D-Day: 1943

[ivanotter]

I doubt it is possible to call a Brooke, Monty, Marshal, etc 'stupid'

Brooke's Italian campaign was to draw German forces into Italy where the North-South movements are dramatically more difficult.

He aimed at a 'strategic trap'.

Releasing the pressure on Italy (as Marshall wanted) would have freed up German resources. That could be rather bad for Overlord.

Brooke objected to Southern France exactly for this reason as well. Getting German forces into Southern France (instead of keeping them in Italy) would free such resources for moving to Normandy. Still not a great idea.

The major difference in thnking was that Marshal et al saw Overlord as the start of the German defeat, whereas Brooke saw it as the end (or at least the crowning) step of German defeat.

Ivan

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Given that the main thing which determined Germany's victory or defeat was the Eastern Front, both Marshall and Brooke are quite hubristic in their view: the main thing the date of the Western Allied landing in Western Europe determines is whether Soviet tank treads are cooling in the Oder, the Elbe, or the Rhine.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

... Without American resources going into fighting the Japanese push into the southwest Pacific, that then leaves Australia in the lurch, having lost many soldiers already killed and captured in the Malaya campaign and with most of its forces currently in Egypt or New Guinea, now having to pull forces back from these theatres to try and prevent the Japanese from capturing New Caledonia and Fiji by themselves. Even if you can do this with Aussie boots, their landing craft and a lot of their logistical train will be American made draining resources from DDay 43. And those boots will have to come out of Egypt, which weakens the Eighth Army, which creates a drag on the British buildup to DDay 43.

This does not differentiate between the operations that halted the Japanese in 1942, and the Allied offensive operations in the South Pacific from early 1943 through mid 1944. Two different campaigns, in different years, using mostly two sets of resources. The amphibious lift, both blue water and small craft in 1942 was barely enough for a one division operation. For the offensives unleashed in 1943 that was expanded to better than two corps worth of amphibious lift for the South Pacific. To put it another way, halting the Japanese attack in the South Pacific in 1942 required a battle fleet, not army size amphibious forces. Just four US Army and Marine divisions fought in the critical battles in the Solomon Islands and on New Guinea to October 1942. The rest of the fighting was done by the Australians.

In ground combat forces this was deployed to the PTO through August 1942

TF 6814 South Pacific 1/42 (AmeriCal Div ) Solomons Sept 1942
41 Infantry South Pacific......3/42 Australia to Dec 42 then New Guniea
27 Infantry Pacific 3/42 Hawaii to Oct 1943, then Central Pacific
1 Marine South Pacific 3/42 Fiji to Aug 42, then to Solomons
32 Infantry South Pacific 4/42 New Guinea in Sept 1942
37 Infantry South Pacific 5/42 Fiji to April 1943
2 Marine South Pacific 9/42 Solomons

So, there were just four ground divisions with 90 days or better of combat in the South Pacific in 1942. Two Army and two Marine. by the time the others entered combat the Japanese navy was crippled and the 17th Army at the verge of retreat.

40 Infantry Pacific 8/42 Hawaii to Dec 1943
43 Infantry South Pacific 10/42 New Caledonia to February 1943
25 Infantry South Pacific 11/42 Solomons
24 Infantry Pacific Hawaii to Sept 43 Hollandia April 1944
7 Infantry US to Pacific 4/43 Aleutians 5/43
1 Cavalry US to South Pacific 4/43

The bulk of the remaining Army ground forces sent to the PTO did not see combat until well into 1943, long after any danger to Australia was past.

In the air it was not much different. A half dozen US bomber wings flying out of Australia and New Guinea supplemented a larger number of USN air wings and Army fighter wings that fought in the South Pacific in 1942. Thats all it took to bring the Japanese offensive there to a halt.

The USN was ready to kick off its Central Pacific campaign in October 1943. leaving the South Pacific in the defense would not have endangered anyone, except a few politicians during the ten month interm. The savings in terms of supply and cargo ships would have been significant.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I doubt it is possible to call a Brooke, Monty, Marshal, etc 'stupid'

Brooke's Italian campaign was to draw German forces into Italy where the North-South movements are dramatically more difficult.

