Consequences of Leningrad falling in 1941-42?

[Derek Pullem]

No, not without a fundamental change in how Hitler thought about strategy. At any rate, Fall Blau was a long shot, but it was not impossible. As Robert Citino notes in Death of the Wehrmacht, it is truly astonishing how close the Germans got, all things considered, to reaching most of their objectives. In a campaign involving maneuvers of hundreds of kilometers, the Germans were halted meters short in Stalingrad, and driven back only a few miles from the mouth of the mountain road to Baku.

I guess the point I was making about the chance of success was not reaching the end point of the campaign but actually achieving something when they got there. As others have pointed out the chances of Nazi Germany benefiting from the Caucasus oil was virtually nil. They could have denied the oil to the Soviets without going all the way to Baku but that wasn't the plan - they were going to use handwavium to get the oil back into the panzers on the front line and the aircraft over Germany.

 

[Dan]

I haven't thought so much about the military implications, however I wonder if Leningrad fell by Christmas 1941, politically it would give enough ammunition to, say, Zhukov, to take over as head of STAVKA*?

*Effectively it would require a coup, with the Red Army deposing Stalin and Beria, (business before pleasure, naturally), but I could see the rest of the Politburo just accepting it knowing they were less likely to end up in the Gulag or leaning up against a wall for the rest of their lives.

 

[Aisha Clan-Clan]

The war lasts 6 months to a year longer with the USSR getting slightly less. Say all of Korea in the allied zone, Japan keeping karafuto and possibly either a czechoslovakia split in 1945 instead of 1992 with west-aligned czechia and WarPac slovakia or a "finlandized" schezoslovakia".

Germany punished less, with less territorial losses(austria plus most of weimar-era borders in the east) since the western allies would feel about nuking 4-5 German cities. Sure, you could point to OTL's occupation of japan/territorial losses but uh, this is the 1940s and nuking White people plays slightly differently with say the median us/uk voter back then than nuking Japan woukd.

 

[RedSword12]

I haven't thought so much about the military implications, however I wonder if Leningrad fell by Christmas 1941, politically it would give enough ammunition to, say, Zhukov, to take over as head of STAVKA*?

*Effectively it would require a coup, with the Red Army deposing Stalin and Beria, (business before pleasure, naturally), but I could see the rest of the Politburo just accepting it knowing they were less likely to end up in the Gulag or leaning up against a wall for the rest of their lives.

Zhukov helped organize the initial defense of the city. He could end up being blamed for the defeat.

 

[Catspoke]

Except that if the northern convoys aren't really a factor until late 41, so if somehow Leningrad falls or is cut off in 1941 there won't be much point in sending Lend Lease convoys. That frees up a fair bit of allied shipping and several hundred extra allied tanks, some of which will go to the Far and Middle east, with the rest facing Rommel.
Sure they weren't great tanks, but 200 or more extra against a force that at times was down to about two dozen working tanks only needs to take out two or three extra tanks each battle to leave the Afrika Korps with literally no working tanks. Rommel was good, but that's a big deal, even if he retains his AT guns as it hands the initiative to the allies for at least a while.
While a 2nd Compass is unlikely, it's reasonable to expect alt- Torch to start with the allies further west than OTL and with better ports than OTL, so there may be no Tunisgrad or an earlier one.

Agree, extra shipping, plus arms could produce earlier results in North Africa for the Allies (which could be an Axis advantage).

OR...
With the fall of Leningrad, the Germans send the Ladoga Seibel ferry force to supply North Africa, along with the Tiger Tanks sent to the Leningrad front OTL, along with aircraft not needed attacking Murmansk convoys going to the Med earlier sort of washing that out.

 

[Karelian]

Leningrad frees up 2 Finnish corps. it doesn't change the fact that the Murmansk railroad is hundreds of kilometers away from Finnish railroads-how are the Finns going to supply a drive across the frozen wilderness against a USSR that can ship in troops and supplies by the trainload? The only railroad at the time in Northern Finland ran along the Baltic, the closest railroad to the Murmansk line was Joensuu to Sortavala, still 200 kilometers within from the Soviet border.

tl;dr The Soviets did not have troops and supplies by the trainloads at the time when the Finns historically contemplated, prepared for, and then called off the offensive against Sorokka. The RKKA forces holding the Sorokka (Belomorsk) front were tired and understrength after the summer months. The reasons to cancel the offensive plans were mainly political (Germany had failed to seize Moscow and Japan had brought United States to the war).

