D-Day: 1943

[Redhand]

The Germans would not have a significant reserve in place, as I showed above. The air war would be a massacre for the Luftwaffe and bleed it to death even faster than IOTL. With Kursk cancelled in May/June 1943 the Germans would still suffer significant defeats equivalent to OTL's.

I may have overstated the German War Capacity in 1943 but I think the fact that Army Group Centre is not wiped out by this point means that reinforcements won't all be sent to hold the line in Russia but rather put to use in the west. You're probably right about the air war, I was just saying that the W.Allies had significant obstacles to overcome in 1943 that were easier to deal with in 1944 because of more wartime experience.

This especially correlates towards the use of Paratroopers and amphibious landings. There is a reason that the Tarawa landing was almost a disaster but the Marshall Island landings weren't and that was experience.

 

[TFSmith121]

Actually, ROUNDUP (or an OVERLORD equivalent) was completely possible

Assuming roughly same success as OTL D-Day, what would the Post-War World look like?

Actually, ROUNDUP (or an OVERLORD equivalent) was completely possible in the summer of 1943.

It would have required the commitment made at ARCADIA in December, 1941, to have remained the top priority for the Allies through 2nd Washington, rather than being supplanted by TORCH. Given a commitment by the Americans to BOLERO and the British to ROUNDUP, even TORCH could have been mounted as historically to finish up in the winter of 1942-43, with ROUNDUP to follow in the summer (contemporaneously with the historical HUSKY).

The above would have required remaining on the defensive in the Pacific, but given the reality of how the dual offensives (South Pacific to Southwest Pacific, and the Central Pacific drive) actually went, that would not have been insurmountable; it can be argued that delaying a significant Pacific counteroffensive until the fall of 1943, when the new fast carriers would be available, would have been a better approach than WATCHTOWER and CARTWHEEL, anyway.

Worth remembering is that in the 11 month period between TORCH and BAYTOWN-AVALANCHE, the Allies mounted no less than four major amphibious operations in the European Theater; TORCH amounted to a 5-division assault afloat simultaneously; HUSKY had 8 reinforced divisions afloat simultaneously (directly comparable to OVERLORD; larger, in fact); BAYTOWN had two, and AVALANCHE had four.

It is also worth remembering the the Allies sustained an army group in combat in Tunisia in 1943, and again in Sicily and in Italy, and in theaters that were both much farther from anything approximating the resources of the United Kingdom and much more austere than northwest Europe, particularly northwestn France.

In addition, the available German forces in France were significantly weaker in 1943 than in 1944, and the eastern front was that much farther east, making any attempt to defend on interior lines just that much more difficult.

And the Atlantic, of course, was was won in 1942; the Allies could not have mounted multiple invasions in the Mediterranean in 1942 and 1943 otherwise.

A 1943 invasion was completely practical and would have led - absent any events of ASB levels of unliklihood - to the liberation of France and Belgium in the summer-autumn-winter of 1943; a stop in the winter of 1943-44 along (presumably) the prewar Franco-German border; a spring-summer campiagn in the Rhineland and a crossing of the Rhine and enevelopment of the Ruhr in 1044; and a drive east toward Berlin and Vienna in the summer-autumn of 1944.

I'd guess the Allies could meet the Soviets as far east as the Vistula.

Best,

 

[Aber]

German tank strength in June 1943 was something like this:

26th panzer had 77 tanks, only 14 of which were panzer IVs.
24th panzer had 24 tanks, 4 of which were panzer IVs.
14th panzer had 19 tanks, none of which were IVs.
9th SS had 3 Stugs.
.

Source?

Second Front Now 1943 by Dunn shows 26th Panzer with 59 Pz IV and 49 Pz III in April, and 24th Panzer with 55 tanks on 1st May.

 

[ScrewySqrl]

The path to faster Wallie victory is a bolder, riskier Med strategy.
Instead of always doing the safest thing, and going Tunisia-Sicily-Italy, a faster strategy (much riskier) would be to go straight for Corsica and Sardinia, neutralize Italy through an air offensive, and land in France in the south in 1943.
A safer option would be to still do Torch, but to bypass Sicily and go directly for Corsica and Sardinia. This could considerably acelerate the fall of Italy, and again allow for a landing in the South of France.
Even if the Germans manage to hold a defensive line in the Alps (easy) and somewhere in France (not that hard) being engaged in the West will make maters even more difficult in Russia and further Allied offensives easier.