He aimed at a 'strategic trap'.

Which the Germans were prepared to abandon. Kesselring repeatedly dodged the weak efforts to make Italy a trap.

Releasing the pressure on Italy (as Marshall wanted) would have freed up German resources. That could be rather bad for Overlord..

There was no Allied pressure on Norway, yet a entire German army and over 300 precious aircraft were kept there. In any case Marshall did not advocate "Releasing the pressure on Italy.." He objected to making the Mediterranean the sole battle front, and having insignificant pressure in the west from the Arctic to Spains border.

Brooke objected to Southern France exactly for this reason as well. Getting German forces into Southern France (instead of keeping them in Italy) would free such resources for moving to Normandy. Still not a great idea..

What German forces 'got' into Southern France when the Allied Army attacked there? A quick look at the German OB for 1944 shows that they were weakning the 19th Army from June, and fled when finally attacked. Nothing of significance was transfered from Italy to south France. Churchill predicted disaster for this campaign. Op Dragoon was opposed by the Brits, and went without their participation, planning, and influence. Yet it turned unto one of the most sucessful Allied operations of the war. Draw your own conclusions.

The major difference in thnking was that Marshal et al saw Overlord as the start of the German defeat, whereas Brooke saw it as the end (or at least the crowning) step of German defeat.

 

[Aber]

Operation PUNISHMENT?

That's actually not true; if you use D Day minus 18 months, then for an invasion set for July, 1943 (HUSKY) all the pre-war US divisions (36 AUS, 2 USMC) would be combat-ready; limit the Pacific deployments to those before June, 1942 (which coincided with 2nd Washington) and that leaves 30 for the ETO, which was GCM's estimate for ROUNDUP; six for the MTO means 24 for SHAEF, and the initial US commitment to OVERLORD was 22.

Army:
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th armored; 1st, 2nd cavalry; 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 40th, 41st, 43rd, 44th, 45th infantry.

Marine Corps:
1st, 2nd divisions

Separate brigades, groups, RCTs, regiments, etc, plus corps and army troops, as necessary.

Obviously, a couple of formations could be expedited; the 82nd Airborne was for HUSKY, and the Americal was formed from existing RCTs; so that bumps the numbers to 25 for SHAEF, 6 for the MTO, and 9 (including 2 USMC) for the Pacific.
t,

The difficulty is getting all those units to Europe. As well as the shipping issue, there is a limit on port capacity in the UK. IIRC from Ruppenthal the US did not manage to transfer more than 2 divisions per month until late in 1944. Therefore an early decision is needed on committing forces to Europe.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The difficulty is getting all those units to Europe. As well as the shipping issue, there is a limit on port capacity in the UK. IIRC from Ruppenthal the US did not manage to transfer more than 2 divisions per month until late in 1944. Therefore an early decision is needed on committing forces to Europe.

Picking through Stauntons text on the US Army ground forces I see the US moved seventeen ground divisions globally in 1943. From October of 1942 through Dec 1943 four Army divisions were sent to the Pacific, one moved from Hawaii to the SP, four from the US to Africa/Italy, three from Italy to the UK, and ten from the US to UK. Aside from the waste of shipping shuffling men from the Med to the UK, while others are passing them on the way to the Med, there is the matter of disbanding the 2d Cav Div to use its men at labor the local population could be paid to do.


