in trouble within OMB and this new Flax Committee." Low retorqued. "It is still much too expensive for the budget Weinberger gave us. We can’t spend $2 billion a year on the shuttle when our overall budget is barely above $3 billion ! “ Low hammered them.
Fletcher intervened. “We just can’t drop the shuttle, not now. George, there's another way around the issues you highlighted. We can go past the glider if we cut deep into the full-size shuttle development costs. I think we can obtain the Saturn-Shuttle if we stage its development. The idea is to build early shuttles using Apollo technology we will phase out later. We would develop first a Mark I shuttle using Apollo J-2s and ablative heatshield. At a later date Mark II will introduce the higher performance SSME engines together with the reusable heatshield. Another way of cutting cost furthermore consists of having a ballistic, unmanned pressure-fed booster instead of the flyback Saturn."
"Taking into account these two fall-back options – phased approach and pressure-fed booster – I’m sure we can obtain a decent Shuttle. The glider is definitively unacceptable; it is too much of a compromise. If we have to use an expendable booster for manned spaceflight, we should better upgrading an Apollo or a Gemini capsule. But we won’t do this; I will insist of the phased Saturn shuttle.”
The meeting concluded with these words. George Low hardly was convinced.
We are arguing about a dangerously compromised shuttle that will suck whatever meagre budget we will have in the next future. We are debating low earth orbit operations – no Moon, no Mars. No, really, it should have been different.
Post-Apollo realities had been sometimes hard to accept, even for a pragmatic like Low. As he listened Fletcher pledge for the shuttle, he was reminded of another meeting exactly two years before.
-------------
... late 1968, as NASA feverishly readied Apollo 8 for flight, newly elected President Richard Nixon had had Nobel Prize Charles Townes leading its transition team on space. Apollo 8 immense popular success ensured that Townes report would be positive.
Low had not been surprised by the report tone. He had learned to appreciate Townes over the years. Townes report to Nixon report expressively pushed for more lunar exploration through Apollo systems !
Sure, there would be no nuclear shuttle, no Mars expedition and no space shuttle to an Earth orbit space station. But flights to the Moon would continue, certainly leading to a moonbase in the late 70's.
NASA had made plans for moonbases since the early days of Apollo. Boeing 1966 Lunar Exploration Systems for Apollo - LESA - really matched Townes vision. A vision George Low might have very well accepted had he been the NASA administrator. But he was not, for personnal reasons.
Unfortunately the astute Webb was gone, replaced by Thomas Paine, a naive dreamer without any political clout. And Paine lobbied against Townes, befriending that idiotic vice-President Spiro Agnew.
As a result Nixon formed the Space Task Group, that over the course of spring and summer Agnew and Paine committed into an expensive program full of clean-sheet designs.
The Space Task Group made its final report on September 15, 1969.
A week later, the Bureau of Budget chief bean counter - Robert Mayo - exposed its feelings on the STG work and NASA future.
Mayo was harsh.
“The Space Task Group report is totally inadequate as a basis for Presidential decision or a published justification of Administration decision. The president is confused over what to decide or not, and this report doesn’t helps at all. Indeed the central issue - What is thefuture of civilian manned space flight activities ? - is not directly addressed. In the end this report is nothing more than an interesting catalogue of expensive options.”
Low reminded how pathetic a clash it had been.
Paine and Mayo each had three options on hand. But they were not exactly similar, not at all ! Paine thought of rocketships far in the future, while Mayo had its hands full of Vietnam war, decaying housing projects, riots, poverty and the ensuing rampant criminality.
Paine imagined NASA flying to Mars spending $10 billion each year.
Mayo saw NASA without manned spaceflight at all (!) running with $1.5 billion annually !
Paine shot first, exposing his own vision.
"Option I is illustrative of a decision to increase funding dramatically and results in early accomplishment of the major manned and unmanned mission opportunities, including launch of a manned mission to Mars in the mid-1980's, establishment of an orbiting lunar station, a 50 man earth-orbit space base and a lunar surface base. Funding would rise from the present $4 billion level to $8-10 billion in 1980.
Options II and III illustrate a decision to maintain funding initially at recent levels and then gradually increasing.
Option II includes a later decision to launch a Mars landing in 1986; in Option III this decision is deferred even futher, probably to the year 2000.
Funding for both options would remain approximately level at $4 billion for the next two fiscal years and then would rise to a peak of $5.7 billion in 1976 - this increase reflecting simultaneous peak resource requirements of space station and space shuttle developments. If these developments were conducted in series, lower funding levels ($4-5 billion) could be achieved. Option II would have a later peak of nearly $8 billion in the early 1980's resulting from the manned Mars landing program. »
As he heard Paine, Mayo eyebrows shot upwards. It was obvious negociations would be difficult.
“Fine. Of course we at the Bureau of Budget also considered various options. These options are based on budget levels, not on the missions themselves.
As you can see, it outlines the consequences of holding NASA to future budgets as low as $1.5 billion. Higher levels are $2.5 billion and $3.5 billion."
Paine opened his mouth, but Mayo waved him silent.
"Alternative A, at $3.5 billion per year, eliminates NERVA and stops production of Saturn V and Apollo spacecraft. This option, however, will maintain a vigorous program in piloted flight, featuring Skylab with three visits as well as six additional Apollo lunar missions. Better yet, such a budget will accommodate a Space Transportation System and Space Station module development with launch of both in 1979.
"Options B1 and B2, at $2.5 billion, also permits flight of Skylab with its three visits, along with the six Apollos. There will be a space station in 1980, with Titan III-Gemini for logistics.
However, there will be no space shuttle.
"Option C is a $1.5 billion budget. The piloted space program will shut down entirely. All manned space flight ceases with Apollo 14 in July 1970. Saturn launch facilities at Cape Canaveral shut down. Yet we will continue to maintain a vigorous program of automated space flight.
« Even at $1.5 billion, NASA could send six Viking landers to Mars, and could take advantage of a rare alignment of the outer planets to send spacecraft to Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and Pluto. NASA would conduct at least one planetary launch each year in the decade, and would pursue a relatively ambitious science and applications program with 95 launches in the decade.
“If – and that’s a big IF – manned spaceflight ever continues, it will be without the shuttle. Upgraded Titan III can certainly do the job unless the shuttle flew sixty times a year - a flight per week !" Mayo concluded.
Within the space of three minutes NASA future budget melted from $10 billion to $1.5 billion. Jesus, we are doomed.
Low could see how Paine took it bad, and how hard it would be for him to answer.
Paine fumbled with budget charts.
“I have begun by assembling my associates wish list that totals $5.4 billion and includes $1.0 billion in new starts. I recognized this is too much and responded their requests were not consistent with the recommendations made to the President by the STG, and far exceed the dollar level that can be reasonably expected.
Hence Mr Mayo I requests $4.2 billion in outlays and $4.497 billion in new budget authority. I can't see how we could cut farther without inflicting serious damage to our space program."
Mayo barely raised an eyebrow.
“You just don’t understand. $3.5 billion is the maximum you will have. The President has no intention of granting anything above that level."
Paine nearly lost his temper
“You can’t do this ! It represents a cut of over a billion dollars or more than 25 percent in my request. Do you realize that your budget mean no commitment to either a space station or a shuttle; cutting the launch rate for Apollo missions to as low as one flight per year; slams the door on continued production of the Saturn V; and even prohibits any new starts even in automated spacecraft ! Do you see that ? I just can’t think the President want this. Be sure I'll meet him personally as soon as possible."
And Paine wrote to Nixon, directly, urging a curtailed and Spartan level of $4.075 billion that would keep the Saturn V in production, or a level of $3.935 billion that would suspend Saturn V production but provide startup funds for a space station and shuttle.
And Nixon didn't changed his opinion.
And Paine had to accept the BoB figures of $3.7 billion in budget authority and $3.825 billion in outlays. These were the numbers that would go to Congress in the President's budget.
Even worse, ordinarily NASA would have absorbed this cut and made the best of it. Alas, the cuts for FY 1971 were only beginning. And this was merely Nixon's requested budget. Congress was free to make further cuts !
In the ensuing budget debates NASA faced its best enemies - Walter Mondale, William Proxmire and Joseph Karth.
In spring 1970 the manned spaceflight program experimented near-death experience. Only the shuttle and space station survived the political storm. Soon however further cut forced a difficult choice - shuttle OR station ? The shuttle had been chosen, and the space station postponed to better days.
Two years later however, the space shuttle, last survivor of Paine grandiose Space Task Group plans, was threatened. And the menace of a shutting down of the manned space flight program after Skylab still loomed over the horizon... as the meeting concluded, George Low mentally wished Fletcher and the shuttle a better fate than Tom Paine Mars dreams.
September 19, 1971
NASA Headquarters, Washington DC
Nixon answer to Weinberger gave George Low reasons to believe that piloted flight might survive, if only at a bare-bones level. That meeting was to be the last before administrator Fletcher send its budget request to the Bureau of the Budget.
Around the table were NASA new boss James Fletcher; and two shuttle program managers, Dale Myers and Leroy Day.
James Fletcher was, above all, an honest man.
"Gentlemen, I will be direct: the situation of the shuttle program is bad enough that I and George discussed of alternatives. As you can see, we have now a half-baked supporter at the Office of Management and budget.
Caspar Weinberger warned President Nixon about how our budget was being cut to alarming levels. Nixon answer has been mixed. It amounts to a blessing of manned spaceflight, but not of the space shuttle itself ! George ?"
"Well, bluntly, the reason why Weinberger and Nixon wants manned spaceflight to continue its because it is already there. Negative symbolism - that what would be felt by the American people if men stopped flying in space only three years having set a foot on the Moon. The Soviets would laugh at us. Our boys that fight in Vietnam - further loss of an already low morale. So we have to hang on, perhaps according to the message that Weinberger and the President passed us in August."
