Ending the Electoral College in the late 1860’s

I’ve been struggling with finding a POD that could eliminate the electoral college in a plausible way.

Could the victorious North force through an amendment to abolish the electoral college in the aftermath of the civil war? I haven’t seen any mention of it, but changing the presidential election to a direct popular vote would seriously hurt the power of the white plantation class. If only a few people in a state can vote, then the state has much less impact on the presidential election. That would give the states incentive to expand the franchise, or be rendered irrelevant at presidential election time.

I do not now enough about the politics of the era to know if this is feasible; is it? If someone thought about it, would it be able to be put through?

If anyone wants to take this and run with it, go ahead—I certainly can’t do anything with it.
 
What they should have done was to call another constitutional convention, which also would have probably made reconstruction less of a mess. The old constitution had just failed in a very obvious way and many of its provisions, including the Electoral College itself, had been written in to protect the interests of slave states and were at least obsolete.

There would have been no reason for the second convention to keep or institute the Electoral College, except for the same tradition-bound thinking that prevented the calling of a second constitutional convention.
 

Red Orm

Banned
There is an almost universal misconception about what the office of President is in the United States, and what the Electoral College exists for. The president was never intended to ever be a representative of the People, or to be elected by the People. That is what state senators and congressmen (the people who are elected by the people) are for. The president is elected by the representatives of the States, to be a fair, neutral, and acceptable (ideally) executor of the Constitution and the Supreme Court's interpretation of it, and to represent the United States internationally. The Electoral College was not made, even in part, to protect the interests of slave states; that was what nasty legislation such as the Three-Fifths Compromise existed for.
 
The claim I made above is from Akhil Amar's "Biography of the Constitution", which is not above criticism but is regarded as pretty authoritative. I've never encountered Red Orm's theory of the presidency anywhere. But I do see lots of attempts is discussions to use high faultin' political theory to mask what were some very grubby compromises.

The basic problem is that if a big percentage of a state's population was made up of slaves, and in one instance (South Carolina) a majority of the state's population was made up of slaves, its potential free electorate would be smaller than the free electorate in non-slave states, and would be outvoted in any sort of one man one vote system. So the slave states were pretty adamant about staying away from OMOV. Its true that no one at the 1787 convention was exactly a (small d) democrat, but the slave states could be relied on to take the least democratic side on any issue that came up, except for maybe Virginia on large state- small state stuff.

So it was in the slaveholders' interest to maximize representation by state in federal institutions, and to minimize representation by population, particularly after they lost on the attempt to get slaves counted for purposes of determining representation (this is where the three fifths compromise came from). First, if an elite kept control of the state government, then they would control an representation that state had in federal bodies. Second, it would make having a relatively small electorate less of a disadvantage, and you are going to have a relatively small electorate if you have enslaved a good part of your population.

Without this issue, most likely the President would have just been elected by the House of Representatives. Many of the framers thought that elections would normally wind up being determined by the House anyway with the system they designed.

It was no accident that South Carolina kept the "have the state legislature select the electors" system around the longest.
 
At the time of the constitution, the president wasn't intended to be representing the people, necessarily, but by the time of the Civil War, the presidency had real power, and going with one voter, one vote, would really hurt the ones who didn't want the black population to vote.
 
What they should have done was to call another constitutional convention, which also would have probably made reconstruction less of a mess. The old constitution had just failed in a very obvious way and many of its provisions, including the Electoral College itself, had been written in to protect the interests of slave states and were at least obsolete.
.

I don't know; is the Constitution really to blame for the war? Does the South not secede if popular vote (which Lincoln won, anyway) decides the presidency?
 
"I don't know; is the Constitution really to blame for the war?"

Not directly, but having a civil war by definition means there are at least serious problems with your system of government.

The USA just got really lucky that the patched-up version worked as well as it did. The performance of the imitation US constitutions in Latin America are not very impressive.
 
OK, but why do you then need an entirely new constitution when the existing one allows for amendments? The 13th Amendment eliminated the issue at the root of the conflict (slavery).

If you want to argue that the Constitution was effectively tainted by its references to slavery, I guess I could see that. But to draw a connection between the manner of electing the President and the war seems rather tortured to me.
 
The slaveholding states, in particular the ones that had relatively large slave populations benefited by the 3/5 rule where slaves were counted as 3/5 of a person for representation - specifically in the House of Representatives. Not only did this give them extra power in the House, but since the number of electors was equal to the number of Senators (2) plus the number of Representatives this gave them a disproportional say in presidential elections. The end of the Civil War and the end of slavery made the 3/5 clause moot, however if the Radical Republicans see the Electoral College as an institution tainted as supporting slave power/slaveocracy and contributing to the war with its costs both financial and human, replacing it with a popular vote - perhaps with a run off if nobody gets >50%.
 
