D-Day: 1943

[TFSmith121]

It's worth making the point as well for the British et al

The lack of combat experience of the US Army is frequently raised in these conversations. It is a bit of a knot, in that one wants to conduct operations with veteran units, but you cant have veterans without first sending virgins forward.

It's worth making the point as well for the British et al, as well; considering the amount of turnover in any mobilized army, the liklihood that majority of the men who saw action in 1940 would still be with the same formation in 1944 is probably slender, but even with that, the divisions ready for action in 1944 with any combat experience in the ETO/MTO (and where they were, historically) would be:

1st Armoured (Med)
6th Armoured (Med)
7th Armoured (Med; to UK for OVERLORD)
1st Airborne (Med; to UK for MARKET-GARDEN)
1st Infantry (Med)
3rd Infantry (UK - France, 1940)
4th Infantry (Med)
46th Infantry (Med)
50th Infantry (Med; to UK for OVERLORD)
51st Infantry (Med; to UK for OVERLORD)
52nd Infantry (UK - France, 1940, but note this was as a standard infantry division; it had reorganized and trained for mountain warfare from 1942, with some significant detachments/attachments/etc.)
56th Infantry (Med)
78th Infantry (Med)

Can. 1st Infantry (Med)
Can. 2nd Infantry (UK - Dieppe, 1942)
Can. 5th Armoured (Med)

So, of the divisions the British and Canadians actually had in the UK in 1944, a grand total of seven, arguably, had seen combat in 1939-44 as divisions...yet only one of them was actually used as an assault division.

And, to be fair, I'm not certain the 7th Armoured, 50th Infantry, and 51st Infantry (much less the 1st Airborne and Canadian 2nd) performed significantly differently than the Guards and 11th armoured, the 53rd and 59th infantry, or the 6th Airborne and the Canadian 3rd divisions...

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Fair enough on these;

I could live with it.

That's true. However, when you look at the proposed surrender terms, the only one that keeps coming up is the Throne.

How stupid does FDR have to be not to see it? Presuming he's still PotUS; part of the problem here, IMO, is Truman was very new in the job in 4/45, just as Japan starts fishing for an ending... (I'm also of the view Byrnes wanted to use the Bomb, as a lever on the SU, & delayed making the call so he'd have it.)

So either FDR wins & isn't dead when the end comes, or doesn't run in '44 & somebody else has a few months in the job, or (maybe most realistically) loses in '44 (after Time decides to publish pix showing just how ill he was; didn't OTL) with same result: in all, Japan gets spared the Bomb.

Now, what that means for the postwar world is possibly worse: it's been suggested the U.S. willingness to use the Bomb on Japan persuaded Stalin she'd also use it on the SU at need, & so we avoided a nuclear war. How much truth there is in it, IDK--but it bears considering.


I won't claim expertise, here (& haven't read Butow), but from what I have read (not a huge amount), the only sticking point was the Throne, & that the U.S. conceded in the event. How & why it took so long, on both sides, isn't simple; all I'm getting at is, the result is credible. Isn't it?

Fair nuf.

Not General Egotist. I want a tree to fall on him. Not much else will get through his head.

Sorry, he was quoting me, there. (And I would do it, if I didn't picture the panzern having the hell strafed & rocketed out of them...)

Fair enough on these; the thing is, a 1943 invasion of NW Europe is likely to keep the Pacific War on the same (fundamental) timeline, since the drive that actually matters - Central Pacific - could probably have kicked off about the same time as historically.

The other issue in Asia is what happens with the Soviets, especially with a potential win in Europe in 1944; they could actually move faster and farther in 1945 than historically, with even more time to prepare.

China would be an obvious focus for them.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Okay, but that misses the point that a US division that went

Which is why I prefer the "in combat" metric, at first blush.

Okay, but that misses the point that a US division that went overseas was certainly seen as combat ready; whether the CCS and theater commanders chose not to commit it, based on the needs/strategy in a particular theater, is not really material.