"What do you mean ?" Low could felt the anguish in Dale Myers voice.
"I mean – for a minute, let's dissociate manned spaceflight and the space shuttle."
It was as if a mortar shell had exploded in the room. Low continued, undisturbed.
"My own view of all this that we might be able to bring the 1973 budget back to the 1972 level, but that our chances of bringing it above that level are essentially non-existent. You all know that the 1972 budget had been too small to launch the Shuttle as a new start. If future budgets continue at that level, a shuttle will be out of the question. Like it or not, but in my opinion, we face no other choice than to kill the space shuttle. Right now."
Low took a deep breath and continued, facing outraged faces.
"Yes, we should come up with a new manned space flight program. I’ve struggled to detail such option since last May. In my view, this program should be based on an evolutionary space station development, leading from Skylab through a series of research and applications modules – RAMs - to a distant goal of a permanent space station.
"The transportation system for this manned space flightprogram would consist of first, Apollo or Gemini capsules to Skylab.
"Then, a glider - a shuttle without rocket engines - launched on an expendable booster for the research and applications modules; and finally, the shuttle but delayed 5 to 10 years beyond our present thinking.
The new element in this plan is the glider. The whole program ties together in that none of it is dead-ended. The glider would be both an up and down logistics system for the research and applications modules, and, at the same time, lead toward the development of a shuttle in the future..."
Low ended its speech. Faces around the table were not exactly encouraging. Dale Myers notably looked appalled. That old bald head and glasses, a foot in both worlds of contractors - North American and NASA.
Myers was evidently outraged.
“That is not acceptable. Neither economically nor technically. This glider would be a typical bureaucratic compromise. You know, a camel is nothing more than a horse designed by a committee… It would be a combination of uneconomic expendables with expensive and risky spaceplane, satisfying neither NASA nor the Bureau of Budget in the end. James ?” Myers called out Fletcher.
"Yes, we talked about alternate space programs recently. But in my opinion we can't drop the shuttle, not now. We recently dropped the fully reusable shuttle in favour of a partially reusable concept. Mathematica told us that this is less expensive to built, but more expensive to fly. Now this glider is something like one third of a reusable shuttle; is such reusability level still worth the price? I don’t think so.”
Leroy Day gave the final blow
"Lacking its own propulsion, a glider would require its own enormous booster; a two-stage rocket which you throw away each time which and would drive the cost per flight as high as $35 million. And so you have an operating cost that is getting to be kind of ridiculous. The vehicle size and everything- it doesn't have much utility. It will certainly be a nice research vehicle that you could have studied re-entry with – but not a good space station logistic vehicle. The Office of Management and Budget and Congress will never support it.
“So we all agreed that the glider is unacceptable.” Fletcher said “sorry George, but we just can’t accept such concept. "Now I want to discuss another subject with you. George Schultz, director of the Budget, send me a staff memo.
Look at this:
“ The President read with interest and agreed with Mr. Weinberger's memorandum of August 12, 1971 on the subject of the future of NASA. Further, the President approved Mr. Weinberger's plan to find enough reductions in other programs to pay for continuing NASA at generally the 3.3 - 3.4 billion dollar level, or about 400 to 500 million more than the present planning targets. “
“As you can see, this approval does not embrace the Shuttle itself, only manned spaceflight.” Fletcher noted. He eyed an agitated Low. “George ?”
“We should debate further on alternate plans.” Low tried again. “Maybe not forego the Shuttle entirely and develop instead some alternative manned space flight program. I recognize that the glider I have described can’t be substitute for a true Shuttle.
"Even cheaper than this reusable spaceplane are capsules, either a block III Apollo or Big Gemini. I was present in September 1969 when Mayo killed the Space Task Group report. I remember Mayo shown Paine and I a report from its Bureau of Budget.
"They mentioned a possible $2.5 billion annual budget [...] adding that even at such level there could be a space station in 1980. However, there would be no space shuttle, rather Titan III-Gemini for logistics. Maybe we should go this way; it would result in a more balanced space program, a logistic vehicle plus a space station.
"Truth is, with such tight budget we have to cut down the logistic vehicle to the glider or Big Gemini or Apollo level if we want to run a space station program in parallel. Anything bigger and more expensive than the glider push the space station far into the 80’s, after the logistic vehicle development is complete. What’s the usefulness of a space station logistic vehicle if it has no space station to go, at least in the first ten years ? will we build a shuttle to nowhere ?"
Myers was boiling. So was Leroy Day, a leading manager in shuttle development.
“George, you know we just can’t accept such options. We can’t return to expendable capsules and rockets. Don’t forget our mantra and the shuttle raison d’etre is lower costs to orbit before space station logistics.”
“But you don’t realise that the Saturn Shuttle is in trouble within OMB and this new Flax Committee." Low retorqued. "It is still much too expensive for the budget Weinberger gave us. We can’t spend $2 billion a year on the shuttle when our overall budget is barely above $3 billion ! “ Low hammered them.
Fletcher intervened. “We just can’t drop the shuttle, not now. George, there's another way around the issues you highlighted. We can go past the glider if we cut deep into the full-size shuttle development costs. I think we can obtain the Saturn-Shuttle if we stage its development. The idea is to build early shuttles using Apollo technology we will phase out later. We would develop first a Mark I shuttle using Apollo J-2s and ablative heatshield. At a later date Mark II will introduce the higher performance SSME engines together with the reusable heatshield. Another way of cutting cost furthermore consists of having a ballistic, unmanned pressure-fed booster instead of the flyback Saturn."
"Taking into account these two fall-back options – phased approach and pressure-fed booster – I’m sure we can obtain a decent Shuttle. The glider is definitively unacceptable; it is too much of a compromise. If we have to use an expendable booster for manned spaceflight, we should better upgrading an Apollo or a Gemini capsule. But we won’t do this; I will insist of the phased Saturn shuttle.”
The meeting concluded with these words. George Low hardly was convinced.
We are arguing about a dangerously compromised shuttle that will suck whatever meagre budget we will have in the next future. We are debating low earth orbit operations – no Moon, no Mars. No, really, it should have been different.
Post-Apollo realities had been sometimes hard to accept, even for a pragmatic like Low. As he listened Fletcher pledge for the shuttle, he was reminded of another meeting exactly two years before.
-------------
... late 1968, as NASA feverishly readied Apollo 8 for flight, newly elected President Richard Nixon had had Nobel Prize Charles Townes leading its transition team on space. Apollo 8 immense popular success ensured that Townes report would be positive.
Low had not been surprised by the report tone. He had learned to appreciate Townes over the years. Townes report to Nixon report expressively pushed for more lunar exploration through Apollo systems !
Sure, there would be no nuclear shuttle, no Mars expedition and no space shuttle to an Earth orbit space station. But flights to the Moon would continue, certainly leading to a moonbase in the late 70's.
NASA had made plans for moonbases since the early days of Apollo. Boeing 1966 Lunar Exploration Systems for Apollo - LESA - really matched Townes vision. A vision George Low might have very well accepted had he been the NASA administrator. But he was not, for personnal reasons.
Unfortunately the astute Webb was gone, replaced by Thomas Paine, a naive dreamer without any political clout. And Paine lobbied against Townes, befriending that idiotic vice-President Spiro Agnew.
As a result Nixon formed the Space Task Group, that over the course of spring and summer Agnew and Paine committed into an expensive program full of clean-sheet designs.
The Space Task Group made its final report on September 15, 1969.
A week later, the Bureau of Budget chief bean counter - Robert Mayo - exposed its feelings on the STG work and NASA future.
Mayo was harsh.
“The Space Task Group report is totally inadequate as a basis for Presidential decision or a published justification of Administration decision. The president is confused over what to decide or not, and this report doesn’t helps at all. Indeed the central issue - What is thefuture of civilian manned space flight activities ? - is not directly addressed. In the end this report is nothing more than an interesting catalogue of expensive options.”
Low reminded how pathetic a clash it had been.
Paine and Mayo each had three options on hand. But they were not exactly similar, not at all ! Paine thought of rocketships far in the future, while Mayo had its hands full of Vietnam war, decaying housing projects, riots, poverty and the ensuing rampant criminality.
Paine imagined NASA flying to Mars spending $10 billion each year.
Mayo saw NASA without manned spaceflight at all (!) running with $1.5 billion annually !
Paine shot first, exposing his own vision.
"Option I is illustrative of a decision to increase funding dramatically and results in early accomplishment of the major manned and unmanned mission opportunities, including launch of a manned mission to Mars in the mid-1980's, establishment of an orbiting lunar station, a 50 man earth-orbit space base and a lunar surface base. Funding would rise from the present $4 billion level to $8-10 billion in 1980.
Options II and III illustrate a decision to maintain funding initially at recent levels and then gradually increasing.
Option II includes a later decision to launch a Mars landing in 1986; in Option III this decision is deferred even futher, probably to the year 2000.
Funding for both options would remain approximately level at $4 billion for the next two fiscal years and then would rise to a peak of $5.7 billion in 1976 - this increase reflecting simultaneous peak resource requirements of space station and space shuttle developments. If these developments were conducted in series, lower funding levels ($4-5 billion) could be achieved. Option II would have a later peak of nearly $8 billion in the early 1980's resulting from the manned Mars landing program. »
As he heard Paine, Mayo eyebrows shot upwards. It was obvious negociations would be difficult.
“Fine. Of course we at the Bureau of Budget also considered various options. These options are based on budget levels, not on the missions themselves.
As you can see, it outlines the consequences of holding NASA to future budgets as low as $1.5 billion. Higher levels are $2.5 billion and $3.5 billion."
Paine opened his mouth, but Mayo waved him silent.