Of course the Wallies could risk a defeat in one of this operations, but it would be a managable risk, and even if they take one blow, they can always fall back on a more conservative strategy.

The problem was that the British were emphatically against any option that would increse the risk of large casualties, being determined to win the war with US factories and Russian lives.

My wargamed plans are this:

North Africa/Tunisia as OTL, followed by Sicily. Demonstrate a buildup in Sicily to look like you're going for Naples. Meanwhile, grab Sardinia and Corsica with carrier-based air support (and long range planes from Tunisia). USS Ranger and 4-6 Escort carriers should be enough planes - like at torch. Use the US Amphibious Corps and Free French troops cooling their heels in Algeria.

With Corsica and Sardnia, you could land ANYWHERE in Italy, opening easy holes in the German/Italian defenses.

Follow this up with a fast thrust at Tuscany (British 8th Army, US 7th) and the South of France (US 5th Army, Free French Army), and cut off the germans in the south of Italy before they can get north. You won't get through the Alps into Austria very well, But you cut off the 15th Army. Combined with the 230K troops Captured in Tunis, Germany will be seriously hurting for troops.

With the landings in the south of France (which should be able to come close to the OTL push of reaching the Central Massif in a week), a landing in Normandy or Brittany can catch the germans moving to slow the forces in the South of France from behind. Its all a case of 'hit them where they aren't' and taking advantage of the fact that the Germans cannot possibly defend everywhere, so you take advantage of your control of the sea to land where they aren't.

 

[Julian]

Source?

Second Front Now 1943 by Dunn shows 26th Panzer with 59 Pz IV and 49 Pz III in April, and 24th Panzer with 55 tanks on 1st May.

It was posted in a discussion on The Dupy Institute showing a very thorough breakdown of tank strength in June 1943. The source the person cited was pretty reliable, might have been primary. I'll try to find it later, I only saved the numbers.

Some of the difference in strength may be because Dunn counts tanks in repair. I didn't since only a couple Panzer IVs were under repair in June 1943.

 

[Saphroneth]

I'd guess the Allies could meet the Soviets as far east as the Vistula.

Best,

And that would put a completely different Oder on the future of Europe.
(Sorry.)
More seriously, that's a case where it could be genuinely argued that the USA would have been a relatively junior partner. The USA, in this situation, wouldn't have had nearly as many divisions deployed as the UK, though probably about the same fighting and a pretty high portion of the equipment.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

The war ends earlier, but there is no way that the Soviets and Western Allies meet any further East then the Oder. Indeed, in all probability they'll meet more-or-less in the same place as IOTL. The WAllies advance in 1943 will be slower then IOTL as the Germans are able to commit additional force that were historically destroyed in the East or committed to Italy. The Eastern Front will also move faster as Germany is forced to take away even more forces even earlier then IOTL.

So Eastern Europe and most likely Eastern Germany will still wind-up under Soviet domination.

 

[MattII]

What is the plausibility of trying to take Sicily on the bounce in 1942? Probably low, I know, but...

Pretty low I'd say, lack of landing craft, and the fact that the Germans occupy the closest position to Sicily (Tunisia) will really make things difficult.

Alternatively, could enough logistics capacity be freed up for two amphib ops in 1943 by shutting down the Pacific offensives?

Well if they conducted no or only limited actionin Itally proper, they ought to be able to pull something off regarding Sardinia.

This light however take away Kursk, which could raise the chances for stalemate in the east.

Or the invasion is given a couple of months longer, and set to happen during/after Kursk, so the German reserves are already drained.

The war ends earlier, but there is no way that the Soviets and Western Allies meet any further East then the Oder. Indeed, in all probability they'll meet more-or-less in the same place as IOTL. The WAllies advance in 1943 will be slower then IOTL as the Germans are able to commit additional force that were historically destroyed in the East or committed to Italy. The Eastern Front will also move faster as Germany is forced to take away even more forces even earlier then IOTL.