"I don't know; is the Constitution really to blame for the war?"

Not directly, but having a civil war by definition means there are at least serious problems with your system of government.

The USA just got really lucky that the patched-up version worked as well as it did. The performance of the imitation US constitutions in Latin America are not very impressive.

Other than a rhetorical point, I'm not seeing any actual argument that the Civil War proved that the Constitution was flawed to the point that the war can be blamed, at least, indirectly, on the Constitution. Would you be so kind as to present a concrete example?
 
There is an almost universal misconception about what the office of President is in the United States, and what the Electoral College exists for. The president was never intended to ever be a representative of the People, or to be elected by the People. That is what state senators and congressmen (the people who are elected by the people) are for. The president is elected by the representatives of the States, to be a fair, neutral, and acceptable (ideally) executor of the Constitution and the Supreme Court's interpretation of it, and to represent the United States internationally. The Electoral College was not made, even in part, to protect the interests of slave states; that was what nasty legislation such as the Three-Fifths Compromise existed for.

Uh, the Electoral College (due to the fact that it is *mostly* based on representation in the House) *incorporated* the three-fifths compromise. Anyway, you are right that the purpose of the Electoral College is widely misunderstood, but I would say you misunderstand it yourself. As I once pointed out in soc.history.what-if

***
Hugh Williamson of North Carolina, favoring legislative election, argued
that "As the Salary of the Executive will be fixed, and he will not be
eligible a 2d. time, there will not be such a dependence on the
Legislature as has been imagined." He opposed direct election because it
would not only favor the large states but specifically the large
*northern* states; even as large a southern state as Virginia (and by
extension, the whole South), Williamson said, could not elect a President
because "Her slaves will have no suffrage."
http://books.google.com/books?id=n0oWAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA32 (Of course
theoretically the southern states could have gotten around this problem by
allowing the slaves to vote, confident that in those days of open voting,
the slaves would not dare to vote against their masters' choice. I doubt
that anyone seriously proposed this, though...)

The chief dispute at the Convention was not between advocates of direct
and indirect election of the president, but between advocates of popular
election (either direct or through an electoral college) and legislative
election. One might think that the advocates of legislative election
based their arguments on the idea that the legislature should be supreme,
but that was not really the case. The delegates quickly decided that the
president should be independent of the legislature, but almost until the
end of the Convention the small states still favored legislative election,
which they felt would be more beneficial to their states and, as
Williamson argued, not inconsistent with executive independence, given a
fixed salary for the president and no possibility of re-election. What
was ultimately decided on was a compromise satisfactory to the
legislative-election advocates, not only because the Electoral College was
based on legislative apportionment--with the resulting advantage to the
small states, especially thanks to the two electoral votes each state got
for its Senate representation--but also because it was widely assumed that
in most elections, no candidate would get a majority, and the race would
go into the House, to be decided on a one-delegation, one-vote basis.

Contrary to the widespread belief that the Electoral College was meant as
an "elitist" anti-democratic measure, the most avid supporters of the
Electoral College were the advocates of popular election. They felt that
the Electoral College was the closest one could get to a popular-election
plan that could actually pass the Convention, given that small states had
the balance of power there, and given the practical difficulties posed by
differences in electoral laws and conditions from state to state--and
especially the obvious difficulty pointed out by Williamson on how direct
elections would limit the power of the slave states. James Wilson who as
early as June 1 had called for popular election of the president, on June
2 called for election by electors chosen by the people, "but this was not
meant as a significant change and was never really considered as such by
the leading members of the Convention. The major alternatives were
legislative election versus some form of popular election, either direct
or indirect..." David K. Nichols, *The Myth of the Modern Presidency,* p.
40.
http://books.google.com/books?id=x6qPrM4B32IC&pg=PA40

Nichols notes that "It is also commonly assumed that the use of electors
was a product of the Framers' distrust of popular opinion. In support of
this claim we are often treated to quotations from delegates to the
convention such as George Mason who said 'It would be as unnatural to
refer the choice of a proper character for chief Magistrate to the people,
as it would be to refer a trial of colours to a blind man.' There is,
however, a major problem with using such statements to show the
antidemocratic character of the electoral college. The delegates who
expressed the deepest distrust of popular votes were delegates who
eventually opposed the Constitution, such as George Mason or Elbridge
Gerry, or those who favored election by the legislature, such as Roger
Sherman, Charles Pinkney, or George Mason...