Now, the long story:

By February 1942 the Finnish state railways were already supplying the forces in occupied Eastern Karelia with rail connection up to Karhumäki (Medvezhyegorsk). Thus the distance they would need to cover from the nearest railhead was nothing these same forces had not done before in similar terrain and force ratios during the invasion and occupation of Eastern Karelia.

This is how they planned to proceed with the offensive historically:
Mannerheim negotiated about the potential for new operations with A.O.K. Norwegen's new commander-in-chief, General Edvard Dietl, at the beginning of February 1942, after the Germans once again tried to persuade Mannerheim to attack. Dietl promised Luftwaffe support for potential future operations. However, in the opinion of both, there were no opportunities for the operation at the time being because the existing forces in the region were tied down to other tasks. Due to the winter conditions, the German attack towards Kantalahti also had to be abandoned. According to Dietl, the Germans aimed to have enough troops available by the summer to carry out the operation. Mannerheim announced Keitel at the beginning of February that there were no conditions for the operation to reach Sorokka. General Airo, however, was tasked with drawing up a plan of attack.

According to Lieutenant General Wiljo (W.E.) Tuompo, Head of Headquarters Command Staff, at the beginning of February Mannerheim considered the possibility of an offensive against Kotskoma. Previously, he didn't want the operation to be mentioned due political considerations, but after the US had broken diplomatic relations with Finland, he seemed to have reconsidered his options. The potential operation was planned to be carried out during the winter, since such conditions were deemed favourable for Finns. Both General Airo and Tuompo turned out to be supporters of the operation.

At the beginning of March 1942, Airo left a memo according to which the capture and holding of Soroka could not be carried out with the available forces. The Finnish HQ was aware of the appearance of fresh Soviet divisions in the isthmus between Seesjärvi and Äänisjärvi and their activity. According to the memo, the Äänisjärvi – Seesjärvi isthmus was the area through which the Finnish offensive would take place. At the end of the memo, it was stated that the winter operation against Sorokka in spring 1942 would have only a small chance of success by March. On the other hand, the forces in the Rukajärvi direction were deemed able to defeat the opposing lone division and reach Kotskoma. The planning of the operation and the already started preparations continued. Liasons were established with Luftlotte 5 for future ground support operations.

A Finnish intel report prepared on March 10, 1942 estimated the frontline strength of the Soviet defensive positions in the direction of Tunkua and Kotskoma has been as c. 8 300 soldier. In total, it has been estimated that there could be approx. 12,000 Soviet soldiers. The strength of the Finnish planned offensive was c. 27,300 men, in which case the calculated strength ratio would have been about 2.3:1 in favor of the Finns.

The Finnish HQ estimated that the maximum amount of forces that could have been supplied in the region were 44,821 soldiers if two extra divisions, which have not yet been deployed from general reserves, had been added to the aforementioned Finnish forces. In that case, the power ratio would have been about 3.7:1 in favor of the Finns. Historically the Finns were forced to use their new 8th Division to protect the Karhumäki region. The use of the 8th division could also be considered as a reserve for a possible attack from the area of the Maaselä group towards the Viena canal. In OTL the use of the division as a reserve or in attack was unlikely, because pulling it from the front line from the Maaselä isthmus would have hardly been possible. If the 4th Division had been left out of the calculations, the total strength of the Finns would have been 39,589 soldiers, leading to 3.3:1 force ratio.

The Finnish General Staff thought the operation as entirely feasible considering the weak state of the Soviet forces in the area in spring 1942. A fall of Leningrad might prompt Mannerheim to give it a go. Now, as you mentioned, the Soviets would definitively make the the defence of this region a priority, and would allocate forces here. But from where, which forces, and what effects this would have to the rest of the Eastern Front in winter 1942?