43 Infantry South Pacific 10/42 New Calidonia to February 1943
25 Infantry South Pacific 11/42
3 Marine US to South Pacific 1/43
82 Abn US to Africa 1/43
36 Infantry US to Africa 4/43
7 Infantry US to South Pacific 4/43
1 Cavalry US to South Pacific 4/43
24 Infantry Hawaii to South Pacific 5/43
6 Infantry US to South Pacific 5/43
45 Infantry US to Africa 6/43
101 Abn US to UK 9/43
3 Armored US to UK 9/43
2 Infantry US to UK 10/43
28 Infantry US to UK 10/43
6 Cav Gp US to UK 10/43
82 Abn Italy to UK 11/43
1 Infantry Italy to UK 11/43
2 Armored Italy to UK 11/43
8 Infantry US to UK 12/43
4 Armored US to UK 12/43
88 Infantry US to Italy 12/43
4th Armored US to UK 12/43
507 Abn US to UK 12/43
4 Cav Gp US to UK 12/43

By sending the post Torch units to the UK instead of the Mediterranean and continuing the transfer from the Med to the UK sixteen US divisions are available. Three others sent to the PTO in 1943 can be added for a total of 18. There were IIRC four British divisions returned from the Med as well.

Beyond counting ground div HQ there is the matter of the logistics requirements of a entire army group fighting the in the Med. Cutting that in half frees up a fair amount of cargo shipping. There is also a savings in infrastructure built in the UK. A large portion of the cargo sent in 1943 was for sheltering, sustaining, and training the 16 divisions and sundry independant groups and regiments that loitered there from mid 1943 to June 1944. Entering NW Europe a year earlier reduces that requirement, turning it into a combat expendenture vs garrison.

 

[MattII]

The L-L sent to the USSR in 1943 and 1944 was basically excess war production, IE: stuff that the United States didn't need nor conceived that it would need. And quite frankly, having to face more German soldiers has more of an impact then having access to a few extra spare trucks. The bottom line is that an earlier second front accelerates the Soviet advance just as much, if not more, as it does the Western Allies.

Yes, but if the US makes a push for a proper second front in 1943, those resources could easily get vacuumed up in the preparations.

 

[cerebus]

The one thing nobody has mentioned is that the Germans were well aware that no invasion in 1943 was coming. If in spring 1942 the allies start organising for an invasion in summer 1943 then they will notice and they will react.

Just like trying to make sealion work by changing German actions but leaving the British alone, trying 1943 Overlord (or Roundup ) without changing German dispositions or actions is cheating.

Personally I think it was a very high risk gamble, The Americans in 1942/3 might have been willing to risk 25,000 men and equivalent equipment on a 50/50 chance but the British psychologically could not afford to.

 

[TemplarKnight]

The Allies would have to land somewhere the Germans least expected them to land to have any chance.... Hmmm.. where could that be? I know, if they want to pull off a 1943 D-Day they could always land on the Frisian Islands.... . That would throw the German high command for a loop.

 

[brovane]

The Allies would have to land somewhere the Germans least expected them to land to have any chance.... Hmmm.. where could that be? I know, if they want to pull off a 1943 D-Day they could always land on the Frisian Islands.... . That would throw the German high command for a loop.

What about landing in Southern France?

 

[Simreeve]

There was no Allied pressure on Norway,

Deception plans, "leaked" via double agents, hinted at a possible Allied landing there... at least in the run-up to Overlord: I'd have to check about earlier than that.

 

[TFSmith121]

The simplest way to increase the shipping and escort pool in the Atlantic

In practical terms, maybe. As a fact of life, the Brits would never have believed it, since losses continued--& in fact, in about April '43, with the two big convoy battles, they were afraid convoy had failed & were on the verge of giving it up.

It's not all about fact: the perception bears on the issue, too.

I don't disagree with that as a fact, either.

No question there was slack in the system. PTO alone used up double the tonnage ETO did, because there was so much delay in unloading. (Ships routinely swung at anchor for extended periods.) Fix that, or even put a dent in it...