"Alternative A, at $3.5 billion per year, eliminates NERVA and stops production of Saturn V and Apollo spacecraft. This option, however, will maintain a vigorous program in piloted flight, featuring Skylab with three visits as well as six additional Apollo lunar missions. Better yet, such a budget will accommodate a Space Transportation System and Space Station module development with launch of both in 1979.
"Options B1 and B2, at $2.5 billion, also permits flight of Skylab with its three visits, along with the six Apollos. There will be a space station in 1980, with Titan III-Gemini for logistics.
However, there will be no space shuttle.
"Option C is a $1.5 billion budget. The piloted space program will shut down entirely. All manned space flight ceases with Apollo 14 in July 1970. Saturn launch facilities at Cape Canaveral shut down. Yet we will continue to maintain a vigorous program of automated space flight.
« Even at $1.5 billion, NASA could send six Viking landers to Mars, and could take advantage of a rare alignment of the outer planets to send spacecraft to Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and Pluto. NASA would conduct at least one planetary launch each year in the decade, and would pursue a relatively ambitious science and applications program with 95 launches in the decade.
“If – and that’s a big IF – manned spaceflight ever continues, it will be without the shuttle. Upgraded Titan III can certainly do the job unless the shuttle flew sixty times a year - a flight per week !" Mayo concluded.
Within the space of three minutes NASA future budget melted from $10 billion to $1.5 billion. Jesus, we are doomed.
Low could see how Paine took it bad, and how hard it would be for him to answer.
Paine fumbled with budget charts.
“I have begun by assembling my associates wish list that totals $5.4 billion and includes $1.0 billion in new starts. I recognized this is too much and responded their requests were not consistent with the recommendations made to the President by the STG, and far exceed the dollar level that can be reasonably expected.
Hence Mr Mayo I requests $4.2 billion in outlays and $4.497 billion in new budget authority. I can't see how we could cut farther without inflicting serious damage to our space program."
Mayo barely raised an eyebrow.
“You just don’t understand. $3.5 billion is the maximum you will have. The President has no intention of granting anything above that level."
Paine nearly lost his temper
“You can’t do this ! It represents a cut of over a billion dollars or more than 25 percent in my request. Do you realize that your budget mean no commitment to either a space station or a shuttle; cutting the launch rate for Apollo missions to as low as one flight per year; slams the door on continued production of the Saturn V; and even prohibits any new starts even in automated spacecraft ! Do you see that ? I just can’t think the President want this. Be sure I'll meet him personally as soon as possible."
And Paine wrote to Nixon, directly, urging a curtailed and Spartan level of $4.075 billion that would keep the Saturn V in production, or a level of $3.935 billion that would suspend Saturn V production but provide startup funds for a space station and shuttle.
And Nixon didn't changed his opinion.
And Paine had to accept the BoB figures of $3.7 billion in budget authority and $3.825 billion in outlays. These were the numbers that would go to Congress in the President's budget.
Even worse, ordinarily NASA would have absorbed this cut and made the best of it. Alas, the cuts for FY 1971 were only beginning. And this was merely Nixon's requested budget. Congress was free to make further cuts !
In the ensuing budget debates NASA faced its best enemies - Walter Mondale, William Proxmire and Joseph Karth.
In spring 1970 the manned spaceflight program experimented near-death experience. Only the shuttle and space station survived the political storm. Soon however further cut forced a difficult choice - shuttle OR station ? The shuttle had been chosen, and the space station postponed to better days.
Two years later however, the space shuttle, last survivor of Paine grandiose Space Task Group plans, was threatened. And the menace of a shutting down of the manned space flight program after Skylab still loomed over the horizon... as the meeting concluded, George Low mentally wished Fletcher and the shuttle a better fate than Tom Paine Mars dreams.
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Archibald
Banned
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=325209
The meeting above never existed OTL - it is an invention of mine. It shows how and why NASA rejected the Flax Shuttle - or a concept mostly similar imagined by George Low (coincidentally, the Flax committee and George Low both had the Titan III glider (what I call the fat dynasoar) in mind, at the same time.
The meeting above never existed OTL - it is an invention of mine. It shows how and why NASA rejected the Flax Shuttle - or a concept mostly similar imagined by George Low (coincidentally, the Flax committee and George Low both had the Titan III glider (what I call the fat dynasoar) in mind, at the same time.
Battle for the space shuttle (7)
Archibald
Banned
September 24, 1971
The Flax committee hold its second meeting. Alexander Flax could see Martha's Vineyard on the background.
He focused on the NASA man and its speech - Dale Myers, that did his best to present the shuttle the space agency dreamed to afford.
Yet another, different concept than the ones they had discussed only five weeks earlier !
“Our preferred concept would be a phased shuttle orbiter. We would first build an interim shuttle with Apollo technology to lower development costs; that shuttle would then gradually be upgraded."
Flax could see that Eugene Fubini was sceptical.
“What about an up-scaled Titan with an unpowered shuttle on top ? Why can’t you use the Air Force rocket, for god sake ? Listen. Why not a small space shuttle with a payload of 10 000 pounds ? What's wrong with that ?"
Myers was stunned.
A ten thousand pounds payload Glider ? Didn't George Low mentioned a similar concept a month ago - with three times the payload ? How the hell did this Fubini heard about it ? Did someone leaked the thing to him ?
It doesn't matter. But damn, not this Glider again !
Myers politely started to rip Fubini arguments to pieces.
"This glider is not a true shuttle because only the orbiter is reusable. Even if the solids are recovered, main engines are lost. With an overall weight limited to 45 tons by the Titan, payload drops substantially, and the payload bay size with it. In my opinion, once you start using expendable rocket for manned spaceflight, you’d better mounting a capsule on top of it !
"The only advantage of a winged spacecraft over this capsule would be its payload bay; not sure it’s enough to justify the complexity of the glider, or the cost of the enlarged Titan. NASA certainly won’t accept such a downgraded shuttle. What we need is a large orbiter with a fully recoverable booster. We don't want this glider; we don't need a fat DynaSoar" Myers concluded with a pun. Fat dinosaur, ha ha ha !
Not only Fubini did not laughed, he also remained silent. Had Dale Myers been less overconfident enough that Nixon advisors would accept the Saturn-Shuttle, he would have smelled the rat.
Unknown to Myers, at this very minute, Eugene Fubini had changed its mind. He didn’t gave a damn about whatever booster the shuttle would use.
For Eugene Fubini, the full-size orbiter was now unnecessary. Something smaller would be better.
It was Flax that resumed the talk.
“Now let’s discuss another topic – the Mathematica study. Can you explain me what's this Thrust Augmented Shuttle Orbiter ?”
“My assistant Robert Lindley currently works along Mathematica” Myers replied. “Robert ?”
Robert Lindley was one of the Arrow orphans, one of James Chamberlin twenty-five top Canadian engineers that had been recruited by a nascent NASA a decade before to work on Gemini and Apollo.
In the post-Apollo era Robert Lindley had been tasked with economic justification of the shuttle.
Flax soon understood why NASA had Lindley in charge of that difficult task. The Canadian was an extremely charming and extremely shrewd man who was getting out of this group of people a set of numbers for what the economics of the shuttle might be downstream.
As he spoke, Flax felt that noone really resisted him; and when Fubini objected about This is not knowable, or if it is knowable, we don't have the information yet; we would have to do a study - Lindley remain unflapable.
To Flax it was obvious what he was doing was focusing, steering this group of Headquarters people into a totally subjective, qualitative kind of justification of the shuttle, without any real basis at all.
A year before Lindley had required an assessment of payload effects by an aerospace corporation with actual experience in building spacecraft. He wanted mission models, projections of the specific spacecraft, and payloads that the shuttle might carry, and he needed such mission models for the Air Force as well as NASA. The BoB also encouraged him strongly to have the economic analysis - including the vital determination of discount rates - conducted by professional economists with experience in this area.
For mission modeling and for payload and launch vehicle cost estimates, Lindley turned to the Aerospace Corp., which had strong ties to the Air Force and was widely known as a center of expertise.
Lockheed, builder of the Corona spacecraft, took charge of work on payload effects.
For the overall economic evaluation, which these other contracts would support, Lindley followed recommendations from the BoB and approached the firm of Mathematica, Inc., in Princeton, New Jersey.
So here was Robert Lindley, fighting bravely to defend a different shuttle, another concept. Unfortunately USAF officials already had ruined his valiant atempt. Preceding Myers and Lindley speeches Air Force presentations had projected lower launch rates than that used in Mathematica Reports.
Furthermore, Mathematica had been deconsidered by the fact their earlier report (issued late May) talked only of – obsolete – fully reusable shuttles. Mathematica still suffered from that credibility issue.
The Mathematica peoples were no engineers - rather economists hired by Weinberger's Bureau of Budget to pressure NASA over cheaper shuttles. The space agency, of course, did not cared much about the effort. Unlike NASA, USAF or the White House, the Mathematica Institute, Princeton, Virginia, was new in the space arena debate.
Lindley speech mentioned revised economic analysis. As he progressed through his speech, Flax come to understood the Mathematica economists also had their own prefered concept, that preserved the big Air Force payload bay at the expense of everything else.
The thing was nothing like Myers Saturn-Shuttle - and really a far cry from it. Even more worrying was the fact that it was quite obvious that, apart from that poor Lindley no one at NASA really cared about the concept.
When the meeting ended Flax was very baffled if not totally pissed-off.
Jesus. What a mess.
-----------
NOTE: look at the four people below. Those four each have a prefered shuttle concept. Date is late September 1971. The end result is a kind of knife-fight over the shuttle budget and shape.
Dale Myers, NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Spaceflight
Klaus Heiss, tasked with a study of Shuttle economics.
The Mathematica institute, Princeton, New Jersey.