 

[Old1812]

The Finnish General Staff thought the operation as entirely feasible considering the weak state of the Soviet forces in the area in spring 1942. A fall of Leningrad might prompt Mannerheim to give it a go. Now, as you mentioned, the Soviets would definitively make the the defence of this region a priority, and would allocate forces here. But from where, which forces, and what effects this would have to the rest of the Eastern Front in winter 1942?

Wouldn't the Soviet counter-offensives still be ongoing at this point?

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

The Finnish General Staff thought the operation as entirely feasible considering the weak state of the Soviet forces in the area in spring 1942. A fall of Leningrad might prompt Mannerheim to give it a go. Now, as you mentioned, the Soviets would definitively make the the defence of this region a priority, and would allocate forces here. But from where, which forces, and what effects this would have to the rest of the Eastern Front in winter 1942?

The Soviets always had extra troops, forces remained on the other borders which could be diverted, after all the Soviets managed to take Iran in a similar situation.

 

[Karelian]

The Soviets always had extra troops, forces remained on the other borders which could be diverted, after all the Soviets managed to take Iran in a similar situation.

They had the manpower available at this time, that is certainly true. Real life is not a Paradox game, though, and transfering forces to the far north from Central Asia would take time. If they were available to begin with, that is. The Soviets were fully expecting a Finnish offensive in OTL, but the force ratios I mentioned were present after they had already reinforced the region with all available units. The Soviets in August 1941 certainly had plenty of forces uncommitted and available to be deployed against Iran. However, these units had either been destroyed, committed to the fighting, or in the process of reorganization by March 1942.

Just handwaving the issue away while Stavka was unable to do so in OTL is just lazy.

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

They had the manpower available at this time, that is certainly true. Real life is not a Paradox game, though, and transfering forces to the far north from Central Asia would take time. If they were available to begin with, that is. The Soviets were fully expecting a Finnish offensive in OTL, but the force ratios I mentioned were present after they had already reinforced the region with all available units. The Soviets in August 1941 certainly had plenty of forces uncommitted and available to be deployed against Iran. However, these units had either been destroyed, committed to the fighting, or in the process of reorganization by March 1942.

Just handwaving the issue away while Stavka was unable to do so in OTL is just lazy.

Lacks of manpower aren't created overnight, the Soviets have plenty of time to redirect troops, also taking Leningrad would take a LOT of manpower, the Soviets have shown in the early stages of Barbarossa that they wouldn't surrender that easily.

 

[Parmenion]

Lacks of manpower aren't created overnight, the Soviets have plenty of time to redirect troops, also taking Leningrad would take a LOT of manpower, the Soviets have shown in the early stages of Barbarossa that they wouldn't surrender that easily.

I mean no disrespect, but why are you contributing here if your only contribution is telling people nothing can be changed and shutting down any discussion?

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

I mean no disrespect, but why are you contributing here if your only contribution is telling people nothing can be changed and shutting down any discussion?

I didn't say there were no changes.

 

[Band in China]

I mean no disrespect, but why are you contributing here if your only contribution is telling people nothing can be changed and shutting down any discussion?

Because people are treating it like a video game where taking a major metropolitan area beyond a river and a swamp somehow results in less Nazi casualties when every other smaller city fought on for months at the minimum. You see phrases like "it frees up men" when the historical account was average attrition rates of around 33% within 5 months of invading the USSR. Because despite receiving good Intel from Sorge the USSR still kept a million men under arms in the Far East and a few divisions in Transbaikal front. You think the communists would trade faraway border concerns for Leningrad the birthplace of the revolution? Nor would they react to it's fall? Short of an insanely risky opposed naval invasion it's hard to see how army group Nord can do better than IOTL constrained by outrunning logistics.

I'm already handwaving the logistics in actually taking the city, but I can't treat it as if the Nazis marched in unopposed while the Soviets sat on their asses.

 

[Karelian]

Lacks of manpower aren't created overnight, the Soviets have plenty of time to redirect troops, also taking Leningrad would take a LOT of manpower, the Soviets have shown in the early stages of Barbarossa that they wouldn't surrender that easily.