God knows a GI in the 101st Airborne in the UK in 1944 was as ready for combat as one in the 82nd Airborne in the UK in 1944...some might argue "more so" even.

Casualties are a whole different criteria, of course; if that's the measure, than the Soviets and Chinese "win" for all that entails.

Not a measure I'd like to win, anyway; the GSP quote about "making some other poor dumb SOB die for his country" would seem to be pertinent.

Best,

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Well, there are some impressive post-Goodwood photographs of upside down Tigers...

Strafing/rocket runs by rarely resulted in this. Carpet bombing by heavy bombers did more damage, but those were friendly-fire prone even when striking static areas. In a environment of maneuver warfare such as is found in a meeting engagement, the Western Allies would be more likely to maul their own formations with carpet bombing then the German's.

Although for inexperienced tank crews, a strafing-rocket run could shake them up badly enough that they would abandon the tank. That was generally a fatal move, because such runs usually conducted in pairs by two separate flights of aircraft and the panicking tank crew would be caught in the open when the second pair of fighter/bombers hit them. Following the Mortaine counterattack, the Allies found a lot of intact-but-abandoned panzer columns with their crews lying torn up nearby.

 

[TFSmith121]

Well, okay, but with all due respect to the PAI Force veterans,

Except if they are in Persia, Iraq, Italian East Africa etc

I believe that you also excluded a number of divisions that are available at your measuring point but which did not eventually get into combat as conventional divisions eg Royal Marines, 9th,42nd,70th Armoured, 61st, 80th Infantry, although I can see your argument for doing so.

Well, okay, but with all due respect to the PAI Force veterans, as undoubtedly combat ready they were for anything necessary along the lines of the threats to local security, there were formations assigned to PAI that went into combat against the Axis (British 56th Division, Polish 3rd and 5th Infantry) and there were those that did not: Indian 1st/31st Armoured and 6th Infantry and Polish 7th Infantry...

Given the need the British (& Commonwealth/Empire/Allies) had for troops by 1943-45, my inference is these later formations functioned largely as organizations to draft replacements from, which could still provide a necessary training and security force role.

The other formations you list above were either broken up by 1943-44 (RM and 9th, since it was converted into the 51st in its second iteration) or were strictly "Home Forces" formations, perfoming a replacement/training/security role in the UK. Again, that's necessary, but it is also not the equivalent of a division that is deployed overseas...

They certainly made deception operations simpler, however.

Best,

 

[Saphroneth]

On the experience issue, I think you can have one or the other. If it's formations, then fair enough; but if it's men, well, the Brits unarguably had more experienced men in 1943 than the US did - which would mean that each division could have a few, though undoubtedly some more than others.
I suppose my point is - Kasserine Pass is an unfair data point to judge the US army by, but at some stage of the war it was the data point.

 

[Aber]

But one source I've read notes:

You should read the recently posted rant on Roundup...

The 'Invasion of France in 1943' lunacy

Nonetheless I have read all sorts of apparently serious suggestions that after North Africa was cleared, or at the very least after Sicily was cleared, an invasion of France should have happened.

Delusional.

Before Italy had surrendered? While the Italian fleet was still threatenting allied shipping. While the Iltalian air force was still theatening allied shipping. While 80 Italian divisions were available to garrison not only italy itself, but the Balkans, and a large part of the Eastern Front!

Before the German army had suffered its great losses of the 1943-44 Russian Winter, which, backed on to the need to replace 80 Italian divisions and garrison the Balkans and fight in Italy itself, halved the re-deployable strength of the German army?

Before Kursk? So the Allied invasion would have arrived neatly in time to face all the powerful new German panzer divisions that had not yet been sent to the eastern front!

Before the Luftwaffe was gutted by being forced up to fight the American daylight bombing campaign over Germany? (Or German industry seriously damaged by both that, and the British night bombing campaign.)

Before the U-boat campaign had been defeated?

While the carrier battles in the Pacific were still in the balance, at a time when the Americans were twice reduced to a single carrier, and had to borrow a British one to make the Pacific fleet viable?