"But what of Alexander Hamilton's argument in the *Federalist*? There
Hamilton claimed that the electoral college would refine popular opinion,
would prevent the worst aspects of popular opinion from operating in the
election of the President. Some delegates probably supported the
electoral college because they saw it as a check on popular opinion. But
it is interesting to note that Hamilton's argument in the *Federalist*
for the refining effect of the electoral college was not made at the
Constitutional Convention. Instead, Gouverneur Morris argued that the
extent of the nation would serve to refine popular choice. Morris
contended that although persons of dubious character and ability might be
elevated to office in a single district or state, they would be unlikely
to be elected by the nation as a whole. Only worthy candidates would have
a chance of gaining election from so large a constituency. For Morris it
was the size of the nation, and not the judgment of the electors, that
would screen unworthy candidates. Hamilton borrows Morris's language for
use in the *Federalist* but he substantially alters Morris's argument..."
http://books.google.com/books?id=x6qPrM4B32IC&pg=PA43

Nichols notes that it is ironic that Morris, so often considered a
reactionary aristocrat, anticipates the concept, usually associated with
the Progressives, of a powerful popular executive, arguing in a July 19
speech that the people at large would be the best judge of presidential
preformance, and that "The executive magistrate should be the guardian of
the people, even of the lower classes, against legislative tyranny."
http://books.google.com/books?id=x6qPrM4B32IC&pg=PA44

Morris, as it turns out, was more perceptive than Hamilton (or than many
small-state delegates who wishfully thought that presidential races would
frequently be thrown into the House; Morris correctly predicted that this
would not be the case, arguing that under the new constitution with its
more powerful national government, men with national reputations would be
likely to arise, and people would vote for them rather than waste their
votes on local or regional favorites). The Electoral College never really
"screened" public opinion; the party system did that. Even as early as
1796, the first "faithless elector" provoked howls of outrage ("What, do I
choose Samuel Miles to determine for me whether John Adams or Thomas
Jefferson shall be President? No! I choose him to act, not to think.") and
even further back, in 1792, when the presidency was uncontested, the vice-
presidency was basically determined on party lines, with electors voting
for Adams or Clinton based on which party had the support of the voters or
legislatures that chose the electors. In short, from a *very* early time,
the Electoral College became an essentially popular election (admittedly
in a modified form), and arguably was intended as such from the beginning.

In fact, even the Anti-Federalists conceded the popular nature of the
Presidency. To some, that was part of the problem. Patrick Henry said,
"To me it appears that there is no check in that Government. The
President, Senators, and Representatives all immediately, or mediately,
are the choice of the people."
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch11s13.html (Other
Anti-Federalists were alarmed by the prohibition of relgious tests for the
presidency: "For my part, in reviewing the qualifications necessary for a
President, I did not suppose that the pope could occupy the President's
chair. But let us remember that we form a government for millions not yet
in existence. I have not the art of divination. In the course of four or
five hundred years, I do not know how it will work. This is most certain,
that Papists may occupy that chair, and Mahometans may take it. I see
nothing against it. There is a disqualification, I believe, in every state
in the Union--it ought to be so in this system."
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a6_3s26.html )
 
The reasons fr the electoral college are important--but needs change over generations. I'm wondering if the needs of the late 1860's might favor an amendment eliminating it, regardless of what was intended when the constitution was ratified.
 
The reasons fr the electoral college are important--but needs change over generations. I'm wondering if the needs of the late 1860's might favor an amendment eliminating it, regardless of what was intended when the constitution was ratified.

Remember that Republicans had won in 1860 because of the Electoral College; a system of popular election with a runoff would almost certainly have defeated them. They were well aware--before, during, and after the War--that there was a substantial Democratic minority in the North. Abolishing the Electoral College might actually help bring the Democrats back to power, because a heavily Democratic South combined with the large Democratic minority in the North, could win a popular election. Indeed, in 1876 and 1888, the Democrats won the popular vote but were kept from power by the Electoral College. (Of course the Democrats' popular vote advantage was largely owing to African American disenfranchisement. But if disenfranchisement could be prevented, Republicans would have a chance of getting a considerable number of southern electoral votes, and therefore need not have feared the Electoral College.)
 
Last edited:

CaliGuy

Banned
Remember that Republicans had won in 1860 because of the Electoral College; a system of popular election with a runoff would almost certainly have defeated them. They were well aware--before, during, and after the War--that there was a substantial Democratic minority in the North. Abolishing the Electoral College might actually help bring the Democrats back to power, because a heavily Democratic South combined with the large Democratic minority in the North, could win a popular election. Indeed, in 1876 and 1888, the Democrats won the popular vote but were kept from power by the Electoral College. (Of course that was largely because of African American disenfranchisement. But if disenfranchisement could be prevented, Republicans would have a chance of getting a considerable number of southern electoral votes, and therefore need not have feared the Electoral College.)
Frankly, in a scenario without an Electoral College in the late 1800s, the Republicans would probably feel compelled to continue defending and protecting things such as Black suffrage in the South; after all, the difference between them winning and losing the U.S. Presidency might literally depend on their success in protecting Black voters in the South!
 