One slight issue here being that if America really needs to they can divert OTL L-L equipment into their own armies, thus speeding up the Western forces while slowing down the eastern ones.

 

[Saphroneth]

One slight issue here being that if America really needs to they can divert OTL L-L equipment into their own armies, thus speeding up the Western forces while slowing down the eastern ones.

True - there's that to consider, which is that with the much-shouted about Second Front, there's less resources diverted to making the Soviets happy in other ways. That means less Bomber Command, less 8th Air Force (for maximum happiness, reduce the bombers but keep the fighters so you can still shred the LW, and chuck all that production capacity into more tanks and more fighters and fighter-bombers), less Lend-Lease to the USSR, and a crapton more Shermans.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

One slight issue here being that if America really needs to they can divert OTL L-L equipment into their own armies, thus speeding up the Western forces while slowing down the eastern ones.

The L-L sent to the USSR in 1943 and 1944 was basically excess war production, IE: stuff that the United States didn't need nor conceived that it would need. And quite frankly, having to face more German soldiers has more of an impact then having access to a few extra spare trucks. The bottom line is that an earlier second front accelerates the Soviet advance just as much, if not more, as it does the Western Allies.

 

[phx1138]

The Western Allies won't ready in 1943, they were but landing craft was needed in North Africa, Italy, and the Pacific.

There was only a shortage because the WAllies decided to land in '44 & actually reduced priority on building them.

The West won't see the Soviet Union as much of a threat, so they won't built up Germany. So Germany stays poorer and may be broken up into serverl countries.

The "break up Germany" idea was a bad one, & Winston would come to his senses. More to the point, the Sovs were a perceived threat, & it's likely Germany gets rebuilt for commercial benefit, if not military.

Stalin will then jump into the Pacific War, hoping to get something.

With ETO finished months sooner, it may well be FDR says, "We don't need you, we got it handled". Which is good for Korea. Not so good for Japan...

Japan is not going to surrender unless at gun point. So the Atomic Bombs will still be used.

Not if the Sovs are in: it was as much their DoW as the Bomb that provoked Japan to surrender.

And maybe China, Korea, and Indo-China say free from communisim.

China won't & Korea won't, if the Sovs are in against Japan; if not, they stay capitalist (or fascist, given the U.S. preferences).

Probably Vietnam goes the same.

The Cold War will be titled much more on our favor.

It's probably a fair bit shorter, too.

1943 would - unfortunately - be a disaster.

We have been piling through this a few times and the conclusion has always been:

- No planning for this. Overlord required an immense amount of planning and allocation. Not done in 1943
- Marshall pushed for it and got shot down time and again by Brooke
- No landing craft
- Too few troops
- no specialised armour
- No harbour
- Germany in a better shape
- no air superiority
- ... and all the other things pointed out before

The result might have been that the invasion would fail and that another Overlord would not be doen before 145/6 - in which instance it could be way too late.

On top of, with a failed Overlord, who says that Germany could not utilise the additional troops in the East?

Sorry - it is not a matter of a leisure-drive to Poland. It might be the horror of Germany actually fighting Stalin to a stalemate.

Ivan

All of which presupposes the WAllies are morons who don't know how to change their priorities to deal with an earlier invasion. If the situation has changed to make it possible, the Allies will change things to make it happen. Why do you presume they're stupid?

The overwhelming material difference is not showing up in 1943 yet. US is not producing at full tilt yet.

American production is at its peak, & would drop in 1944, as the end of the war was in sight.

And if you insist, how about just cancelling the Italian mainland campaign, which was a sewer of wasted manpower, resources, and shipping?

Don't forget the battle of the Atlantic is still raging, only in the second half of 1943 are the U-boats being overcome. So getting the unready US army and equipment across to the UK is going to be problematical.

Uh, no. The U-boats were beaten by June, it's just the Admiralty hadn't quite realized it yet. Cancel the Italian joke, you make it irrelevant. It would have helped if the WAllies had had the wit to just bottle up the PAA, rather than waste the manpower & effort reducing it.