Alexander Flax, tasked with shuttle studies
for Nixon Presidential Science Advisory Committee (the PSAC)
Caspar Weinberger, in charge of shuttle studies for the Office of Management and Budget (the OMB)
The Flax committee hold its second meeting. Alexander Flax could see Martha's Vineyard on the background.
He focused on the NASA man and its speech - Dale Myers, that did his best to present the shuttle the space agency dreamed to afford.
Yet another, different concept than the ones they had discussed only five weeks earlier !
“Our preferred concept would be a phased shuttle orbiter. We would first build an interim shuttle with Apollo technology to lower development costs; that shuttle would then gradually be upgraded."
Flax could see that Eugene Fubini was sceptical.
“What about an up-scaled Titan with an unpowered shuttle on top ? Why can’t you use the Air Force rocket, for god sake ? Listen. Why not a small space shuttle with a payload of 10 000 pounds ? What's wrong with that ?"
Myers was stunned.
A ten thousand pounds payload Glider ? Didn't George Low mentioned a similar concept a month ago - with three times the payload ? How the hell did this Fubini heard about it ? Did someone leaked the thing to him ?
It doesn't matter. But damn, not this Glider again !
Myers politely started to rip Fubini arguments to pieces.
"This glider is not a true shuttle because only the orbiter is reusable. Even if the solids are recovered, main engines are lost. With an overall weight limited to 45 tons by the Titan, payload drops substantially, and the payload bay size with it. In my opinion, once you start using expendable rocket for manned spaceflight, you’d better mounting a capsule on top of it !
"The only advantage of a winged spacecraft over this capsule would be its payload bay; not sure it’s enough to justify the complexity of the glider, or the cost of the enlarged Titan. NASA certainly won’t accept such a downgraded shuttle. What we need is a large orbiter with a fully recoverable booster. We don't want this glider; we don't need a fat DynaSoar" Myers concluded with a pun. Fat dinosaur, ha ha ha !
Not only Fubini did not laughed, he also remained silent. Had Dale Myers been less overconfident enough that Nixon advisors would accept the Saturn-Shuttle, he would have smelled the rat.
Unknown to Myers, at this very minute, Eugene Fubini had changed its mind. He didn’t gave a damn about whatever booster the shuttle would use.
For Eugene Fubini, the full-size orbiter was now unnecessary. Something smaller would be better.
It was Flax that resumed the talk.
“Now let’s discuss another topic – the Mathematica study. Can you explain me what's this Thrust Augmented Shuttle Orbiter ?”
“My assistant Robert Lindley currently works along Mathematica” Myers replied. “Robert ?”
Robert Lindley was one of the Arrow orphans, one of James Chamberlin twenty-five top Canadian engineers that had been recruited by a nascent NASA a decade before to work on Gemini and Apollo.
In the post-Apollo era Robert Lindley had been tasked with economic justification of the shuttle.
Flax soon understood why NASA had Lindley in charge of that difficult task. The Canadian was an extremely charming and extremely shrewd man who was getting out of this group of people a set of numbers for what the economics of the shuttle might be downstream.
As he spoke, Flax felt that noone really resisted him; and when Fubini objected about This is not knowable, or if it is knowable, we don't have the information yet; we would have to do a study - Lindley remain unflapable.
To Flax it was obvious what he was doing was focusing, steering this group of Headquarters people into a totally subjective, qualitative kind of justification of the shuttle, without any real basis at all.
A year before Lindley had required an assessment of payload effects by an aerospace corporation with actual experience in building spacecraft. He wanted mission models, projections of the specific spacecraft, and payloads that the shuttle might carry, and he needed such mission models for the Air Force as well as NASA. The BoB also encouraged him strongly to have the economic analysis - including the vital determination of discount rates - conducted by professional economists with experience in this area.
For mission modeling and for payload and launch vehicle cost estimates, Lindley turned to the Aerospace Corp., which had strong ties to the Air Force and was widely known as a center of expertise.
Lockheed, builder of the Corona spacecraft, took charge of work on payload effects.
For the overall economic evaluation, which these other contracts would support, Lindley followed recommendations from the BoB and approached the firm of Mathematica, Inc., in Princeton, New Jersey.
So here was Robert Lindley, fighting bravely to defend a different shuttle, another concept. Unfortunately USAF officials already had ruined his valiant atempt. Preceding Myers and Lindley speeches Air Force presentations had projected lower launch rates than that used in Mathematica Reports.
Furthermore, Mathematica had been deconsidered by the fact their earlier report (issued late May) talked only of – obsolete – fully reusable shuttles. Mathematica still suffered from that credibility issue.
The Mathematica peoples were no engineers - rather economists hired by Weinberger's Bureau of Budget to pressure NASA over cheaper shuttles. The space agency, of course, did not cared much about the effort. Unlike NASA, USAF or the White House, the Mathematica Institute, Princeton, Virginia, was new in the space arena debate.
Lindley speech mentioned revised economic analysis. As he progressed through his speech, Flax come to understood the Mathematica economists also had their own prefered concept, that preserved the big Air Force payload bay at the expense of everything else.
The thing was nothing like Myers Saturn-Shuttle - and really a far cry from it. Even more worrying was the fact that it was quite obvious that, apart from that poor Lindley no one at NASA really cared about the concept.
When the meeting ended Flax was very baffled if not totally pissed-off.
Jesus. What a mess.
-----------
NOTE: look at the four people below. Those four each have a prefered shuttle concept. Date is late September 1971. The end result is a kind of knife-fight over the shuttle budget and shape.
Dale Myers, NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Spaceflight
Klaus Heiss, tasked with a study of Shuttle economics.
The Mathematica institute, Princeton, New Jersey.
Alexander Flax, tasked with shuttle studies
for Nixon Presidential Science Advisory Committee (the PSAC)
Caspar Weinberger, in charge of shuttle studies for the Office of Management and Budget (the OMB)
To call it a mess is putting it rather mildly...
Makes you wonder if anything's gonna come out of this...
Makes you wonder if anything's gonna come out of this...
Archibald
Banned
Worse thing is that the situation is from OTL. Very little butterflies.
for the record, Nixon adopted the shuttle on January 5, 1972 and after that the program ran full steam like a train wreck - nobody could stop it, not even Carter / Mondale.
So my POD is so time before January 5, 1972. The clock is ticking !
for the record, Nixon adopted the shuttle on January 5, 1972 and after that the program ran full steam like a train wreck - nobody could stop it, not even Carter / Mondale.
So my POD is so time before January 5, 1972. The clock is ticking !
Europe in space (2)
Archibald
Banned
ESRO / ELDO and NASA future plans.
“…Representatives of ELDO and several European aerospace companies visited Nasa's Marshall Space Flight Centre last week for a two-day conference on the proposed space tug project.
Preliminary design studies have been carried out for ELDO by European space consortia, and the results of these were presented at the meeting, which was held primarily to discuss the technical aspects.
The tug, a vehicle intended to operate purely in space as a general workhorse and possibly as a trans-lunar shuttle, is receiving most attention in Europe as a possible contribution to America's future space transport system.
European companies are advocating development of a chemically propelled unmanned tug which could be used to carry into higher orbits satellites launched by the shuttle…
One alternative for providing an interim space tug capability is to use one or more of the existing launch vehicle upper stages in an expendable mode.
This approach has been the subject of a detailed investigation over the past three years at the Lewis Research Center (LeRC).
The activity included two contracted studies to establish the feasibility of the existing upper stage alternative, six additional contracted studies by the manufacturers of the Burner II, Scout, Delta, Agena, Transtage and Centaur stages to define in detail the modifications required for Shuttle compatibility, and a comprehensive in-house evaluation.
The baseline upper stages considered in this study are versions of existing propulsive stages modified only as required to make them space tugs. Those configurations considered as baseline stages are:
Agena
Burner II
Scout (Castor II/X259)
Centaur
Delta
Transtage
Agena..
The Agena uses a single Bell Model 8096 engine capable of multiple restarts..
Centaur. - The Centaur D-1S is the largest of the baseline stages studied, and offers the highest performance. The Centaur D-1S is a modification of the present Centaur D-IT which is currently being flown on the Titan booster. Two pump-fed hydrogen-oxygen RL10A 3-3A engines with multiple restart capability provide the propulsion for Centaur.
Delta. - The Delta space tug is based on the second stage of the current expendable Delta launch vehicle. It carries the Delta Inertial Guidance System and uses a single pressure-fed LM descent engine capable of multiple restarts. The Delta stage is the smallest of the liquid propellant stages studied, and carries about 10,000 pounds of propellant.
Transtage. - The C-26 Transtage considered in this study, is the final stage of the.Titan IIIC expendable launch vehicle. Propulsion is provided by two AJ-10-138pressure fed engines which are capable of multiple restarts. Transtage carries the most propellant of the Earth storable stages and it is the shortest of all the liquid propellant stages considered. Its total length is 15 feet.
Source : FLIGHT International, 4 October 1971
“…Representatives of ELDO and several European aerospace companies visited Nasa's Marshall Space Flight Centre last week for a two-day conference on the proposed space tug project.
Preliminary design studies have been carried out for ELDO by European space consortia, and the results of these were presented at the meeting, which was held primarily to discuss the technical aspects.
The tug, a vehicle intended to operate purely in space as a general workhorse and possibly as a trans-lunar shuttle, is receiving most attention in Europe as a possible contribution to America's future space transport system.
European companies are advocating development of a chemically propelled unmanned tug which could be used to carry into higher orbits satellites launched by the shuttle…
One alternative for providing an interim space tug capability is to use one or more of the existing launch vehicle upper stages in an expendable mode.
This approach has been the subject of a detailed investigation over the past three years at the Lewis Research Center (LeRC).