Remember that Republicans had won in 1860 because of the Electoral College; a system of popular election with a runoff would almost certainly have defeated them.

In the 19th century they are not going to adopt a runoff system. Just arranging one nationwide popular vote, given the communications/transportation of the time, will be quite the logistical feat. Trying to hold two in a span of a few weeks would be even more so.
 
Last edited:
In the 19th century they are not going to adopt a runoff system. Just arranging one nationwide popular vote, given the communications/transportation of the time, will be quite the logistical feat. Trying to hold two in a span of a few weeks would be even more so.

I don't see why not. Many states held elections for President and HoR on different days. And a second canvass for President would be no harder to arrange than the first.
 
I don't know; is the Constitution really to blame for the war? Does the South not secede if popular vote (which Lincoln won, anyway) decides the presidency?

The popular vote deciding the presidency would be seen as the tyranny of the most populated states. The smaller states will have massive opposition to this scenario because it really limits their ability to influence the presidential election. Even in a post-Civil War scenario there would be massive opposition by many of the northern states.
 
I am a great fan of democracy, and believe proportional representation is inherently and obviously more democratic. As for arguments based on what was intended by the framers of the Constitution, I respectfully suggest that the nation has evolved since then, and intentions have changed. I have a lot less respect for someone who rhetorically says "never intended;" first of all I would think someone at the Constitutional Convention did suggest close dependence on the will of the people polled nationally, and anyway if no one (at the Convention--the CC was not itself democratically representative except in a very indirect sense and whole factions were left out of it to protest, comment or amend after the fact, including getting the whole Bill of Rights written and adopted), still again, we've had over 200 years of history--more than 230 now--of governance under an often Amended Constitution since then, and it certainly has been intended by many many people since 1786 that the President should be regarded as elected by the people of the whole nation, for the people of the whole nation. It is even implicit in the very first words of the Constitution itself that "We, the People" govern and that the Constitution is a means to that end. To say that the Framers did a good job and their intentions should be given respectful consideration when we go about suggesting changes, and their arguments against this or that measure they did consider should be given critical attention with careful thought for how much their premises and reasoning still apply to this day, versus possible changes of circumstances or evolution of our consensual premises, is wise. To say that the dead hand of a gathering of partisan men in a long bygone century must override the collective considerations of hundreds of millions of people with a couple centuries of new experience in a vastly changed world is just plain fatuous.

Furthermore of late here on the board, and probably going back to its beginnings but unnoticed by me, has been a lot of interesting discussion of the matter which certainly is thought provoking. On the whole I think if we had adopted a proportional philosophy across the board, to select Congress at least, and the best possible approach to coupling the unitary, singular office of the Presidency with popular consensus rather than the ideological will'o'the'wisp of some august gathering of superior men allegedly untainted by partisanship to choose the greatest and wisest man to hold executive power by lofty considerations above the grasp of the common mob, we'd generally be much better off. Or anyway--generally no worse off.

However, one crucial election sticks out like a sore thumb in any contemplation of the virtues of a proportional approach to selecting the President--and that is, the very election implied by the OP themselves to be the watershed hopefully leading to PR in that office--and that is of course the Election of 1860.

{Reading more carefully over the thread, I see that DavidT succinctly makes the point I elaborate below}.

Consider how the institution of Electoral Votes, apportioned to the states via the formula of number of Representatives (roughly proportional to population*) plus 2 each for the Senators (making disproportional, skewed in favor of small state voters) actually operated in 1860: Lincoln only got less than 40 percent of the popular vote, yet acquired 180 EV, 28 more than the 152 needed to win and almost 60 percent of the total 303. This counted all states, north and south.

The other outcomes for the other three candidates who among them split the majority of over 60 percent of PV counted are interesting and diverting, but due to the tendency of the Electoral vote system cast winner take all by state to multiply leads into larger margins, they are moot since Lincoln got a solid lead in the Electoral votes. Legally the various losers (and look at Stephen Douglas, outpolling Breckenridge by as much as he trailed Lincoln, and far outpolling Bell, yet losing in EV to their combined totals by 8 to one!) had no recourse but to defer to Lincoln, who also (legally speaking, irrelevant, but morally speaking of some weight) led even Douglas by a quarter of his total PV.

Given the proposition that slavery had to be eliminated sooner or later, and that the general trend of Republican reforms during and after the war was necessary and salutary, what a disaster it would be for anyone but Lincoln to win the Presidency! Or for him to win it, but with the appearance of marginality, such winning by a House Vote.