Before the American ‘buildup’ had achieved a fraction of the stregth it needed?

Before enough invasion craft were even available? (In 1944 the May atttack was abandoned and the entire British shipbuildingindustry pulled off finishing new carriers and repairing mercahnt ships to make up the shortfall in landing craft. Marshall finally noted in 1944 that apparently the problem was a shortage of some thing he had never heard of called a Landing Ship Tank!)

While the Indian andn Australian fronts were on the edge and still drawing reinforcements, not able to release them to other theatres?

That is when some lunatics think a second front should have been launched in France.

Brooke’s comment is still the best.

They are right in thinking it will end the war quickly, just not to our advantage.

 

[Dirk_Pitt]

Wow! This thread grew massively!

Maybe a potential PoD could be France fights on? They still lose metropolitan France but retain North Africa.

Between them and the British, they secure Libya by late 1941 early '42. Then a potential Sicily venture in mid-1942.

Is this possible?

 

[TFSmith121]

Experienced at what, however?

On the experience issue, I think you can have one or the other. If it's formations, then fair enough; but if it's men, well, the Brits unarguably had more experienced men in 1943 than the US did - which would mean that each division could have a few, though undoubtedly some more than others.
I suppose my point is - Kasserine Pass is an unfair data point to judge the US army by, but at some stage of the war it was the data point.

Experienced at what, however? Most of the British Army troops in the UK in 1943-44 - outside of those veterans of the Med that had transferred back, notably the 7th Armoured and 50th and 51st infantry divisions - had been defeated in 1940 in Norway and/or France and had spent the past 3+ years on anti-invasion duties or training for the invasion.

Kasserine Pass was in the early winter of 1943; detached elements of one US infantry division and one US armored division, amounting to roughly a brigade group of each, in a forward position with poor leadership at the corps and army level, flanked by an Allied formation with extremely poor equipment and supply, was hit and driven back by what amounted to a reinforced pair of Axis mobile divisions. Not surprisingly, what happened to the US forces was exactly what happened to the British 2nd Armoured Division in March-April, 1941 (Mechili) and 1st Armoured Division (Antelat) in January, 1942. Given that with reinforcements from the rest of the US 1st Armored Division and the 9th Infantry Division's artillery, Ward's command not only held but regained the lost ground in a matter of days, the idea that Kasserine exposed any great truths other than Anderson and Fredendall were equally poor commanders as Neame, Gambier-Perry, et al is a bit much.

By the summer of 1943 (historically), the US had managed extremely complex joint and combined operations in North Africa, the South Pacific, and the North Pacific, and the AUS had beaten the Germans and Italians when it faced them in Tunisia and the Japanese in the Solomons and elsewhere in the Pacific. Considering the lowpoints of the British record in 1942-43 (Malaya-Singapore in 1942, the loss of Gazala and Tobruk in 1942, the Arakan offensive in 1942-43 and the Dodecanese in 1943), I'm not certain Brooke et al had all that much to say...

All the Allied armies had a learning curve; all their formations did as well.

Best,

 

[Redhand]

Experienced at what, however? Most of the British Army troops in the UK in 1943-44 - outside of those veterans of the Med that had transferred back, notably the 7th Armoured and 50th and 51st infantry divisions - had been defeated in 1940 in Norway and/or France and had spent the past 3+ years on anti-invasion duties or training for the invasion.

Kasserine Pass was in the early winter of 1943; detached elements of one US infantry division and one US armored division, amounting to roughly a brigade group of each, in a forward position with poor leadership at the corps and army level, flanked by an Allied formation with extremely poor equipment and supply, was hit and driven back by what amounted to a reinforced pair of Axis mobile divisions. Not surprsingly, what happened to the US forces was exactly what happened to the British 2nd Armoured Division in March-April, 1941 (Mechili) and 1st Armoured Division (Antelat) in January, 1942. Given that with reinforcements from the rest of the 1st Armored Division and the 9th Infantry Division's artillery, Ward's command not only held but regained the lost ground in a matter of days, the idea that Kasserine exposed any great truths other than Anderson and Fredendall were equally poor commanders as Neame, Gambier-Perry, et al is a bit much.