The activity included two contracted studies to establish the feasibility of the existing upper stage alternative, six additional contracted studies by the manufacturers of the Burner II, Scout, Delta, Agena, Transtage and Centaur stages to define in detail the modifications required for Shuttle compatibility, and a comprehensive in-house evaluation.
The baseline upper stages considered in this study are versions of existing propulsive stages modified only as required to make them space tugs. Those configurations considered as baseline stages are:
Agena
Burner II
Scout (Castor II/X259)
Centaur
Delta
Transtage
Agena..
The Agena uses a single Bell Model 8096 engine capable of multiple restarts..
Centaur. - The Centaur D-1S is the largest of the baseline stages studied, and offers the highest performance. The Centaur D-1S is a modification of the present Centaur D-IT which is currently being flown on the Titan booster. Two pump-fed hydrogen-oxygen RL10A 3-3A engines with multiple restart capability provide the propulsion for Centaur.
Delta. - The Delta space tug is based on the second stage of the current expendable Delta launch vehicle. It carries the Delta Inertial Guidance System and uses a single pressure-fed LM descent engine capable of multiple restarts. The Delta stage is the smallest of the liquid propellant stages studied, and carries about 10,000 pounds of propellant.
Transtage. - The C-26 Transtage considered in this study, is the final stage of the.Titan IIIC expendable launch vehicle. Propulsion is provided by two AJ-10-138pressure fed engines which are capable of multiple restarts. Transtage carries the most propellant of the Earth storable stages and it is the shortest of all the liquid propellant stages considered. Its total length is 15 feet.
Source : FLIGHT International, 4 October 1971
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Dam is that TL good.
i even learn new thing here !
Found on Data here, i have to adapt some future NASA Post for 2001: A Space-Time Odyssey...
i even learn new thing here !
Found on Data here, i have to adapt some future NASA Post for 2001: A Space-Time Odyssey...
Battle for the space shuttle (8)
Archibald
Banned
SHALL WE BUILD THE SPACE SHUTTLE?
Technology Review . October-November 1971.
John M. Logsdon
NASA is trying to win approval of the Shuttle program from the Nixon administration.
How does the issues at play in Washington affect the funding question ?
The only comparably-sized space program, Apollo, operated in an environment in which political and economic decisions were strikingly different from those affecting the Shuttle.
A key point was that presidential support for Apollo was omnipresent and cast an overarching shadow on all policy issues.
Such is not the case for the Shuttle; support for it is at best ambivalent and at some extremes perhaps contentious.
Worse, the political process, with officeholders constantly seeking popular support and reelection every 2, 4, or 6 years, means that they want payoffs in their programs within those time constraints.
The process is ill-suited to fostering long-term technological programs with results only coming in future decades.
Technology Review . October-November 1971.
John M. Logsdon
NASA is trying to win approval of the Shuttle program from the Nixon administration.
How does the issues at play in Washington affect the funding question ?
The only comparably-sized space program, Apollo, operated in an environment in which political and economic decisions were strikingly different from those affecting the Shuttle.
A key point was that presidential support for Apollo was omnipresent and cast an overarching shadow on all policy issues.
Such is not the case for the Shuttle; support for it is at best ambivalent and at some extremes perhaps contentious.
Worse, the political process, with officeholders constantly seeking popular support and reelection every 2, 4, or 6 years, means that they want payoffs in their programs within those time constraints.
The process is ill-suited to fostering long-term technological programs with results only coming in future decades.
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Battle for the space shuttle (9)
Archibald
Banned
October 9, 1971
Eugene Fubini and Alexander Flax had a meeting with Bureau of Budget officials. Latest news from Caspar Weinberger office did not exactly pleased Flax.
"James Fletcher is a wise man."Flax told Weinberger. "You know why ?"
"No."
"He didn't put all his eggs into a single basket. Look at this: he asked you for an orbiter with an external tank, and then proposed two options for the booster. He obviously wanted the Saturn, but that would be expensive. Being a wise man, Fletcher evidently had a fallback option: a pressure-fed dumb booster, strong enough to fall into the ocean under parachutes, unmanned."
"Indeed. And I, Weinberger, told Fletcher last week I would oppose the Saturn-shuttle but not the big dumb booster. I can live with that shuttle. You realizes that my decision amounts to a go ahead to the program by the Bureau of Budget – and, sooner than latter, by the President. So, what's your problem, Dr Flax ? That might be a viable shuttle no ?"
"No it isn't. We have no experience with pressure-fed rockets. But I'll tell you where the real problem is. You have been mistaken: the problem is not the booster. The main issue is with the orbiter: that thing is too big. It is that massive orbiter that, in turn, makes the tank and the booster bigger. All three elements in the shuttle system are tied together one way or another. Change one and you change the other two."
Weinberger was evidently confused.
"But how do we ended with such a big orbiter then ? Isn't the Air Force responsible for that ?"
"It is, and I'll tell you the exact story behind that. The exact reason why the Air Force insist on such a big payload bay, that in turn drives the orbiter to a huge size and cost."
Flax made a pause, then resumed talking, evidently chosing his words carefully.
"For five years I, Alexander Flax, ran a highly secretive military space agency called the National Reconnaissance Office. It was spun off from the Air Force a decade ago to deal with spy satellites snapping pictures of the Soviet Union.
Our optical spy satellites fell into two broad categories.
The KH-4 Corona scan the Soviet Union at medium resolution – what matters is broad mapping, not details.
The second category of spysats deals with detailed pictures – details as small as some inches. That's the KH-8 Gambit.
We launched a bunch of short lived reconnaissance satellites over the years, but recently we shifted into the exact opposite direction. The NRO recently launched a new breed of spy satellite, called the KH-9, to succeed the KH-4 Corona in the broad mapping role.
It is a monster of satellite, but still lacks an essential element: we still can't beam the photos electronically to the ground, real time.
We have to place the developed film into a return capsule, drop that into the atmosphere, catch that with an Hercules cargo aircraft, pull it onboard, then bring the film down to Washington for analysis. A very cumbersome process we hope to eliminate with the next generation of spy satellite, at the end of this decade. Our objective is near real-time transmission of electronic pictures."
Fubini and Flax made a pause, judging the effect of their speeches on Weinberger.
"Let's go back to the shuttle. That KH-8 successor that could beam the pictures to the ground, real time - well, it is, too, an enormous satellite. Dimension wise, that KH-11 is 60 ft long by 15 feet wide, with a mass of 65 000 pounds..."
"Which, by a bizarre coincidence, match the limits the Air Force set to the shuttle payload bay. What a coincidence !" Weinberger smiled.
"There you are. Now perhaps you think that, as a former head of the NRO agency, and Nixon technical advisor on the shuttle, I (and Eugene) should fight to the last end to keep the shuttle bay wide enough to launch those KH-11 babies.
To make it short, I should be happy that your Bureau of Budget and NASA agree on that full size Shuttle orbiter !"
"Well, that would be logical." Weinberger nodded. "But...you don’t." he smiled.
"Bad luck: there are some little issues with all this. Eugene ?"
"Indeed. Issue number one is that the Titan currently does a good job launching spy satellites.
Problem number two is that the Air Force had man rated the Titan for the Manned Orbital Laboratory.
And a last issue is that, at current flight rates, the throw-away Titan has better economics than any shuttle concept !
Because there's not enough satellites to launch, as of today it is cheaper to throw away rockets than to reuse them, Shuttle-style. C'est la vie."
Weinberger was confused.
"But the Air Force need the big orbiter to ferry KH-11s into orbit no ?"
"No. Let's put the problem into a different perspective. KH-11s are so big they drive the shuttle dimension - and cost - to the roof. Now I ask, why bother launching the KH-11 within a shuttle payload bay when a Titan III can do the job earlier and cheaper ? Have a smaller shuttle that does not launch the big spy sat, for example a space plane with a payload of 40 000 pounds only."
"That won't work" Weinberger reacted.
"Why ?"
"Because this amount to a mixed fleet of Titan and Shuttle, and this mean not enough satellites remain to justify the shuttle economically. Because, you see, when NASA officials try justifying the shuttle on economic grounds, they base their estimations on the number of satellites launched over the last decade.
That probably included what you told me minutes ago - that bunch of short lived reconnaissance satellites. Hell, this mean that your NRO accounted for a large percentage of the satellites we launched over the last decade ! How about that ?"
Flax answered cautiously
"In some way you're right. Early batches of NRO spy satellites had a very short lifespan, and a high failure rate, so we launched dozens of them. Can't tell you more. What I can tell you is that those days are over: the next generation is the exact opposite. Big, heavy, expensive and with a long useful life. So there’s much less things to launch as a result.
I insist that a mixed fleet of Titan and shuttle would be a wise thing to have. And I'd like to develop this idea further."
"How ?"
It was Fubini that answered.
"Now follow my reasoning again. We could have a fleet of Titan that would launch NASA shuttle and NRO spy satellites indifferently - and separately. The KH-11 would ride to space a top a Titan, but not into the shuttle payload bay. That's my glider concept - kind of scaled-up DynaSoar.
Imagine an unpowered shuttle a top a multistage expendable booster that push it into orbit. But the Titan that would launch this glider is a bigger variant, because the fat DynaSoar still weights 100 000 pounds. Martin call it the III-L. But that's apparently too big for your spy satellite no ?"
"Indeed. The KH-9 and KH-11 are massive, but not this point. They are launched by a standard Titan III-C."
"So we would have two Titan variants then, the usual III-C and that monster III-L to launch your Glider. No ?" Weinberger liked that debate.
"Exact." Flax smiled. "Now what I'll propose won't please Eugene. But why bother with this glider ?"
"Uh ?"
"What's the usefulness of it ? Can you really justify it ? Do you think NASA would accept that ?"
Fubini reaction was of irritation, followed by resignation.