I am not sure Lincoln would have won a vote in the House; it depends on the nature of the Congressional delegations. One might guess that the 18 states voting for Lincoln with their EV all had Republican dominated Congressional delegations, but perhaps some did not; 15 states cast their EV for one of the other three, mostly to Breckenridge, and given a race between Douglas and Lincoln, if more than 3 states voting for Lincoln had more non-Republican Congressmen than Republicans, presumably the award would go to Breckenridge (runner up in EV, despite having half the popular votes of Lincoln and considerably fewer than Douglas) and after all the combined votes of the Northern and Southern Democratic parties would far outnumber Lincoln's PV total and constitute a majority of the popular votes cast.

It does seem likely that all 18 pro-Lincoln states would be Republican dominated and stick with him, but it would not be amazing if one or two, though probably not 4, defected under those circumstances! Besides, the vote would not be thrown into the House unless Lincoln's PV margin were even thinner, causing states to flip--the thing being, that OTL Lincoln states would be highly unlikely to flip to the EV OTL second-runner Breckenridge; most likely to benefit would be Douglas, but flipping 30 votes from Lincoln to him would not put Douglas in the lead; the Congressional vote would remain between Lincoln and Breckenridge. There is still a fair chance that Northern Democrats might prefer to empower Lincoln over Breckenridge, but putting the Southerner in charge would extend the status quo and put the secession crisis off, a point strongly in his favor in some circles.

If instead of the winner take all distortion of national popular vote preferences, either of two proportional routes--one awarding all 303 EV by national proportion, another going state by state--would leave Lincoln short of an EV victory and throw the election into Congress. In either case it would be Douglas, not Breckenridge, running against Lincoln there.

No, wait, I stand corrected--according to Golfman76's epic recent calculations of proportional awarding of EV state by state, it seems Lincoln would have gotten 105, while Breckinridge would get 62 and Douglas and Bell would have 54 each. Thus, since awarding EV on a national basis would require a bigger revision of the system than doing it state by state, the outcome is again a Lincoln/Breckenridge race in the House under that system. If we accept that the proportional awarding of EV would be on a national basis (or that no one looks at EV at all, they being abolished in favor of straight counts/percentages of national totals) then it becomes a Lincoln/Douglas decision.

By Golfman76's method, and even more so if national PR were adopted, a great many races do get thrown into Congress.

Maybe if this had happened in 1860, the long term outcomes would be superior, but it seems to me pretty necessary that the Civil War be fought and won on OTL terms; even if Lincoln could run a gauntlet of this type and emerge as President his power would be much weakened.

As a general rule, I think the danger of many, perhaps most, race being decided in the House, and between two candidates who put together still might not represent a majority of PV cast would be anticipated by enemies of PR.

Some alternative system of aggregating EV to nominate a winner would have to be adopted, such as transferable votes, so that votes toward the worst performing candidate are distributed via the written preferences of the voters perhaps, to concentrate second, third and lower preference votes on the leading candidates until one emerges with clear EV majority. Logistically we could accommodate that pretty easily today with computerized methods, but in the mid-19th century, it would be hard to do I suppose.

A very simple form of transferable voting though would be to hold the election based on each voter choosing one candidate, state by state or nationally, and then losing candidates successively name the more successful candidate they "will" their vote to. Thus with Golfman76's national outcomes, first whoever speaks for the "Fusion" Democrats (getting 30 EV) awards their votes to say Douglas, making the 2-way race Lincoln 105, Douglas 82. Then Bell, with only 52, is approached next, and he decides for sectional reasons to support Breckenridge. (If instead he supported Lincoln for more ideological reasons, Lincoln would win of course). If Bell supports his fellow Southerner the rank of all 3 is now Breckenridge 118, Lincoln 105, Douglas 82. Now it all hinges on Douglas--even not counting Fusion's 30, awarding his 52 to either leading candidate decides the race. If he goes for Lincoln he is declaring Northern supremacy (and gosh, just because they have the numerical majority) and implicitly erosion of the slave-holder position to some degree which may lead visibly straight to secession; if he supports Breckenridge the Democrats, in southern dominated form plainly moving the D party even further toward slavocracy and against abolition, rule.

Even filtering proportional assignment by popular vote through state apportionments, I think making a rule that if EV can be pooled like this after the election (this is called "asset voting" by the way) whoever has the highest national popular vote within a winning coalition is the one who becomes President would be popular and part of the package--in that case the race is really between Lincoln and Douglas, just as it would be if the EV were awarded directly by national PV.
--------------
Not to get further entangled in wonky ATL rules, the point of all this is that in the 1860s, it would be widely known and well understood that national unity and Union victory were heavily favored by the traditional winner-take-all rules of assigning EV; had any sort of proportional system been in place before the election of 1860 the results, from the Republican point of view anyway, would be disastrous. And the Republicans dominated the national system by any measure at least until 1876.