The Soviet forces from the 32nd Army and the forces of the Medvezhyegorsk and Maselgskaja Operational Directions were the following: 263rd Division, 66th Separate Infantry Brigade, 61st Separate Infantry Brigade, 367th Division, 289th Division, 65th Separate Marine Brigade and 186th Division.

Out of these the 367th Division (consisting of personel drafted from Siberian military districts with a significant percentage of former prison camp inmates) suffered losses in the battles around Krivin on 6-7 February 1942 and was almost completely destroyed. In winter 1942 the "division" had two battalions made out of younger cohorts of former forced labour convicts. It lacked armoured equipment, machine guns and SMGs, and had only six LMGS per company.

61st Separate Infantry Brigade had three battalions, a total of 900 soldiers and 20 tanks. It was also a formation reinforced by voluntary sailors from the Soviet Navy, but to a lesses degree than the 66th, which was 80% composed of voluntary Soviet naval crewmen. The 65th Separate Marine Brigade had 600 men, again voluntary sailors mostly out of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. The 186th had c. 7 500 - 8 000 soldiers, and it was refitted with 700 men at the end of January. Out of these replacements 500 were recovering soldiers released from military hospitals. Later on the Soviets raised a new infantry division, 73rd, consisting entirely of personnel drafted from the local prison camp population from the Sorokka area. Another later reinforcement was the well-equipped 85th Separate Marine Brigade, with 6 000 soldiers, but again constisting of naval personnel.

As one can see from the summary above, the forces the Soviets were able to send to the region were not exactly A-grade. Meanwhile the fall of Leningrad would have enabled the Finnish Army to reconstitute their best remaining units (which had also suffered severe casualties during the summer and autumn of 1941) and focus them to this operation. Operationally this time period of the year was deemed the most beneficial for offensive operations.

At the end of March, the average air temperature varied between -31 and -5 degrees Celsius. Especially at the turn of March-April the average -15C temperatures made the skiing conditions good. The average amount of snow varied between 55 and 60 cm in forested areas and in open areas the snow cover was found to be 75 cm. At the end of March, the average ground frost was 20 cm on the ground in marshy areas and 35 cm in forests. The average strength of lake ice was 60–65 cm towards the end of March. At the same time the spring skies were typically clear, which would have given both sides good chances to use aerial reconnaissance and air support.

An attack at this time of the year and in these weather conditions would have enabled the Finnish infantry to roam the terrain in a manner that the road-bound Soviet forces would have found hard to counter. The Soviet forces were only now establishing new separate ski brigades, and their infantry divisions as a rule still lacked skis and ski training.

The Soviet command was not blind to this state of affairs, having just suffered a series of losses against ski-equipped Finnish troops around Medvezhyegorsk in December 1941. As the only short-term remedy to this state of affairs, the Soviet forces in the region kept constantly improving their current defensive positions by building new defensive positions around the road areas which they relied on in their supply. The Finnish preparatory operations for the planned Sorokka offensive included a +100-men strong long-range recon patrol raid to the supply center of Petrovski Jam and the surrounding depots on February 1942. The raid (which included war crimes such as the destruction of Soviet field hospital) severely compromised the supply system of the Medvezhyegorsk Operational Group for several months.

So, let's play ball.
Where exactly do the Soviets reinforcements come from in March 1942. They do have reserves, that is a fact. They are also committed to their front-wide winter counteroffensives further south, and are in the middle of building "a second Red Army" after their prewar formations have mostly been destroyed.

 

[Tangles2]