The simplest way to increase the shipping and escort pool in the Atlantic is to limit the North Russia, Persian Corridor, and North Pacific supply operations significantly (to the level of providing only what the Soviets could carry themselves, if necessary);

The second simplest way would be to cancel or limit the counteroffensives waged by the Allies in the Pacific theater in 1942-43, notably cancelling the North Pacific (LANDCRAB and COTTAGE) operations, the 1942 Burma-Arakan offensive, and the South Pacific Theater offensive (i.e., Guadalcanal and the Solomons); concentrating on the Southwest Pacific Theater in 1942-43 (basically, the historical defenses of Papua - Milne Bay and Imita Ridge - followed up by a stronger series of counteroffensives - Buna-Gona and then Lae-Salamaua) and including a series of carrier raids in the Central and South Pacific means that not only are the Japanese continually are caught off guard (thanks to sigint) they also are fighting a land campaign at the longest extent of their sea lanes and well-exposed to Allied air power, all while the US and Australians have stong bases close to the active theater.

This also reduces the need for secure storage space and cargo-handling, which reduces the amount of shipping needed for floating warehouses...and the limits in the Pacific means far less shipping and sea time generally is needed to sustain whatever operations the Allies do mount.

By early in 1943, once the situation in the Southwest Pacific is stable, MacArthur could be relieved by Blamey (which reduces a lot of wrangling and makes New Guinea an all-Australian theater), and sent off to the CBI to deal with Chiang (which would free up Stilwell for the ETO, and save a lot of wrangling in the CBI, as well); the Central Pacific campaign starts on schedule, and the Japanese either lose an attritional fight in Micronesia (cutting off whatever they have left to the south in New Guinea or the Solomons) or fall back to the PI. Either way, the Allies win.

Avoiding misadventures like the Dodecanese won't hurt, either.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Um, no, actually...

Whether the Invasion of France was feasible or not in 43 or whether it was logistically sustainable, this is a global conflict, and there's no way the American public would allow Roosevelt to not direct military resources to the Pacific. The country was directly and dastardly attacked by the Japanese, no one at that time was going to be able to convince Americans to let the "Japs" be while we take care of Hitler first.

Let's also look at this from another angle, remembering this was a global conflict. Without American resources going into fighting the Japanese push into the southwest Pacific, that then leaves Australia in the lurch, having lost many soldiers already killed and captured in the Malaya campaign and with most of its forces currently in Egypt or New Guinea, now having to pull forces back from these theatres to try and prevent the Japanese from capturing New Caledonia and Fiji by themselves. Even if you can do this with Aussie boots, their landing craft and a lot of their logistical train will be American made draining resources from DDay 43. And those boots will have to come out of Egypt, which weakens the Eighth Army, which creates a drag on the British buildup to DDay 43.

First off, after Midway, the Japanese are not in a position to "capture" anything, as Milne Bay makes clear...

The Allies (US, Australia, and New Zealand) had ample resources to defend Australia, New Zealand, the shipping lanes from such east and north to Panama and the US West Coast, as well as the strategic triangle of Alaska-Hawaii-Panama, by the time of the 2nd Washington Conference.

Between the US Pacific Fleet and North, South, and Southwest Pacific forces, the RAN and RNZN, the 5th, 7th, 11th, and nascent 13th air forces, the Fleet Marine Forces (air wings), the USN's Pacific naval air forces, the RAAF and RNZAF in theater, and the combat units already in theater - notably the 1st and 2nd Marine divisions, the 24th, 25th, 27th, 32nd, 37th and 41st infantry divisions (AUS), the 6th and 7th Australian divisions (AIF), the 3rd NZ Division (NZEF), and the various separate brigades, RCTs, regiments, battalions, etc, plus the entire AMF (1st-5th infantry divisions, 1st and 2nd cavalry divisions, plus separate formations and units prewar) for the defense of Australia, and the equivalent in New Zealand...add in (likely) the US 3rd Marine Division and 93rd Division, the Australian 9th Division (AIF), and the NZ 2nd Division (redeployed from the Med) and it's really no contest.

And carrier raids and a sucessful campaign in the Southwest Pacific under a US c-in-c in 1942-43 surely provides for the "now we're on the offensive" needs - if there really are any.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Carl touched on this above, but other points worth mentioning are:

The difficulty is getting all those units to Europe. As well as the shipping issue, there is a limit on port capacity in the UK. IIRC from Ruppenthal the US did not manage to transfer more than 2 divisions per month until late in 1944. Therefore an early decision is needed on committing forces to Europe.