"I don't think so. Even a pragmatic manager like their deputy administrator - George Low - would not accept this Glider. I think their opinion would be "Hell, this is a step backward, back to that DynaSoar McNamara cancelled a decade ago."
"But then, Alexander, what option remains if the KH-11-sized-orbiter and the glider are eliminated altogether ?"
"Oh, there's another option no one think about. It is not a shuttle, but nevertheless remains a space station logistic vehicle - in fact the cheapest of them all ! Oh, and it can fly into orbit a top a Titan III-C, just like the NRO big spy satellites. No need for the III-L."
"What's that thing ?" Weinberger was confused again. He couldn't figure what the hell Flax was talking about.
"Big Gemini." Flax said "I told you it was the cheapest of the space station logistic vehicles, but not a shuttle. That might please you, Mr Weinberger: manned spaceflight continues without the burden of a big spaceplane. How about that ?"
"Indeed. We discussed the matter last August with the President. He doesn't want to give manned spaceflight. But he doesn't like the shuttle either.
Fubini didn't said anything. Hell, he might be right. Since my Glider was not exactly received with great enthusiasm by those NASA guys... the main roadblock is Dale Myers.
"But wasn't the size of the shuttle payload bay also driven by NASA space station modules ?" Weinberger wanted to be sure he had factored everything in the equation.
"You're right." Flax said. "But what space station are you talking about ? None planned as of today - not with the shuttle already busting the budget."
"Gentlemen, in the end you are telling me that manned space flight and the shuttle are different matters." Weinberger said.
"You get it. As for military satellites, the actual boosters are doing a fine job."
Weinberger aparently had enough information to make a decision, and went away.
As they concluded the meeting, Flax had a little smile on his face. Even Weinberger had no idea how big the National Reconnaissance Office really was. Billions of dollars had been spend on spy satellites, the overall program was nearly as important as Apollo.
Of course there had been failures, and cancellations, and the hardware they left was so advanced it could not decently be destroyed. It was instead stored at a warehouse in a remote corner of a military base... somewhere in the desert. Flax had been there a couple of times.
A major surprise - if it ever leaks to the world - will be the extend of the cooperation between NASA and the National Reconnaissance Office, Fubini thought as he watched Weinberger leaving.
It was just breathtaking to think how much help the civilian space agency had benefited from the space spies; it made for some amazing stories no sci-fi writter could even imagine in his right mind. It was better than James Bond.
Eugene Fubini and Alexander Flax had a meeting with Bureau of Budget officials. Latest news from Caspar Weinberger office did not exactly pleased Flax.
"James Fletcher is a wise man."Flax told Weinberger. "You know why ?"
"No."
"He didn't put all his eggs into a single basket. Look at this: he asked you for an orbiter with an external tank, and then proposed two options for the booster. He obviously wanted the Saturn, but that would be expensive. Being a wise man, Fletcher evidently had a fallback option: a pressure-fed dumb booster, strong enough to fall into the ocean under parachutes, unmanned."
"Indeed. And I, Weinberger, told Fletcher last week I would oppose the Saturn-shuttle but not the big dumb booster. I can live with that shuttle. You realizes that my decision amounts to a go ahead to the program by the Bureau of Budget – and, sooner than latter, by the President. So, what's your problem, Dr Flax ? That might be a viable shuttle no ?"
"No it isn't. We have no experience with pressure-fed rockets. But I'll tell you where the real problem is. You have been mistaken: the problem is not the booster. The main issue is with the orbiter: that thing is too big. It is that massive orbiter that, in turn, makes the tank and the booster bigger. All three elements in the shuttle system are tied together one way or another. Change one and you change the other two."
Weinberger was evidently confused.
"But how do we ended with such a big orbiter then ? Isn't the Air Force responsible for that ?"
"It is, and I'll tell you the exact story behind that. The exact reason why the Air Force insist on such a big payload bay, that in turn drives the orbiter to a huge size and cost."
Flax made a pause, then resumed talking, evidently chosing his words carefully.
"For five years I, Alexander Flax, ran a highly secretive military space agency called the National Reconnaissance Office. It was spun off from the Air Force a decade ago to deal with spy satellites snapping pictures of the Soviet Union.
Our optical spy satellites fell into two broad categories.
The KH-4 Corona scan the Soviet Union at medium resolution – what matters is broad mapping, not details.
The second category of spysats deals with detailed pictures – details as small as some inches. That's the KH-8 Gambit.
We launched a bunch of short lived reconnaissance satellites over the years, but recently we shifted into the exact opposite direction. The NRO recently launched a new breed of spy satellite, called the KH-9, to succeed the KH-4 Corona in the broad mapping role.
It is a monster of satellite, but still lacks an essential element: we still can't beam the photos electronically to the ground, real time.
We have to place the developed film into a return capsule, drop that into the atmosphere, catch that with an Hercules cargo aircraft, pull it onboard, then bring the film down to Washington for analysis. A very cumbersome process we hope to eliminate with the next generation of spy satellite, at the end of this decade. Our objective is near real-time transmission of electronic pictures."
Fubini and Flax made a pause, judging the effect of their speeches on Weinberger.
"Let's go back to the shuttle. That KH-8 successor that could beam the pictures to the ground, real time - well, it is, too, an enormous satellite. Dimension wise, that KH-11 is 60 ft long by 15 feet wide, with a mass of 65 000 pounds..."
"Which, by a bizarre coincidence, match the limits the Air Force set to the shuttle payload bay. What a coincidence !" Weinberger smiled.
"There you are. Now perhaps you think that, as a former head of the NRO agency, and Nixon technical advisor on the shuttle, I (and Eugene) should fight to the last end to keep the shuttle bay wide enough to launch those KH-11 babies.
To make it short, I should be happy that your Bureau of Budget and NASA agree on that full size Shuttle orbiter !"
"Well, that would be logical." Weinberger nodded. "But...you don’t." he smiled.
"Bad luck: there are some little issues with all this. Eugene ?"
"Indeed. Issue number one is that the Titan currently does a good job launching spy satellites.
Problem number two is that the Air Force had man rated the Titan for the Manned Orbital Laboratory.
And a last issue is that, at current flight rates, the throw-away Titan has better economics than any shuttle concept !
Because there's not enough satellites to launch, as of today it is cheaper to throw away rockets than to reuse them, Shuttle-style. C'est la vie."
Weinberger was confused.
"But the Air Force need the big orbiter to ferry KH-11s into orbit no ?"
"No. Let's put the problem into a different perspective. KH-11s are so big they drive the shuttle dimension - and cost - to the roof. Now I ask, why bother launching the KH-11 within a shuttle payload bay when a Titan III can do the job earlier and cheaper ? Have a smaller shuttle that does not launch the big spy sat, for example a space plane with a payload of 40 000 pounds only."
"That won't work" Weinberger reacted.
"Why ?"
"Because this amount to a mixed fleet of Titan and Shuttle, and this mean not enough satellites remain to justify the shuttle economically. Because, you see, when NASA officials try justifying the shuttle on economic grounds, they base their estimations on the number of satellites launched over the last decade.
That probably included what you told me minutes ago - that bunch of short lived reconnaissance satellites. Hell, this mean that your NRO accounted for a large percentage of the satellites we launched over the last decade ! How about that ?"
Flax answered cautiously
"In some way you're right. Early batches of NRO spy satellites had a very short lifespan, and a high failure rate, so we launched dozens of them. Can't tell you more. What I can tell you is that those days are over: the next generation is the exact opposite. Big, heavy, expensive and with a long useful life. So there’s much less things to launch as a result.
I insist that a mixed fleet of Titan and shuttle would be a wise thing to have. And I'd like to develop this idea further."
"How ?"
It was Fubini that answered.
"Now follow my reasoning again. We could have a fleet of Titan that would launch NASA shuttle and NRO spy satellites indifferently - and separately. The KH-11 would ride to space a top a Titan, but not into the shuttle payload bay. That's my glider concept - kind of scaled-up DynaSoar.
Imagine an unpowered shuttle a top a multistage expendable booster that push it into orbit. But the Titan that would launch this glider is a bigger variant, because the fat DynaSoar still weights 100 000 pounds. Martin call it the III-L. But that's apparently too big for your spy satellite no ?"
"Indeed. The KH-9 and KH-11 are massive, but not this point. They are launched by a standard Titan III-C."
"So we would have two Titan variants then, the usual III-C and that monster III-L to launch your Glider. No ?" Weinberger liked that debate.
"Exact." Flax smiled. "Now what I'll propose won't please Eugene. But why bother with this glider ?"
"Uh ?"
"What's the usefulness of it ? Can you really justify it ? Do you think NASA would accept that ?"
Fubini reaction was of irritation, followed by resignation.
"I don't think so. Even a pragmatic manager like their deputy administrator - George Low - would not accept this Glider. I think their opinion would be "Hell, this is a step backward, back to that DynaSoar McNamara cancelled a decade ago."
"But then, Alexander, what option remains if the KH-11-sized-orbiter and the glider are eliminated altogether ?"
"Oh, there's another option no one think about. It is not a shuttle, but nevertheless remains a space station logistic vehicle - in fact the cheapest of them all ! Oh, and it can fly into orbit a top a Titan III-C, just like the NRO big spy satellites. No need for the III-L."
"What's that thing ?" Weinberger was confused again. He couldn't figure what the hell Flax was talking about.
"Big Gemini." Flax said "I told you it was the cheapest of the space station logistic vehicles, but not a shuttle. That might please you, Mr Weinberger: manned spaceflight continues without the burden of a big spaceplane. How about that ?"
"Indeed. We discussed the matter last August with the President. He doesn't want to give manned spaceflight. But he doesn't like the shuttle either.