The other interesting ATL I've seen regarding this was in a wargaming scenario in the 1980s which this discussion sparked my recall of. In it the Finno-Soviet war exposed a far poorer performance of the RA due to the purges, resulting in essentially a far more blood thirsty stalemate in the KP, but the flow on was a far greater loss of confidence by Stalin and the politburo to actually be effective in achieving or supporting an aggressive territorial agenda. With an eventual cease fire virtually in place having achieved little or no tangible benefit, this spooked the Soviets from proceeding with the occupation of the Baltic states as IOTL. The net result of this deferment was that German approaches to Finland and the Baltic states, remained free of Soviet forces, and in effect would eventually act as a land route for Germany in Barbarossa. The effect would see the fall of Leningrad and many flow ons. With the securing of the Baltic the logistic issues of the Northern Front were greatly simplified. Army Group North actually reaches Moscow, but gets heavily involved in a Stalingrad type urban attritional battle, never fully securing it and with the Winter offensive of the Siberian divisons actually encircle the Germans forces in the city. (aka 6th army). However both Hoth and Guderain had anticipated such possibility, and with the greater logisticall flexibility to move troops and resources with the possession of Leningrad and are stage a successful breakout reconnecting to the balance of AG North and consolidate around the Baltic states and Leningrad, though at great cost in men and material. It creates an entirely different scope on subsequent Eastern Front operations, with options like the occupation of the Kola peninsula and Murmansk creating a whole ream of changes to the Allies support of Russia (No arctic convoys after 1942, lend lease through Iran changes etc.). The loss of Leningrad entirely reshapes the operational perspectives of both sides to an almost unrecognizable degree, which made it a fascinating study. However, I will say that the only comparatively, (and I emphasize comparatively) straightforward occurrence of this was with the non-occupation of the Baltic states as occurred IRL.

I found it interesting as to balancing all the factors facing those states. It was really a lose/lose situation either Soviet or German occupation. With Finnish support they might have sided with Germany (look at the Lithuanian and Latvian SS divisions and number of Estonians who fought for Finland and a whole slew of other historic facts which reveal how divided the prospects where internally) and then try to assume which way the entire deck of cards is going to fall. For example, if the BS rolling stock and rail lines are intact for German use then so much is simplified in supporting later Eastern Front options. Too complex to call but great to speculate I reckon. But it remains the only scenario I've seen where Leningrad is occupied in simple terms. Either way the flow on will trigger a number of intensely attritional operations in the Northern sectors and around Moscow. Makes much of the rest of the Russian campaign open to individual assessment and evaluation on how you want the new AU to proceed. Either way Possession of Leningrad equates to total control of movement in the Baltic, which simplifies so many Axis logistic issues given the vastness of the theatre.

 

[DrakonFin]

The other interesting ATL I've seen regarding this was in a wargaming scenario in the 1980s which this discussion sparked my recall of. In it the Finno-Soviet war exposed a far poorer performance of the RA due to the purges, resulting in essentially a far more blood thirsty stalemate in the KP, but the flow on was a far greater loss of confidence by Stalin and the politburo to actually be effective in achieving or supporting an aggressive territorial agenda. With an eventual cease fire virtually in place having achieved little or no tangible benefit, this spooked the Soviets from proceeding with the occupation of the Baltic states as IOTL. The net result of this deferment was that German approaches to Finland and the Baltic states, remained free of Soviet forces, and in effect would eventually act as a land route for Germany in Barbarossa. The effect would see the fall of Leningrad and many flow ons. With the securing of the Baltic the logistic issues of the Northern Front were greatly simplified. Army Group North actually reaches Moscow, but gets heavily involved in a Stalingrad type urban attritional battle, never fully securing it and with the Winter offensive of the Siberian divisons actually encircle the Germans forces in the city. (aka 6th army). However both Hoth and Guderain had anticipated such possibility, and with the greater logisticall flexibility to move troops and resources with the possession of Leningrad and are stage a successful breakout reconnecting to the balance of AG North and consolidate around the Baltic states and Leningrad, though at great cost in men and material. It creates an entirely different scope on subsequent Eastern Front operations, with options like the occupation of the Kola peninsula and Murmansk creating a whole ream of changes to the Allies support of Russia (No arctic convoys after 1942, lend lease through Iran changes etc.). The loss of Leningrad entirely reshapes the operational perspectives of both sides to an almost unrecognizable degree, which made it a fascinating study. However, I will say that the only comparatively, (and I emphasize comparatively) straightforward occurrence of this was with the non-occupation of the Baltic states as occurred IRL.