Carl touched on this above, but other points worth mentioning are:

1) Any troopship in point-to-point operations on the Atlantic (NY to UK) is going to make (at least) two roundtrips in the same time it takes the same troopship to make one roundtrip in the Pacific (San Francisco to Port Moresby). Same for any troopship moving from the UK to the Indian Ocean, certainly by the Cape route. The British moved the 2nd, 5th, and 6th/70th infantry divisions from either the UK or Egypt to India in this period, as well as the 5th Indian Division from Egypt; in addition, the 6th, 7th, and 9th Australian divisions were moved from Egypt.

2) The shipping provided to support the Russian on the North Russia, North Pacific, and Persian Corridor including transports (i.e. troopships) and freighters; some percentage - up to ALL - of that could be added to the BOLERO effort in 1942-43;

3) Freighters can be used as troop ships on the North Atlantic; not very comfortable, but doable, because of the length of the passage; not something one could easily do on the Pacific point to point runs.

4) Every combat loader/attack transport/APA/LST crossing the Atlantic can be used as a trooper for BOLERO; not as easy for the same ships on the Pacific runs. The LSTs would be sort of rugged, but it would be doable because of the length of the passage.

5) The build-up of facilities in the UK needed for BOLERO would certainly be assisted by the US engineer combat and construction units freed up by a lesser level of commitment to the Pacific (generally, and North, South, and Southwest Pacific theaters specifically) as well as less of a US commitment of such troops to the CBI, Persian Gulf Service Command, and the Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

Best,

 

[Locke01]

First off, after Midway, the Japanese are not in a position to "capture" anything, as Milne Bay makes clear...

The Allies (US, Australia, and New Zealand) had ample resources to defend Australia, New Zealand, the shipping lanes from such east and north to Panama and the US West Coast, as well as the strategic triangle of Alaska-Hawaii-Panama, by the time of the 2nd Washington Conference.

Between the US Pacific Fleet and North, South, and Southwest Pacific forces, the RAN and RNZN, the 5th, 7th, and nascent 13th air forces, the Fleet Marine Forces (air wings), the USN's Pacific naval air forces, the RAAF and RNZAF in theater, and the combat units already in theater - notably the 1st and 2nd Marine divisions, the 24th, 25th, 27th, 32nd, 37th and 41st infantry divisions (AUS), the 6th and 7th Australian divisions (AIF), the 3rd NZ Division (NZEF), and the various separate brigades, RCTs, regiments, battalions, etc, plus the entire AMF (1st-5th infantry divisions, 1st and 2nd cavalry divisions, plus separate formations and units prewar) for the defense of Australia, and the equivalent in New Zealand...add in (likely) the US 3rd Marine Division and 93rd Division, the Australian 9th Division (AIF), and the NZ 2nd Division (redeployed from the Med) and it's really no contest.

And carrier raids and a sucessful campaign in the Southwest Pacific under a US c-in-c in 1942-43 surely provides for the "now we're on the offensive" needs - if there really are any.

Best,

Wouldn't resorting to such a strategy have some knock-on effects for the long-term course of the Pacific War? I think under this scenario, the Allies would run the risk of delaying the Central Pacific offensive by a year, potentially even delay it into 1945. A delayed Central Pacific offensive means no B-29 bombers in the Marianas in late 44/early 45. and could potentially drag out the war with Japan into 1946. Even assuming the war with Germany wraps up a year earlier (very desirable I grant), the Allies would still need an enormous amount of time to redeploy forces to the Pacific, but they will still have to make up for a lot of lost time. So, I dunno, what would be the lesser of two evils here? I guess that would be postponing the defeat of Japan in accordance with the stated principle of ''Germany first''. Either which you slice it, I think this war will still continue on into 1945.

 

[TFSmith121]

Actually, in spring, 1942, the Allies WERE organizing for

The one thing nobody has mentioned is that the Germans were well aware that no invasion in 1943 was coming. If in spring 1942 the allies start organising for an invasion in summer 1943 then they will notice and they will react.

