Chapter 6: A Firm Hand
Even as Andrew Bonar-Law went to meet with the King on the 31st of July a small battle would take place near Blesington that would have an effect on the development, or rather the reinforcement of existing, strategic plans of both the Irish and British forces over the next few months of the conflict. While this battle would achieved limited notice outside the British Isles, it being eclipsed by the cumulation of the elections in the UK, it did receive a great deal of attention from the military commands on both sides. The battle itself was the natural result of General Macready having stabilizing the situation in Dublin by the 29th and the need to disperse the Irish forces close to his positions as small raids were occurring from this area and positions in Greystones into the city. There was also a desire on the part of his immediate superior the Earl of Cavan to remove the Irish from the town before they could effectively entrench as they appeared to having doing, the specter of trench warfare not being an appealing vista considering the current morale problems, considering Macready's superiority in both artilery and tanks a quick victory would be beneficial to morale after the bloody fighting in Dublin. On the Irish side Blessington occurred because by the start of the battle the development of a conventional military wing to match the associated irregular IRA forces was only in its infancy, in fact Blessington showed that the Army Council 's decision over that past week to seek out former British servicemen as correct, while a central platform of the Mulchahy-Brugha strategy was to avoid battle where possible was all well and good in theory in practice the Army would require a core of these forces to operate in parallel with existing IRA brigade structure to make this strategy work. The forces in Blessington were essentially a guerilla force, though most were in uniform, with limited experience of conventional warfare facing one of finest conventional armies in the world at time with a great deal of experience in attacking much tougher defenses than would be in Blessington. As such the debacle that occurred seems easy to understand in hindsight, though prior to the battle the difficulty of the British seizure of Dublin had likely lulled the Irish to the danger of being deployed so close to Macready's main strength.
As such on the 31st General Macready had mobilized a significant portion of his available mobile strength to dislodge the Irish from their positions around Blessington, the assault itself would very much resemble attacks on German strong points during the latter stages of the Great War. To this end he assembled roughly eight thousand of his infantry, though only three thousand were veterans the rest been recruits, he would also use the bulk of the Mark IV tanks available to him in conjunction with barrage just prior to assault from his concentrated 18pdr batteries. As such the attack was scheduled to begin with such a barrage at 06:30 on morning of the 31st followed by an assault at 07:00, though this was delayed by an hour owing to a confrontation between some civilians and some of recently arrived Royal Ulster Rifles. On the Irish side one of the few saving graces on the day was that Maj-General Daly (O'Malley and 1,500 fighters having redeployed to Cork) seems to become aware of the likelihood of an assault and had opted for more of a in-depth defense than had been originally planned with the majority of his six thousand soldiers being just south of, rather than inside, Blessington. When the artillery barrage began at 07:34 the Irish forward positions were thrown into confusion, only a handful of those present having experience such sustained artillery fire before, as such when the Mark VI's with infantry in close behind came in a generalized rout began back towards Newbridge, by 12:05 the last Irish position had fallen with over 257 killed and 463 injured on the Irish side for only 73 killed and 102 injured on the British side; a further 174 Irish being taken prisoner, primarily from those holding the rearguard. The speed of this collapse surprised even Macready as the methodical nature of the assault served to limited the numbers of prisoners taken but had led to significantly lower causalities than original projected. While a rapid advance was possible at this stage the British forces largely withdrew back towards Dublin and Kingstown (Dun Laoighaire) as it had been discussed previously with the Earl of Cavan leaving only a small garrison in Blessigton itself; and there was no reason to dent the growth in morale by the decisiveness of the victory by exposing his forces to possible ambush in an unprepared advance (and also the cost of holding any advance).
This battle then had an impact on the strategy meetings held over the following few days between the Imperial General Staff and among the newly re-elected Bonar-Law Cabinet; the Beaverbrook press boasting in the papers of “the apparent firm hand of Bonar-Law opposed to the failures of Llyod George”. The agreed view of the majority of the Cabinet and of the Imperial General Staff was that it would take several months to raise sufficient forces to be able to adequately occupy the entirety of Ireland, and that while defeating the Irish forces in the field (as Blessington had proved) would not prove difficult the fact was such a victory would require restoring a British administration to Ireland, and that this occupation itself would prove costly as Dublin was showing. The large part of the administration (both policing and administrative duties) coming out of a limited number of RUC from the North but primarily from the Army. To occupy the entirety of Southern Ireland would require at least 100,000 soldiers in-conjunction with restoring a functioning civil authority to Dublin Castle or the troops requirements would increase significantly owing to these non military duties. As such the strategy agreed upon was to occupy Dublin and clear a security zone in the old Pale plus Northern Ireland which was experience an upsurge in attacks since the Four Courts raid, and for an blockade of Ireland with the aim of economically strangling the Provisional Government; with the goal enforcing a more favorable (to the British Government) revision of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. While there was arguments within the Cabinet for restoring Ireland as an integral part of Britain (Joynson-Hicks and Churchill) it was felt this option should only be adopted if the Irish were not amenable to reason. The international situation not being conductive to this scenario, by the 3rd August the Cabinet had decided to implement this blockade strategy in line with a gradual buildup of forces over the next four to six months if it was required to enforce a solution favorable to the Government upon the Irish; an addendum was included to request support from the other Dominions as this would alleviate some of the cost and manpower of raising troops from Ireland.