Fubini didn't said anything. Hell, he might be right. Since my Glider was not exactly received with great enthusiasm by those NASA guys... the main roadblock is Dale Myers.
"But wasn't the size of the shuttle payload bay also driven by NASA space station modules ?" Weinberger wanted to be sure he had factored everything in the equation.
"You're right." Flax said. "But what space station are you talking about ? None planned as of today - not with the shuttle already busting the budget."
"Gentlemen, in the end you are telling me that manned space flight and the shuttle are different matters." Weinberger said.
"You get it. As for military satellites, the actual boosters are doing a fine job."
Weinberger aparently had enough information to make a decision, and went away.
As they concluded the meeting, Flax had a little smile on his face. Even Weinberger had no idea how big the National Reconnaissance Office really was. Billions of dollars had been spend on spy satellites, the overall program was nearly as important as Apollo.
Of course there had been failures, and cancellations, and the hardware they left was so advanced it could not decently be destroyed. It was instead stored at a warehouse in a remote corner of a military base... somewhere in the desert. Flax had been there a couple of times.
A major surprise - if it ever leaks to the world - will be the extend of the cooperation between NASA and the National Reconnaissance Office, Fubini thought as he watched Weinberger leaving.
It was just breathtaking to think how much help the civilian space agency had benefited from the space spies; it made for some amazing stories no sci-fi writter could even imagine in his right mind. It was better than James Bond.
Battle for the space shuttle (10)
Archibald
Banned
the capsules strike back !
October 19, 1971
Alexander Flax
Memo to:
Dr. Edward E. David
Executive Office of the President - Office of Science and Technology
Washington, D. C. 20506
Dear Ed:
The Space Shuttle Panel has now had several meetings over a period of two months and I believe it would be useful to give you an interim report on our current impressions and opinions regarding the NASA Space Shuttle Program.
Even during this brief period, as a result of ongoing technical and cost tradeoff studies and program changes to accommodate changing FY -73 budget and peak year funding guidelines and constraints, the shuttle configuration and program phasing have been undergoing continuous revision.
While, in my opinion, the searching examination and revision of the program which has been taking place has been, for the most part, healthy, it has limited the extent to which the Panel has been able to review in depth the merits of particular approaches and the plausibility of the economic and other justifications for the changing program plans.
Given the diversity of scientific and technical backgrounds, interests, and value systems represented among the Panel members, I am sure you will not be surprised to learn that up to this time, we are far from achieving any degree of unanimity regarding the attractiveness, utility, desirability, or necessity of the space shuttle system or, for that matter, on the virtues of alternatives to it. Nevertheless, there are some areas of fairly general agreement and some points of disagreement which I believe are worth reporting in order to help illuminate the critical issues.
Most of the members of the Panel doubt that a viable shuttle program can be undertaken without a degree of national commitment over a long term analogous to that which sustained the Apollo program. Such a degree of political and public support may be attainable, but it is certainly not now apparent.
Planning a program as large and risky (with respect to both technology and cost) as the shuttle, with the long-term prospect of fixed ceiling budgets for the program and for NASA as a whole, does not bode well for the future of the program.
Already some decisions regarding the shuttle system and program have been taken which introduce additional hazards to the success of the program technically, operationally, and economically in order to reduce projected peak-year funding requirements.
For this and other reasons, most Panel members feel that serious consideration must be given to less costly programs which, while they provide less advancement in space capability than the shuttle, still continue to maintain options for continuing manned spaceflight activity, enlarge space operational capabilities, and allow for further progress in space technology.
The attachment contains a more detailed discussion of questions considered by the Panel under the headings:
I. Space Shuttle Objectives, Benefits and Viability
II. Shuttle System and Program
III. Shuttle Cost, Economics and Risks
IV. Space Program Assessment
V. Alternative Programs
Although I have tried in this letter and the attachment to reflect the consensus of the Panel, there has been no opportunity for the members to review and comment on them and they should therefore be considered to be in the nature of a
Chairman's report on Panel activities.
Attachment
Sincerely,
Alexander H. Flax
(...)
V. Alternative Programs
The Panel considered a number of alternatives to development of the shuttle which would provide lesser capabilities and lesser potential long-range future cost savings than the shuttle program but which met to some degree the requirements for a continuing manned program and for further progress in space and spave vehicle technology.
Unfortunately, the costs and technical data for such programs have not been available in anywhere near the depth and detail as for the shuttle program; this is not at all surprising in view of the massive funding and emphasis which the shuttle program has received over the past two years.
Objections can be and were raised to every alternative program on the grounds that, although it was cheaper than the shuttle program, the potential benefits were so much smaller that the cost of such programs could not be justified.
Such objections effectively left only two alternatives for the next ten years: either (1) proceed with the shuttle program now or soon, or (2) drop manned spaceflight activity after Skylab A and the possible Salyut visit and do nothing new in space vehicle and space operations technology. Most of the Panel rejected these "all or nothing" views.
There were three principal alternatives to deciding now to proceed with the shuttle with a 1978-79 objective for the first manned orbital flight which gained some degree of support within the Panel.
This support was subject to various qualifications such as, on the one hand, that they should be considered as preferable to the shuttle and, on the other hand, that they should be considered only if the shuttle were rejected because of budget limitations or the failure to achieve a sufficient degree of national commitment.
In any case, it was agreed that all the alternatives required a good deal more technical, operational and cost analysis before they could proceed.
The alternatives are as follows:
A. Defer Decision on the Shuttle
This alternative contemplates the possibility that with further studies, analyses and technology advancement, uncertainties and risks in the shuttle technical and cost areas can be reduced to a point of greater acceptability and that the national climate for generating the requisite degree of commitment to the program may be improved over the next year or two.
This alternative can, of course, be combined with a period of more intensive study of other alternatives so that there would be a better basis for decision at some future time. A deferral of decision involves lengthening the period during which the U. S. will have no option for a manned spaceflight activity. Present planning by the NASA Office of Manned Spaceflight (01\4S1-7) calls for two Apollo flights in 1972, three Skylab flights in 1973, a Skylab revisit in 1974, and possibly Salyut docking in 1975 and 1976. If carried out on the current schedule, the shuttle program could achieve first manned orbital flight in 1978 or 1979, giving a two or three year lapse in U. S. manned spaceflight.
If a decision on the shuttle is deferred for a year or more, the hiatus in U. S. manned activity could extend to four or five years. There is some Saturn/ Apollo hardware which not used for backup in Skylab or Salyut docking could be used to support another Skylab (which, however, would have no backup). The continuation of the Saturn/Apollo industrial and support effort even during periods when there is little spaceflight activity is very expensive ($500 million to $1 billion annually) with present hardware and mode of operation designed to launch the very large and expensive payloads for manned lunar flights.
It does not seem economically sound to adopt a course of action which would l cad to having to continue the Saturn/Apollo industrial and support base for an extended period, the duration of which is necessarily unknown at the time it is decided upon. This is particularly so because Saturn/Apollo assets are limited in number (4 Command and Service Modules will remain after Skylab and Salyut docking) and reopening manufacturing lines would further significantly increase the already high cost of this approach.
Therefore, if a shuttle decision is to be delayed beyond July 1972, if a viable continuing manned spaceflight option is to be assured without undue economic burden, it would be essential to initiate detailed engineering design and planning for one of the two alternative launch vehicle and spacecraft programs.
B. Ballistic Recovery System
This alternative involves foregoing technological innovation in launch and recovery. However, it permits a continuing manned spaceflight capability, at least for low orbit, at a cost considerably lower than presently possible with Saturn/Apollo systems.
One proposal for a new ballistic recovery system is the "Big Gemini" which is billed as a growth version of the Gemini recovery capsule, but, which to all intents and purposes, is a new spacecraft design based on Gemini technology.
The vehicle is capable of reentry with 2000 pounds of payload and with a Titan III-M launch vehicle can be orbited with 7,000 pounds of payload, including cargo carried in a non-recoverable cargo -propulsion module. It has a passenger capacity of nine men.
There is also a proposal to modify the Apollo command module to make it refurbishable. This would be capable of launch and recovery with four men and would be launched with a modified expendable service module similar to the one used to launch Apollo. This system could most readily be launched by a Saturn IB with which the basic command and service module hardware is already compatible.
Apparently, NASA has considered such ballistic recovery systems only as a short-term interim manned spaceflight capability to cover delays of a year or two in shuttle availability. Therefore, there has been no study of the best approach, if a longer-term program were to be pursued.
The Saturn IB/Apollo program might be the best solution if only a short period were involved, but it is probably not the best choice for a system to provide for a period of 5 to 10 years.
The Big Gemini/Titan III approach is estimated to cost $0.8 to $1.2 billion in RDT&E. However, annual program support costs and direct operating and refurbishment costs would be substantially lower.
A careful and complete comparative study of the two system approaches and perhaps other alternatives is required before the choice could be made for this alternative.
The selection of the launch vehicle also requires more analysis. In addition to Titan III-M and Saturn IB, consideration should also be given to versions of the Titan III-L (large -core Titan vehicle with varying numbers and arrangements of strap -on solid rockets xith a payload of 100,000 pounds)
The parachute-recovered pressure-fed booster might also be attractive for this program if it proves to be feasible and cost effective. Launch vehicle selection should be based not only on requirements of the manned spacecraft, but also on the payload requirements of the space station modules and experimental hardware which the manned spacecraft would presumably be supporting.
The ballistic recovery vehicles and non-recoverable launch vehicles contemplated in this alternative would be justified only if a slow-paced manned spaceflight program were contemplated (2 to 4 manned flights per year).
If the annual frequency of manned flight activity rose much above 5, the cost of each flight ($50 to $150 million) would quickly become prohibitive.
On the other hand, for the low flight rates, this program would require much lower initial investment than the shuttle and should provide a continuing manned spaceflight capability at considerably lower cost than the present Saturn/Apollo systems.