Just like trying to make sealion work by changing German actions but leaving the British alone, trying 1943 Overlord (or Roundup ) without changing German dispositions or actions is cheating.

Personally I think it was a very high risk gamble, The Americans in 1942/3 might have been willing to risk 25,000 men and equivalent equipment on a 50/50 chance but the British psychologically could not afford to.

Actually, in spring, 1942, the Allies WERE organizing for an invasion in summer, 1943...BOLERO began in the winter of 1941-42, essentially.

That changed after 2nd Washington and the commitment to TORCH, but the Germans were well aware the Allies planned to land in France; they just thought they could react in time. Historically, they did not...

The Germans still have to deal with the realities of the Eastern Front, and I don't see them going to a Fabian strategy in 1942 (not when Stalingrad is where they chose to make their stand) and doubtfully in 1943 (Kursk was the same month as HUSKY).

And, bottom line, whatever they do less in the east to try and cobble together a defense in the west means the Soviets have an easier time than they did historically...two front wars are like that.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

The Central Pacific offensive kicked off in November, 1943, with

Wouldn't resorting to such a strategy have some knock-on effects for the long-term course of the Pacific War? I think under this scenario, the Allies would run the risk of delaying the Central Pacific offensive by a year, potentially even delay it into 1945. A delayed Central Pacific offensive means no B-29 bombers in the Marianas in late 44/early 45. and could potentially drag out the war with Japan into 1946. Even assuming the war with Germany wraps up a year earlier (very desirable I grant), the Allies would still need an enormous amount of time to redeploy forces to the Pacific, but they will still have to make up for a lot of lost time. So, I dunno, what would be the lesser of two evils here? I guess that would be postponing the defeat of Japan in accordance with the stated principle of ''Germany first''. Either which you slice it, I think this war will still continue on into 1945.

The Central Pacific offensive kicked off in November, 1943, with the Gilberts offensive; no reason that would be delayed, since, presumably, 4 months into ROUNDUP, the Allies would be in Paris and Brussells (and, ideally, Antwerp)....

The big difference in avoiding the South Pacific offensives in 1942-43 (WATCHTOWER to CARTWHEEL) means the Pacific Fleet is actually stronger in late 1943 than it was historically, since at least some of the losses sustained in the South Pacific would not have occurred - two fast carriers and a half dozen cruisers, at least...

Given that Germany was the only one of the Axis with the scientific and industrial wherewithal to pose a serious threat to the Allies, then yes, Germany First was the correct strategy.

My expectation is that TORCH in 1942, followed by a ROUNDUP-scaled operation in 1943, a strategic defensive in the Pacific in 1942-43 and the (more or less historical) Central Pacific offensive in 1943-44 leads to VE Day in 1944 and VJ Day in 1945.

Simply my two cents, but the Allies dispersed a lot of combat power all over the world in 1942-43, and there are real questions about the utility of a lot of it...

Best,

 

[Saphroneth]

I think we can also all agree that a shorter war is better for everyone, all round.
This may be really callous of me to say, but - there is a balance and trade-off, here. Which is, if Nazi Germany is defeated soon enough, they have not done the things which make them the embodiment of evil, the things which finally discredited their sick philosophies.
"Fortunately", in terms of that discrediting, the Wannasee conference was in early 1942. So even a 1942 D-Day will still have it happen, while also materially reducing the number of people they actually manage to kill.

 

[Aber]

Carl touched on this above, but other points worth mentioning are:

1) Any troopship in point-to-point operations on the Atlantic (NY to UK) is going to make (at least) two roundtrips in the same time it takes the same troopship to make one roundtrip in the Pacific (San Francisco to Port Moresby). Same for any troopship moving from the UK to the Indian Ocean, certainly by the Cape route. The British moved the 2nd, 5th, and 6th/70th infantry divisions from either the UK or Egypt to India in this period, as well as the 5th Indian Division; in addition, the 6th, 7th, and 9th Australian divisions were moved from Egypt.