And if FDR had enough nerve to tell MacArthur to go screw, you'd free lots of LCs from the stupid SWPA ops aimed at liberating the P.I. instead of defeating Japan. Of course, that's a very low-probability option, because it risked MacArthur turning around & coming to DC to run for PotUS--& FDR damn well knew it (which is why Dugout Doug was still in Oz).

the Atlantic, of course, was was won in 1942; the Allies could not have mounted multiple invasions in the Mediterranean in 1942 and 1943 otherwise.

That's a bit overstated. I agree with you otherwise.

 

[TFSmith121]

That's actually not true; if you use D Day minus 18 months, then

And that would put a completely different Oder on the future of Europe.
(Sorry.)
More seriously, that's a case where it could be genuinely argued that the USA would have been a relatively junior partner. The USA, in this situation, wouldn't have had nearly as many divisions deployed as the UK, though probably about the same fighting and a pretty high portion of the equipment.

Operation PUNISHMENT?

That's actually not true; if you use D Day minus 18 months, then for an invasion set for July, 1943 (HUSKY) all the pre-war US divisions (36 AUS, 2 USMC) would be combat-ready; limit the Pacific deployments to those before June, 1942 (which coincided with 2nd Washington) and that leaves 30 for the ETO, which was GCM's estimate for ROUNDUP; six for the MTO means 24 for SHAEF, and the initial US commitment to OVERLORD was 22.

Army:
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th armored; 1st, 2nd cavalry; 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 40th, 41st, 43rd, 44th, 45th infantry.

Marine Corps:
1st, 2nd divisions

Separate brigades, groups, RCTs, regiments, etc, plus corps and army troops, as necessary.

Obviously, a couple of formations could be expedited; the 82nd Airborne was for HUSKY, and the Americal was formed from existing RCTs; so that bumps the numbers to 25 for SHAEF, 6 for the MTO, and 9 (including 2 USMC) for the Pacific.

After that, basically 18 months after any of the divisions organized in 1942 were raised, they'd be ready for action - that provides:

6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th armored; Americal, 76th, 77th, 78th, 79th, 80th, 81st infantry; 82nd Airborne; 83rd, 84th, 85th, 86th, 87th, 88th, 90th, 91st, 92nd, 93rd, 94th, 95th, 96th, 98th, 99th, 100th infantry; 101st Airborne; 102nd, 103rd, 104th infantry; 3rd Marine.

Totals are 76, including 75 army (14 armored, 2 airborne, 59 infantry) and three Marine divisions; which, gives the US the equivalent of what historically went to the ETO and at least 10 divisions for the Pacific, which is enough for the Central Pacific offensive.

The British/Canadian/Polish numbers will remain the same as they were historically (although they will be concentrated in one army group, rather than split among two), and depending how quickly the French divisions re-equipped under ANFA can be made ready, there's another eight Allied divisions.

The US force structure in the ETO still would have been about three times the total British/Canadian/Polish. The percentages in terms of air power would be as historical, generally.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

As soon as the Germans switched from the Western Approaches and North Atlantic,

That's a bit overstated. I agree with you otherwise.

As soon as the Germans switched from the Western Approaches and North Atlantic, the Allies had won the Battle of the Atlantic, since the UK was the decisive theater.

As painful as PAUKENSCHLAG and NEULAND were, what both operations really amount to is an admission by the Germans that Britain not only can not be starved out of the war, by abandoning the field they are handing the Allies the ability to mount BOLERO, POINTBLANK, and (ultimately) OVERLORD...

The other element when it comes to the shipping war is how much it took not just to mount the Allies' 1942 offensives, from the Mediterranean to Burma to the Southwest Pacific to the South Pacific to the North Pacific, but also to sustain the active operations, as well as the build-ups in non-active theaters, and the entirely separate maritime logistic operations going on - the North Russia run, Persian Corridor, North Pacific-Siberia, etc. Add in some questionable projects like CANOL, and there was a lot of logistic capabilities that could have been re-purposed in 1942 and 1943 to support the liberation of northwestern Europe.