I found it interesting as to balancing all the factors facing those states. It was really a lose/lose situation either Soviet or German occupation. With Finnish support they might have sided with Germany (look at the Lithuanian and Latvian SS divisions and number of Estonians who fought for Finland and a whole slew of other historic facts which reveal how divided the prospects where internally) and then try to assume which way the entire deck of cards is going to fall. For example, if the BS rolling stock and rail lines are intact for German use then so much is simplified in supporting later Eastern Front options. Too complex to call but great to speculate I reckon. But it remains the only scenario I've seen where Leningrad is occupied in simple terms. Either way the flow on will trigger a number of intensely attritional operations in the Northern sectors and around Moscow. Makes much of the rest of the Russian campaign open to individual assessment and evaluation on how you want the new AU to proceed. Either way Possession of Leningrad equates to total control of movement in the Baltic, which simplifies so many Axis logistic issues given the vastness of the theatre.

One important thing to remember is that there already were Soviet troops in the Baltics since late 1939, in bases Moscow forced the Baltics to hand over at the same time they were bullying Finland, too, prior to the Winter War. So, these Red Army bases would necessarily slow down the German invasion somewhat, especially if the Soviets also try to reinforce them in the event, to not allow them to be overwhelmed. This might then take the shape of a Soviet counter-invasion of the Baltics from the east when German forces are attacking from the south.

It is, IMO, a fair question to ask if the Soviets actually got significant benefits from taking over the Baltic states IOTL, as opposed to their losses. The Germans took most the area over in less than three weeks since the beginning of Barbarossa, apart from just northern Estonia, and managed to inflict the Red Army significant losses in that time. The Red Army and the Soviet navy could have saved a lot of resources lost during the withdrawal from the Baltic area by not sending so many assets there in the first place. Look at the Soviet evacuation of Tallinn alone and the huge losses they took due to the minefields in the Gulf of Finland in the late summer of 1941 for reference - over 60 ships and from 10 000 to 16 000 lives lost in a single engagement. Comparatively, they might have held the German forces off for a similar amount of time in the Baltics just by rushing in units into Estonia and maybe northern Latvia as soon as the German invasion started, to support the troops already there in Estonian bases.

As for Baltic soldiers fighting for the Germans, one would need to consider the fact that without a Soviet takeover of the Baltics at first, there would be comparatively less anti-Soviet feelings in the area come 1941, the Germans would not be seen as comparative liberators from Soviet rule as they were understood IOTL, and thus there would be less willingness to join the German forces during the war. We would comparatively see more people trying to flee west instead (taking any boat to Sweden, for example). You'll do well to remember that things were not simple for the people caught in the events, even IOTL many Estonians specifically left for Finland to volunteer for the Finnish military because they didn't want to join the German forces, but rather saw the Finns as their "brothers" (building on prewar cooperation and friendship). The Estonians also pushed for creating a volunteer unit of their own under the Finnish command to be potentially used as the core of a new independent Estonian Army to be created after the war.

 

[Tangles2]

One important thing to remember is that there already were Soviet troops in the Baltics since late 1940, in bases Moscow forced the Baltics to hand over at the same time they were bullying Finland, too, prior to the Winter War. So, these Red Army bases would necessarily slow down the German invasion somewhat, especially if the Soviets also try to reinforce them in the event, to not allow them to be overwhelmed. This might then take the shape of a Soviet counter-invasion of the Baltics from the east when German forces are attacking from the south.

It is, IMO, a fair question to ask if the Soviets actually got significant benefits from taking over the Baltic states IOTL, as opposed to their losses. The Germans took most the area over in less than three weeks since the beginning of Barbarossa, apart from just northern Estonia, and managed to inflict the Red Army significant losses in that time. The Red Army and the Soviet navy could have saved a lot of resources lost during the withdrawal from the Baltic area by not sending so many assets there in the first place. Look at the Soviet evacuation of Tallinn alone and the huge losses they took due to the minefields in the Gulf of Finland in the late summer of 1941 for reference - over 60 ships and from 10 000 to 16 000 lives lost in a single engagement. Comparatively, they might have held the German forces off for a similar amount of time in the Baltics just by rushing in units into Estonia and maybe northern Latvia as soon as the German invasion started, to support the troops already there in Estonian bases.