If then there is any window for persuading a sufficiently strong and motivated public that the Presidency should be determined by proportional voting in any form, it is not in the post-Civil War years!

As time passed and the Republican party itself developed tendencies of splitting on ideological and sectional lines, with a rising tide of more populist movements--Greeley's Liberal Republicans, the Greenbacks, the formerly Republican wing of the People's Party, later Progressive Republicans such as Roosevelt's faction and the LaFollette family in Wisconsin--threatening to undermine its unity, leaving the party to be dominated more and more by pro-corporate and conservative interests--the wacky notion that government of, by and for the people ought to be elected by those same people would become more and more widely embraced. But perhaps it was a keen memory of the narrow win for radical democratic principles in 1860 that blocked the idea of moving away from the indirection of the EV system as it had evolved under partisan reality in the 19th century. And perhaps it was merely a sort of mindless instinct that the old ways were best that was an unconscious memory of that trauma that ruled.

On the other side of the great partisan divide, of course the losers of 1860 would have more motive to consider radical change. But 1860 also revealed to them too the dangers of disunity. The Solid South was, from the point of view of the oligarchies running the place, very comfortable indeed with winner take all and would hardly want to risk eroding the solidity that gave them the advantages of a self-promoting one party state with more radical principles of proportionality, especially since these might give African-Americans a small but guaranteed share of every election when hitherto they were frozen out completely. There was I think leverage for more radical thought, particularly since the People's Party had diverse regional roots including independent rise of Southern independents with no Republican ties. But for it to become the sort of overwhelming majority wave of support necessary to back a shift to proportionality would be very difficult. Again I think a better window than 1865-1880 would be 1880-1900.
-------------------------------------------------
*Except of course for the distorting effect of the 3/5 Compromise--which note, actually downgraded the number of Representatives each slaveholder state got and thus eroded their Electoral votes too--though since only white men could vote those diminished districts and state PV for the Electoral votes, their individual power was indeed amplified compared to that of their equals in non-slaveholder states--but that only mattered if their common interests caused them to unify their votes consistently which was often not the case in the Antebellum years. Actually the power of white supremacist blocs was elevated by mooting the 3/5 compromise since this would mean fully counting African-Americans as full citizens while in fact they continued to be excluded from actually voting, while their antagonists were unified into the Solid South that dictated terms to the national Democratic party and by Congressional and Senatorial seniority rules, entrenched their representatives in powerful positions within each body all out of proportion to their numbers!
 
In the 19th century they are not going to adopt a runoff system. Just arranging one nationwide popular vote, given the communications/transportation of the time, will be quite the logistical feat. Trying to hold two in a span of a few weeks would be even more so.

Even if that were true (which I doubt) the fact remains that even in 1860 the Democrats would have won a plurality of the popular vote had they been united. (By contrast, Lincoln would have won in the Electoral College even against a united opposition.) Heck, in 1864 they won 45 percent of the popular vote *with the South out of the Union.* So there is no reason for the Republicans to think that a popular vote system, with or without a runoff, would be more favorable to them than the Electoral College was.
 
Frankly, in a scenario without an Electoral College in the late 1800s, the Republicans would probably feel compelled to continue defending and protecting things such as Black suffrage in the South; after all, the difference between them winning and losing the U.S. Presidency might literally depend on their success in protecting Black voters in the South!

One reason among many I wish we had fair and proportional voting across the board!

But unfortunately, also a very strong (if secondary) reason for people comfortable with the two-party system, or especially a de facto one party system such as the Republicans enjoyed especially in the post-Civil War years, to stay comfortable with the first-past-the-post, winner take all system inherited from 1786. The last thing they'd want is to be forced to hold their large-scale, white-interest policies hostage to any minority, particularly African-Americans. Not to see short the pro-African sentiment that did develop, first among a tiny minority of the more extreme Abolitionists and then during the war among a great many (if probably not a majority) of Union officers and soldiers. These people would be quite wounded to be told they didn't care about the southern blacks at all. But would they defend the idea that Republican power should be dependent on them? Even if some thought that would be morally fitting, it certainly would not be convenient, and could they sell the idea to the majority of fellow Northern Republicans ranging from indifferent to the fate of African-Americans to sharing some serious racist notions with the Southern ruling consensus themselves? They'd let it ride, speak approvingly of small acts of patronage of African-American individuals (appointment to Federal and maybe some state offices--a famous Revenue Cutter service captain operating in Alaskan waters in the 1880s and '90s was African-American for instance), verbally deplore and denounce acts of barbaric racism (mainly in effect as rhetoric against Democrats, of any section or ideology), and generally consider their work done. Good enough people, but asking them to take on this burden systematically for dubious advantage or none seems vain. After all, if Southern black votes gives them some pickup, how much do they lose by allowing Northern Democrats to take more power in proportion to their popular vote support? More than the Southern Democrats lose? It would be a good thing, from these Northern Republican points of view, to light a fire under the monopolistic Southern political system and stir it up, but a bad thing to undermine their own security. Sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.