To the Irish Cabinet and Army Council in Kilkenny the debacle in Blessington proved (after an initial panic) the need to change the structure of the Army, or more accurately to develop a conventional military in parallel with existing brigade structure. While a policy of avoiding conventional engagements with the British Army where circumstances were unfavorable had been vindicated, the fact of the poor performance of the 2nd Midland's Division and Dublin Division in Blessington indicated for any favourable situation to occur the Army would actually need to be capable of winning a conventional engagement. What would develop from these meeting would be the usage of the vehicle of the existing National Army of the Free State as a professional core of the Irish Republican Army, while the majority of the National Army would also be members of the IRA the command structure of the National Army would operate much as any other conventional military and involve many non-Republicans in its structure. This situation was to persist till the resistance of the National Army was no longer militarily feasible, at which point it was planned for the force to be absorbed into the brigade structure of the IRA, when this would occur was assumed to depend primarily on the British Army's strength and tactics; in fact the Army Council themselves seem to have intended the National Army as only a temporary structure, lasting at most a month or two, and records indicate they were surprised by the British blockade and slow deployment strategy. The distinction between the National Army (or Regulars as they became known) and the rest of brigade structure of the rest of the Irish Republican Army (or Irregulars) has often been assumed to between full-time soldiers and part-time resistance fighters, though this view fails to understand the difference between what the National Army was intended for as opposed to what it became; it was intended as a temporary measure to improve the IRA's combat effectiveness but also primarily as a recruitment tool to recruit men of experience and training that would never countenance joining the IRA itself but could be recruited into standing army, and it would be largely be successful in both these objectives.
To understand what the National Army became during late 1922 and early 1923 one has to look at the events in the early weeks of the conflict. During the early weeks the Free State National Army and the Anti-Treaty IRA brigades were in-effect rather indistinguishable in both armaments and tactics, baring a majority of the Free State soldiers wore uniforms and the Anti-Treaty fighters did not. As such when the Provisional Government began its recruitment drive the National Army (also a reformed Civic Guard) was chosen as the recruitment vehicle, by mid-July the total number in the Regulars stood at around 23,500 with a further 28,000 active members in the Irregulars (though it is claimed the total IRA brigade strenght at around 103,000 only being active at certain points of the conflict), the start of August the numbers in the Regulars had risen to 41,200 (Irregular numbers remaining largely stagnant). In fact the numbers could have been much higher as the primary difficult the Irish would have during the conflict was in armaments; and the competing needs of the Regulars for equipment and the need of the Irregular forces to establish hidden arm's caches for later usage when British forces resumed occupation duty. Because of this the Provisional Government and Army Council would opt to make the nascent Civil Guard an unarmed police force allowing the limited arms to be put to more effective use; the compromise between the various commands being the National Army receiving the standardized weapons such as the Lee Enfields, the Thompson sub-machine guns and the heavy weapons available to Army such the Hotchkiss Machine-gun, the modified armoured vehicles (such as the Lancia's) and surprisingly five Martinsyde F.4 Buzzard's (only four though were armed) the British had supplied prior to the conflict and had escaped to Galway when fighting erupted in Dublin. This would lead to the National Army to gain the distinction of being one first armies to use submachineguns as a primary infantry weapon and and owing to its lack of artillery to adopt a radically different doctrine than other conventional armies in the 1920's. Much of this equipment arriving in limited time frame between the Truce in 1921 and the end of August 1922 when the British Blockade would become difficult to penetrate, though it must be noted the majority of the submachine guns and heavy machine gun ammunition would arrive in late June and July 1922 as the Free State engaged in a desperate search for armaments. This is not to state the existing Irregular brigades did not receive significant support, in fact it can be argued that they received the majority of the small arms available to fledgling state, but this was an eclectic collection ranging personal revolvers and shotguns to several Lewis guns and dynamite; its important to note the Quartermaster Corps of the Irregular's was intended to take over the Regular's Quartermaster Corps when the time came.