As for Baltic soldiers fighting for the Germans, one would need to consider the fact that without a Soviet takeover of the Baltics at first, there would be comparatively less anti-Soviet feelings in the area come 1941, the Germans would not be seen as comparative liberators from Soviet rule as they were understood IOTL, and thus there would be less willingness to join the German forces during the war. We would comparatively see more people trying to flee west instead (taking any boat to Sweden, for example). You'll do well to remember that things were not simple for the people caught in the events, even IOTL many Estonians specifically left for Finland to volunteer for the Finnish military because they didn't want to join the German forces, but rather saw the Finns as their "brothers" (building on prewar cooperation and friendship). The Estonians also pushed for creating a volunteer unit of their own under the Finnish command to be potentially used as the core of a new independent Estonian Army to be created after the war.

The Basses were the first stage and post a successful confrontation against Finland. If it was less so and the politburo and stalin lost confidence in the RA to the degree indicated, then this basing facility could quite possibly have been a non-starter.

 

[DrakonFin]

The Basses were the first stage and post a successful confrontation against Finland. If it was less so and the politburo and stalin lost confidence in the RA to the degree indicated, then this basing facility could quite possibly have been a non-starter.

Sorry, I had the wrong year there. Bases in the Baltic states were already occupied by the Soviet military since October 1939, based on the "mutual assistance treaties" Moscow forced on the Baltic states in the fall of 1939. The Soviets for example used airfields in Estonia to bomb Finnish cities during the Winter War.

As these bases predated the Winter War, and were in fact a part of the same effort as trying to conquer Finland, a worse than OTL Soviet showing against the Finns would not pre-empt the Red Army presence in the Baltics.

 

[Tangles2]

Sorry, I had the wrong year there. Bases in the Baltic states were already occupied by the Soviet military since October 1939, based on the "mutual assistance treaties" Moscow forced on the Baltic states in the fall of 1939. The Soviets for example used airfields in Estonia to bomb Finnish cities during the Winter War.

As these bases predated the Winter War, and were in fact a part of the same effort as trying to conquer Finland, a worse than OTL Soviet showing against the Finns would not pre-empt the Red Army presence in the Baltics.

As with all AH the dates can vary. Its how long is a piece of string context. Will the BS be as 'receptive' to the soviet advances and 'mutual aid pacts' if there are signs that all in not well with the RA? Line up your own perspective and see which AU you want to develop.

 

[DrakonFin]

As with all AH the dates can vary. Its how long is a piece of string context. Will the BS be as 'receptive' to the soviet advances and 'mutual aid pacts' if there are signs that all in not well with the RA? Line up your own perspective and see which AU you want to develop.

IMHO, it is not very likely for the Red Army to put up a significantly worse effort in the Winter War than IOTL, the OTL result was very good and lucky for the Finns as it was. Just prior to the Winter War, many people in important positions believed that the Finnish military could not prevail against a committed Soviet attack. Mannerheim himself initially thought that the Finnish army could only put up resistance for a few weeks before being overwhelmed.

In the fall of 1939 IOTL, the USSR bullied the Baltic states into those treaties with the threat of force, concentrating hundreds of thousands of troops on their borders. The Baltic governments knew they wouldn't have the military strength to oppose a Soviet invasion on that scale. Suspicions about the Red Army's capabilities would not likely create a major difference in their thinking.

So, even if we could tweak the timeline so that the Soviet demands are made to the Baltics only after the Winter War, I don't think it would make a big difference to the decisions of the Baltic governments. And even if they still by some miracle found their backbones and declined the Soviet demands, the Red Army would have the strength to overwhelm their defences as they had smaller armies than Finland, and didn't enjoy the defensive strengths the Finns had in the Winter War, like difficult terrain. In the event, Stalin couldn't really afford losing face again by just allowing the Baltic governments decline his demands and simply doing nothing. He would have had to invade, like he did with Finland. The most likely end result would have been the Soviet occupation of the Baltics, roughly on schedule with the OTL.

What you are in fact positing is Stalin agreeing to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Hitler, but then deciding not to take advantage of the secret protocol with regards to the Baltic states to boost the defence of the USSR's western flank. On balance, I think it would be better to suggest a TL where the MR Pact is not agreed to at all. That would make it less likely for Stalin to have the chance to try and add Finland and the Baltic states into his sphere in 1939-41.