In the 19th century they are not going to adopt a runoff system. Just arranging one nationwide popular vote, given the communications/transportation of the time, will be quite the logistical feat. Trying to hold two in a span of a few weeks would be even more so.

By the 1860s, the nation had a pretty comprehensive telegraph network. The issues and personalities of the candidates would already have been hashed over in the main campaign and in a runoff, one is presented with two of the many (possibly) candidates who had already run in the main election. There is no one new in the race, just removal of third alternatives, and people who voted for W or X among the 2 leading candidates the first time presumably still will support them in the second round. It is only those who voted for Y,Z, or Omega outside that 2-person race who have to decide which of those to to transfer their vote to. All voters have had ample time to form judgements of the two remaining candidates. I don't see a big problem.

I'm more fascinated by the possibilities of an instant runoff however; a system that lets someone register that their true preference lies with someone deemed to have "no chance of winning" and yet retain an effective voice in determining which among the "real two" candidates ultimately wins at the same time strikes me as far superior since it may be that someone deemed an extreme outlier actually has more support than anyone realized, so in a future election they may rise up in the polls as representing a very important point of view. It becomes much more difficult for party bosses to manipulate who the candidates shall be with that sort of open door letting air and light in. Meanwhile, given that in any year the realistic race is between two leading candidates (it may be surprising who one or even both of them are though) I don't think it's good to exclude the whole electorate from weighing in on that. Preference voting and instant run-off are pretty much one and the same.

To implement preference voting effectively though might be a tech challenge beyond 19th century practical ability. Hence my wacky notion of asset voting among the minor candidates. The voters ought to be able to decide who their votes transfer to, but in the absence of an effective mechanism giving the decision to the candidate they did vote for is a fair approximation. Since voting is not just a one-time thing but is done dozens of times in a lifetime, voters can come to know and judge the character of their candidates and their likely reactions, and if they think some candidate who is not expected to actually wind up in the top two is nevertheless closely in sympathy with their own priorities, they can vote for them, in the hope that maybe this election or the next more people will swing around and support them too--and meanwhile, their vote is not completely wasted because it can tip the balance among the winners of a close election.

The popular vote deciding the presidency would be seen as the tyranny of the most populated states. The smaller states will have massive opposition to this scenario because it really limits their ability to influence the presidential election. Even in a post-Civil War scenario there would be massive opposition by many of the northern states.

I think words like "tyranny" and "massive" overstate the case considerably. Now they certainly did not back during the Constitutional Convention, as DavidT's first post explained--this is exactly what the small state delegates worried about and said so in so many words. Including the extreme ones. At that time the debate was about power in the abstract.

But of course the "large states," as long as we pursue the fallacy of aggregating people who belong to broad categories into being of one mind on the subject, have their own grounds to worry that tipping the balance too far in the other direction can also result in "tyranny," and by gosh that seems like a more realistic fear to me.

But what happens in real life, as soon as some compromise formula trying to balance out the fears is implemented? In fact I find it hard to imagine any major issue that political factions have polarized around since the adoption of the Constitution more than two centuries ago in which the issue was well described as "small states versus big states." The fact is both small and big states have populations that first of all, insofar as they can be characterized of being of one mind or another state by state, are split on the major political issues. There were big slave states and small slave states, big abolitionist strongholds and small ones. There are small states that are heavily industrial, and big states that are overwhelmingly rural (less true than it used to be but very relevant a hundred years ago or so). There are, in any era, both big and small states that are stalwart for one party or the other, and others, both big and small, that swing back and forth.

Furthermore, it is not true that the people of a state can be presumed to first of all give loyalty to that state, and see everything through the lens of their state versus some other states. To this day some people in some states do make a big issue of state pride, or even go beyond mere team-like loyalty to a serious view that some other state is a serious rival in things that matter, I suppose. Again back in the 1780s and '90s it was reasonable to think that most people viewed the USA as a federation of convenience of sovereign states that would prefer total independence, if this were practical, and the Articles of Confederation union was founded on that presumption too.