Best,

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

As you can read here: https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=285956
this has been discussed fairly recently. That previous thread had more than a few point refuting the naysayers, most of whom I suspect did their research on old History Channel shows.

While a 1943 attack into NW Europe would not have been a walkover the Allies missed a opportunity. For whatever reason their strategy took a wrong turn in early 1943, not just in terms of Europe. A lot of complex reasons for those decisions, and really it is difficult to criticize. I doubt many of us could have done any better. Still with hind sight it does look like the wrong call was made.

 

[phx1138]

As soon as the Germans switched from the Western Approaches and North Atlantic, the Allies had won the Battle of the Atlantic, since the UK was the decisive theater.

In practical terms, maybe. As a fact of life, the Brits would never have believed it, since losses continued--& in fact, in about April '43, with the two big convoy battles, they were afraid convoy had failed & were on the verge of giving it up.

It's not all about fact: the perception bears on the issue, too.

by abandoning the field they are handing the Allies the ability to mount BOLERO, POINTBLANK, and (ultimately) OVERLORD...

I don't disagree with that as a fact, either.

The other element when it comes to the shipping war is how much it took not just to mount the Allies' 1942 offensives, from the Mediterranean to Burma to the Southwest Pacific to the South Pacific to the North Pacific, but also to sustain the active operations, as well as the build-ups in non-active theaters, and the entirely separate maritime logistic operations going on - the North Russia run, Persian Corridor, North Pacific-Siberia, etc. Add in some questionable projects like CANOL, and there was a lot of logistic capabilities that could have been re-purposed in 1942 and 1943 to support the liberation of northwestern Europe.

No question there was slack in the system. PTO alone used up double the tonnage ETO did, because there was so much delay in unloading. (Ships routinely swung at anchor for extended periods.) Fix that, or even put a dent in it...

 

[bm79]

Whether the Invasion of France was feasible or not in 43 or whether it was logistically sustainable, this is a global conflict, and there's no way the American public would allow Roosevelt to not direct military resources to the Pacific. The country was directly and dastardly attacked by the Japanese, no one at that time was going to be able to convince Americans to let the "Japs" be while we take care of Hitler first.

Let's also look at this from another angle, remembering this was a global conflict. Without American resources going into fighting the Japanese push into the southwest Pacific, that then leaves Australia in the lurch, having lost many soldiers already killed and captured in the Malaya campaign and with most of its forces currently in Egypt or New Guinea, now having to pull forces back from these theatres to try and prevent the Japanese from capturing New Caledonia and Fiji by themselves. Even if you can do this with Aussie boots, their landing craft and a lot of their logistical train will be American made draining resources from DDay 43. And those boots will have to come out of Egypt, which weakens the Eighth Army, which creates a drag on the British buildup to DDay 43.

 

[Tentrees]

Read ...






Second Front: The Allied Invasion of France, 1942-43

By Alexander M. Grace

For a plausible second front in France.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

With ETO finished months sooner, it may well be FDR says, "We don't need you, we got it handled".

At which point Stalin shrugs his shoulders in disappointment, attacks anyways, and the US just would have to deal with the resulting fait accompli.

Put bluntly: Soviet entry into the Pacific War is inevitable the moment Germany surrenders. Stalin knew that Japan was doomed and that the Red Army would be able to steamroll the Kwantung Army once he had dealt with the Germans. Stalin also knew that IOTL the Americans wanted the USSR in and was willing to milk that for what it was worth.

Truman did consider telling Stalin "no, we don't want your help" only for one of his advisers to point out that the Far Eastern territorial concessions made to the Soviets at Yalta were well within the capability of the Soviet Union to seize regardless of the US's permission.

Second Front: The Allied Invasion of France, 1942-43

By Alexander M. Grace

For a plausible second front in France.

Read it. It completely murders the butterfly effect. The author completely ignores (or ignores) that an early Western Front has dramatic impact on the Eastern Front. Plausible? Hardly.

 

[NoOneFamous]

How long would it take Germany to move significant forces from the Eastern Front?

 

[ObssesedNuker]

How long would it take Germany to move significant forces from the Eastern Front?

Somewhere around a month.