2) The shipping provided to support the Russian on the North Russia, North Pacific, and Persian Corridor including transports (i.e. troopships) and freighters; some percentage - up to ALL - of that could be added to the BOLERO effort in 1942-43;

3) Freighters can be used as troop ships on the North Atlantic; not very comfortable, but doable, because of the length of the passage; not something one could easily do on the Pacific point to point runs.

4) Every combat loader/attack transport/APA/LST crossing the Atlantic can be used as a trooper for BOLERO; not as easy for the same ships on the Pacific runs. The LSTs would be sort of rugged, but it would be doable because of the length of the passage.

5) The build-up of facilities in the UK needed for BOLERO would certainly be assisted by the US engineer combat and construction units freed up by a lesser level of commitment to the Pacific (generally, and North, South, and Southwest Pacific theaters specifically) as well as less of a US commitment of such troops to the CBI, Persian Gulf Service Command, and the Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

Best,

Agreed

There is a further issue with US divisions. At January 1942 there were I believe 40 US Army divisions in existence, which will need to be drawn on for cadres to create another 50 over the next 18 months. The more divisions that are deployed overseas, the less trained men that will be available as cadres, and the more divisions that are in combat, the more replacements will be needed. Therefore the total number of divisions that will be available by the end of 1944 will be less, although this will be balanced by lower deployment in the Pacific.

 

[phx1138]

Soviet entry into the Pacific War is inevitable the moment Germany surrenders.

True. The question I have is, how much has the changed ETO situation (presuming ETO after D-Day goes about as OTL, & ends early May '44) butterflied things in PTO? Has MacArthur been halted to give LCs to ETO? Or even delayed? Has this given Nimitz the chance to jump to Saipan sooner? And with ETO over, does this give FDR a chance to offer Japan surrender in mid-'44, when Tojo's gov't falls? (A bit optimistic, granted...)

Whether the Invasion of France was feasible or not in 43 or whether it was logistically sustainable, this is a global conflict, and there's no way the American public would allow Roosevelt to not direct military resources to the Pacific. The country was directly and dastardly attacked by the Japanese, no one at that time was going to be able to convince Americans to let the "Japs" be while we take care of Hitler first.

Let's also look at this from another angle, remembering this was a global conflict. Without American resources going into fighting the Japanese push into the southwest Pacific, that then leaves Australia in the lurch, having lost many soldiers already killed and captured in the Malaya campaign and with most of its forces currently in Egypt or New Guinea, now having to pull forces back from these theatres to try and prevent the Japanese from capturing New Caledonia and Fiji by themselves. Even if you can do this with Aussie boots, their landing craft and a lot of their logistical train will be American made draining resources from DDay 43. And those boots will have to come out of Egypt, which weakens the Eighth Army, which creates a drag on the British buildup to DDay 43.

That is all just utter nonsense. Nobody's talking about "pulling out of Egypt". And the U.S. policy from before the start of the PacWar was "Germany first", & that's what happened OTL.

I doubt it is possible to call a Brooke, Monty, Marshal, etc 'stupid'

I freely call Monty stupid for his inability to pursue, despite his inflated claims. And for his changes to Wavell's proposed reforms, which would have made Eighth Army nearer Heer in performance in '42.

Brooke's Italian campaign was to draw German forces into Italy where the North-South movements are dramatically more difficult.

He aimed at a 'strategic trap'.

Releasing the pressure on Italy (as Marshall wanted) would have freed up German resources. That could be rather bad for Overlord.

That was the theory. The fact was, twice as many Allied troops were enmeshed, plus the enormous waste of shipping to supply them and the Italian civilians.

Don't invade Italy & make the Italians partisans, hostile to the Germans. Force the Germans to feed them & pacifiy them. Raid up & down the coasts of Italy with MGBs, MTBs, & fibos. Use a few hundred men instead of tens of thousands. Save all the shipping for invading France and winning the damn war.