Insofar as the Constitution was framed and adopted by people who still put their first loyalty to their state, though, they had already agreed, in ratifying the Constitution, that the notion of state sovereignty really could not do, not for practical purposes of any of the states faring well in a big tough world of superpowers. Gradually, the loyalty of people to their state started to erode, in favor of allegiance to the United States as a collective whole. And I believe this was more correct than prior notions of state sovereignty. After all, prior to the Revolution, there was little to stop a person born in one British colony from relocating to another and becoming accepted there as a resident of that colony, with all rights and responsibilities appropriate to their station. With the Constitution, states lost all power to regulation immigration from other states; a US citizen may go anywhere in the Union they choose, and state laws cannot discriminate, beyond reasonable residency requirement periods measured in months at most, against newcomers versus people born there. (This was indeed a major premise of the Dred Scott decision--if the Constitution recognized the right of a white man to own people of color as property with "no rights a white man is bound to respect" in one state, that that right did not disappear if that slave owner moved to another state--they were bound to extend the right recognized in the South to any state or territory in the Union). In fact then, the American people before the Revolution and after it were citizens of a larger polity than the colony/state they happened to live in. That they did not fully understand or recognize the full consequences of this fact does not invalidate it, and it certainly does not in later times when in fact attachment to particular states grew less and less.

In fact, the people who live in a state, whether they do consciously or reflexively give special allegiance to it, are divided on political issues for the most part. Some issues they might overwhelmingly agree on relative to different views held elsewhere in the nation, but there will always be controversies dividing them as well. In turn some of these divisive issues might be unique to the state, but by and large they will tend to be shared with people in other states. If these commonly divisive issues, where people come down strongly on one side or the other, hold all across the Union, then this means that people on each side of the divide will find political allies outside their state. And even if the controversy is regional (Easterners are not likely to understand how divisive the question of water rights can be in Western states, for instance) still the fault line runs right across state borders, and unites people in big and small states together against their rivals in the same mix of big and small states.

Consider the position of rural people in states whose overall population is centered in big mega-cities--in Illinois, New York state, California. In Presidential elections they tend to be overwhelmed by the city vote, and the same tends to be true in Senatorial and gubernatorial races too. Are not these rural populations natural allies of the citizens of states that are both small and rural? And vice versa of course, there are largely rural states that have a substantial but minority urban population; the city people there may have more in common with highly urbanized states, yet are captive of their rural majorities on a statewide and national level.

Also, political identities shift and fluctuate over time. States that were once considered bastions of reaction become progressive, and states that once pioneered liberalism become reactionary. In the course of one of these transitions a movement to agree to disagree may find more favor than a movement to turn the tables and reverse the monopoly of power and tyranny of slim majorities.

I think it is entirely possible then that residents of "small states," or anyway sufficiently many of them, might find more common ground with the dominant factions of various big states than with their own state neighbors. Given that, a sufficient number of small states may at some political moment or other agree to give up the special rights the Constitution gives them in favor of establishing that elections should go by all the people, and that no votes should be wasted--and it may be their political enemies in their various states agree with them on this point if not others, and a consensus cutting across factional lines that arbitrary regional blocs should be done away with or bypassed in favor of one person, one vote and all sides have a proportional place at the seats of power.
--------------------
DavidT pointed out that in the days of the Constitutional convention, the small states looked to Congress appointing the President as a superior method than any direct power of the people to elect them--and here's a funny thing. If we were to apply proportional assignment of electoral votes, we would more often have years when no candidate gets a decisive majority of EV. This happens a lot in Golfman76's analysis of the outcomes of proportional assignment of EV state by state, and it would happen still more often if EV were assigned proportionally on a nationwide basis. I have an aversion to the idea of the outcomes being decided in Congress, especially in the manner prescribed, with each state getting just one vote, and therefore have been wracking my brains for how to form coalitions or use transferable votes in some form to settle it without going there. But in fact if we made no such provisions, the outcome would be to go to Congress on the one-vote-per state delegation rule, and this is exactly what the small states wanted in 1786!

Thus, I would suggest to small state EV inflation advocates that the power of large state majorities is more than adequately checked by the ability of voters to cast votes for multiple candidates. In fact, all the computations we can do based on OTL elections are invalid for an ATL where proportional assignment of EV is a reality--for people would then vote differently! And we can expect, given the number of times and numbers of voters who voted for a third party candidate who "had no chance"--H. Ross Perot in 1992 being the most spectacular example (short of course, of 1860) but with John Anderson in 1980 and George Wallace in 1968 also having a profound impact (covered up by Electoral College tallies under winner take all rules) that Presidential candidates often have won with less than 50 percent of the vote, we can only expect the number of third party votes to increase under proportional allotment. In effect the popular vote would be nullified more often than not. But of course there would also be the effect of voters in states that shifted the outcomes out of proportion to a candidate's popular support perhaps being themselves dissatisfied with their collective delegation's poor choice, and punishing them--and Congress is elected every two years, so an unpopular choice of President by Congress is liable to see the party that did it punished, the balance tipped, and the next election thrown to a Congress goes the other way. And if this seesaw itself gives rise to dissatisfaction, third party candidates may morph into first or second party ones.
 
Top