By the summer of 1943 (historically), the US had managed extremely complex joint and combined operations in North Africa, the South Pacific, and the North Pacific, and the AUS had beaten the Germans and Italians when it faced them in Tunisia and the Japanese in the Solomons and elsewhere in the Pacific. Considering the lowpoints of the British record in 1942-43 (Malaya-Singapore in 1942, the loss of Gazala and Tobruk in 1942, the Arakan offensive in 1942-43 and the Dodecanese in 1943), I'm not certain Brooke et al had all that much to say...

All the Allied armies had a learning curve; all their formations did as well.

Best,

Forward elements of the American Army getting pushed back from an exposed part of an advance by highly experience desert forces was not at all as bad as the British performance in Greece or Malaya for that matter. Brooke probably held a fair amount of bias against nonCommonwealth troops, not maliciously, but he might have thought along the lines of "an army that was smaller than Bulgaria's up until recently shouldn't be telling ME how to run a war!"

The truth about the US Army in Europe is that it had extremely good close artillery support and had an edge in squad based infantry combat due to the presence of a standard issue semiautomatic rifle as opposed to bolt actions but suffered from deficiencies in armoured combat doctrine, and in many cases it outperformed its allies in terms of holding isolated pieces with of ground stubbornly but had a tendency to miss opportunities to use maneuver rather than attrition if the unit was not blessed with a really good commander.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
Maybe a potential PoD could be France fights on? They still lose metropolitan France but retain North Africa.

Between them and the British, they secure Libya by late 1941 early '42. Then a potential Sicily venture in mid-1942.

Is this possible?

Yes, tho it is much different from the discussion in this thread. Thus far in this conversation the PoD is focused of US /British decisions between mid 1942 & early 1943. I've seen the France fights question in several other forums & it develops differently from its 1940 PoD.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

You should read the recently posted rant on Roundup...

Where was that one? Link? Generally when people use the term "Roundup" as the label for a 1943 invasion of NW Europe it suggests they are not well read on the subject. Lots of other indicators in that bit of text as well.

 

[TFSmith121]

Sure, but simply having the USA and British simply make the smart play in 1942 seems

Wow! This thread grew massively!

Maybe a potential PoD could be France fights on? They still lose metropolitan France but retain North Africa.

Between them and the British, they secure Libya by late 1941 early '42. Then a potential Sicily venture in mid-1942.

Is this possible?

Sure, but simply having the USA and British simply make the smart play in 1942 is much simpler, and, frankly, more within the realm of the possible. The US and UK had the resources to mount a sucessful invasion of France in 1943, given the correct decisions in 1942.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Well, true, but...

Forward elements of the American Army getting pushed back from an exposed part of an advance by highly experience desert forces was not at all as bad as the British performance in Greece or Malaya for that matter. Brooke probably held a fair amount of bias against nonCommonwealth troops, not maliciously, but he might have thought along the lines of "an army that was smaller than Bulgaria's up until recently shouldn't be telling ME how to run a war!"

The truth about the US Army in Europe is that it had extremely good close artillery support and had an edge in squad based infantry combat due to the presence of a standard issue semiautomatic rifle as opposed to bolt actions but suffered from deficiencies in armoured combat doctrine, and in many cases it outperformed its allies in terms of holding isolated pieces with of ground stubbornly but had a tendency to miss opportunities to use maneuver rather than attrition if the unit was not blessed with a really good commander.

Well, true, but...is your point re maneuver warfare in the second paragraph any different than the French in 1940 or the British/Commonwealth/etc in 1940-43? Or, for that matter, the Germans or Soviets?