The simplest way to increase the shipping and escort pool in the Atlantic is to limit the North Russia, Persian Corridor, and North Pacific supply operations significantly (to the level of providing only what the Soviets could carry themselves, if necessary);

The second simplest way would be to cancel or limit the counteroffensives waged by the Allies in the Pacific theater in 1942-43, notably cancelling the North Pacific (LANDCRAB and COTTAGE) operations, the 1942 Burma-Arakan offensive, and the South Pacific Theater offensive (i.e., Guadalcanal and the Solomons); concentrating on the Southwest Pacific Theater in 1942-43 (basically, the historical defenses of Papua - Milne Bay and Imita Ridge - followed up by a stronger series of counteroffensives - Buna-Gona and then Lae-Salamaua) and including a series of carrier raids in the Central and South Pacific means that not only are the Japanese continually are caught off guard (thanks to sigint) they also are fighting a land campaign at the longest extent of their sea lanes and well-exposed to Allied air power, all while the US and Australians have stong bases close to the active theater.

This also reduces the need for secure storage space and cargo-handling, which reduces the amount of shipping needed for floating warehouses...and the limits in the Pacific means far less shipping and sea time generally is needed to sustain whatever operations the Allies do mount.

By early in 1943, once the situation in the Southwest Pacific is stable, MacArthur could be relieved by Blamey (which reduces a lot of wrangling and makes New Guinea an all-Australian theater), and sent off to the CBI to deal with Chiang (which would free up Stilwell for the ETO, and save a lot of wrangling in the CBI, as well); the Central Pacific campaign starts on schedule, and the Japanese either lose an attritional fight in Micronesia (cutting off whatever they have left to the south in New Guinea or the Solomons) or fall back to the PI. Either way, the Allies win.

Those are some interesting proposals. I do like MacArthur ending up in CBI, even further away from anything important.

I have my doubts you'd persuade (or overrule) King's desire to counterattack at Guadalcanal, & I'd concede that, given it & Torch were close enough contemporaneous not to matter for a '43 invasion.

I'd cancel NorPac ops entirely; there's nothing but bad weather in the Aleutians, anyhow. (This'd also free up dozens of subs for ops in Home Waters, Yellow Sea, & such, where they'd actually contribute to defeating Japan, instead of sailing around doing nothing--& getting at least one sub sunk.)

Wouldn't resorting to such a strategy have some knock-on effects for the long-term course of the Pacific War? I think under this scenario, the Allies would run the risk of delaying the Central Pacific offensive by a year, potentially even delay it into 1945.

It really doesn't. Nimitz had to wait for the Essexes anyhow. And if you've delayed MacArthur's access to the P.I. (by sending him to Burma, better still), you've shaved at least 8mo off the OTL end of the war: 6 in P.I., & at least one each at Okinawa & Iwo Jima (which were reinforced by troops bound for P.I. that didn't arrive). Not to mention the increased damage to Japan's economy from sub patrols that OTL weren't made (if you cancel the Aleutian jaunt...); even without, the war's shorter.

I'm presuming redeployments from ETO have next to no impact on OTL deployments into PTO for the Jan 1943-June 1944 period.

My expectation is that TORCH in 1942, followed by a ROUNDUP-scaled operation in 1943, a strategic defensive in the Pacific in 1942-43 and the (more or less historical) Central Pacific offensive in 1943-44 leads to VE Day in 1944 and VJ Day in 1945.

I'd propose VJ-Day in '44, too, actually, maybe by December; no later than about Feb '45: Japan's economy was in crisis, & she was starting to look for an out.

Here, there's a question: does FDR run again in '44 TTL? If he doesn't, the new PotUS (unlike FDR) won't be too ill to notice Japan looking for an out (OTL, it took til April '45; TTL, I expect it's sooner), & Magic knew it; somewhere between FDR's death & Truman's take over & Byrnes wanting to use the Bomb to frighten the Sovs, it was ignored...& it wasn't til the Bomb was ready Japan actually surrendered. (I know, she wanted all kinds of ridiculous terms; what was irreducible, & what she got, was to keep the Throne.)