Except for providing a launch vehicle system of higher payload capacity in common use, this alternative would have little effect on unmanned space programs. It would provide a respectable capability to support manned space experimentation and other space station activities. The crews would, however, be subjected to the same launch and recovery accelerations and environments presently experienced by the Apollo astronauts.
October 19, 1971
Alexander Flax
Memo to:
Dr. Edward E. David
Executive Office of the President - Office of Science and Technology
Washington, D. C. 20506
Dear Ed:
The Space Shuttle Panel has now had several meetings over a period of two months and I believe it would be useful to give you an interim report on our current impressions and opinions regarding the NASA Space Shuttle Program.
Even during this brief period, as a result of ongoing technical and cost tradeoff studies and program changes to accommodate changing FY -73 budget and peak year funding guidelines and constraints, the shuttle configuration and program phasing have been undergoing continuous revision.
While, in my opinion, the searching examination and revision of the program which has been taking place has been, for the most part, healthy, it has limited the extent to which the Panel has been able to review in depth the merits of particular approaches and the plausibility of the economic and other justifications for the changing program plans.
Given the diversity of scientific and technical backgrounds, interests, and value systems represented among the Panel members, I am sure you will not be surprised to learn that up to this time, we are far from achieving any degree of unanimity regarding the attractiveness, utility, desirability, or necessity of the space shuttle system or, for that matter, on the virtues of alternatives to it. Nevertheless, there are some areas of fairly general agreement and some points of disagreement which I believe are worth reporting in order to help illuminate the critical issues.
Most of the members of the Panel doubt that a viable shuttle program can be undertaken without a degree of national commitment over a long term analogous to that which sustained the Apollo program. Such a degree of political and public support may be attainable, but it is certainly not now apparent.
Planning a program as large and risky (with respect to both technology and cost) as the shuttle, with the long-term prospect of fixed ceiling budgets for the program and for NASA as a whole, does not bode well for the future of the program.
Already some decisions regarding the shuttle system and program have been taken which introduce additional hazards to the success of the program technically, operationally, and economically in order to reduce projected peak-year funding requirements.
For this and other reasons, most Panel members feel that serious consideration must be given to less costly programs which, while they provide less advancement in space capability than the shuttle, still continue to maintain options for continuing manned spaceflight activity, enlarge space operational capabilities, and allow for further progress in space technology.
The attachment contains a more detailed discussion of questions considered by the Panel under the headings:
I. Space Shuttle Objectives, Benefits and Viability
II. Shuttle System and Program
III. Shuttle Cost, Economics and Risks
IV. Space Program Assessment
V. Alternative Programs
Although I have tried in this letter and the attachment to reflect the consensus of the Panel, there has been no opportunity for the members to review and comment on them and they should therefore be considered to be in the nature of a
Chairman's report on Panel activities.
Attachment
Sincerely,
Alexander H. Flax
(...)
V. Alternative Programs
The Panel considered a number of alternatives to development of the shuttle which would provide lesser capabilities and lesser potential long-range future cost savings than the shuttle program but which met to some degree the requirements for a continuing manned program and for further progress in space and spave vehicle technology.
Unfortunately, the costs and technical data for such programs have not been available in anywhere near the depth and detail as for the shuttle program; this is not at all surprising in view of the massive funding and emphasis which the shuttle program has received over the past two years.
Objections can be and were raised to every alternative program on the grounds that, although it was cheaper than the shuttle program, the potential benefits were so much smaller that the cost of such programs could not be justified.
Such objections effectively left only two alternatives for the next ten years: either (1) proceed with the shuttle program now or soon, or (2) drop manned spaceflight activity after Skylab A and the possible Salyut visit and do nothing new in space vehicle and space operations technology. Most of the Panel rejected these "all or nothing" views.
There were three principal alternatives to deciding now to proceed with the shuttle with a 1978-79 objective for the first manned orbital flight which gained some degree of support within the Panel.
This support was subject to various qualifications such as, on the one hand, that they should be considered as preferable to the shuttle and, on the other hand, that they should be considered only if the shuttle were rejected because of budget limitations or the failure to achieve a sufficient degree of national commitment.
In any case, it was agreed that all the alternatives required a good deal more technical, operational and cost analysis before they could proceed.
The alternatives are as follows:
A. Defer Decision on the Shuttle
This alternative contemplates the possibility that with further studies, analyses and technology advancement, uncertainties and risks in the shuttle technical and cost areas can be reduced to a point of greater acceptability and that the national climate for generating the requisite degree of commitment to the program may be improved over the next year or two.
This alternative can, of course, be combined with a period of more intensive study of other alternatives so that there would be a better basis for decision at some future time. A deferral of decision involves lengthening the period during which the U. S. will have no option for a manned spaceflight activity. Present planning by the NASA Office of Manned Spaceflight (01\4S1-7) calls for two Apollo flights in 1972, three Skylab flights in 1973, a Skylab revisit in 1974, and possibly Salyut docking in 1975 and 1976. If carried out on the current schedule, the shuttle program could achieve first manned orbital flight in 1978 or 1979, giving a two or three year lapse in U. S. manned spaceflight.
If a decision on the shuttle is deferred for a year or more, the hiatus in U. S. manned activity could extend to four or five years. There is some Saturn/ Apollo hardware which not used for backup in Skylab or Salyut docking could be used to support another Skylab (which, however, would have no backup). The continuation of the Saturn/Apollo industrial and support effort even during periods when there is little spaceflight activity is very expensive ($500 million to $1 billion annually) with present hardware and mode of operation designed to launch the very large and expensive payloads for manned lunar flights.
It does not seem economically sound to adopt a course of action which would l cad to having to continue the Saturn/Apollo industrial and support base for an extended period, the duration of which is necessarily unknown at the time it is decided upon. This is particularly so because Saturn/Apollo assets are limited in number (4 Command and Service Modules will remain after Skylab and Salyut docking) and reopening manufacturing lines would further significantly increase the already high cost of this approach.
Therefore, if a shuttle decision is to be delayed beyond July 1972, if a viable continuing manned spaceflight option is to be assured without undue economic burden, it would be essential to initiate detailed engineering design and planning for one of the two alternative launch vehicle and spacecraft programs.
B. Ballistic Recovery System
This alternative involves foregoing technological innovation in launch and recovery. However, it permits a continuing manned spaceflight capability, at least for low orbit, at a cost considerably lower than presently possible with Saturn/Apollo systems.
One proposal for a new ballistic recovery system is the "Big Gemini" which is billed as a growth version of the Gemini recovery capsule, but, which to all intents and purposes, is a new spacecraft design based on Gemini technology.
The vehicle is capable of reentry with 2000 pounds of payload and with a Titan III-M launch vehicle can be orbited with 7,000 pounds of payload, including cargo carried in a non-recoverable cargo -propulsion module. It has a passenger capacity of nine men.
There is also a proposal to modify the Apollo command module to make it refurbishable. This would be capable of launch and recovery with four men and would be launched with a modified expendable service module similar to the one used to launch Apollo. This system could most readily be launched by a Saturn IB with which the basic command and service module hardware is already compatible.
Apparently, NASA has considered such ballistic recovery systems only as a short-term interim manned spaceflight capability to cover delays of a year or two in shuttle availability. Therefore, there has been no study of the best approach, if a longer-term program were to be pursued.
The Saturn IB/Apollo program might be the best solution if only a short period were involved, but it is probably not the best choice for a system to provide for a period of 5 to 10 years.
The Big Gemini/Titan III approach is estimated to cost $0.8 to $1.2 billion in RDT&E. However, annual program support costs and direct operating and refurbishment costs would be substantially lower.
A careful and complete comparative study of the two system approaches and perhaps other alternatives is required before the choice could be made for this alternative.
The selection of the launch vehicle also requires more analysis. In addition to Titan III-M and Saturn IB, consideration should also be given to versions of the Titan III-L (large -core Titan vehicle with varying numbers and arrangements of strap -on solid rockets xith a payload of 100,000 pounds)
The parachute-recovered pressure-fed booster might also be attractive for this program if it proves to be feasible and cost effective. Launch vehicle selection should be based not only on requirements of the manned spacecraft, but also on the payload requirements of the space station modules and experimental hardware which the manned spacecraft would presumably be supporting.
The ballistic recovery vehicles and non-recoverable launch vehicles contemplated in this alternative would be justified only if a slow-paced manned spaceflight program were contemplated (2 to 4 manned flights per year).
If the annual frequency of manned flight activity rose much above 5, the cost of each flight ($50 to $150 million) would quickly become prohibitive.
On the other hand, for the low flight rates, this program would require much lower initial investment than the shuttle and should provide a continuing manned spaceflight capability at considerably lower cost than the present Saturn/Apollo systems.
Except for providing a launch vehicle system of higher payload capacity in common use, this alternative would have little effect on unmanned space programs. It would provide a respectable capability to support manned space experimentation and other space station activities. The crews would, however, be subjected to the same launch and recovery accelerations and environments presently experienced by the Apollo astronauts.
Archibald
Banned
As always, another great update Archibald
I did a little search in your TL and I saw that late 1968 NASA had a different administrator.
Couldn't find a lot of information on this general (can't remember his name) Tom Paine was a democrat in Nixon republican administration so he knew that his head might be cut any time soon. Among those considered were Simon Ramo - the -R in TRW, and cold warrior General Bernard Schriever.
Ramo and Shrieber had developed the Minuteman ICBM early in the 60's. The whole development and deployement had been a tremendous success - work done in three or four years after starting from scratch.
NASA might have fell under military command, who knows.
In the end Nixon decided to keep Paine per lack of successor - they all knew that post-Apollo NASA was a poisonned calice (and indeed it was, and still is 45 years later)