Historically, it took the Western Allies all of 11 months from Normandy to VE Day. Once would expect, given rational decisions in 1942, a very strong offensive could have been launched in 1943 and the time required to liberate France and Belgium, pause because of the winter-spring, and then cross the Rhine and envelop the Ruhr in the spring-summer of 1944 would take roughly as long, given the general weakness of the Germans in the West in 1943 vs. 1944, the wider and deeper eastern front in 1943 vs 1944, and the realities the Germans could not abandon the Scandinavian, Italian, and Balkan peninsulas in 1943 any more than they could in 1944...

Best,

 

[Locke01]

Brooke probably held a fair amount of bias against nonCommonwealth troops, not maliciously, but he might have thought along the lines of "an army that was smaller than Bulgaria's up until recently shouldn't be telling ME how to run a war!"

To be fair to Brooke, his criticisms of American military forces were primarily directed at their senior commanders rather than the troops themselves, and to be even more fair to Brooke, he appears to have held most British and Commonwealth officers in equally low regard. It is probably true that he resented anyone telling him how to run a war. Even Montgomery, his personal friend and confidante, was subjected to withering criticism when he suggested a course of action contrary to Brooke's own views (ironically, one such incident occurred when Monty advocated invading France in 1943, and skipping the italian campaign!).

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

.... Even Montgomery, his personal friend and confidante, was subjected to withering criticism when he suggested a course of action contrary to Brooke's own views (ironically, one such incident occurred when Monty advocated invading France in 1943, and skipping the italian campaign!).

I'd heard Monty had stated post war it was a mistake not to have attacked in 1943, but not heard this version. Do you have details for the source? - thanks.

 

[TFSmith121]

This is an interesting point:

To be fair to Brooke, his criticisms of American military forces were primarily directed at their senior commanders rather than the troops themselves, and to be even more fair to Brooke, he appears to have held most British and Commonwealth officers in equally low regard. It is probably true that he resented anyone telling him how to run a war. Even Montgomery, his personal friend and confidante, was subjected to withering criticism when he suggested a course of action contrary to Brooke's own views (ironically, one such incident occurred when Monty advocated invading France in 1943, and skipping the italian campaign!).

This is an interesting point: one of the true measure of a great captain is using the personnel and tools at hand to succeed.

I think George C. Marshall qualifies on that score; I am not sure if Alan Brooke does...

Best,

 

[Dirk_Pitt]

What would happen to Poland if the final front lines ran along the Vistula?

A divided Poland or would the allies have enough political capital to demand a united neutral Poland?

Or would the Soviets be allowed all of Poland?

And as for post war Germany, with the same scenario as above, would the Western Allies go with the Morganthau plan since the Soviets are less of a threat?

 

[TFSmith121]

It would really depend on the situation when a) the

What would happen to Poland if the final front lines ran along the Vistula?

A divided Poland or would the allies have enough political capital to demand a united neutral Poland?

Or would the Soviets be allowed all of Poland?

And as for post war Germany, with the same scenario as above, would the Western Allies go with the Morganthau plan since the Soviets are less of a threat?

It would really depend on the situation when a) the "postwar" occupation zones were first laid out; and b) the situation on the ground on VE Day. Obviously, the decision to create a French zone would probably influence a), as well.

My guess, based just on the historical precdent (in Germany) is there would be a Polish Republic in the west led by the descendents of the London Poles and a Polish People's Republic (or perhaps even a Polish SSR?) led by the descendents of the Lublin Poles.

Another possibility would be a neutral Poland, akin to Austria after the four powers occupation.

As far as Germany goes, I would expect there would be a lot of attention to the cost/benefits of of re-creating something of the mix of independent states (at least to a degree) found in Central Europe before 1860...twice in three decades was a bit much...

Especially if the Soviets do not have a major presence in Central Europe.

Best,

 

[astor88]

Confidence

In a book which I now can't recall the title of, the author tells the story of Gen. Brooke sitting on the beach at Dunkirk bawling his eyes out, a totally broken man. He also refused to ever again to command. Its just my opinion but I don't think Gen. Brooke had any confidence in the british forces facing the German army. Only with numerical superior numbers and total air dominance would he give approval. regards